Village of Canajoharie v. Planning BoardVillage of Canajoharie v. Planning Board
In 2007, Beech-Nut Nutrition Corporation (sued as Beech-Nut Nutrition Group)1 made a business decision to consolidate operations from its three existing facilities to one central location. At this time, Beech-Nut operated two manufacturing facilities in Montgomery County—one in the Village of Canajoharie and one in the Town of Fort Plain—and a corporate headquarters in Missouri. While Beech-Nut considered many options, including the option of relocating outside of New York, it ultimately decided to consolidate operations within New York and indeed within Montgomery County; that is, it endeavored to build a new facility in a business park owned by respondent Montgomery County Industrial Development Agency (hereinafter
To that end, Beech-Nut sought and received funding for the project from respondent Empire State Development Corporation and thereafter enlisted the assistance of the IDA in making the project feasible. In its application to the IDA, Beech-Nut detailed its corporate decision to consolidate and relocate (i.e., to preserve its competitive position, meet expanding production needs and maintain compliance with stringent manufacturing and safety requirements) and further detailed the infeasibility of consolidating and expanding at the Canajoharie facility itself (i.e., the 115-year-old facility was in great need of modernization, had recently been damaged by a flood and had an extremely limited physical footprint). Beech-Nut further detailed its exploration of relocating its operations outside of New York.
In the meantime, over the course of many months, review of the project under the State Environmental Quality Review Act (see
Petitioner commenced this combined declaratory judgment action/
In its amended petition, petitioner alleged that the Planning
Generally, standing to challenge compliance with SEQRA turns on a showing by the challenger that it has sustained an injury-in-fact different from that of the public at large and one that falls within the zone of interest protected by SEQRA (see Society of Plastics Indus. v County of Suffolk, 77 NY2d 761, 777 [1991]). A municipality, such as petitioner, “must demonstrate how its personal or property rights, either personally or in a representative capacity, will be directly and specifically affected apart from any damage suffered by the public at large” (Matter of Saratoga Lake Protection & Improvement Dist. v Department of Pub. Works of City of Saratoga Springs, 46 AD3d 979, 983 [2007], lv denied 10 NY3d 706 [2008] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). Moreover, with respect to SEQRA claims in particular, a challenger “must demonstrate that it will suffer an injury that is environmental and not solely economic in nature” (Matter of Mobil Oil Corp. v Syracuse Indus. Dev. Agency, 76 NY2d 428, 433 [1990]).
Even viewing the allegations in the amended petition in a light most favorable to it (see e.g. Matter of Powers v De Groodt, 43 AD3d 509, 513 [2007]), petitioner failed to make any showing that it would indeed suffer a specific or direct environmental harm as a result of the proposed project (see Matter of Mobil Oil Corp. v Syracuse Indus. Dev. Agency, 76 NY2d at 433-434).3 Rather, the amended petition contains nothing more than allegations of potential economic harm, ranging from the loss of employment, commercial activity and sales tax revenue, to negative impacts on population, housing values and resources, to increased tax burdens for all remaining property owners. To this end, even the allegations of economic harm do not arise from the proposed project itself but, rather, from Beech-Nut‘s business decision to transfer all manufacturing and corporate
Next, as petitioner was not an “[a]ffected tax jurisdiction” (
Finally, petitioner‘s remaining contentions, to the extent properly before us, have been reviewed and found to be without merit.
Cardona, P.J., Mercure, Kavanagh and Stein, JJ., concur.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.