Case Information
*0 FILED IN 3rd COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 3/27/2015 3:25:50 PM JEFFREY D. KYLE Clerk IN THE THIRD COURT OF APPEALS THIRD COURT OF APPEALS 3/27/2015 3:25:50 PM JEFFREY D. KYLE 03-15-00054-CR AUSTIN, TEXAS *1 ACCEPTED [4677782] CLERK AT AUSTIN TEXAS VINCENT ALONZO CORSON, § CAUSE NO. 03-15-00054-CR
Appellant § TRIAL COURT NO. 71,403 §
§ CAUSE NO. 03-15-00055-CR § TRIAL COURT NO. 72,778 V. §
§ CAUSE NO. 03-15-00056-CR § TRIAL COURT NO. 72,779 §
THE STATE OF TEXAS, § CAUSE NO. 03-15-00057-CR
Appellee § TRIAL COURT NO. 72,780 BRIEF OF APPELLANT On appeal from the 426 th District Court of Bell County, Texas Hon. Fancy H. Jezek, presiding COPELAND LAW FIRM P.O. Box 399 Cedar Park, TX 78613 Phone: 512.897.8126 Fax: 512.215.8114 Email: ecopeland63@yahoo.com Erika Copeland State Bar No. 16075250 Attorney for Appellant *2 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Table of Contents i
Index of Authorities ii-v
Identity of Parties and Counsel 1
Statement of Facts/Background 3
Summary of the Argument 6
Professional Evaluation of the Record 7
Conclusion 25
Notice to Client 25
Compliance with Kelly v. State 26
Prayer 26
Certificate of Service and of Compliance with Rule 9 27
and Kelly v. State
i *3 INDEX OF AUTHORITIES Authorities Page
United States Supreme Court cases Anders v. California 7,24
386 U.S. 738 (1967)
McCoy v. Court of Appeals 25
486 U.S. 429 n. 10, 108 S.C. 1895, 100 L.Ed.2d 4440 (1988) Padilla v. Kennedy 8
130 S. Ct. 1477 (U.S. 2010)
Strickland v. Washington 17,18
466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 Texas Court of Criminal Appeals cases Bradley v. State 11
608 S.W.2d 652 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) Dansby v. State
398 S.W. 3d 233 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) 8 DeVary v. State 16
615 S.W.2d 739 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) Ganious v. State 7
436 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969) Hernandez v. State 12
613 S.W.2d 287 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) Hernandez v. State 18
988 S.W.2d 770 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) ii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES, continued Authorities Page
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals cases, continued Jackson v. State 15,16
590 S.W.2d 514 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) Jackson v. State 18
877 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) Jackson v. State 18
973 S.W.2d 954 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) Jackson v. State 24
680 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) Kelly v. State 24
436 S.W.3d 313 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) McWherter v. State 15
571 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) Menefee v. State 21
287 S.W.3d 9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)
Mitchell v. State 11
608 S.W.2d 226 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) Nunez v. State 24
565 S.W.2d 536 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) Rickles v. State 19
202 S.W.3d 759 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) Speth v. State 12
6 S.W.3d 530 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)
iii *5 INDEX OF AUTHORITIES, continued Authorities Page
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals cases, continued Stafford v. State 24,25
813 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) Williams, Ex parte 21
703 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) Texas Courts of Appeal cases Antwine v. State 19
268 S.W.3d 634 (Tex. App. - Eastland 2008, pet. ref’d ) Bradfield v. State 24
42 S.W.3d 350 (Tex. App. – Texarkana 2001, pet. ref’d ) Burruss v. State 18
20 S.W.3d 179 (Tex. App. – Texarkana 2000, pet. ref’d ) Coronado v. State 24
996 S.W.2d 283 (Tex. App. – Waco 2000, pet. ref’d ) Fisher v. State 15
397 S.W.3d 740 (Tex. App. – Houston [14 th Dist.] 2013, pet. ref’d) Guiterrez v. State 12
354 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. App. – Texarkana 2011, pet. granted on other grounds )
Kanouse v. State 24
958 S.W.2d 509 (Tex. App. – Beaumont 1996, no pet .) iv *6 INDEX OF AUTHORITIES, continued Authorities Page
Texas Court of Appeals cases, continued Keller v. State 20,21
125 S.W.3d 600 (Tex. App. – Houston [1 st Dist.] 2003), pet. dism’d, improvidently granted , 146 S.W.3d 677 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)
Lawal v. State 16
368 S.W.3d 876 (Tex. App. – Houston [14 th Dist.] 2012, no pet.) Staggs v. State 20,21
314 S.W.3d 155 (Tex. App. – Houston [1 st Dist.] 2010, no pet .) Thompson v. State 16
852 S.W.2d 268 (Tex. App. – Dallas 1993, no pet.) Statutes TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 21.02 (West 2014) 9,10
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art.26.13 (West 2014) 8,13
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 1.15 (West 2014) 20,21,22
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 46B.021 (West 2014) 22
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 42.12 §11(a) (West 2014) 12
TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 8.01(a), 22.041 (1)(b), 22.02, 22.04 9,10,15
and 30.02 (West 2014)
v *7 IN THE THIRD COURT OF APPEALS AT AUSTIN TEXAS VINCENT ALONZO CORSON, § CAUSE NO. 03-15-00054-CR
Appellant § TRIAL COURT NO. 71,403 §
§ CAUSE NO. 03-15-00055-CR § TRIAL COURT NO. 72,778 V. §
§ CAUSE NO. 03-15-00056-CR § TRIAL COURT NO. 72,779 §
THE STATE OF TEXAS, § CAUSE NO. 03-15-00057-CR
Appellee § TRIAL COURT NO. 72,780 BRIEF OF
APPELLANT TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS:
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL COMES NOW Vincent Alonzo Corson, appellant, who would show the Court that interested parties herein are as follows:
VINCENT ALONZO CORSON , appellant, TDCJ No. 01973705, Gurney *8 Transfer Facility, 1385 FM 3328, Palestine, Texas 75803.
STEPHEN N. LEE , trial attorney for appellant, 800 N. Main St., Copperas Cove, Texas 76522.
ERIKA COPELAND , appellate attorney for appellant, P.O. Box 399, Cedar Park, Texas 78613.
SHELLY D. STRIMPLE and BOB ODOM , Assistant Bell County District Attorneys, trial and appellate attorneys, respectively, for appellee, the State of
Texas, P.O. Box 540, Belton, Texas 76513.
