ALONSO v. UNITED STATES
No. 84-5885
C. A. 11th Cir.
1166
VINCENT v. LOUISIANA
No. 83-6865
C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied.
JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL joins, dissenting.
“There is no higher duty of a court, under our constitutional system, than the careful processing and adjudication of petitions for writs of habeas corpus, for it is in such proceedings that a person in custody charges that error, neglect, or evil purpose has resulted in his unlawful confinement and that he is dеprived of his freedom contrary to law.” Harris v. Nelson, 394 U. S. 286, 292 (1969). Because the proceedings in this case have fallen intolerably short of fulfilling this duty, and because this Court must be vigilant in ensuring that lower courts do not improperly cut corners in administering the Great Writ, I respectfully dissent from the Court‘s denial of certiorari.
I
The petitioner Harоld Vincent was convicted in 1974 of armed robbery and second-degree murder by a jury in Vernon Parish, Louisiana. Vincent‘s trial had been delayed for over two years while he underwent evaluation and treatment for schizophrenia. This mental illness was so severe that psychiatrists at the Louisiana State Penitentiary Genеral Hospital had certified that Vincent did not meet the constitutional standard of triability in that he could neither “realiz[e] the nature of the charges against him” nor properly “assist his attorney.” 1 Record 17, 18. After intensive treatment with psychotropic drugs, particularly Thorazine, these psychiatrists notified the trial cоurt that, so long as Vincent remained on his regulated dosage, he would have the mental capacity to proceed with trial. Id., at 18. They emphasized at Vincent‘s pretrial sanity hearing that Vincent was dependent on Thorazine and that it was “almost a sure thing” that he would revert to episodes of psychosis if he stopped taking the medication. Id., at 64; see also id., at 20-23.
According to Vincent‘s subsequent habeas petition, which Vincent prepared with the assistance of an inmate paralegal:
“On July 6, 1974, petitioner was transferred from the Louisiana State Penitentiary to Vernon Parish without any of his
medication. Petitioner immediately inquired with Vernоn Parish officials about his medication, but no one seemed to know anything about it. Consequently, on the morning trial was scheduled to commence, petitioner intentionally cut his leg to get to the hospital to see someone about receiving some Thorozine [sic]. When he appeared in court with his pаnts leg rolled up and a rag wrapped around his lower leg, petitioner‘s mother and sisters became upset and rushed to talk with him. After petitioner told them the reason he cut his leg, they talked with petitioner‘s trial attorneys, William E. Tilley and Chris Smith, III, concerning the likelihood of petitioner receiving some Thorozine [siс]. Petitioner‘s attorneys brought the matter to the attention of the trial court, and after a few preliminary motions were argued, Judge Terrell ordered Vernon Parish officials to bring petitioner to the hospital. “Petitioner was taken to the Leesville General Hospital where his leg was bandaged and he was given a shot. Petitioner explained his condition to the doctor that treated him, but was informed that it was against hospital regulations to prescribe Thorozine [sic] to him. Petitioner was returned to the courthouse for continuation of the proceedings against him. Throughout his trial . . . petitioner was without his prescribed mеdication, Thorozine [sic]. He was convicted as charged and . . . sentenced to a term of life imprisonment.” Id., at 9-10.
Vincent claimed that, as a result of this alleged deprivation of Thorazine, he was “mentally incompetent” during the trial in that he was unable “to maintain his ability to consult with his attorney and understand the proceedings against him.” Id., at 10.
After Vincent filed his federal habeas petition, the District Court ordered the State to submit a response. Ten months passed before the State, prompted by the court‘s threat summarily to grant the petition, see id., at 36, finally filed an answer. The State denied Vincent‘s material allegations and, in the аlternative, asserted that “[a]ssuming the facts to be as alleged by the defendant he knew exactly what he was doing in an attempt to get the medication that he desired” and thereby manifested his competence. Id., at 44-45, 57.
