Vincent v. City of New Haven

commissioner referred to the as an outbuilding “iconic figure,” another expressed commissioner a “feel[ing] that the is an [outbuilding important characteristic to landscape Southport historic village”; (emphasis and another noted added); that it is characteristic of “what we like” about the view from the water, and observed the “aura of charm” that it lends to the water- front. (Emphasis We added.) conclude that the commis- sion’s denial was based on preferences aesthetic rather than on an evidence based determination of the impact proposed that the changes would have on the historical aspects Southport Harbor area of Southport Historic District. See General Statutes 7-147f The (b). plaintiffs commission’s denial of the application, there- fore, amounted to an arbitrary unreasonable and exer- authority cise of its and constituted an abuse of its discretion.

The commission’s final claim appeal on is that the improperly trial court plaintiffs concluded that revised application met all of the commission’s con- cerns regarding “massing” proposed struc- ture. Because we have concluded that the trial court correctly limited its review of the record to the commis- sion’s plaintiffs stated reason for denying revised application, we need not address this issue.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion justices the other concurred. MARTHA VINCENT v. CITY OF NEW HAVEN ET AL.

(SC 17661) Katz, Borden, Palmer, Zarella, Vertefeuille and Js.* * justices listing seniority reflects their status on this court as of argument. the date of oral officially Argued March November released 200 6 M. Dodge, Jason appellants (defendants). Weaver, A.

Thomas appellee (plaintiff). for the Nathan Julian filed brief for Connecti- Shafner Trial Lawyers cut Association amicus curiae.

Opinion J. The sole issue raised this workers’ PALMER, depen is whether the compensation appeal who, prior employee’s death, dent of an coverage, was entitled to health insurance also is enti coverage following employ tled to health insurance city defendant, ee’s death. The named of New Haven plaintiff, Vincent, denied the Martha (city),1 husband, after her Edwin Vincent injury died of a work-related to his heart. (decedent), city’s contested the denial of coverage, that, because she had been entitled to and claiming city’s at the receiving coverage was expense prior pursuant the decedent’s death to Gen to eral she also was (Rev. 1989) 31-284b,2 Statutes coverage entitled to such after the decedent’s death. compensation The workers’ commissioner for the third (commissioner) agreed plaintiff that, district with the under General Statutes 7-433c3 and (Rev. 1989) §§ city’s Management Agency, Interlocal Risk heart and Connecticut hypertension administrator, simplicity, also is a defendant. In the interest of only city opinion. throughout we refer this provides part: (Rev. 1989) “(a) General Statutes in relevant maintain, nearly possible, employees In order to as as the income of who any employment-related injuries, provides suffer who acci any employee coverage dent and health insurance or life insurance or hourly weekly payments regular makes or contributions at the or rate for employees employee provide full-time welfare fund . . . shall such employee equivalent payments or welfare fund or contri employee eligible receiving butions while the to receive or is workers’ compensation payments pursuant chapter, to this or while the provision receiving wages payments a sick leave for time lost due injury. employment-related . . .” to an Hereinafter, all references to 31-284b are to the 1989 revision unless provided. otherwise part: 7-433c in relevant “Not any chapter any withstanding provision general statute, 568 or other charter, special contrary, act or ordinance to the in the event a uniformed paid municipal department paid regular member of a fire or a a member of successfully municipal police department passed physical who a examina entry service, any tion on such which examination failed to reveal into hypertension disease, duty duty evidence of or heart suffers either off or on her with city required was 31-306,4 the hypertension by heart any impairment or caused condition or partial temporary permanent, or total or resulting his or his in death disease may be, his disability, dependents, shall receive from as the case he or his municipal employer in the same amount and medical care provided chapter or 568 if such death manner as that and the same by personal injury in the disability of and a which arose out caused was duty employment within in line of and his and was suffered course of employment, municipal scope state retirement from the or of his may covered, dependents, system he his as case under which he is or be, be which would retirement or survivor benefits shall receive same by disability personal system paid a if such or was caused under said death employment, injury was of his which arose out of and in the course employment. duty scope If line and within the of his suffered was, passage physical of his at the time of such examination successful proof employment, employment, no or a condition for such as required as in the maintenance of such shall be evidence record examination municipal or state retirement of a under this section or under such claim any systems. provided be in lieu of other The benefits this section shall policeman dependents fireman his be entitled benefits which such or or municipal employer provisions chapter 568 to receive from his under the covered, municipal system he is or the or state retirement under which provided by section, impairment except as as a condition or result by hypertension resulting in his or of health caused or heart disease death section, temporary permanent, partial disability. his or As used in this total ‘municipal employer’ meaning and the term shall have the same shall 7-467.” defined said term is defined section Hereinafter, all references to 7-433c are the 1989 revision. 4 part: “(b) in to relevant resulting Compensation paid shall on account death from accident be of occupational arising employment in from an out of and the course of or as disease follows: “(1) paid There be sum of dollars for burial shall the four thousand expenses. wholly partially dependent upon If or the deceased there no one paid employee, expenses the burial of four thousand dollars shall be to the responsibility expenses. person paying who assumes the of the funeral dependent upon “(2) wholly at time To those the deceased the weekly per injury, compensation equal sixty-six of his a to and two-thirds injury weekly average earnings cent of at the time the deceased weekly set in but in no more than the maximum benefit rate forth case twenty injury year the in the or less than section 31-309for which occurred disease, injury weekly. occupational time dollars In the case of an partial incapacity such to work as a result of shall be date total compensation dependent (A) weekly entitled disease. rate each compen- arising from a under section as a result of death receive benefits annually injury adjusted occurring 1,1977, be sable on or after October shall 782

