Vincent Wallen appeals the District Court’s summary judgment against him in a suit alleging an assault by Bill M. Domm, his former supervisor. The District Court,
Wallen and Domm were both employed at the Veterans Administration Hospital in Hampton, Virginia; Wallen as Chief of Psychology Services and Domm as Chief of Staff. During 1980 and 1981 the two were involved in a continuing dispute over the adequacy with which Wallen was performing his duties. The alleged assault stems from a discussion or argument between the two in Domm’s office on June 10, 1981.
On that occasion, Domm summoned Wallen into his office, indicated a particular chair in which he wished Wallen to sit, and proceeded to criticize his job performance and the actions Wallen had taken in response to previous criticisms. During the ensuing, sometimes heated, discussion, Domm more than once told Wallen, “Buster, you better get back in line.” Domm walked around the room as he talked, assumed a boxer-like, “balanced” stance at times, and at one point stood between Wallen and the door. Wallen testified on deposition that he believed that Domm would not allow him to leave the room and that he feared for his safety. When Wallen asked Domm if he could leave, however, Domm permitted him to go unhindered.
Wallen filed suit in state court, alleging, inter alia, that Domm’s conduct amounted to a common-law assault. 1 This suit was later removed to federal court. Domm filed a motion for summary judgment based on the absolute immunity of federal officials while acting within the outer perimeter of their duties. Wallen appeals the grant of that motion as it pertains to the assault allegation.
Assuming that Domm’s actions amounted to an assault, 2 his discussion with Wallen of his evaluation of Wallen’s job performance, and Wallen’s reaction to that evaluation, falls well within the outer perimeter of his discretionary authority as Wallen’s supervisor. The trial court’s finding to this effect is supported by the record, and we will not disturb it.
Appellant agrees that government officers are absolutely immune from state or common-law tort liability when acting within the outer perimeter of their line of duty, Barr v. Matteo, supra, but he argues that even if the discussion in Domm’s office generally was within Domm’s line of duty, he was not authorized to assault his subordinates. Thus, the allegations in this case, he contends, would place the portion of Domm’s actions that constitute the assault outside the immunity claim. Appellant misconstrues both the rationale and the scope of the immunity in this type situation.
*126 New government officials are authorized to commit torts as a part of their line of duty, but to separate the activity that constitutes the wrong from its surrounding context — an otherwise proper exercise of authority — would effectively emasculate the immunity defense. Once the wrongful acts are excluded from an exercise of authority, only innocuous activity remains to which immunity would be available. Thus, the defense would apply only to conduct for which it is not needed.
The principal purpose of immunity is not to protect government officials from groundless suits, but to free those officials from inhibitions on their decisionmaking occasioned by a fear that their actions or underlying motives will later be second-guessed in a court of law.
See Spalding v. Vilas,
Application of the immunity is not affected by whether the injury was committed in good faith, negligently, or even intentionally. In
Barr
the acting director of the Office of Rent Stabilization, charged with issuing a libelous press release, was permitted an absolute immunity defense, based on a finding that he acted within the outer perimeter of his duties, despite an allegation that he acted with malice.
Barr v. Matteo, supra
at 575,
Since no constitutional violation is involved in this case, the activity complained of falls well within the limits of an absolute immunity claim. The judgment of the District Court, accordingly, is
AFFIRMED.
Notes
. Wallen also made other state-law claims, including injury to reputation and both intentional and negligent infliction of mental distress. None of these claims rise to the level of, nor has Wallen ever alleged, a violation of his federally protected constitutional rights. Only the assault claim is a subject of this appeal.
. Given our disposition of this case, we need not decide if the undisputed facts in the record are sufficient to make out an assault, an issue not raised by the District Court’s opinion. We merely note that “the courts have been reluctant to protect extremely timid individuals from exaggerated fears of contact, and seem to have required quite uniformly that the apprehension [of a harmful or offensive contact] be one which would normally be aroused in the mind of a reasonable person.” Prosser, Law of Torts § 10 at 39.