Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.
[Tjhat astonishing Chicago — a city where they are always rubbing the lamp, and fetching up the genii, and contriving and achieving new impossibilities. It is hopeless for the occasional visitor to try to keep up with Chicago— she outgrows his prophecies faster than he can make them.
- Mark TwaiN, Life on the Mississippi 326 (Signet Classic 2001) (1883)
The City of Chicago (Chicago or City) has conceived a $6.6 billion program to modernize O’Hare International Airport, which consistently ranks as one of our nation’s busiest and most delayed airports. To fund the initial component of the program — the preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) regarding the modernization program — Chicago sought and received from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) approval to impose a $4.50 facility fee on passengers enplaning at O’Hare. Now three Chicago suburbs, the Villages of Bensenville and Elk Grove and the City of Park Ridge, petition for review of the FAA’s decision, alleging that, in approving Chicago’s application, it violated the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. §§ 40101 et seq., the Administrative *1116 Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seq., and its own regulations. Because the FAA did not find, as required by statute, that Chicago’s passenger facility fee will generate only that revenue necessary to fund the EIS, we grant the municipalities’ petition and remand for the FAA’s further consideration.
I.
The FAA may authorize an “eligible agency,” i.e., a public agency controlling a commercial airport, see 49 U.S.C. § 40117(a)(2), to impose a “passenger facility fee” of from one to three dollars “on each paying passenger of an air carrier” to be used to finance “an eligible airport-related project,” id. § 40117(b)(1). An “eligible airport-related project” includes “a project for airport development or airport planning.” Id. § 40117(a)(3)(A). Once the FAA determines that an agency’s passenger facility fee application is substantially complete, it must advise the public of its decision by letter and give notice in the Federal Register of its intent to rule on the application and invite public comment thereon. See id. § 40117(c)(3); 14 C.F.R. § 158.27(b)-(c). The FAA has 120 days after receiving the application to approve or deny it, in whole or in part. See 49 U.S.C § 40117(c)(4); 14 C.F.R. § 158.27(c)(4). .
Before authorizing any passenger facility fee, however, the FAA must make three specific findings based on the application. See 49 U.S.C § 40117(d). The FAA must find that the proposed passenger facility fee will not generate excessive revenue, that is, revenue constituting “more than the amount necessary to finance the specific project.” Id. § 40117(d)(1). Additionally, the FAA must find that the specific project is an eligible airport-related project that will maintain or improve the “capacity, safety, or security of the national air transportation system”; reduce airport noise; or improve conditions for competition “between or among air carriers and foreign air carriers.” Id. § 40117(d)(2)(A)-(C). Finally, the FAA must find that the application includes an “adequate justification” for the specified project. Id. § 40117(d)(3).
The FAA may also authorize, under a different standard, a higher passenger facility fee of $4.00 or $4.50. Id. § 40117(b)(4). “[I]n the case of an airport that has more than .25 percent of the total number of annual boardings in the United States,” the higher fee can be imposed if the FAA finds that the project “will make a significant contribution to improving air safety and security, increasing competition among ah- carriers, reducing current or anticipated congestion, or reducing the impact of aviation noise on people living near the airport.” 1 Id. § 40117(b)(4)(A). The FAA approved Chicago’s passenger facility fee challenged here under this statutory framework.
In October 2002, Chicago’s Department of Aviation (Department) applied to the FAA for authority to impose and use a passenger facility fee of $4.50 to fund a “Runway Formulation Project,” the initial component of the City’s O’Hare modernization program. Joint Appendix (J.A.) 54, 69, 71-72. In its application, the Department explained that the modernization program would cost $6.6 billion and provide for the “phased reconfiguration of the *1117 airfield at O’Hare as well as corresponding expansions and reconfiguration of passenger terminals, access/circulation systems and necessary support facilities.” J.A. 71. According to the Department, the “major functional components” of the program included the addition of a new runway, the relocation of three existing runways and the extension of two others. J.A. 71. The Department explained that the program also entailed “the construction of an airside concourse, a western terminal and access roads,” acquisition of necessary land and measures to mitigate airport noise. J.A. 71.