same to which been she had .5 entitled prior the decedent’s death The workers’ compensation review board com (board) affirmed the decision, city missioner’s and the appealed.6 We con clude that the is not entitled to 31-306, and, therefore, benefits under reverse the decision of the board. procedural history

The relevant facts and are undis- puted. employed by The decedent was city as a On police officer. October suf- 1990, the decedent fered an injury his heart7 and claim filed a for benefits city accepted and, 7-433c. The the claim provided following first, subsequent as as of herein October and each first, cost-of-living adjustment October such with a weekly compensation irjury in his rate as determined as of date of the weekly compensation under section If the 31-309. maximum deter- rate as provisions 31-309, any mined under the be section effective as of irjury, following greater October first the date of than the maximum weekly compensation prevailing injury, weekly rate at the time of com- pensation irjured employee rate which the was at the entitled receive by injury time shall be increased dollar amount of the increase weekly provisions in the maximum rate irjury section 31-309 from the date of to such October first. Such cost-of- living paid by be increases shall without order or award acjustments apply payment from the commissioner. Such shall to each such succeeding period commencing made the next twelve-month with succeeding injury. October first next the date of “(3) surviving spouse presumptive dependent, If compensa- sole is the paid remarriage shall until tion death or if should .” such occur. . . Hereinafter, all references to 31-306 are to the 1989 revision. plaintiffs right We note that the 7- § survivor’s benefits arises under 433c, commonly Hypertension Act, known as the Heart and but the benefits upon which became entitled the decedent’s death are set Lyme, n.9, Genesky forth in See 31-306. East (2005) (“[a]lthough A.2d an award of not a benefits under 7-433c is compensation award, Compensation workers’ the Workers’ Act is used procedural avenue the administration of 7-433c”[inter quotation omitted]). nal city appealed Appellate The from the decision of the to the Court board pursuant 31-301b, appeal § to General Statutes and we transferred the pursuant (c) § this court to General Statutes 51-199 and Practice 65-1. § Book injury The not record does reveal the nature of the decedent’s to his heart. 31-284b, pro- requirements with the accordance health plaintiff group with the decedent vided coverage. insurance as a result 3, the decedent died September 1991,

On sole injury. plaintiff, The the decedent’s of his heart city with agreement an dependent, entered into claim city accepted plaintiffs pursuant which how- city, The for survivor’s benefits under 31-306. liability contested health insurance ever, continuing claiming that, plain language coverage, provide 31-306, of a to the coverage surviving by that he was bound employee. Concluding deceased prior precedent board; Weymouth of the see v. Police 3, No. CRB-1-02-7 Dept., (April 2003) (holding applies dependents of deceased 31-306 v. Enfield, Sansone CRB-01-98- employees); No. ruled 18, 1999) (same); commissioner (November city plaintiff. appealed in favor of the from board, of the commissioner which decision ruling. affirmed the commissioner’s board, city appeal On from decision obligation its maintains that terminated with plainly and

upon the decedent’s death because a surviving dependent’s limits unambiguously expenses weekly compensation calculated to burial percentage employee’s earnings. as a deceased city. agree We with the preliminarily

