95 P. 686 | Idaho | 1908
This is an appeal from the judgment. The record presented to this court consists of the judgment-roll and a statement of the case settled and allowed by the trial court.
The plaintiff alleges in the complaint that it is the owner and in possession of a public easement of an undivided one-ninth interest in a certain ditch, and has the right to convey in said ditch known as the Big Ditch, taking water from Wood river, in Blaine county, Idaho, 700 inches of water through said ditch and laterals; that it is the owner and in the possession of all ditches and laterals for the purpose of conveying water along, over and upon the lots, blocks, streets and alleys of Hailey; that it is the owner of a public easement, and in the possession and entitled to the right to use 700 inches under four-inch pressure, of the waters of Big Wood river, through said ditch and laterals, for irrigation and domestic purposes. It is then alleged that the defendant claims some interest in said property which is without any right whatever. Plaintiff demands judgment that the defendant set forth his claim to said property, and that a decree be entered adjudging that he has no interest in said property, and that the plaintiff’s title is good and valid, and that the defendant be enjoined from asserting any claim to said property.
The defendant puts in issue the allegations of the complaint by denials, and alleges that in April, 1883, the Oregon Land and Improvement Company located and appropriated a water right to the extent of 6,000 inches of water out of the waters of Wood river, and constructed the canal mentioned in plaintiff’s complaint, known as the Big Ditch, for the pur
As a further defense, the defendant pleads the statute of limitations, under sees. 4036, 4037 and 4060, Rev. Stat. Upon the issues thus presented, the court made his findings of fact and conclusions of law, and entered a decree as follows:
“Wherefore, by reason of the law and findings aforesaid, it is ordered, adjudged and decreed that the village of Hailey is entitled to the right to the use and possession of 271.45 inches of the waters of Big Wood river, through what is*487 known as the Idaho & Oregon Land Improvement Company Hitch or ‘Big Hitch’ and laterals, which is taken from said Big Wood river abont four and one-half miles north of the village of Hailey, Blaine county, Idaho, measured under a four-inch pressure, at thec point where the main lateral is diverted from said ditch, near the northeast corner of the town of Hailey, for any and all legitimate street purposes on the streets and alleys of the said village of Hailey. That the defendant has no right, title or interest whatever in the plaintiff’s right to the use of said water or any part thereof. Except and provided, however, that if, at any time or times, the said full quantity of 271.45 inches of water shall not be necessary to be used as aforesaid, the said village shall, at such times, take of said quantity only so much as shall be so necessary, and permit the remainder to flow uninterrupted in said ditch.
“That the village of Hailey has an easement in said Idaho & Oregon Land Improvement Company Hitch or ‘Big Hitch’ and in the laterals extending from the same to, along and upon the streets and alleys of said village, to the extent of conveying through said ditch and laterals 271.45 inches of water, and that the defendant has no right, title or interest whatever in said easement.
“That plaintiff have judgment for its costs expended herein, amounting to the sum of $103.00.
“Hated February 2d, 1906.”
By the pleadings the issues presented to the court for decision are:
1. Is the plaintiff the owner of a public easement and in the possession of an undivided one-ninth interest in what is known as the Big Hitch, taken from Wood river in Blaine county, Idaho, and an equal interest in the laterals extending from said ditch to said village; and has the plaintiff the right to convey 700 inches of water through said ditch and laterals for use on the streets of said city or village ?
2. Is the plaintiff the owner and in the possession of any and all ditches taken from said ditch and laterals for the pur
3. Is the plaintiff the owner of a public easement in the-possession and right to the nse of 700 inches of water, measured under a fonr-inch pressure, of the waters of said Big Wood river through said ditch and laterals for irrigation and domestic purposes?
4. Has the defendant been the sole and exclusive owner of the whole of the property described in the complaint and seised and possessed of the same, and in the sole and exclusive control thereof, and paid taxes thereon for a period of time exceeding five years?