STATEMENT OF FACTS/BACKGROUND Child Endangerment Offense
On October 21, 2013, Vincent Alonzo Carson entered an open plea of guilty to the state jail felony offense of child endangerment/abandonment with intent to
return in trial court cause number 71,403 (CA No. 03-15-00054-CR). After
hearing punishment evidence, the trial court deferred a finding of guilt in the case
and instead assessed a 2-year period of community supervision. (R.R.2, p. 23).
On November 22, 2013, the state moved to adjudicate Corson’s guilt, but pursuant
to a plea agreement, the trial court instead amended the terms of his community
supervision and continued his probation. (R.R. 3, pp. 10-12). Finally, on January
9, 2014, the state again moved to adjudicate Corson’s community supervision for
violation of certain terms and conditions of that supervision. Corson was alleged to
have committed three new offenses as described below--being the additional
offenses the subject of this brief. (C.R. 1, pp. 78-79). On August 26, 2014, Corson
appeared before the trial court – this time for a consolidated plea hearing on the
state’s motion to adjudicate his state jail community supervision in his child
endangerment offense as well as for pleas to the three new offenses the subject
of this brief. Corson entered an open plea of true to the state’s adjudication
motion. (R.R. 4, p.15). The trial court found the allegations in the state’s motion
to adjudicate true and adjudicated Corson’s guilt in that cause (71,403).
New Offenses
When Corson appeared before the trial court on August 26, 2014, in addition to hearing the state’s motion to adjudicate his guilt in his child endangerment
charge, the trial court also consolidated plea hearings for the three new offenses
alleged as the basis for adjudication of his community supervision in the first
place, to-wit: trial cause no. 72,778–aggravated assault (CA no. 03-15-00055-CR);
trial cause no. 72,779–aggravated kidnapping (CA no. 03-15-00056-CR), and trial
cause no. 72,780–burglary of a habitation (CA no. 03-15-00057-CR). (R.R. 4, p.
7). Corson, as noted, not only entered an open plea of ―true‖ to the adjudication
motion allegations, he also entered an open plea of ―guilty‖ to each of the three
new offenses. (R.R. 4, pp. 16-17). The trial court found Corson guilty in all three
new offenses: cause number 72,778, (aggravated assault with a deadly weapon),
cause number 72,779, (aggravated kidnapping) and cause number 72,780 (burglary
of a habitation with intent to commit another felony). (R.R. 6, pp. 77-80).
Motion to Withdraw Pleas
On December 17, 2014, Corson and his attorney appeared before the trial *11 court on Corson’s motion to withdraw his pleas he had entered on August 26,
2014, on the four cases here under review. (R.R. 5, pp. 5-6). After
hearing argument of counsel, the trial court denied the motion. (R.R. 5, p. 12).
Punishment Hearing
After the trial court denied Corson’s motion to withdraw his pleas, the trial court heard punishment evidence on all four cases from Janeka Wiggins, Corson’s
ex-wife. Wiggins essentially described her relationship with appellant before and
after a car accident that left him with a head injury which, she believed, impacted
his personality. (R.R. 6, pp. 31-32). She also described the incident after their
separation where Corson appeared uninvited at her apartment where he shot her
five times and kidnapped their child, actions that gave rise to the three new
offenses the subject of his adjudication motion and also of this brief. (R.R. 6, pp.
21-25).
Corson testified that he had served in the military and that he was deployed twice into combat zones. As a result, he said, he suffered from post-traumatic
stress disorder. Additionally, he suffered head injuries from a suicide attempt via a
car wreck. (R.R. 6, p. 38). With regard to the incident where he shot his ex-wife,
and which resulted in the three new felony charges, he testified that he did not go
to her apartment to shoot her; ―something in [him] just clicked, and it just
happened.‖ (R.R. 6, pp. 43-44). He was sorry he had shot her and could not really
explain his actions that day. (R.R. 6, p. 45)
Punishments Assessed
Having found Corson guilty in all three new offenses: cause number 72,778, (aggravated assault with a deadly weapon), cause number 72,779, (aggravated
kidnapping) and cause number 72,780 (burglary of a habitation with intent to
commit another felony), (R.R. 6, pp. 77-80), and, having adjudicated his guilt in
the child endangerment offense earlier, cause number 71,403, the trial court
assessed a 2-year sentence for the state jail offense, a 20-year sentence in the
aggravated assault case and two 40-year sentences in the aggravated kidnapping
and burglary of a habitation cases—all to be served concurrently in the
Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. In all three of
the new offenses, the court made affirmative findings that a deadly weapon had
been used or exhibited. (R.R. 6, pp. 77-81).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT Appellate counsel concludes that the records examined contain no reversible error or arguable grounds for appeal in any of the referenced causes the subject of
this brief.
PROFESSIONAL EVALUATION OF THE RECORD Counsel has reviewed the appellate records in these cases, which consist of the various documents in the respective Clerk’s Records and the transcript of
Corson’s consolidated adjudication and plea hearings. As a matter of her
professional judgment, Counsel reluctantly concludes that the record contains no
reversible error. Neither are there any jurisdictional defects apparent in the records
examined. In such a case, where Counsel concludes that there are no arguable
grounds for reversal, she is required to present a professional evaluation of the
record demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to be advanced for appeal.
See Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967); Ganious v. State , 436 S.W.2d 137
(Tex. Crim. App. 1969). That evaluation follows.
Arguable Points of Error
The Thirteenth Court of Appeals at San Antonio has provided an instructive list for consideration when complying with Anders . Accordingly, Counsel in this
case has reviewed Mr. Corson’s records for error centering on the following areas:
1. Whether his original indictments in all four cases were sufficient charging instruments.
2. Whether there were any adverse pretrial rulings, including but not limited to rulings on motions to suppress, motions to quash or the like.
3. Whether there was compliance with Texas Code of Criminal Procedure 26.13 and, if appropriate, Padilla v. Kennedy , 130 S. Ct. 1477 (U.S. 2010) in all cases.
4. Whether the issue of Corson’s competency was raised prior to sentencing, so as to warrant an inquiry by the court, and whether appellant was mentally competent when the court accepted his pleas (in both the original case which resulted in the adjudication motion as well as the latter filed three cases).
5. Whether Corson’s pleas were at all times freely and voluntarily made.
6. Whether there were any adverse rulings during the punishment hearing on objections or motions.
7. Whether there was any failure on the part of appellant’s trial counsel to object to fundamental error.
8. Whether the sentences imposed in all four cases were within the applicable ranges of punishment.
9. Whether the written judgments for each case accurately reflect the sentences that were imposed and whether all credits were properly applied.