We note issue raised in appeal, namely, whether the is entitled to con- tinued health insurance 31-306 follow- coverage under decedent, the death of the one of ing “is aspects . . . Because the relevant of this construction. subjected judicial have neither previous statute been scrutiny interpretation board, nor to a time-tested 784 special

we afford no deference to the conclusion of the board.8 . . . Instead, we exercise plenary review apply we otherwise questions to such of law. . . . [that] “When construing statute, objec- fundamental [o]ur tive is to ascertain and give apparent effect to the intent ... legislature. words, In other we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, of statutory language applied to the facts of case, [the] question of including whether the language actually 8 repeatedly agency’s This interpre court has observed that an reasonable only tation of an statute is entitled to deference when that interpretation subjected judicial agency interpreta has been review or the See, e.g.,Longley tion is both Employees reasonable and time-tested. v. State Commission, 149, 163-66, (2007). Retirement 284 Conn. 931 A.2d 890 It is undisputed dependent surviving that whether 31-306entitles a to continued coverage previously subject health insurance is an issue that has not been the judicial Although that, of review. it is true since its decision in v. Sansone Enfield, supra, 3885, interpreted requiring No. the board has § 31-306 as an continued employee, of a deceased Sansone was not decided until 1999. satisfy requirement according To the time-tested of the rule deference to agency’s interpretation statute, interpretation formally of a must applied long period have been articulated and “over a of time . . . .” State Society Podiatry, 709, 719, Medical v. Board Examiners in 208 Conn. (1988); 546 Municipal Employees A.2d 830 see also Hartford Hartford Assn., 251, 262, (2002) (deference 259 Conn. agency’s 788 A.2d 60 accorded interpretation only agency reasonable of statute when has followed that interpretation period time”). “for an extended Because Sansone is a relatively decision, say interpretation recent we cannot that the board’s sufficiently long-standing judicial deference, § 31-306 especially to warrant applied interpretation in only view of the fact that the board has in two previous Christopher Retardation, cases. See R. v. Commissioner Mental n.9, 893 (2006) (two agency A.2d 431 “isolated” decisions twenty-three year period over interpretation”); is not “a time-tested cf. Connecticut Aging Dept. Ass n. Providers Social of Not-for-Profit Services, n.18, (observing agency interpretation years hardly of “[f]our constitutes a ‘time-tested’ agency interpretation”). Moreover, because we conclude that the statute is ambiguous, interpretation prevail the board’s would not event. Society Podiatry, supra, See State Medical v. Board Examiners (rule applies only agency consistently of deference when “has followed its period long time, statutory language ambigu construction over a ous, agency’s interpretation [emphasis and the added]). is reasonable” meaning, to determine apply. seeking ... In does first to consider the l-2z9 directs us relationship other its to itself and text of the statute considering such text and If, examining after statutes. plain is and of such text relationship, meaning such yield or unworkable and does not absurd unambiguous of the meaning evidence of results, extratextual . . When a statute is . shall not be considered. statute interpre- for we also look unambiguous, not and plain and circum- history to legislative tive guidance enactment, legislative its surrounding stances its relation- implement, and to designed it was policy principles and common law ship existing legislation subject .... matter general same governing the principles, these we general “Moreover, applying [i]n Compensation (act), Act are that the mindful [Workers’ seq.] indisputably areme- 31-275 et General Statutes generously dial be construed statute should . . . The humanitarian and accomplish purpose. its overly purposes against of the act counsel remedial unduly eligibility limits narrow construction . . . con- compensation. Accordingly, workers’ [i]n must compensation law, we resolve workers’ struing statutory in a manner that will ambiguities lacunae pur- act. . . purpose of the further remedial [T]he poses allowing of act itself are best served sphere of operation a reasonable legislation remedial inter- purposes.” (Citations omitted; those considering omitted.) nal Pizzuto Commis- quotation Retardation, 257, 264-65, sioner Mental mind, principles With these (2007). turn the relevant language. shall, provides: meaning § l-2z “The a statute instance, of the itself and its

first be ascertained from text statute relationship If, examining considering and after such text other statutes. plain relationship, meaning unambiguous text such such yield results, does absurd or unworkable extratextual evidence not considered.” statute shall Under General Statutes (b),