An examination of the findings shows that the court found that the village of Hailey is a municipal corporation organized on April 21, 1903; that on December 6, 1880, John Hailey made a desert entry containing 484.70 acres, and in the spring of 1881, laid out the town of Hailey into streets and alleys, blocks and lots, etc., and made a plat of the same and filed said plat in the county recorder’s office in said county on May 10,1881; that on August 24, 1882, said Hailey filed a revised plat of said town of Hailey, embracing the same land included in the original plat and covering substantially all of said desert entry; in 1881, John Hailey constructed a ditch from Indian creek to the town of Hailey as then platted, and during the years 1881 and 1882 conveyed water through said ditch from Indian creek to the town of Hailey, and used the same on the streets by the inhabitants of said town for irrigation and other street purposes; that on June 7,1882, said Hailey entered into an agreement of sale with the Idaho & Oregon Land Improvement Company, agreeing to sell to said company the land embraced in said desert entry, excepting such lots as had previously been disposed of, said Hailey to make proof and then convey according to said agreement; that on March 24, 1883, the Oregon Land & Improvement Company located a water right for 12,000 inches, to be taken from Wood river about four and one-half miles above the town of Hailey, said water to be used for irrigation purposes upon said, desert entry and upon other claims; and in
Then follows what is denominated a history of the use of said water in said town, in which it is recited by the trial court, that as soon as the plat of the original town of Hailey was filed, the people began purchasing lots and erecting buildings, and that water was conveyed to said town from Indian creek and used in the years of 1881, 1882 and 1883; that the Big Ditch was dug in the summer of 1883, taking water from Big Wood river, which, during the latter part of the year 1883, was used on the streets in the town of Hailey, and as the town grew, ditches were extended, trees planted, and water used, and from the year 1881 up to the present time, the lot owners and inhabitants have planted trees yearly, and that said Hailey and his successors in interest have planted trees and encouraged the planting of trees; that such trees required irrigation, and had been irrigated every year by the water and ditches in question; that the use by the public of said water
Tbe court, as conclusions of law, found that by tbe incorporation of the village, tbe municipality took exclusive control and authority of tbe streets of Hailey and all right and authority to use water on tbe streets; and that tbe lands covered by the streets and alleys were set apart and dedicated by John Hailey for public use for highways, for public traffic, and for all uses and purposes; and that tbe setting apart of tbe streets was more than a common-law dedication, that it was a dedication enlarged by statute to tbe extent that tbe lot owners purchased with their lots tbe right to plant trees in tbe streets of Hailey; and by statute were granted tbe right to use tbe soil for tree growing, and that this statutory enlargement is something more than a mere right of passage, and gives a right to tbe use of tbe soil for tbe growth of vegetation, and that this right to tbe use of tbe soil cannot be separated from tbe right to tbe use of tbe necessary water to induce growth; and there being a grant to tbe use of tbe land, tbe right to tbe use of tbe water follows; that tbe water in question is appurtenant to tbe land in tbe streets and alleys, and tbe use of the same for legitimate street purposes is inseparable therefrom, and is incident to and necessary for a reasonable enjoyment thereof; that tbe beneficial uses to which water can be put on tbe streets and alleys of Hailey includes all sanitary considerations, extinguishing fires, betterment and preservation of roadways, etc.; that tbe village of Hailey is entitled to tbe right to tbe use of 271.45 inches of said waters of Big river, through said Big Ditch mentioned, under a four-inch pressure at tbe point where tbe main lateral is diverted from said ditch, to be used for legitimate street purposes when necessary; and that the village has an easement in said ditch and laterals to tbe extent of conveying through said ditch and laterals 271.45 inches of water, and is entitled to a decree of such water and easement in said ditch; and that the defendant has no interest or estate whatever in the plaintiff’s right to use said water or its easement.