10. Whether there is evidence to support his guilty pleas in the felony cases (and, to support his plea of ―true‖ in his adjudication motion) including an examination of the respective records with regard to the recently enunciated exception to the general rule that the state must only prove one violation of a *15 community supervision condition to sustain a revocation order, as carved out by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in Dansby v. State , 398 S.W.3d 233, 241-243 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
11. Whether Corson was denied effective assistance of counsel. Additionally, because one of these cases also involves an adjudication proceeding, Counsel has examined that area of jurisprudence for potential
violations of due process with regard to imposition of terms and conditions of
community supervision including whether those terms and conditions were
reasonably imposed. In that same regard, Counsel also reviewed the amendments
to the terms and conditions of Mr. Corson’s original community supervision after
the initial imposition of same as well as the adequacy of the state’s notice of
violations of the terms and conditions of his community supervision which resulted
in the instant adjudication of his guilty plea.
Prior Proceedings
Indictments – all cases Corson’s original indictments for the felony offenses of 1) child endangerment, 2) aggravated assault, 3) aggravated kidnapping and 4) burglary of
a habitation tracked the then applicable statutory provisions of TEXAS PENAL
CODE sections 22.041, 22.02, 22.04 and 30.02 , respectively. The indictments
met the ―requisites of an Indictment‖ provided in the Code of Criminal
Procedure’s art. 21.02 , and thus constituted proper charging instruments. See
TEX. PENAL CODE §§22.041 (1)(b), 22.02, 22.04 and 30.02 (West 2014) ;
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 21.02 (West 2014) .
Prior Proceedings – State Jail Felony (T.C. No. 71,403) (Community Supervision)
Original Compliance with Texas Code of Criminal Procedure 26.13 On October 21, 2013, Corson appeared with his trial attorney before the trial court. He entered an open plea of guilty to the trial court to the charged offense of
child endangerment by abandonment with intent to return in open court. After
properly admonishing Corson and securing his oral waiver of jury trial, the trial
court accepted his plea and written plea admonitions which included a waiver of
jury trial and stipulation of evidence. In his ―Guilty Plea Memorandum,‖ Corson
judicially confessed to the alleged offense. (C.R. 1, pp. 23-26). The plea
documents were signed by Corson and/or his attorney and appear proper in all
regards.
Adjudication Motion
Despite his plea in cause number 71,403, a finding of guilt was deferred, and *17 Corson was initially placed on two years’ community supervision. (C.R. 1, p. 29).
A subsequent amended adjudication motion filed July 25, 2014, and the subject of
his subsequent consolidated punishment hearing, alleged that Corson had violated
the terms and conditions of his community supervision by committing the three
other offenses the subject of this appeal. (C.R. 1, pp. 78-79).
Motion to Adjudicate – Notice
A motion to adjudicate need not meet the particulars of an indictment, information, or complaint. Mitchell v. State , 608 S.W.2d 226 (Tex. Crim. App.
1980). The allegations in such motion need only be sufficient to apprise
probationer of the violations alleged to have occurred. In the instant case, it
appears that the allegations in Corson’s motion to adjudicate were sufficiently
specific to apprise him of the violations alleged such that he may not, for the first
time on appeal, claim that they were vague or did not otherwise provide fair notice.
See (C.R. 1, pp. 78-79) and Bradley v. State , 608 S.W.2d 652 (Tex. Crim. App.
1980). Moreover, Corson made no such complaint at his subsequent adjudication
hearing, and, in fact, he acknowledged to the trial court that he had received
adequate notice of the contents of the motion and that he understood the allegations
made against him. (R.R. 4, p. 10).
Reasonableness of Terms and Conditions of Community Supervision A trial court has broad discretion in imposing conditions of community supervision. The conditions must be reasonable and must be designated to ―protect
or restore the community, protect or restore the victim, or punish, rehabilitate or
reform the defendant.‖ See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. Art. 42.12 §11(a)
(West 2013) ; and, Speth v. State , 6 S.W.3d 530, 533 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
Counsel’s review of the terms and conditions of community supervision imposed
upon Corson does not show that any term or condition relied upon to justify
adjudication of Corson’s guilt appears unreasonable on its face. Moreover, Corson
made no complaint of any condition when they were first imposed and complaint
may not be made for the first time on appeal. Guiterrez v. State , 354 S.W.3d 1
(Tex. App. – Texarkana 2011, pet. granted on other grounds ). Thus, that Corson
never complained of any condition or any other particular term of his community
supervision operated as a waiver of his right to complain after his subsequent
adjudication. Hernandez v. State , 613 S.W.2d 287 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) ( op. on
reh’g ).
Adverse Pre-Hearing Rulings
There was only one adverse pre-adjudication or plea hearing ruling, and it is *19 described below for ―all cases.‖
Evidentiary Rulings/Fundamental Error
There were no adverse rulings during the adjudication, plea or punishment hearings, and no failure on the part of Corson’s trial counsel to object to
fundamental error.
Plea of ―True‖
At his adjudication hearing, consolidated with the plea hearing on his three new felony offenses, Corson entered a plea of ―true‖ to the allegations of the
state’s amended motion to adjudicate – only after he had been properly
admonished by the trial court. There is no suggestion from the record that
Corson’s plea of ―true‖ was anything but freely and voluntarily made. He was
specifically advised by the trial court that he was not required to testify. (R.R. 4, p.
8).
Prior Proceedings – all other cases
Original Compliance with Texas Code of Criminal Procedure 26.13 On August 26, 2014, Corson appeared with his trial attorney before the trial court in a hearing which consolidated his above-described adjudication hearing
with plea hearings on his three new offenses also the subject of this brief. He
entered
an open plea of guilty to the trial court to each of the new offenses in open court.
(R.R. 4, pp. 15-16). He was properly admonished, and the trial court secured his
waivers of jury trial both orally and in writing in all three cases. (R.R. 4, pp. 8-9)
(and, see in each case C.R. 1, pp. 84, 24, 22, and 22, respectively. The plea
documents in each case included stipulations of evidence which were signed by
Corson and/or his attorney and appear proper in all regards. ( See C.R. 1, each
case, pp. 84, 24, 22 and 22, respectively).
Adverse Pre-Hearing ruling – all cases
On December 17, 2014, hearing was had on Corson’s motion to withdraw his prior plea of ―true‖ to his adjudication motion and of ―guilty‖ to his other three
felony cases.
Evidence for Withdrawing Pleas—all cases Evidence adduced at Corson’s hearing to withdraw his pleas consists of medical records concerning a traumatic brain injury Corson suffered in a car wreck
that was characterized by his ex-wife as a ―suicide‖ attempt on his part. ( See R.R.
