Facts
- Joey Paul Clement was charged with three counts of vehicular homicide and one count of operating a vehicle while intoxicated (fourth offense) following a fatal collision on November 20, 2021 [lines="25-32"].
- The accident resulted in the deaths of Lily Dufrene, Michaila Bowling, and Hali Coss, all of whom were passengers in another vehicle that collided with Clement's truck [lines="46-55"].
- At trial, the jury found Clement guilty of negligent homicide for Dufrene's death and guilty of vehicular homicide for Bowling and Coss's deaths [lines="36-41"].
- The trial court sentenced him to five years for negligent homicide and a combined total of sixty years for the two counts of vehicular homicide, along with twenty years for the DUI offense, all to be served consecutively [lines="39-42"].
- Clement appealed, raising multiple assignments of error related to the sufficiency of evidence and the legality of the imposed sentences [lines="43-45"].
Issues
- Whether the evidence presented was sufficient to uphold the convictions for vehicular homicide and negligent homicide based on the claim that Clement's intoxication did not contribute to the accidents [lines="65-70"].
- Whether the trial court imposed an unconstitutional excessive sentence for negligent homicide given the circumstances surrounding the case [lines="420-422"].
Holdings
- The appellate court affirmed that the evidence was sufficient to establish Clement's intoxication as a contributing factor to the deaths of the victims, as the State met its burden of proof under the vehicular homicide statute [lines="331-332"].
- The court found no abuse of discretion in the sentencing for negligent homicide, holding it was not unconstitutionally excessive given Clement's criminal history and the severity of the offenses [lines="540-541"].
OPINION
Case Information
*1 Before: McKEOWN, GOULD, and H.A. THOMAS, Circuit Judges.
Rudy Alexander Villeda-Mejia is a citizen of Honduras. He petitions for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) , which denied his motion to reopen proceedings seeking protection under the Convention Against *2 Torture (“CAT”) based on changed circumstances in Honduras. We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion, and we defer to the BIA’s exercise of discretion unless it act ed arbitrarily, irrationally, or contrary to law. Reyes-Corado v. Garland , 76 F.4th 1256, 1259 (9th Cir. 2023). We deny the petition.
To prevail on a motion to reopen on the basis of changed country conditions, a petitioner must: “(1) produce evidence that conditions have changed in the country of removal; (2) demonstrate that the evidence is material; (3) show that the evidence was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearings; and (4) ‘demonstrate that the new evidence, when considered together with the evidence presented at the original hearing, would establish prima facie eligibility for the re lief sought.’” Agonafer v. Sessions , 859 F.3d 1198, 1204 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Toufighi v. Mukasey , 538 F.3d 988, 996 (9th Cir. 2008)). The new evidence must be “qualitatively different” from the evidence presented at the previous hearing. Malty v. Ashcroft , 381 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir. 2004).
Here, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Villeda- Mejia’s motion to reopen. As the BIA noted, the evidence that Villeda-Mejia submitted in support of his motion to reopen, which consisted of an academic article and a news article, “reflects a continuation of the crime, violence and police corruption previously considered by the Immigration Judge during the merits hearing.” Because this *3 evidence “simply recounts previous conditions presented at a previous hearing,” it is insufficient to show a change in country conditions. Agonafer , 859 F.3d at 1204.
PETITION DENIED.
[*] This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
[**] The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).