Without holding an evidentiary hearing or otherwise inquiring into the merits of Vincent‘s allegations beyond reviеwing the trial
II
There can be no doubt thаt, if Vincent was in fact deprived of his Thorazine during trial and this deprivation rendered him incompetent to stand trial, he is entitled to have his conviction vacated. “[T]he conviction of an accused person while he is legally incompetent violates due process,” Pate v. Robinson, 383 U. S. 375, 378 (1966), and a petitioner is not barred frоm raising this issue by his failure to have challenged his competence at trial, id., at 384.1 See also Drope v. Missouri, 420 U. S. 162 (1975); Dusky v. United States, 362 U. S. 402 (1960); Bishop v. United States, 350 U. S. 961 (1956). Yet the Court today refuses to disturb the lower courts’ summary dismissal of Vincent‘s petition for failure of proof even though Vincent has never been accorded an opportunity to adduce evidence in support of his allegatiоns. This result is squarely at odds with our precedents, with
Where a habeas petition sets forth “specific and detailed factual assertions” that, if true, would entitle the petitioner to relief, the court must ensure the full development of the relevant facts. Machibroda v. United States, 368 U. S. 487, 496 (1962); see also
Although a well-pleaded habeas petition frequently will require an evidentiary hearing, we have long recognized that federal courts may employ intermediate factfinding procedures in determining whether a full hearing is necessary. See, e. g., Machibroda v. United States, supra, at 495. Thus the Habeas Corpus Rules provide that the court may order limited discovery,
Vincent‘s claims have never even been addressed through a state evidentiary hearing, and the duty of the District Court to give full and fair consideration to them was therefore particularly clear. See, e. g., Townsend v. Sain, supra, at 313-314. None of the justifications proffered by the court or the Stаte can excuse the court‘s summary dismissal of Vincent‘s petition. The court asserted, for example, that there is nothing in the transcript record suggesting that Vincent had acted irrationally or had otherwise been incompetent during trial. 1 Record 65. However, we have consistently rejected the notion that the absence of such evidence in the transcript can alone obviate the need for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of the petitioner‘s mental capacity at trial. See, e. g., Drope v. Missouri, supra, at 179; Pate v. Robinson, supra, at 386 (“While [petitioner‘s] demeanor at trial might be relevant to the ultimate decision as to his sanity, it cannot be reliеd upon to dispense with a hearing on that very issue“). Similarly, the court emphasized that Vincent‘s attorneys had failed to raise the issue of his possible incompetence at trial. 1 Record 64. Again, however, while this failure might well be evidence indicating that Vincent was not incompetent, it could just as well reflect his attorneys’ unfamiliarity with the gravity of the situation or the ineffectiveness of their assistance; the ultimate truth cannot be determined in the absence of further inquiry.
The heart of the court‘s summary rejection of Vincent‘s petition appears to be that there is “nothing in the trial transcript” proving that Vincent was without his Thorazine during trial, mutilated himself in an attempt to obtain Thorazine, or would have reverted to his former incompetence if in fact he really were deprived of Thorazine. Ibid. Yet the alleged incidents occurred before the trial actually began, and the absence of supporting evidence in the transcriрt therefore obviously does not disprove Vincent‘s claim. Indeed, one of the fundamental purposes of federal habeas factfinding is to determine the truth of “purported occurrences outside the courtroom and upon which the record could, therefore, cast no real light.” Machibroda v. United States, supra, at 494-495. See also Hawk v. Olson, 326 U. S. 271, 274 (1945). In the proрer exercise of its responsibilities under the Habeas Corpus Rules, the District Court easily could have sought independent verification of
The District Court emphasized that, under pertinent Fifth Circuit precedent, a habeas petitioner alleging that he was incompetent to stand trial must demonstrate facts that “‘positively, unequivocally, and clearly generate the real, substantial, and legitimate doubt‘” as to his mental capacity to assist in his defense. 1 Record 65, quoting Bruce v. Estelle, 483 F. 2d 1031, 1043 (CA5 1973). Although this standard may be perfectly appropriate, § 2254 and its attendant Rules forbid the invocation of the standard before a petitioner has been given the opportunity to present his supporting evidence.5 Where, as here, there is undis-
I dissent.
SWEAT ET AL. v. ARKANSAS
No. 84-49
Ct. App. Ark.
Certiorari denied.
JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL joins, dissenting.
After the State of Arkansas had initiated formal criminal proceedings against the petitioners Russell and Richard (“Bud“) Sweat, a state undercover agent contacted the Sweats and, in a series of telephone conversations and face-to-face meetings, deliberatеly elicited incriminating statements from them. Because the Sweats’ right to counsel had accrued when formal criminal proceedings were begun, the prosecution‘s introduction at trial of these subsequent statements clearly violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. See, e. g., United States v. Henry, 447
Notes
“1. Thorazine not being sent with Vincent from Angola. Verification: Prison Records.
“2. Vincent cut his leg to get to hospital to request thorazine. Verification: Leesville General Hospital records; Police Jury payment records; William E. Tilley, Chris Smith, III, Della Vincent, Brenda Carlin.
“3. Vincent made requests of jail officials, his attorneys and family for thorazine. Verification: Vernon Parish police officers, William E. Tilley, Chris Smith, III., Della Vincent, Brenda Carlin. . . .” Pet. for Cert. 7.