6, p. 32). However, while the records, which were offered by Corson without
objection by the state, appear to support Corson’s contention that he suffered from
a brain injury from a car wreck and possibly from post-traumatic stress from
overseas deployment with the military, the records do not rise to a level that would
suggest that Corson was not competent to offer the pleas nor that, as a result of
severe mental disease or defect, he did not know that his conduct was wrong when
he committed the alleged offenses. See TEX. PENAL CODE §8.01(a) (West
2014) and Fisher v. State , 397 S.W.3d 740 (Tex. App. – Houston [14 th Dist.] 2013,
pet. ref’d).
Trial Court’s Findings on Motion to Withdraw Pleas and Analysis
After hearing argument of trial counsel and reviewing medical records adduced at the hearing, the trial court denied Corson’s motion and moved to the
punishment hearing in each case. (R.R. 5, p. 12).
A trial court’s ruling on whether to allow the withdrawal of a plea is subject to the discretion of the trial court, and a liberal practice prevails in Texas regarding
that ruling. McWherter v. State , 571 S.W.2d 312, 313 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978). A
defendant may withdraw his guilty plea as a matter of right, without assigning
reason, until judgment has been pronounced or the case has been taken under
advisement. Jackson v. State , 590 S.W.2d 514, 515 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
However, if a defendant requests permission to withdraw a guilty plea after the
trial judge has taken the case under advisement or pronounces judgment, the
withdrawal of such plea is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Jackson ,
590 S.W. 2d at 515; McWherter , 571 S.W.2d a5 313 n. 2.
Here, the trial court had already admonished Corson, accepted his guilty pleas, and passed the cases for a future sentencing hearing. It is well settled that a
court takes a case under advisement when it accepts a properly admonished guilty
plea and passes the case for pre-sentence investigation and punishment. See
DeVary v. State , 615 S.W.2d 739, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (finding appellant’s
decision to withdraw plea was too late because trial court had taken case under
advisement when it had accepted appellant’s guilty plea and admonished him at
hearing two months earlier); Jackson , 590 S.W.2d at 514-15 (holding case had
been taken under advisement, and defendant could not withdraw guilty plea as
matter of right, where court had accepted guilty plea and passed the case for pre-
sentence investigation); Lawal v. State , 368 S.W.3d 876, 882 (Tex. App. –
Houston [14 th Dist.] 2012, no pet .) (concluding that defendant could not withdraw
guilty plea as matter of right because trial court had taken case under advisement
when it had accepted defendant’s guilty plea and reset case for hearing on PSI
report); Thompson v. State , 852 S.W.2d 268, 270 (Tex. App. – Dallas 1993, no
pet .) (holding defendant could not withdraw guilty plea as matter of right where
―only issue remaining to be decided was the appropriate punishment‖). Here,
Corson’s case was already under advisement, and he was not entitled to withdraw
his guilty plea as a matter of law. See , Jackson , 590 S.W.2d at 514. Moreover,
there was no evidence adduced at the hearing to withdraw the pleas that would
suggest that Corson’s pleas were anything other than freely and voluntarily made.
Neither was there any evidence that Corson was incompetent to enter the pleas nor
that there was any other impediment to the giving of such pleas. In fact, the trial
court also had in its records a report from a court-appointed expert, Dr. Pugliese,
that indicated Corson’s mental condition did not meet the standards for
incompetency or an insanity defense. See Supp. C.R. 1, in all cases). Thus, the
trial court’s decision in refusing to grant Corson’s motion to withdraw his pleas
seems supported by the record, and there was no abuse of discretion shown.
Trial Error/Ineffective Assistance of Counsel – all cases Appellate counsel found no evidence in the records examined which would support a claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel.
Strickland v. Washington , decided by the United States Supreme Court in 1984 established the standard by which to gauge the adequacy of representation of
counsel and articulated a two-step analysis:
1. Did the attorney’s performance fail to constitute ―reasonably effective assistance,‖ i.e. , did the defense attorney’s representation fall below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms?
2. If so, was there a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings could have been different?
– see Strickland , 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 690.
(The test in Strickland is properly applied to the punishment phase of a non-capital
case as well. See Hernandez v. State , 988 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex. Crim. App.
1999)).
In considering a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a reviewing court begins with a strong presumption that counsel was effective. Jackson v. State , 877
S.W.2d 768, 771 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). A reviewing court presumes counsel’s
actions were motivated by sound trial strategy. Id . A complainant has the burden
of rebutting that presumption by evidence from the record affirmatively supporting
the claim. See Jackson v. State , 973 S.W.2d 954, 955 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
However, even if a complainant can prove such error occurred, he must then prove
hat but for the error, there is a reasonable probability the outcome of the
proceeding would have been different. See Burruss v. State , 20 S.W.3d 179, 186
(Tex. App. – Texarkana 2000, pet. ref’d ).
Here, evidence adduced at Corson’s adjudication and sentencing hearings included his admission to the allegations in the state’s motion to adjudicate and to
those in his indictments. Testimony from the victim indicated that Corson shot his
victim 5 times while she held her baby. After shooting the victim, Corson took
another child with him while the victim sought help on her own. In light of that
testimony, even if examination of his adjudication hearing or sentencing hearings
revealed instances where his trial counsel possibly committed an error of some
kind in his representation (which the record does not support), it is highly unlikely
that but for such error, there was a reasonable probability that the outcomes of
Corson’s adjudication or sentencing hearings would have been different.
Sufficiency of Evidence of Violations of Community Supervision and of Guilt – all cases
A trial court’s order adjudicating community supervision is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Rickles v. State , 202 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2006); Antwine v. State , 268 S.W.3d 634, 636 (Tex. App. - Eastland 2008,
pet. ref’d ). In an adjudication hearing, the state must prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that a defendant violated the terms of his community supervision.
Rickles , 202 S.W.3d at 763-4; Antwine , 268 S.W.3d at 636. Proof of any one of
the alleged violations of the conditions of community supervision is sufficient to
support an adjudication order. Id . at 636.
Here, Corson admitted that he had committed the new offenses as alleged.
Evidence sufficient to support even one allegation of the state’s motion, as noted,
justifies the adjudication of his community supervision, a finding of guilt on his
original plea, and the imposition of his resulting punishment. Thus, the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in moving to adjudicate Corson’s guilt and imposing
subsequent punishment at the subsequent punishment hearing. Neither was there
insufficient evidence of guilt in his remaining cases in light of his guilty pleas in
those cases.