“ [compensation paid shall be dependents] on [to resulting account death from an accident arising out of and in the of employment course or from an occupational disease as (1) four thousand follows: . . expenses dollars for burial those [and] [t]o wholly dependent upon the deceased at the injury, weekly compensation time of his equal sixty- per six and two-thirds of the weekly cent earn- average ings injury the deceased at the time of . . . .” (Em- phasis added.) payments These two payment —a expenses weekly burial payment and a per- based on a employee’s centage weekly deceased average earnings represent only compensation the to which — a surviving express is entitled the under of 31-306. statute language § The makes no mention of any an entitlement to benefits, other including health insurance coverage.

The plaintiff nevertheless claims that 31-306 is § and that ambiguity must be resolved in her favor in light of the beneficent purposes of the plaintiff act. The separate relies on two but related arguments support her claim of First, ambiguity. plaintiff refers to General Statutes (4),10 31-275 which provides part: in relevant “As used in [the act], provides: unless context otherwise * ** * “(4) ‘Compensation’ payments by provi- means or mandated act], including, to, indemnity, sions of but not limited [the medical and hospital surgical nursing or aid and service section under 31-294d any type payment disability, disability partial of for whether for total or of permanent temporary nature, benefit, expense, payments or death funeral provisions 31-284b, 31-310, made under the of section 31-293a or or adjustment payments required by in benefits or ...” [the act]. legislature “compensation” We note that the did not define the term purposes 1991; 91-32, 1; act until see Public Acts No. and that implicates applicable statutory case the 1989 revision of the provisions injury. previously based on the date decedent’s As court explained, however, legislature, defining “compensation” has the term “merely already in § 31-275 through- clarified the term as it had been used ” “ act as purposes ‘[c]ompensation’ defines provisions payments mandated “benefits . . . payments not limited to including, but act], [the . . .” of section 31-284b provisions made made that, “payments plaintiff contends because 31-284b” include provisions [§] Pep- dependents; see insurance benefits for Tufaro Inc., A.2d peridge Farm, App. 234, 239, depen includes benefits for (1991) (§ “compensation” use of the word dents); legislature’s interpreted as reasonably signifying § 31-306 within insurance benefits an intent include health Second, the purview statutory provision. of that 31- relies on General Statutes provides who 284b which (a), con employees to its must employees injured tinue such coverage nearly possible, as the income maintain, order to “[i]n injuries who employees employment-related suffer 11,” it essence, In maintains that 31-284b, purpose reasonable read the remedial employees, only 31-306, which refers into which dependents only employees, refers imports so As the doing ambiguity into 31-306. change Weinberg out the and did not enact substantive in the law.” act Vending 336, 347, Co., (1992). ARA 223 A.2d v. 612 1203 “ 11 purposes (a), means all § For of General Statutes 31-284b ‘income’ employment, including his individual from forms of remuneration an coverage wages, coverage, and health insurance life insurance accident ‘employee plan’ plan means welfare contributions and welfare depen any plan employees or or their families or established maintained both, hospital dents, medical, surgical or for care benefits.” 1991; (a) Although of “income” was added to 31-284b definition 1991, 91-32, (P.A. 91-32); No. and the case see Public Acts implicates applicable statutory provisions; see the 1989 revision of the foot history opinion; public incorpo legislative note 10 act that merely suggests meaning of the term rated this definition that it clarified the previously Weinberg Vending it in the See ARA as had been used act. Co., 346-47, legislative history 336, (1992) (citing 612 A.2d 1203 91-32). P.A. plaintiff notes, since the board’s decision in Sansone,12 on board has relied this rationale concluding that interplay” statutory provisions “the these “should be construed to allow [surviving dependent] . . part receive insurance coverage omitted.) her (Internal quotation survivor’s benefits.” Haven, v. New 4919, No. CRB-3-05-1(Janu Vincent ary 13, Enfield, supra, Sansone 2006), quoting No. 3885. We conclude that neither 31-275 nor supports plaintiffs claim 31-306 reasonably to require provide be construed to a a deceased employee.