It will be seen from the findings that the trial court proceeded upon the theory that by the use of the water through the Big Ditch from Big Wood river upon the desert entry of said Hailey, under which said desert entry was reclaimed, and upon which final proof was made, said water became an appurtenant to said land and inseparable therefrom. If this be the theory upon which said case was tried, and the view of the law upon which the findings are founded, then said findings are unwarranted by law. There is no statute of the United States, or of this state, which prohibits a desert entryman from disposing of the water used for final proof, separate from the land, after proof has been made.
When the water had been used for reclaiming said land, and final proof of the same had been submitted to the government and patent issued therefor, the entryman had complied with the legal requirements prescribed by the government, and took title to his land without any conditions or restrictions, the land became Ms property to dispose of as he might see fit, either the water and the land together or separately.
In the case of Hard v. Boise City Irrigation and Land Co., 9 Ida. 589, 76 Pac. 331, 65 L. R. A. 407, this court held that the owner of a water right, by purchase, or original appropriation, had a right to dispose of the same and sell the water separate and apart from the land. To the same effect is Johnston v. Little Horse Irrigation Co., 13 Wyo. 208, 110 Am. St. Rep. 986, 70 L. R. A. 341, 79 Pac. 22. If this be a correct statement of the law, then the trial court erred in its conclusion of law, to the effect that the water applied to the desert
The next question is: Do the findings show,that when the desert entryman filed a plat, laying out the townsite of Hailey in the spring of 1881 and in August 1882, that he thereby made a dedication of the streets and alleys of said platted ground, and that such dedication carried with it as an incident and necessary to the enjoyment thereof, the water which had been applied to said land %
The findings show that the appropriation of water from Big Wood river was not made until March 24, 1883, and the ditch was constructed during the summer of 1883, and in the latter part of the summer or fall of 1883, water was conveyed through said ditch from Wood river to the town of Hailey, and used upon the streets of said village; therefore, the water appropriated from Wood river and conducted through said Big Ditch had not been applied to the desert entry of Mr. Hailey at the time said plats were made and recorded; consequently, the dedication made by the making and recording of said plats, if any, would not cover the water from Big Wood river, which was not appropriated until seven months after the filing of the amended plat.
The water used on said desert entry at the time said plats of the village of Hailey were filed for record was water taken from Indian creek, and not from Big Wood river through said Big Ditch, so whatever passed by the dedication in the making and recording of said plat would only apply to the condition of the land, marked as streets and alleys, at the times when said plats were filed, if at all, and would not pass to the public use any of the waters of Big Wood river carried through said Big Ditch.
It is further contended by respondent that the findings of the court show a dedication of the waters of Big Wood river, carried through said Big Ditch, by user, and that the same will arise out of either one of the following conditions:
1. For a prescriptive period.
2. For the period prescribed by statute as a bar for real actions.
It is admitted, however, that to support the first two classes the limit of adverse user must exist, and the use must not be permissive only, and that the findings do not show a dedication upon such grounds. But it is contended that the user of said water has been for such a period of time, that to deny the respondent’s right thereto at this time would affect private rights and public convenience. This is the real and important question in this case: Has the municipality of Hailey and the people within said village used the waters in controversy a sufficient length of time and under such conditions that the same amounts to a dedication by user? Before the findings of the court can establish a dedication by user, it must appear therefrom that the owner intended to dedicate the water to the public use. As said by the supreme court of California in the case of Hartley v. Vermillion, 70 Pac. 273, “The intention of the owner to dedicate is a vital element in every case, and that intention also is a pure question of fact. A mere permissive user, by the owner, of the land for a highway never can amount to a dedication. That is a user by license, and nothing more, and of itself never would ripen into a dedication, no matter how long continued.”