When he pleads guilty, a criminal defendant waives his right to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence. Keller v. State , 125 S.W.3d 600, 605 (Tex. App. –
Houston [1 st Dist.] 2003), pet. dism’d, improvidently granted , 146 S.W.3d 677
(Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (per curiam); see also Staggs v. State , 314 S.W.3d 155,
159 (Tex. App. – Houston [1 st Dist.] 2010, no pet.). In such cases, review is
limited to determining whether the evidence supports the conviction under article
1.15 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure . See, TEX. CODE CRIM.
PROC. art. 1.15 (West 2014) (stating that State must ―introduce evidence into
the record showing the guilt of the defendant and said evidence shall be accepted
by the court as the basis for its judgment and in no event shall a person charged be
convicted upon his plea without sufficient evidence to support the same.‖); Keller ,
125 S.W.3d at 605 (citing TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 1.15 (West 2005) ).
State must offer sufficient proof to support any judgment based on a guilty plea in a felony case tried before a court. Keller , 125 S.W.3d at 604 (citation
omitted); see also Ex parte Williams , 703 S.W.2d 674, 678 (Tex. Crim. App.
1986). ―The State, however, is not required to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt; the supporting evidence must simply embrace every essential
element of the charged offense.‖ Staggs , 314 S.W.3d at 159.
Article 1.15 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure requires the State to ―introduce evidence into the record showing the guilt of the defendant and said
evidence shall be accepted by the court as the basis for its judgment and in no
event shall a person charged be convicted upon his plea without sufficient evidence
to support the same.‖ TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 1.15 ; see Menefee v.
State , 287 S.W.3d 9, 13-14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). The evidence supporting a
guilty plea may take several forms. Menefee , 287 S.W.3d at 13. Article 1.15
provides that the evidence may be stipulated if the defendant in such a case
consents in writing, in open court, to waive the appearance, confrontation, and
cross-examination of witnesses, and further consents either to an oral stipulation of
the evidence and testimony or to the introduction of testimony by affidavits,
written statements of witnesses, and any other documentary evidence in support of
the judgment of the court. See , TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 1.15 (West
2014) . Here, there is sufficient supporting evidence to uphold Corson’s pleas of
guilty. In each case, his plea documents include a judicial confession and
stipulation of evidence.
Competency – all cases
Because an issue of competency was raised prior to sentencing in these cases, Counsel specifically reviewed Corson’s records in that regard, but she
concludes that 1) there is no evidence to suggest that Corson was mentally
incompetent to stand trial and 2) Corson presented no evidence suggestive of the
defense of insanity.
Here, the trial court did consider Corson’s suggestion of incompetency. See ,
R.R. 1, pp. 70 (71,403), 16 (72,778), 14 (72,779) and 14 (72,780). As a result, the
trial court ordered his examination for competency by a disinterested third party,
Dr. Frank Pugliese, pursuant to article 46B.021 of the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure . See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 46B.021 (West 2014) . Dr.
Pugliese’s report to the trial court did not indicate that Corson’s mental condition
met the standards for incompetency or an insanity defense. ( See Supp. C.R. 1, in
all cases). Further, both Corson and his trial counsel indicated their beliefs when
Corson entered his pleas that he was competent and understood the proceedings.
(R.R. 4, pp. 10, 12). Moreover, in addition to the various stipulations and written
admissions he entered into in each case, Corson testified at his sentencing hearing.
His testimony does not appear incoherent, and he apologized for shooting his
victim. (R.R. 6, p. 42). Finally, the medical records introduced during Corson’s
sentencing hearing do not support a suggestion of incompetency or the affirmative
defense of insanity. The records do contain references to his head injury (among
other injuries) and speak of his depression, but those records do not suggest, and
Corson did not argue that they suggested, either incompetence to stand trial or
satisfaction of the elements of the defense of insanity as defined by Texas law.
( See R.R. 8, Defendant’s Exhibit 1).
Sufficiency – Punishment—all cases
The trial court assessed the following sentences upon adjudication of Corson’s community supervision and after hearing punishment evidence in all his
cases:
For the State Jail felony offense of child endangerment – 2 years. For Aggravated Assault with a Deadly Weapon – 20 years. For Aggravated Kidnapping – 40 years.
For Burglary of a Habitation with Intent to Commit a Felony – 40 years. A review of the evidence for sufficiency is inappropriate with respect to the assessment of punishment. See , Bradfield v. State , 42 S.W.3d 350, 351 (Tex. App.
– Texarkana 2001, pet. ref’d ); Kanouse v. State , 958 S.W.2d 509, 510 (Tex. App.
– Beaumont 1996, no pet .)( citing Jackson v. State , 680 S.W.2d 809, 814 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1984)). Here, the sentences ultimately assessed by the trial court were
within the applicable punishment ranges for the subject offenses, and none of the
sentences on their face appear ―unreasonable‖ or ―irrational‖ in light of the
testimony adduced at Corson’s punishment hearing. See , Nunez v. State , 565
S.W.2d 536 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978). Thus, Corson cannot establish any error
arising from the punishments assessed by the trial court in any of his four cases.
Standard of Review – ―Frivolous Appeals‖—All Cases In an Anders case, a reviewing court must, ―after a full examination of all proceedings, […] decide whether the case is wholly frivolous.‖ Anders , 386 U.S.
at 744, 87 S. Ct. at 1400; accord Stafford v. State , 813 S.W.2d 503, 509-11 (Tex.
Crim.
App. 1991); Coronado v. State , 996 S.W.2d 283, 285 (Tex. App. – Waco 2000,
pet. ref’d ). An appeal is ―wholly frivolous‖ or ―without merit‖ when it ―lacks any
basis in law or fact.‖ McCoy v. Court of Appeals , 486 U.S. 429, 439 n. 10, 108
S.C. 1895, 1902, 100 L.Ed.2d 4440 (1988). Arguments are frivolous if they
―cannot conceivably persuade the court.‖ Id . at 426, 108 S. Ct. at 1901. An appeal
is not frivolous if based on ―arguable grounds.‖ Stafford , 813 S.W.2d at 511.
CONCLUSION Here, appellate counsel cannot in good faith argue that there is a basis ―in law or in fact‖ that an error occurred in the adjudication of Corson’s community
supervision or in the plea hearing involving his other three cases. For that reason,
appellate counsel is required to move for leave to withdraw in each case to allow
appellant the opportunity to submit his briefs in response to this brief should he
choose to do so. See , Stafford v. State , 813 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
Accompanying this brief then in Appendix 1 through 4 are copies of appellate
counsel’s motions to withdraw on those grounds in each case. Originals of those
motions have been separately filed with this Court.
