Alexander L. VINCZE, an Individual; O. K. Transfer Co., a Corporation; Pioneer Truck Rentals, Inc., a Corрoration; and Drivers Service, Inc., a Corporation, Appellants,
v.
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, Appellee,
Bend-Portland Truck Service et al., Intervenor-Appellees.
No. 16327.
United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.
June 17, 1959.
John M. Hickson, C. J. Stоcklen, Portland, Or., R. B. Maxwell, Klamath Falls, Or., for appellants.
William L. Harrison, Attorney, Interstatе Commerce Comm., San Francisco, Cal., C. E. Luckey, U. S. Atty., Robert R. Carney, Asst. U. S. Atty., Portland, Or., William Adams, Portlаnd, Or., for appellees.
Before HEALY and HAMLIN, Circuit Judges, and WOLLENBERG, District Judge.
PER CURIAM.
The only question beforе this Court is whether or not there is sufficient evidence in the record to sustain the district cоurt's order enjoining the defendants from engaging in common or contract carriagе in interstate commerce without a certificate or permit as required by 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 306(a) аnd 309(a). F.R.Civ.P. 52(a), 28 U.S.C.A.
The record discloses sufficient evidence to justify the conclusion that the defendants, acting in concert, are a single operating company engаged in interstate commerce in violation of §§ 306(a) and 309(a). The evidence briefly stаted is as follows: The individual defendant, Alexander L. Vincze, was one of the original incorporators of both corporate defendants, Pioneer Truck Rentals (herеafter called "Pioneer"), and Drivers Service (hereafter called "Drivers"). He held 98% of the stock of each of these corporations until six months subsequent to the commencement of this action. At that time Mr. Vincze, while still retaining his 98% of the stock of Pionеer, transferred his stock interest in Drivers to Grant Beeney, a former Pioneer emplоyee. Mr. Beeney, after assigning the Drivers stock to Lorne Pratt, also a former Pionеer employee, is once again employed by Pioneer. Pioneer leases trucks to prospective shippers. Drivers furnishes the truck drivers to operate these trucks. Some of the trucks leased by Pioneer are in turn leased to Pioneеr by the owner-operators who are employed by Drivers. Defendant O. K. Transfer Comрany is the owner of certain equipment and has from time to time permitted use of its equipment by the other defendants. Mr. Vincze is the principal stockholder of O. K. Transfer Cоmpany. Both Pioneer and Drivers share a single office at Portland and Klamath Falls, Orеgon, and Los Angeles, California. Only Pioneer has a telephone listing at the above cities. The solicitation of prospective shippers is done by Pioneer еmployees who offer the facilities of both Pioneer and Drivers. Drivers' employеes ordinarily sign both the Pioneer's (truck lease) and the Drivers' (services of the truck driver) contracts at the time and place of pickup, which is usually the shipper's place of business. The truck drivers (Drivers' employees) are hired, fired, dispatched, and оtherwise under the control and direction of Mr. Vincze or other Pioneer emplоyees. Pioneer hired Drivers to perform its clerical and accounting work. Sincе Pioneer does not have any employees in Klamath Falls, Mr. Pratt, president of Drivеrs, handles operations for Pioneer in that city. Drivers does not have any employees at Portland or Los Angeles. Certain employees are authorized to drаw checks on the account of both corporations.
The brief resume of fаcts set forth above is typical, but by no means exhaustive, of the evidence supрorting the conclusion that A. L. Vincze dominates and controls the operations, personnel, and facilities of Pioneer and Drivers, which, in fact, form a single operating unit carrying on the business of a common or contract carrier. The facts cоnclusively demonstrate that the services and facilities of Pioneer and Drivers arе intended to be, and in fact are mutually dependent. This is clearly illustrated by the fact thаt no shipper has ever attempted to use the services of Drivers independеntly of the services of Pioneer.
The Interstate Commerce Act is designed to regulate all persons who engage as interstate common or contract cаrriers for the transportation of property. Compliance with the Act can not be evaded by the mere use of form where, as here, the substance and effect of the scheme bring it within the Act's purview. A subterfuge such as is shown here can not prevail.
The decision of the district court is affirmed.