No. 12195 | Ga. | Jun 25, 1938
Art. 7, sec. 6, pax. 2, of the constitution of this State (Code, § 2-5402), declares: “The General Assembly shall not have power to delegate to any county the right to levy a tax for any purpose, except for educational purposes; to build and repair the public buildings and bridges; to maintain and support prisoners; to pay jurors and coroners, and for litigation, quarantine, roads, and expenses of courts; to support paupers and pay debts heretofore existing; to pay the county police, and to provide for necessaiy sanitation, and for the collection and preservation of records of birth, death, disease, and health.” By an amendment proposed by an act of the General Assembly of 1929 (Ga. L.
“The debt hereafter incurred by any county, municipal corporation or political division of this State, except as in this constitution provided for, shall never exceed seven per centum of the assessed value of all the taxable property therein, and no such county, municipality, or division shall incur any new debt except for a temporary loan or loans, to supply casual deficiencies of revenue, not to exceed one fifth of one per centum of the assessed value of the taxable property therein, without the assent of two thirds of the qualified voters thereof, voting at an election for that purpose to be held as prescribed by law.” Constitution of Georgia, art. 7, sec. 7, par. 1. Code, § 2-5501. Under the foregoing constitutional provision, county officers have no right to contract a debt, except upon being authorized as therein provided, on the ground that anticipated revenues from sources other than taxation can be used to discharge such indebtedness. Tate v. Elberton, 136
The exception in this case is to a judgment refusing to enjoin the county treasurer of Fulton County from paying $6,333.33, based on a contract the material provisions of which are as follows: “Georgia, Fulton County. This agreement entered into this the 9th day of August, 1937, between Dr. Thomas H. Reed of New York, New York, first party, and Atlanta Chamber of Commerce, a corporation of Atlanta, Georgia, the City of Atlanta, a municipal corporation of the State of Georgia, and Fulton County, Georgia, second. parties. Witnesseth: (1) Second parties hereby employ first party to make a complete administrative and financial survey of the City of Atlanta and of Fulton County, which will include the study of the operation of each department of the respective governments; a complete job analysis covering the work and compensation of all employees; an analysis of school costs; a study of the general financial situation; a consideration of assessed valuations and assessments and tax-collection procedure, and a consideration of the constitutional and other legal problems involved. The results of the survey will be embodied in two reports and drafts of the necessary legislation, consisting of: 1. A detailed report in which all the supporting data is set forth to be available for reference. 2. A brief report in form suitable for general distribution, stating the recommendations of the survey. 3. The proposed legislative acts and constitutional amendments necessary to carry out the recommendations. . . (9) Neither of second parties shall be liable for any default on the part of either of the other second parties to carry out any obligation imposed upon it under this agreement, and the liability of each of second parties is expressly limited to six thousand three hundred thirty-three dollars and thirty-three cents ($6,333.33). ,. . (12) This agreement is executed by Fulton County pursuant to resolutions of the Board of Commissioners of Roads and Revenues of Fulton County duly entered upon the minutes of said board.” Held, that this contract is not for a purpose included in those for which the foregoing provisions of the constitution authorize levying a tax. The court erred in refusing an interlocutory injunction. DeVaughn v. Booten, 146 Ga. 836 (92 S.E. 629" court="Ga." date_filed="1917-05-18" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/devaughn-v-booten-5581708?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="5581708">92 S. E. 629); Atlanta Chamber of Commerce v. McRae, 174 Ga. 590 (163 S.E. 701" court="Ga." date_filed="1932-03-05" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/atlanta-chamber-of-commerce-v-mcrae-5588801?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="5588801">163 S. E. 701).
Judgment reversed.