NOTICE TO CLIENT Counsel hereby affirms that she has notified Vincent Alonzo Corson, appellant, of the filing of this brief in each of the referenced cases, of his right to
file pro se response briefs should he choose to do so and of his right to examine
his appellate records per the applicable Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure to
accomplish that goal. Notice of those rights and of Counsel’s motions to withdraw
was provided to Mr. Corson by both certified mail, return receipt requested, and by
first-class mail at his last known mailing address at the date of this filing, to-wit:
Vincent Alonzo Corson TDCJ No. 01973705
Gurney Transfer Facility 1385 FM 3328
Palestine, Texas 75803 COMPLIANCE WITH KELLY v. STATE Finally, Counsel also hereby affirms that she has provided to Mr. Corson motions for access to his appellate records as required by the dictates of Kelly v.
State , 436 S.W.3d 313 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) for each of the referenced cases.
( See copies of same in Appendix 5 through 8).
PRAYER WHEREFORE , Counsel respectfully prays that this Court permit her to withdraw from each of these cases after this Court’s own examination of the
records and to afford Mr. Corson his right to file pro se response briefs if he wishes
to do so.
COPELAND LAW FIRM P.O. Box 399 Cedar Park, TX 78613 Phone: 512.897.8126 Fax: 512.215.8114 Email: ecopeland63@yahoo.com By: /s/ Erika Copeland Erika Copeland State Bar No. 16075250 Attorney for Appellant CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND OF COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 9 and KELLY v. STATE This is to certify that on March 26, 2015, a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document was served on Bob Odom, Assistant District
Attorney of Bell County, P.O. Box 540, Belton, Texas 76513 and on Vincent
Alonzo Corson, appellant, TDCJ No. 01973705, Gurney Transfer Facility, 1385
FM 3328, Palestine, Texas 75803, in accordance with the Texas Rules of Appellate
Procedure , and that Appellant’s brief is in compliance with Rule 9 of the Texas
Rules of Appellate Procedure and that portion which must be included under Rule
9.4(i)(1) contains 5364 words. Further, Counsel certifies that she has complied
with the dictates of Kelly v. State insofar as providing motions for Mr. Corson to
gain access to his appellate records if he so chooses.
/s/ Erika Copeland Erika Copeland *35 APPENDIX 1-8 *36 IN THE THIRD COURT OF APPEALS AT AUSTIN TEXAS VINCENT ALONZO CORSON, §
Appellant §
§
§ CAUSE NO. 03-15-00054-CR §
V. § TRIAL COURT NO. 71,403
§
§
§
THE STATE OF TEXAS, §
Appellee § MOTION TO WITHDRAW TO THE HONORABLE JUDGES OF SAID COURT:
NOW COMES Erika Copeland, PO Box 399, Cedar Park, Texas 78613, appellate attorney for Vincent Alonzo Corson, and respectfully moves this
Honorable Court to allow said attorney to withdraw as attorney of record in this
matter, terminating his representation of the above referenced appellant and for
good cause would respectfully show this Honorable Court as follows:
I. Contemporaneous with the filing of this Motion to Withdraw, counsel has filed an Anders brief. Withdrawal of counsel is necessary to permit Mr. Corson to
file a pro se response brief, if he so desires.
II. Pending Deadlines Appellant’s brief is due April 19, 2015.
III. Documents Filed and Prepared for Defendant Counsel has prepared a docketing statement and Appellant’s Brief in this cause, and has filed same with this Court. Counsel previously prepared
Appellant’s Notice of Appeal, Request for Reporter’s Record and Designations of
Clerk’s Record.
IV. Notice of Last Known Address of Defendant Counsel has notified Appellant of the filing of this Motion to Withdraw and of the filing of this brief by mailing a copy of this Motion to Appellant’s last
known mailing address by regular, first class mail and by certified mail, return
receipt requested, and addressed as follows:
Vincent Alonzo Corson TDCJ No. 01973705 Gurney Transfer Facility 1385 FM 3328 Palestine, TX 75803 V.
WHEREFORE , Movant prays this Honorable Court to allow Movant to withdraw from the representation of appellant and would, in all things, relieve
Movant herein, discharging Movant from her obligations and responsibilities to
this Defendant in this matter.
Respectfully submitted, COPELAND LAW FIRM P.O. Box 399 Cedar Park, TX 78613 Pho: 512.897.8126 Fax: 512.215.8114 Email: tcopeland14@yahoo.com /s/ Erika Copeland Erika Copeland State Bar No. 04801500 Attorney for Appellant CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND OF COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 9 This is to certify that on March 26 2015, a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document was served on Bob Odom, Assistant District Attorney of
Bell County, appellate attorney for appellee, the State of Texas, PO Box 540,
Belton, Texas 76513 and Vincent Alonzo Corson, TDCJ No. 01973705, Gurney
Transfer Facility, 1385 FM 3328, Palestine, Texas 75803, in accordance with the
Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, and that motion for withdrawal is in
compliance with Rule 9 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure and that portion
which must be included under Rule 9.4(i)(1) contains 445 words.
/s/ Erika Copeland Erika Copeland *39 IN THE THIRD COURT OF APPEALS AT AUSTIN TEXAS VINCENT ALONZO CORSON, §
Appellant §
§
§ CAUSE NO. 03-15-00055-CR §
V. § TRIAL COURT NO. 72,778
§
§
§
THE STATE OF TEXAS, §
Appellee § MOTION TO WITHDRAW TO THE HONORABLE JUDGES OF SAID COURT:
NOW COMES Erika Copeland, PO Box 399, Cedar Park, Texas 78613, appellate attorney for Vincent Alonzo Corson, and respectfully moves this
Honorable Court to allow said attorney to withdraw as attorney of record in this
matter, terminating his representation of the above referenced appellant and for
good cause would respectfully show this Honorable Court as follows:
I. Contemporaneous with the filing of this Motion to Withdraw, counsel has filed an Anders brief. Withdrawal of counsel is necessary to permit Mr. Corson to
file a pro se response brief, if he so desires.
II. Pending Deadlines Appellant’s brief is due April 19, 2015.
III. Documents Filed and Prepared for Defendant Counsel has prepared a docketing statement and Appellant’s Brief in this cause, and has filed same with this Court. Counsel previously prepared
Appellant’s Notice of Appeal, Request for Reporter’s Record and Designations of
Clerk’s Record.