First, reject plaintiffs contention that 31-§ “compensation” which defines (4), include health coverage, affords a basis for concluding that requires city 31-306 continue plaintiff with coverage following such the death of the expressly provides decedent. General Statutes compensation apply that its definition of shall through- out the act “unless the context otherwise “By phrase . . .” adding ‘unless context other- wise provides,’ legislature that in recognized some cases the circumstances under which the statute is applied control the the term being ‘compen- ” Weinberg Co., v. ARA Vending sation.’ J., (Covello, dissenting). Sec- presents example: tion 31-306 one for purposes such section, “compensation” the term is expressly limited payments expenses weekly for burial payments represent percentage of the deceased employee’s weekly average To construe earnings. 31-§ require would ignore express otherwise us to directive regarding specific Frankl, compensa M. We note that Jesse then chairman of the workers’ commission, majority opinion tion dissented from the of the board in Sansone. Hospi Bridgeport provision. See paid Opportunities, & Rights on Human tal Commission 101, 653 A.2d 782 there (“[ujnless (1995) statutory indicates contrary, itemization evidence to the be exclusive” the list to intended legislature when the omitted]). Indeed, marks quotation [internal than list be illustrative rather intends for a legislature See, express that intent.13 it knows how to exhaustive, “ ‘in (a) (defining Statutes General e.g., ” . including . . forms remuneration as “all come’ Statutes [emphasis added]); General wages” ” “ pay as “benefits or ‘[compensation’ (defining act], includ provisions ments mandated [the to, but not limited indemnity, surgical medical and ing, [emphasis added]). aid” 31-306 is with the disagree

We also which that an 31-284b, in light employee receiving who is injured benefits the act is entitled to the same Cappellino reject plaintiffs in We claim that this court’s decision Cheshire, (1993), is with the inconsistent Cappel are In enumerated in 31-306 exclusive. conclusion that benefits dependent spouse lino, surviving was entitled to receive held that the disability partial unpaid permanent that had balance of certain prior cause unrelated to to her to his death from a been awarded husband Id., 571-72, Cappellino distinguishable employment. from his 574. present surviving it benefits under case because did not involve surviving importantly, Cappellino, in that the we concluded 31-306.More disability benefits, despite unpaid spouse was entitled to her husband’s any provision expressly mandating payment those benefits absence of because, dependent, Statutes under General lump partial disability 31-302,“permanent awards be commuted into placed his or her for the benefit of the sums and trust commutation, upon Id., that, “[i]f, dependents.” We reasoned 575-76. pass dependents, survivorship right it would in the award . would wholly if to hold that commuta be a unreasonable construction [a]ct pass dependents.” (Inter made, survivorship would not tion were quotation Id., light omitted.) In of the different nal 576. analysis provisions Cappellino, in that case our decision at issue appeal. bearing on our resolution of the have no 790

to prior injury. which he was entitled to the The claims that the legislature’s reason that requirement, nearly that is, maintain, “to as as possible, the income employees employment-related who suffer injuries”; General Statutes to (Rev. applies 31-284b (a); § equal with to surviving dependents force of de- and, therefore, employees, ceased § 31-306 should be construed to include the continued health that coverage is (a). § under 31-284b plaintiffs contention, contrary

The however, is to the straightforward of both of language statutory those provisions. Section 31-284b employer an “provide shall employee equivalent continue to to [the] . while coverage employee eligible is to receive is receiving or . . . .” General (Emphasis added.) (Rev. Statutes to 31- 1989) § v. Kelly Bridgeport, 284b see (a); App. 9, 16-17, requires 762 A.2d 31-284b (§ employer “to continue only employee insurance benefits while an is receiving ‘compensation payments’ disability denied, the [act]”), cert.