In the ease of Cooper v. Monterey County, 104 Cal. 437, 38 Pac. 106, the supreme court of that state had under consideration the sufficiency of a finding to show a dedication of a public highway. The finding in that case after describing the highway continues . “has been continuously and uninterruptedly traveled and used by the general public as and for a public road or highway ever since 1872; and that ‘the same is a public highway’; and ‘that such use of said portion of said land as a road or highway by the general public has been with the knowledge of plaintiff and without objection on his part.’ ”
The court commenting on that finding says: “The finding that the strip of land in question was traveled and used by the public ever since 1872, with the knowledge of the plaintiff and without objection on his part, is only the finding of probative
In the case of the City and County of San Francisco v. Grote, 120 Cal. 62, 65 Am. St. Rep. 155, 52 Pac. 128, 41 L. R. A. 335, the court says:
“It is no trivial thing to take another’s land without compensation, and for this reason the courts will not lightly declare a dedication to public use. It is elementary law that an intention to dedicate upon the part of the owner must be plainly manifest. ’ ’
And in the case of Hartley v. Vermillion, supra, the court further says:
“And while long-continued user without objection and with the knowledge and consent of the owner is some evidence of a right in the public, still there must be joined to that user an intention upon the part of the owner to dedicate, or no dedication will be consummated; for the long-continued user by the public without objection by the owner is entirely consistent with a license to the public to use the land, and therefore evidence of long-continued user alone will not support a finding of fact that a dedication was created. Neither will a finding of fact of mere long-continued user support a conclusion of law that a public highway was created. As previously stated, in order to constitute a dedication of a highway by evidence in pais, there must be convincing evidence that the owner intended to appropriate the land to the public use.”
The findings ‘ ‘ That it was the intent of Hailey and his successors down to Eiley, that the occupants of the town tract should have the free use of this water on the streets of the town for all legitimate purposes,” and “That the use of this water on the streets of Hailey is necessary for a reasonable enjoyment of the streets, and private rights and public convenience and accommodation would be materially affected by an interruption of the use of this water on the streets of Hailey,” are findings of probative facts. Such probative
We are, therefore, clearly of the opinion that the findings in this ease are not sufficient of themselves to show a dedication by user.
An examination of the findings clearly shows that the court proceeded upon the theory that the use of the water by Mr. Hailey on his desert entry in the reclamation thereof, and for the purpose of making final proof, affixed said water to the land and made the same inseparable therefrom, for it is found by the trial court that said desert entry consisted of 440 acres, and that the original plat and the revised plat included substantially all the lands embraced in said Hailey’s desert entry, and that the streets and alleys set apart upon said plat include 181.09 acres of said entry, thereby showing that the court considered the acreage of the streets and alleys to be the basis for figuring the water dedicated to the same. It will be observed, however, that the court did not find the amount of water which had actually been used, or necessary to be used upon said streets and alleys. This, it was necessary for the court to do as the extent of the dedication, if there be a dedication of said water, was one of the issues in said case.
A gain; the defendant’s answer presented an issue under sec. 4036, Rev. Stat., which is as follows: “No action for the recovery of real property, or for the recovery of the posses
Upon the issue thus presented, the court made no finding. In the case of Later Bros. v. Haywood, ante, p. 45, 93 Pac. 374, this court held that where the trial court fails to find on all the material issues, the judgment will be reversed, unless a finding thereon, whether for or against the successful party, would not affect the judgment entered. And where the court fails to find on an issue presented, and a finding thereon might call for a different judgment, it is reversible error. It is apparent, therefore, in this ease that had the court made a finding upon the issue interposed, of the statute of limitations, it would affect and control the judgment, and if in favor of the •defendant, the judgment must follow such finding, and be for defendant. The failure to find upon this issue is reversible error.
Again, examining the findings we are unable to discover any facts found which would justify a judgment that the plaintiff <or the public had any interest in said water appropriation, nr any interest in the Big Ditch through which the waters of said appropriation were carried. At most, the facts found disclose that the water used by the public upon the streets nf said village of Hailey was taken from a lateral leading from the Big Ditch. If this be correct, the findings would not warrant a judgment giving the village of Hailey the right to the use and possession of 271.45 inches of the water of Big
The judgment in this case is therefore reversed, and the cause remanded for a retrial. Clerk’s costs on appeal, and the costs of printing twenty-five pages of the transcript, and the reply brief, are awarded to appellant.