IV. Notice of Last Known Address of Defendant Counsel has notified Appellant of the filing of this Motion to Withdraw and of the filing of this brief by mailing a copy of this Motion to Appellant’s last
known mailing address by regular, first class mail and by certified mail, return
receipt requested, and addressed as follows:
Vincent Alonzo Corson TDCJ No. 01973705 Gurney Transfer Facility 1385 FM 3328 Palestine, TX 75803 V.
WHEREFORE , Movant prays this Honorable Court to allow Movant to withdraw from the representation of appellant and would, in all things, relieve
Movant herein, discharging Movant from her obligations and responsibilities to
this Defendant in this matter.
Respectfully submitted, COPELAND LAW FIRM P.O. Box 399 Cedar Park, TX 78613 Pho: 512.897.8126 Fax: 512.215.8114 Email: tcopeland14@yahoo.com /s/ Erika Copeland Erika Copeland State Bar No. 04801500 Attorney for Appellant CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND OF COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 9 This is to certify that on March 26 2015, a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document was served on Bob Odom, Assistant District Attorney of
Bell County, appellate attorney for appellee, the State of Texas, PO Box 540,
Belton, Texas 76513 and Vincent Alonzo Corson, TDCJ No. 01973705, Gurney
Transfer Facility, 1385 FM 3328, Palestine, Texas 75803, in accordance with the
Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, and that motion for withdrawal is in
compliance with Rule 9 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure and that portion
which must be included under Rule 9.4(i)(1) contains 445 words.
/s/ Erika Copeland Erika Copeland *42 IN THE THIRD COURT OF APPEALS AT AUSTIN TEXAS VINCENT ALONZO CORSON, §
Appellant §
§
§ CAUSE NO. 03-15-00056-CR §
V. § TRIAL COURT NO. 72,779
§
§
§
THE STATE OF TEXAS, §
Appellee § MOTION TO WITHDRAW TO THE HONORABLE JUDGES OF SAID COURT:
NOW COMES Erika Copeland, PO Box 399, Cedar Park, Texas 78613, appellate attorney for Vincent Alonzo Corson, and respectfully moves this
Honorable Court to allow said attorney to withdraw as attorney of record in this
matter, terminating his representation of the above referenced appellant and for
good cause would respectfully show this Honorable Court as follows:
I. Contemporaneous with the filing of this Motion to Withdraw, counsel has filed an Anders brief. Withdrawal of counsel is necessary to permit Mr. Corson to
file a pro se response brief, if he so desires.
II. Pending Deadlines Appellant’s brief is due April 19, 2015.
III. Documents Filed and Prepared for Defendant Counsel has prepared a docketing statement and Appellant’s Brief in this cause, and has filed same with this Court. Counsel previously prepared
Appellant’s Notice of Appeal, Request for Reporter’s Record and Designations of
Clerk’s Record.
IV. Notice of Last Known Address of Defendant Counsel has notified Appellant of the filing of this Motion to Withdraw and of the filing of this brief by mailing a copy of this Motion to Appellant’s last
known mailing address by regular, first class mail and by certified mail, return
receipt requested, and addressed as follows:
Vincent Alonzo Corson TDCJ No. 01973705 Gurney Transfer Facility 1385 FM 3328 Palestine, TX 75803 V.
WHEREFORE , Movant prays this Honorable Court to allow Movant to withdraw from the representation of appellant and would, in all things, relieve
Movant herein, discharging Movant from her obligations and responsibilities to
this Defendant in this matter.
Respectfully submitted, COPELAND LAW FIRM P.O. Box 399 Cedar Park, TX 78613 Pho: 512.897.8126 Fax: 512.215.8114 Email: tcopeland14@yahoo.com /s/ Erika Copeland Erika Copeland State Bar No. 04801500 Attorney for Appellant CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND OF COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 9 This is to certify that on March 26 2015, a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document was served on Bob Odom, Assistant District Attorney of
Bell County, appellate attorney for appellee, the State of Texas, PO Box 540,
Belton, Texas 76513 and Vincent Alonzo Corson, TDCJ No. 01973705, Gurney
Transfer Facility, 1385 FM 3328, Palestine, Texas 75803, in accordance with the
Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, and that motion for withdrawal is in
compliance with Rule 9 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure and that portion
which must be included under Rule 9.4(i)(1) contains 445 words.
/s/ Erika Copeland Erika Copeland *45 IN THE THIRD COURT OF APPEALS AT AUSTIN TEXAS VINCENT ALONZO CORSON, §
Appellant §
§ § CAUSE NO. 03-15-00057-CR §
V. § TRIAL COURT NO. 72,780
§
§
§
THE STATE OF TEXAS, §
Appellee § MOTION TO WITHDRAW TO THE HONORABLE JUDGES OF SAID COURT:
NOW COMES Erika Copeland, PO Box 399, Cedar Park, Texas 78613, appellate attorney for Vincent Alonzo Corson, and respectfully moves this
Honorable Court to allow said attorney to withdraw as attorney of record in this
matter, terminating his representation of the above referenced appellant and for
good cause would respectfully show this Honorable Court as follows:
I. Contemporaneous with the filing of this Motion to Withdraw, counsel has filed an Anders brief. Withdrawal of counsel is necessary to permit Mr. Corson to
file a pro se response brief, if he so desires.
II. Pending Deadlines Appellant’s brief is due April 19, 2015.
III. Documents Filed and Prepared for Defendant Counsel has prepared a docketing statement and Appellant’s Brief in this cause, and has filed same with this Court. Counsel previously prepared
Appellant’s Notice of Appeal, Request for Reporter’s Record and Designations of
Clerk’s Record.
IV. Notice of Last Known Address of Defendant Counsel has notified Appellant of the filing of this Motion to Withdraw and of the filing of this brief by mailing a copy of this Motion to Appellant’s last
known mailing address by regular, first class mail and by certified mail, return
receipt requested, and addressed as follows:
Vincent Alonzo Corson TDCJ No. 01973705 Gurney Transfer Facility 1385 FM 3328 Palestine, TX 75803 V.
WHEREFORE , Movant prays this Honorable Court to allow Movant to withdraw from the representation of appellant and would, in all things, relieve
Movant herein, discharging Movant from her obligations and responsibilities to
this Defendant in this matter.