(2001). Thus, only 31-284b refers (a) “employees” and contains no reference either to employees deceased dependents.14 or to their surviving Although Pepperidge Farm, Inc., supra, The contends that Tufaro supports App. 234, her claim she is entitled to health insurance statutory notwithstanding provisions that the relevant contain no dependents employees. Tufaro, Appellate reference In Court con that, (Rev. 1991) 31-284b, cluded which identi applicable present case, i.e., cal to the version in the the revision only an must continue to insurance not to the injured employee employee’s dependents, though but also even 31- only employees. Pepperidge Farm, Inc., supra, 284b refers 239. Tufaro predicated express “objective The court’s conclusion was on fact that the employee’s id.; income”; is maintain all of an [§ forms 31-284b] “ ” that, (a), under General Statutes 31-284b ‘income’ is defined “allforms remuneration,” including and contributions to employee plan employees welfare “established or maintained for their dependents inappo families or ... for medical . . . benefits.” Tufaro clearly site to the case because the fell within Tufaro purview 1991) 31-284b, of General Statutes and the task Appellate determine, light Court was dependents of deceased pertain does insur- or refer to health not mention it does employees, support no therefore, derives claim, plaintiffs ance. pred- claim is on which that statutoiy language from the icated.15 31-306 to construing § contends that

The follow- continued health deny right her the result that is to a harsh death leads ing the decedent’s dependent’s “income” payments constituted language, whether case, present how- employee in The decedent under that statute. 31-284b, and, therefore, ever, employee within the is not an employee of the ambiguity in resolved in favor that the court Tufaro fundamentally, involve did not More relevant to the case. not Tufaro 31-306, namely, unambig- case, provision in which at issue surviving dependent of a deceased uously the benefits to which the delimits explained, employee identified in 31- the benefits is entitled. As we have insurance. not include health 306 do 15 acquiescence apply legislative urges us to the doctrine surviving dependent of a deceased that the the decisions the board Weymouth v. See Police is entitled to health insurance benefits. 4550; supra, Dept., supra, Enfield, v. No. 3885. Under that No. Sansone statutory provision response in doctrine, legislature’s failure to amend a provision may interpretation be viewed as evidence of a of the to definitive interpretation. agreement E.g., legislative on Human with that Commission 783, 763, Opportunities Associates, Rights 250 739 A.2d v. Sullivan & presumed interpretation (1999) (“[t]he legislature to be aware 238 may subsequent a be understood as of a statute and ... its nonaction interpretation” quotation omitted]). that validation of [internal applicable legislature normally, fails Although, when the the doctrine is period following a time this court’s amend a statute within reasonable see, Peeler, interpretation provision issue; e.g., v. 271 Conn. of the at State following 338, 427-28, (2004) (legislative this court’s inaction may acquiescence interpretation legislative in that of statute viewed as denied, 94, interpretation), Ed. U.S. 126 S. Ct. 163 L. 2d cert. 546 acquiescence applied legislative (2005); we also have the rule of Gavin, Berkley interpretations E.g., administrative of statutes. present case, 761, 780, (2000). in A.2d 248 We decline to do so however, that the board’s for the same reason that we have concluded deference, is, interpretation judicial §of 31-306 is not entitled to because relatively infrequent interpretation relatively vintage and of is of recent opinion. application. Accordingly, we believe that it See footnote 8 of this inaction, any especially legislative is too to draw firm conclusion from soon appeal may possibility pendency itself have that the of this in view any taking provided legislature in with a to refrain from action reason response to the decisions of the board. inconsistent with the humanitarian purposes of the act. course, We agree, that the act is remedial nature and must be broadly construed to that end. We also agree ambiguities should be a resolved in man- ner that rather than furthers, thwarts, the act’s remedial purposes. We free, however, are not ambiguity create when exists; words, none other cannot “accom- a plish contrary result that is to the intent of the legisla- expressed ture as in the language.”16 Luce plain act’s United Technologies Corp., n.16, recently 717 A.2d 747 (1998). As we reiterated, have “a court must construe statute as written. . . . Courts supply construction ... omissions add exceptions merely it appears good because reasons adding exist them. . . legisla- The intent the ture, repeatedly as this has observed, court tois found not in what the legislature say, meant to but in say. the what it did ... It is axiomatic that the court itself cannot rewrite a accomplish statute to particular result. That is a function of legislature.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Doe Norwich Roman Corp., Catholic Diocesan 207, 216, Stamford, also Doe see (2006); 699 A.2d (1997) (“ parties [although . . . . . called public policy implica- attention presented tions of case, [was], the issue bottom, at [the] statutory a matter Thus, construction”). no matter sympathetic how or deserving may appear be, province it is the of the legislature, court, not this 16Thus, principle statutory construction that us instructs to construe broadly purpose guide the act to achieve its remedial does not us in the principle applicable only statutory case because is when the susceptible language interpretation is of more than one reasonable when statute, yields although plain unambiguous, the text of the and absurd or present case, unworkable results. See General Statutes 1-2z. In the statutory governing language is neither nor leads to an absurd or unworkable result. to include ought whether 31-306 to determine coverage.17 the case reversed and is of the board The decision to reverse with direction the board remanded to the commissioner. decision of ZARE- VERTEFEUILLE opinion KATZ,

