Vintson v. StateVintson v. State
Appellant was convicted of the offense of murder in the second degree, and sentenced to serve a term of ten years’ imprisonment in the penitentiary.
The circumstancеs surrounding the offense with which he was charged, and for which he was convicted, were, as the еvidence tends to show, substantially as follows:
There was bad blood between appellаnt and one Jess Clark, the son-in-law of the deceased, Ike Snider, due, it appears, to the fact that Clark claimed to have discovered his wife, in the dead hours of the night, some sevеral weeks prior to the killing of Snider, in company with appellant some distance from Clаrk’s home, in the bushes. And this at a time when Clark’s said wife was supposed to be in bed beside her husband.
Upon thé occasion of the fatal difficulty, appellant, in company with one Skinner, camе along the public road in front of the house occupied by Clark, Snider, and others. Appellant end Skinner were each riding a mule.- -Exactly what happened'as appellant рassed the house occupied by Clark and Snider was- in' serious dispute by the evidence. Suffice it to say that Clark either got or had his pistol and came out into the public road, and engaged with appellant, who had gotten some distance heyond Clark’s house, in a shooting affrаy. When the shooting was ovgr, it was discovered that Ike Snider, who was .seated on the porch.fronting the public road of the house occupied by him and Clark and taking no part in the fight between appellant and Clark, was. shot through the head. He died.
There^was ample evidence -supporting the inference that he died as a result of a-pistol shot by appellant, whilе shooting at Clark. The shooting of Snider,, the deceased, by appellant, occurring as wе have indicated, appellant’s guilt or innocence is to be determined solely on the proposition of whether or not he would have been blameless had the shot which killed Snider killed Clark, for whom it was intended. Lewis v. State, ante, p. 108,
We find a total lack of evidence supporting the theory suggested, or hinted at, by certain questions to witnesses during the trial, that appellant fired directly and intentionally at Snider, the deceased. Appellant pleaded sеlf-defense; that is, that he was attacked by Clark in such a manner as that he was justified in firing at Clark the shot which killed Snider.
There was much testimony, and we will not undertake to discuss - it in detail. That for the state was in direct conflict, in nearly every instance, with that for the appellant. Testimony as to whеther or not appellant was drunk at the time of the fatal shooting was admissible as a part of the res gesta», but whether or not he “fell off a mule,” etc., some hours prior to the oсcasion, and at a place some miles removed from the scene of the 'difficulty wаs not relevant to any issue in the case, and its admission was prejudicial error. Carlisle v. State, ante, p. 255,
Likewise, we think it error for the court to have admitted testimony as to what was said and done by appellant when and after the witness Addie Loftin had reached him some minutes aftеr the fatal shooting was over. Arnold v. State,
The ease was in the main correctly triеd. With- the evidence being more closely confined to the issue of self-defense vel non, а retrial ought to occasion much less difficulty. What we have said above will, we believe, suffiсiently indicate the views of this court to enable the trial judge to rule without confusion. ■■
We find no fault with the admission in' *340 evidenсe of the letter, shown to hear appellant’s signature, which was delivered to Mrs. Snider. It had а direct bearing upon the question of motive vel non.
We do not deem it necessary to pass upon the written charges refused to appellant. While some of them undoubtedly statе correct propositions of applicable law, yet in a number of instances at least the matter contained therein was covered by and included in the trial court’s orаl charge in connection with other written charges given at appellant’s request. We will sаy that written charge O was properly refused by reason of its failing to hypothesize that what аppellant may have said or done was not such as in the nature of things would be known to him to bе “calculated to bring on the difficulty.”
The other refused charges involve no more than elеmentary principles of law, and since the circumstances may not be the same on another trial, what we might say of them now could perhaps be misleading.
■ For the errors pointed out, the judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded.
Reversed and remanded.