As for the Runway Formulation Project itself, the Department explained that it involved the “[completion of all technical, physical and operational planning, as well as environmental processing” needed for the modernization program, “with a particular focus on the impacts and requirements for” the first phase of the modernization program. 2 J.A. 71. The Department then explained in greater detail what the Runway Formulation Project entailed. J.A. 71-72. The Department initially estimated that the Runway Formulation Project would cost $200 million, but — in response to the FAA’s concerns about the project’s scope — later downsized the project and concomitantly lowered its estimated cost to $121 million. 3 Compare J.A. 254, with J.A. 75, 262, 265.
This project ... includes, but is not limited to, surveys of existing conditions, including soil borings and geotechnical analyses, utility surveys, environmental surveys, airport-wide drainage design, utility and other underground corridor definition, review and updating design standards, continued refinement of capital cost estimates, project scope definition and other studies as required for processing of the [EIS] for the entire airfield and major components of other aspects of the [modernization program],
In support of its modernization program generally and its Runway Formulation Project specifically, the Department explained that O’Hare consistently ranks as one of the nation’s busiest and most delayed airports. The modernization program addresses these conditions, the Department explained, because it “has been formulated to preserve and enhance the capacity of the national air transportation system.” J.A. 72. The Department further stated that “[t]he justification for this capital investment lies in the operational benefits (reduced delays and airfield capacity enhancement) that will result from the design and construction of the [modernization program].” J.A. 73. Turning to the subject of its application, ie., the Runway Formulation Project, the Department explained that it will “preserve and enhance the capacity and safety of the national air transportation system by providing for projects which reduce delays and congestion at O’Hare” and that “[t]he analysis to be performed through this project is necessary to support environmental processing.” J.A. 72 (emphasis in original).
The FAA deemed Chicago’s passenger facility fee application substantially complete on November 27, 2002. Accordingly, the FAA published notice in the Federal Register of its intent to rule on Chicago’s *1118 application and invited public comment. See Notice of Intent To Rule on Application 0S-15-C-00-ORD To Impose a Passenger Facility Charge (PFC) at Chicago O’Hare Int’l Airport cfe To Use the Revenue at Chicago O’Hare Int’l Airport, Chicago, IL & Gary/Chicago Airport, Gary, IN, 67 Fed.Reg. 77,549, 77,550 (Dec. 18, 2002).
In February 2003, the FAA partially approved Chicago’s application. See Final Agency Decision, City of Chicago, Dep’t of Aviation, Chicago, IL, Feb. 28, 2003, reprinted in J.A. 353-78. In its order, the FAA authorized Chicago to impose and use a $4.50 passenger facility fee to fund a Runway Formulation Project with a total estimated cost of over $220 million, a sum intended to be divided equally between the cost of the EIS itself and associated financing and interest costs. 4 In doing so, the FAA explained that “[congestion,' capacity, and competition constraints at [O’Hare] have been noted in many studies and reports, most recently] the FAA’s 2001 Airport Capacity Benchmark Report” and that Chicago’s modernization program “has been formulated to address some of these concerns.” J.A. 361. The FAA repeatedly noted, however, that the Runway Formulation Project entailed only the work “leading to the completion of an EIS,” J.A. 360, for the modernization program, which also included the study of alternatives to the modernization program. See, e.g., J.A. 360-61, 368-70. According to the FAA, the Runway Formulation Project “includes only that work involved in the completion of all technical, physical, and operational planning, as well as environmental processing, leading to the completion of an EIS for the entire airfield and other major components of the [modernization program].” J.A. 360. The FAA further stressed that its authorization of the passenger facility fee to fund the EIS did not “include any construction or land acquisition costs nor ... any design work beyond what the FAA agrees is necessary to complete the EIS process.” J.A. 361.
The municipalities now petition for review of the FAA’s order approving Chicago’s passenger facility fee. For the reasons set forth below, we grant their petition and remand the case to the FAA for further consideration.
II.
Before discussing the merits, we must address the FAA’s two contentions that we lack jurisdiction to do so. Specifically, the FAA alleges that the municipalities lack standing to bring their petition and, in any event, they brought it too soon. We disagree with both contentions.
