264 Mass. 71 | Mass. | 1928
The decree from which the libellant appeals is based upon a finding that he connived at an act of adultery on the part of the libellee, and dismisses the libel which set up the adultery as ground for divorce. The libellant does not deny that the decree is proper if the finding is correct, but contends that neither the evidence nor the law sustains the finding.
This court will not overturn the findings of fact made by the Probate Court in a proceeding for divorce unless they are plainly wrong. Drew v. Drew, 250 Mass. 41, 44. There
We need not recite at length the evidence here presented. What took place immediately upon the discovery of the wife’s transgression, considered in the light of the admitted desires of the libellant, will support the inference which the judge made, that his contribution to the event went beyond the part of spectator to that of manager. The case stands upon the border line of connivance; but we think it is governed by Morrison v. Morrison, Noyes v. Noyes, and Leavitt v. Leavitt, rather than by Robbins v. Robbins and Wilson v. Wilson, supra.
Decree affirmed.