A federal court “may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.” 28 U.S.C. § 2283. In February 1988 Citizens Utilities Co. of Illinois filed a suit in state court, asking the court to enforce a consent decree it had entered in 1971 resolving litigation between Citizens and the Village of Bolingbrook. The Village responded with this suit, asking the federal judge to enjoin the state proceedings. An injunction is “expressly authorized by Act of Congress”, according to the Village, because the consent decree is a contract in restraint of trade, its enforcement a violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 2. The decree allocates between Citizens and the Village the responsibility (and the entitlement) to provide water and sewer service to buildings in and near the Village. The Village believes that the decree is a territorial allocation, unlawful per se, and not saved by the state action exemption after
City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.,
One may search the Sherman Act and the enforcement clauses of the antitrust laws — principally § 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26—in vain for mention of injunctions against state proceedings. A tour through the debates leading to the antitrust laws will not reveal any discussion of the topic. The Supreme Court has not brought light out of this darkness. Three Justices concluded in
Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp.,
I would hold that no injunction may issue against currently pending state-court proceedings unless those proceedings are themselves part of a “pattern of baseless, repetitive claims” that are being used as an anticompetitive device, all the traditional prerequisites for equitable relief are satisfied, and the only way to give the antitrust laws their intended scope is by staying the state proceedings.
Approaches such as that taken by Justice Blackmun, however attractive as a matter of first principles, have been criticized on the ground that they read “expressly” out of § 2283. E.g., Martin H. Redish,
The Anti-Injunction Statute Reconsidered,
44 U.Chi.L.Rev. 717 (1977). Recently the Court has emphasized unanimously that § 2283 establishes a fundamental policy, the exceptions to which “are ‘not [to] be enlarged by loose statutory construction.’ ”
Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp.,
— U.S. —,
The district court applied Justice Blackmun’s approach and concluded that no injunction could issue, because Citizens has filed but a single suit. The Village nonetheless believes that it prevails under Justice Blackmun’s approach. It treats the Justice’s reference to multiple suits as a restatement of the elements of “sham litigation” — that is, litigation not entitled to the protection of the
Noerr-Pennington
doctrine. Since 1977 many courts, including this one, have recognized that a single suit may be a “sham”, and therefore a substantive violation of the antitrust laws, when it is pursued in order to impose high costs of defending rather than in order to obtain relief. E.g.,
MCI Communications Corp. v. AT & T,
This is a colorable argument but misses Justice Blackmun’s point. He inquired whether the failure to issue an injunction would prevent the effective enforcement of the antitrust laws. In other words, when does the need to raise antitrust defenses in state court itself impose high costs on rival-rous behavior, discourage competition, raise prices to consumers, and thereby violate the antitrust laws? If only one suit has been filed in state court, defending against that suit is no more costly than filing an independent action in federal court. In either case, if the merits of the antitrust argument are clear there will be swift vindication. When the adversary pursues multiple suits in multiple forums it may be disproportionately expensive to defend in state court. Otherwise, what’s the difference? Perhaps if the state litigation were extraordinarily expensive and the state judge refused to entertain (or indefinitely postponed considering) an antitrust defense, the state suit could penalize competition and so be a source of antitrust concern. Such events must be rare, however, and the search for them may not be worth the candle. Waiting for multiple suits usually smokes out the antitrust offender’s true goals and guards against *484 hasty federal intervention based on little more than speculation that the state courts will not do their jobs.
The need to defend against the state litigation could thwart the achievement of the objectives of the Sherman Act only when the process is the punishment. See
Grip-Pak, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc.,
The Village would face a further hurdle even if we were to agree with its recharacterization of Justice Blackmun’s approach. The Village concedes that it is not entitled to an injunction unless the state suit is “sham litigation” within the meaning of
California Motor Transport, Premier,
and
Grip-Pak.
Nothing in the record suggests that Citizens filed the state suit because it would be costly for the Village to defend. Citizens not only wanted to win but also has won. The state court has rendered a judgment almost entirely in Citizens’ favor.
*
The Village denies that its loss is significant, informing us that it did not present an antitrust defense. Because federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction of cases under the Sherman Act, see
General Investment Co. v. Lake Shore Ry.,
Not so. Federal courts may have exclusive jurisdiction of claims under the Sherman Act, but state courts are competent to adjudicate antitrust defenses. See, e.g.,
Vendo,
Citizens contends that the Village’s decision to withhold the antitrust arguments from the state court precludes further litigation in the federal court. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1738 the federal court must give this neglect the same effect a state court would.
Migra v. Warren City School District Board of Education,
a litigant is foreclosed as to matters that could have been litigated, just as well as those actually litigated.... [If] the Village resolutely refuses to pose the question to the state court by way of defense, it faces the kinds of risks that I have identified.... I caution the Village that it proceeds at own risk [sic] if it doesn’t tender the antitrust defense in the state court hearing.
The parties have not briefed in this court the question under § 1738: whether Illinois law precludes the Village from filing a fresh antitrust suit, having omitted to make an antitrust defense in the pending suit. The district court must decide the point in the first instance if the Village presses its demands for damages or prospective relief. For now what matters is that Citizens’ victory in the state case, coupled with the absence of any claim that Citizens filed its suit to drain the Village’s coffers rather than to enforce the consent decree, makes it impossible to characterize the suit as a sham.
So we affirm the judgment for two reasons, each sufficient. Even if the suit pending in state court were “sham litigation”, § 2283 would prevent an injunction under Justice Blackmun’s views because the state court may entertain the antitrust defense without jeopardizing the achievement of federal objectives; but the suit is not “sham litigation” within the meaning of California Motor Transport anyway. Neither preliminary nor permanent injunc-tive relief is available against the case now pending. The district court must decide whether the Village is entitled to damages or relief against future litigation, to which § 2283 does not apply.
AFFIRMED.
Notes
Citizens believes that its victory at trial in state court renders the Village’s request for a preliminary injunction moot. It does not. The district court could enjoin the ongoing state proceedings (now on appeal) and block execution of the judgment. The injunction in Vendo forbade implementation of a final judgment rendered by the state court. The dispute between the parties is live, even with respect to the request for preliminary injunctive relief.