In this LLA, Js., concurred. with the result I

BORDEN, concurring. agree J., reasoning. of its majority, and with much by the reached whether respect with analysis only I from its depart ambiguous. at issue language deprive construing her of also maintains that provision place right would health insurance to continued equal protection jeopardy of the fourteenth clause under the in constitutional Specifically, she claims that constitution. amendment to the United States denying justification benefits to no there is rational dependents employees surviving dependents when of deceased living employees benefits. “This court has entitled to receive the same are analysis, held, with constitutional framework in accordance the federal suspect proceed along policy that neither that in areas of social economic [protection [e]qual rights, infringe fundamental constitutional lines nor plausible policy [cjlause long reason for the as there is a is satisfied [as] appar legislative the classification is facts on which classification by may governmen ently rationally be the have been considered to true based goal relationship to its . of the classification decisionmaker and tal arbitrary . . . .” or irrational attenuated as to render the distinction is so Co., Rayhall omitted; quotation omitted.) (Citations Akim internal act, weekly compensa (2003). 328, 342, 819 A.2d 803 Under employee payment work is the same as who is unable to made to tion dependent surviving weekly compensation payment of the made to the (a) (Rev. employee upon §§ 31-306 his death. See General Statutes death, may presume that, Thus, (2) (a). before his and 31-307 dependent; support payment his employee both himself and used weekly dependent death, following employee’s that same would have circumstances, legislature support only. payment In such herself by payment surviving reasonably received concluded that the could have dependent dependent that the life insurance benefits addition to —in (a) to meet with sufficient in accordance have received —is dependent’s needs.

Contrary majority, to the I would conclude that the

interpretation 1989) § of General Statutes 31-

adopted by 306 that was the workers’ plaintiff, review board and offered Martha Vin-

appeal, namely, cent, on that an is

provide

dependent employee, plausible. of a deceased is There-

statutory language ambiguous. fore, the is Viera v.

(“[t]he (2007) Cohen, 412, 421,

ambiguity test determine statute, whether the when

susceptible in context, read to more than one reason-

interpretation” quotation able [internal marks omit-

ted]); Genesky Lyme, see also v. East

(Borden, concurring) (“if 278, 881 A.2d 114 J.,

considering the text of the ship issue, statute at its relation-

applied statutes, other to the facts of the

permit likely plausible case, would than more one

meaning, meaning ‘plain its cannot be said unambiguous’ ”). Nonetheless, I would also conclude despite ambiguity, that, the extratextual source of

meaning language of the on which the

namely, pur- relies, scheme’s remedial

pose, enough strong suggestion is not to overcome the majority opinion aptly that, text as the demon- strates, health benefits are not included in 31-306.I agree therefore that the decision of the workers’ com- pensation review board should be reversed.

JIM’SAUTOBODYv. COMMISSIONER

OF MOTOR VEHICLES

(SC 17758) Rogers, J., Noreott, Palmer, Schaller, C. Zarella and Js.

Case Details

Case Name: Vincent v. City of New Haven

Court Name: Supreme Court of Connecticut

Date Published: Mar 11, 2008

Citation: 941 A.2d 932

Docket Number: SC 17661

Court Abbreviation: Conn.