To satisfy Article Ill’s “irreducible constitutional minimum of standing,” a party must demonstrate injury-in-fact, causation and redressability.
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
That the municipalities will not suffer their alleged injury alone — Chicago plans to charge all passengers enplaning at O’Hare — does not, as the FAA alleges, render their injury insufficient to confer standing.
Cf. Warth v. Seldin,
Nor do we think the municipalities’ alleged .injury too attenuated or distant to represent a constitutionally-sufficient injury-in-fkct, as the FAA asserts, by virtue of the fact that Chicago will not start collecting the passenger facility fee the FAA authorized until 13 years from now. That Chicago intends to spend today what it is authorized to collect tomorrow does not render the municipalities’ alleged injury “conjectural or hypothetical.”
Lujan,
The ripeness doctrine requires us to consider “the fitness of the issues for judicial review and the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.”
*1120
Abbott Labs. v. Gardner,
Finding that the municipalities have standing to petition for review of the FAA’s action and did not jump the gun in doing so now, we accordingly turn to the merits of their petition. We agree that the FAA acted arbitrarily, capriciously and contrary to law in authorizing Chicago’s Runway Formulation Project with an estimated total cost of over $220 million— half to pay for the EIS, half to cover financing and interest costs.
See
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A);
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
One thing the parties appear to agree on is that over $110 million for an airport project EIS is an extraordinarily high estimate.
5
Despite the FAA’s repeated assur-
*1121
anees that the City may only use this immense sum to fund an EIS of the modernization program,
6
however, it simply accepts at face value that the sum is in fact
necessary
to do so.
See
49 U.S.C. § 40117(d)(1). Chicago’s modernization project may be so unique that over $110 million is necessary to pay for an EIS regarding it, but the FAA never said as much.
See PanAmSat v. FCC,
The municipalities have an explanation of their own for Chicago’s eye-popping EIS estimate. They point out that Chicago’s initial “clarification” of its passenger facility fee application estimated that “Project Formulation,” including the “[c]ompletion of all planning [and] environmental processing,” would cost $42 million, while preliminary engineering — “[t]o transition from initial planning concepts into formal design” — and runway design would cost an additional $45 and $99 million, respectively. J.A. -254 (emphasis added). In response to the FAA’s concerns about the scope of the project, however, the City clarified its application again less than one week later, this time purporting to limit the project to the tasks necessary to prepare an EIS. See J.A. 255-58 (“[W]e have spent a good deal of time clarifying the information we sent previously, and reconsidering the level of [passenger facility fee] resources needed in support of the environmental process.”). But in the City’s second clarification, it estimated that “Program Formulation,” again including planning and environmental processing as well as “preliminary engineering in support of [the] environmental review process,” would total $93.1 million. 7 J.A. 257-58.
Why did Chicago’s cost estimate for planning and environmental processing balloon in less than a week from $42 million to over $93 million? The municipalities allege that the cost of planning and environmental processing in fact did not change — Chicago merely moved the preliminary engineering work to support the formal design of the modernization program that the FAA questioned — -as well as
*1122
its associated costs — into those categories. The FAA, the municipalities say, unwittingly authorized the City to fund preliminary engineering and formal design work in furtherance of its modernization program beyond that necessary to complete the EIS. The FAA made no effort to dispel the municipalities’ theory. Nor does Chicago’s application (together with the clarifications thereof) on its face explain what the FAA itself failed to,
see Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n,
By statute, the FAA’s factual findings are “conclusive” if based on “substantial” record evidence.
See
49 U.S.C. § 46110(c). Despite Chicago’s extraordinarily high cost estimate of its proposed EIS and the FAA’s express statutory duty, however, the FAA made not one finding regarding the necessity of over $110 million to prepare an EIS for the modernization program. The FAA simply concluded that the fee “will not result in revenue that exceeds the amount necessary to finance the projects.” J.A. 358. But in these circumstances, such a simple recitation of the statutory standard neither satisfies the statute,
see
49 U.S.C. § 40117(d)(1), nor assures us that the agency’s decision is rational.
See 5
U.S.C. § 706(2)(A);
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n,
Seeking to assure us that the authorized sum is necessary, the FAA counsel claims that “[t]he amount of funds necessary to perform air transportation projects is a quintessential example of the type of decision that falls within an agency’s expertise and as to which this- Court defers.” Respondent’s Br. at 36. We have no quarrel with this general principle; it is true that we owe considerable deference to an agency’s exercise of its judgment and expertise in estimating costs. 8 We do have difficulty, however, with its application in this case. The FAA cannot simply declare its “expertise”; it must exercise that expertise and demonstrate sufficiently that it has done so 9 else we have nothing to review much less defer to. Nor is it enough for the FAA to assert that we need not worry about Chicago’s fee now because the municipalities can mount a challenge later if Chicago in fact diverts passenger facility fee revenue to any unapproved projects. The assertion is irrelevant, however, to the municipalities’ current challenge because the FAA must specifically find that the fee will not generate excessive revenue before authorizing its assessment and collection. See 49 U.S.C. § 40117(d)(1).
* * *
For the foregoing reasons, we grant the municipalities’ petition for review and remand the matter to the Federal Aviation Administration for its further consider *1123 ation in accordance with this opinion. In light of this holding, we do not reach the municipalities’ other claims.
So ordered.
Notes
. The FAA must additionally find that "the project cannot be paid for from funds reasonably expected to be available for the programs referred to in [49 U.S.C. §] 48103,” id. § 40117(b)(4)(B), which section specifies the amounts available from the Airport and Airway Trust Fund to make grants for airport planning, development and noise compatibility planning and programs. See id. § 48103.
. The first phase of the modernization program, the Department explained, included the design and construction of "a new northernmost parallel runway,” an extension of "Runway 10L” and "a new southern closely-spaced runway.” J.A. 71.
. The Department also requested an amount equal to the revised cost estimate, that is, another $121 million, to cover bond financing and interest.
. The FAA reduced the passenger facility fee "bond capital and financing and interest amounts” in light of the City's intention to "utilize $10,178,850 in Fiscal Year 2003 [Airport Improvement Program] entitlement funds on this project.” J.A. 361.
. Compare Petitioners' Br. at 25 ("A quarter of a billion dollars is an exorbitant and unprecedented amount to fund an airport environmental study. The proposed funding level would be an order of magnitude greater than any EIS in aviation history.”), with Oral Arg. Tr. at 16:50 (FAA counsel acknowledging EIS estimate is "extraordinarily high”) & 18:31 (FAA counsel acknowledging “we all agree that [the EIS estimate] is an extraordinarily high number based on what anyone has ever *1121 done in this connection''); cf. Uncertain Economy Forces Scaling Back of Int’l Airport's First Phase, Aviation Week & Space Technology, Mar. 11, 1991, at 48 (“Pre-1990 planning [for Denver International Airport], including the [EIS] and airport master plan, cost an additional %20.716 million.” (emphasis added)), reprinted in Petitioner's Br. at App. B.
. See, e.g., J.A. 360 ("this project includes only work ... leading to the completion of an EIS”); J.A. 361 ("[t]his formulation project will result in an EIS ... and does not include any construction or land acquisition costs nor does it include any design work beyond what the FAA agrees is necessary to complete the EIS process”); J.A. 368 (“the FAA is only approving those tasks needed in order to complete the [EIS] for the proposed [modernization program]”); J.A. 369 (“the FAA is only approving the tasks necessary for .preparation of the [EIS]”); J.A. 370 (“the FAA is limiting its approval to only that work which the FAA agrees is required for the completion of an [EIS]”).
. Chicago also estimated in its second application clarification that "Phase 1 Project Formulation” would cost $’27.9 million, see J.A. 260-61, in addition to the $93.1 million for “[p]reliminary engineering in support of [the] environmental review process.” J.A. 258. In a revision of its second clarification, the City provided the identical cost estimates for "Program Formulation” and "Phase 1 Project Formulation.” As discussed above, the FAA ultimately authorized Chicago to collect approximately $220 million, having reduced the City's bond capital and financing and interest estimates by over $10 million apiece. See supra at p. 1118 & n. 4.
.
See Nat'l Ass’n of Secs. Dealers, Inc. v. SEC,
.
Cf. Am. Lung Ass’n v. EPA,
