19 Ohio App. 60 | Ohio Ct. App. | 1924
The village of Bay brought its action in the Common Pleas against the village of Dover and others to quiet title to certain real estate. The trial court decreed the relief sought and error is now prosecuted to this court.
The record is incomplete, but we think that the facts at issue are not uncertain. It appears that ini 1899 Dover was one of the townships in the county of Cuyahoga, and that the trustees of that township bought the land in question, consisting of less than two .acres along the lake shore and within the township, and that the purpose of such land was to afford a public park; that in 1901 the hamlet of Bay was erected in. said township under the municipal laws then prevailing, and the boundaries of the hamlet included the land
Actual equities would be impossible of ■ proof. The taxpayers whose money went into the original purchase are beyond identification and the real estate subjected to taxation at that time is partly in the village of Dover, partly in the village of Bay and partly in the village of North Olmsted. The decree in the Common Pleas was against the village of North Olmsted as well as the village of Dover, but the former is not complaining of the decree rendered. The question before this court, therefore, is whether by operation of law the legal title of the property in question passed into the township in which it was situated or remained in the old township which retained the original name of Dover.
It is unnecessary for us to review the authorities so fully afforded in the interesting and exhaustive briefs herein. Some of them involve the construction of statutes ; others hinge upon their own
“It has been frequently declared in general terms that, in the absence of a specific statutory adjustment of the matter, the old corporation owns all the public property within her new limits, and is responsible for all debts contracted by her before the act of separation was passed; and that the new subdivision has no claim to any portion of the public property except what falls within its boundaries
It is not necessary for us, however, to go to the full length of the text quoted in holding that all public property within its boundaries vests in the new political unit. There might be some classes of property that would not so pass. Its acquisition by the original unit might have been for such purposes, and the relations of the old to the new unit might be such, as to create a situation requiring the court to recognize the continuing title of the old unit to that particular property. Board of Education v. Board of Education, 16 Ohio St., 595. In this case we are dealing, however, with property admittedly acquired for park purposes. The original township would certainly not be heard to claim title to township roads or bridges or other property or improvements of like character. They passed, of course, to the new township. It seems that there was no statute conferring authority on townships to establish and maintain parks, but there was as much authority for Bay township to control the park as there was for
The decree of the Oommon Pleas will be modified to conform to the petition and evidence by a finding and decree that the village of Bay is the holder of the legal title to the property in question for the use and benefit of the public as a public park, and with this modification the judgment will be affirmed at the costs of the defendant in error.
Judgment modified, and affirmed as modified.