Respectfully submitted, COPELAND LAW FIRM P.O. Box 399 Cedar Park, TX 78613 Pho: 512.897.8126 Fax: 512.215.8114 Email: tcopeland14@yahoo.com /s/ Erika Copeland Erika Copeland State Bar No. 04801500 Attorney for Appellant CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND OF COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 9 This is to certify that on March 26 2015, a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document was served on Bob Odom, Assistant District Attorney of
Bell County, appellate attorney for appellee, the State of Texas, PO Box 540,
Belton, Texas 76513 and Vincent Alonzo Corson, TDCJ No. 01973705, Gurney
Transfer Facility, 1385 FM 3328, Palestine, Texas 75803, in accordance with the
Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, and that motion for withdrawal is in
compliance with Rule 9 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure and that portion
which must be included under Rule 9.4(i)(1) contains 445 words.
/s/ Erika Copeland Erika Copeland *48 IN THE THIRD COURT OF APPEALS AT AUSTIN TEXAS VINCENT ALONZO CORSON, §
Appellant §
§
§ CAUSE NO. 03-15-00054-CR §
V. § TRIAL COURT NO. 71,403
§
§
§
THE STATE OF TEXAS, §
Appellee § MOTION FOR ACCESS TO APPELLATE RECORD NOW COMES Vincent Alonzo Corson, TDCJ No. 01973705, Gurney Transfer Facility, 1385 FM 3328, Palestine, Texas 75803 and
respectfully moves this Honorable Court to grant him access to the
appellate record in the above-referenced cause in order to effectuate his
right to file a response to the Anders briefs filed herein by Appellant’s
appellate counsel.
Respectfully submitted,
Vincent Alonzo Corson TDCJ No. 01973705 Gurney Transfer Facility 1385 FM 3328 Palestine, Texas 75803 Date:
*49 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND OF COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 9
This is to certify that on March_____2015, a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document was served on Shelly D. Strimple and
Bob Odom, Assistant District Attorneys of Bell County, trial and appellate
attorneys, respectively, for appellee, the State of Texas, PO Box 540, Belton,
Texas 76513 in accordance with the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure,
and that motion is in compliance with Rule 9 of the Texas Rules of Appellate
Procedure and that portion which must be included under Rule 9.4(i)(1)
contains 232 words.
Vincent Alonzo Corson TDCJ No. 01973705 Gurney Transfer Facility 1385 FM 3328 Palestine, Texas 75803 Date:
*50 IN THE THIRD COURT OF APPEALS AT AUSTIN TEXAS VINCENT ALONZO CORSON, §
Appellant §
§
§ CAUSE NO. 03-15-00055-CR §
V. § TRIAL COURT NO. 72,778
§
§
§
THE STATE OF TEXAS, §
Appellee § MOTION FOR ACCESS TO APPELLATE RECORD NOW COMES Vincent Alonzo Corson, TDCJ No. 01973705, Gurney Transfer Facility, 1385 FM 3328, Palestine, Texas 75803 and
respectfully moves this Honorable Court to grant him access to the
appellate record in the above-referenced cause in order to effectuate his
right to file a response to the Anders briefs filed herein by Appellant’s
appellate counsel.
Respectfully submitted,
Vincent Alonzo Corson TDCJ No. 01973705 Gurney Transfer Facility 1385 FM 3328 Palestine, Texas 75803 Date:
*51 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND OF COMPLIANCE WITH
RULE 9
This is to certify that on March 2015, a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document was served on Shelly D. Strimple and
Bob Odom, Assistant District Attorneys of Bell County, trial and appellate
attorneys, respectively, for appellee, the State of Texas, PO Box 540, Belton,
Texas 76513 in accordance with the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure,
and that motion is in compliance with Rule 9 of the Texas Rules of Appellate
Procedure and that portion which must be included under Rule 9.4(i)(1)
contains 232 words.
Vincent Alonzo Corson TDCJ No. 01973705 Gurney Transfer Facility 1385 FM 3328 Palestine, Texas 75803 Date:
*52 IN THE THIRD COURT OF APPEALS AT AUSTIN TEXAS VINCENT ALONZO CORSON, §
Appellant §
§
§ CAUSE NO. 03-15-00056-CR §
V. § TRIAL COURT NO. 72,779
§
§
§
THE STATE OF TEXAS, §
Appellee § MOTION FOR ACCESS TO APPELLATE RECORD NOW COMES Vincent Alonzo Corson, TDCJ No. 01973705, Gurney Transfer Facility, 1385 FM 3328, Palestine, Texas 75803 and
respectfully moves this Honorable Court to grant him access to the
appellate record in the above-referenced cause in order to effectuate his
right to file a response to the Anders briefs filed herein by Appellant’s
appellate counsel.
Respectfully submitted, Vincent Alonzo Corson TDCJ No. 01973705 Gurney Transfer Facility 1385 FM 3328 Palestine, Texas 75803 Date:
*53 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND OF COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 9 This is to certify that on March 2015, a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document was served on Shelly D. Strimple and
Bob Odom, Assistant District Attorneys of Bell County, trial and appellate
attorneys, respectively, for appellee, the State of Texas, PO Box 540, Belton,
Texas 76513 in accordance with the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure,
and that motion is in compliance with Rule 9 of the Texas Rules of Appellate
Procedure and that portion which must be included under Rule 9.4(i)(1)
contains 232 words.
Vincent Alonzo Corson TDCJ No. 01973705 Gurney Transfer Facility 1385 FM 3328 Palestine, Texas 75803 Date:
*54 IN THE THIRD COURT OF APPEALS AT AUSTIN TEXAS VINCENT ALONZO CORSON, §
Appellant §
§
§ CAUSE NO. 03-15-00057-CR §
V. § TRIAL COURT NO. 72,780
§
§
§
THE STATE OF TEXAS, §
Appellee § MOTION FOR ACCESS TO APPELLATE RECORD NOW COMES Vincent Alonzo Corson, TDCJ No. 01973705, Gurney Transfer Facility, 1385 FM 3328, Palestine, Texas 75803 and
respectfully moves this Honorable Court to grant him access to the
appellate record in the above-referenced cause in order to effectuate his
right to file a response to the Anders briefs filed herein by Appellant’s
appellate counsel.
Respectfully submitted, Vincent Alonzo Corson TDCJ No. 01973705 Gurney Transfer Facility 1385 FM 3328 Palestine, Texas 75803 Date:
*55 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND OF COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 9 This is to certify that on March 2015, a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document was served on Shelly Bob Odom,
Assistant District Attorney of Bell County, appellate attorneys for appellee,
the State of Texas, PO Box 540, Belton, Texas 76513 in accordance with
the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, and that motion is in compliance
with Rule 9 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure and that portion
which must be included under Rule 9.4(i)(1) contains 232 words.
Vincent Alonzo Corson TDCJ No. 01973705 Gurney Transfer Facility 1385 FM 3328 Palestine, Texas 75803 Date: