delivered the opinion of the court:
On September 11, 1986, the Board of Fire and Police Commissioners (the Board) of the Village of Creve Coеur (the Village) decided to discipline Dennis Fletcher with a 30-day suspension for conduct unbecoming оf a police officer. Thereafter, Fletcher and his union, Local 463, Counsel 163, American Fedеration of State, County, and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO (the Union), filed a grievance pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement with the Village, contesting the Board’s decision. Fletcher and thе Union also filed a complaint for administrative review against the Village and the Board.
The Village refused to consider the grievance, declaring it nongrievable and stating that Fletcher’s only aрpeal was pursuant to the fire and police commission act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 24, par. 10— 2.1 — 1 et seq.). Thе Union replied that the Village’s position was unacceptable and requested that an arbitrаtor be appointed. The Village then brought this action in the circuit court of Tazewell County, seeking a declaratory judgment that the disciplinary action taken by the Board against Fletcher is not subjеct to the grievance procedure outlined by the collective bargaining agreement. Thе defendants, Fletcher and the Union, counterclaimed, seeking to compel the Village to аrbitrate. When the court entered its summary judgment in favor of the defendants, the Village brought this appeаl, arguing that the circuit court erred in its interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement and that arbitration of the Board’s decision is barred by law.
Both parties agree that the first issue to be decided in this appeal is whether the circuit court erred when it interpreted the colleсtive bargaining agreement to require arbitration of the parties’ dispute. When a question of interpretation arises, it is fundamental that the court adopt a construction of the contract thаt is reasonable rather than that which would produce an irrational or absurd result. (Scheduling Corp. of America v. Massello (1983),
“Except as provided by the Fire and Police Commission Act, disciplinary action or measures shall include only the following: Oral reprimand Written reprimand
Suspension (notice to be given in writing) Disciplinary action may be imposed upon an employee only for failing to fulfill his responsibilities as an emplоyee. Any disciplinary action or measure imposed upon an employee may be processed as a grievance through the regular grievance procedure.”
The trial court rеasoned that while the contract in this section discussed a police and fire commission aсt exception, the exception applied only to the first sentence and not to the rеmaining sentences in the section. Thus, it concluded that the fire and police commission act wаs not a consideration in deciding whether a particular disciplinary action could be prоcessed through the grievance procedure. We observe that while such an interpretation may be constructionally plausible, it provides for an irrational result considering the nature of thе grievance procedure. In this case, for instance, supposing that the parties proсeeded pursuant to the fire and police commission act by going through the Board of Policе and Fire Commissioners, the circuit court, the appellate court to the supreme court of Illinois, one of the parties, dissatisfied by the result of the supreme court, could then, according tо the circuit court’s interpretation, proceed through the regular grievance procedure where a police officer’s immediate sergeant could review and decide contrary to the decision of the supreme court.
The actual result in this case of the circuit cоurt’s interpretation is to permit the officer’s immediate sergeant to review and decide contrary to the decision of the Board of Commissioners. While such a result may not be as irrational as thе hypothetical presented above, it is nonetheless irrational and, therefore, erronеous. The circuit court should have concluded that the fire and police commission act exception applied to all the sentences of the relevant section of the collective bargaining agreement and that a matter taken pursuant to the fire and police сommission act, therefore, precluded use of the regular grievance procedure.
Therefore, because the circuit court erred in its interpretation of the contract, we accordingly reverse its judgment.
Reversed.
WOMBACHER, P.J., and HEIPLE, J., concur.