*1 VILLAGE OF BELLE TERRE et al.
BORAAS et al. Argued February 19-20, April No. 73-191. 1974 Decided *2 Burger, Court, opinion which Douglas, J., delivered the Rehnquist, Powell, Blackmun; White, and J., Stewart, C. and post, J., Marshall, Brennan, J., post, p. 10, and JJ., joined. dissenting opinions. p. 12, filed appellants. "for Gegan the cause argued E.
Bernard J. von Oiste. James him on brief was With appellees. Sager for Lawrence G. the cause argued Burt and Melvin L. him on the brief were With Wulf Neuborne. Douglas opinion
Mr. Justice delivered Coúrt. shore, north Long
Belle Terre on village Island’s Its total .people. ábout 220 homes inhabited restricted square land area is less than one mile. has excluding, lodging one-family dwellings land use to multiple- or fraternity houses, houses, boarding houses, “family” used houses. The word as 'dwelling the.ordi-. by blood, persons or more related means, 'nance “[o]ne (cid:127) cooking together and living or adoption, marriagé, of household serv- single housekeeping unit, exclusive (2) A persons exceeding ants. number of but not two living cooking housekeeping unit together single as a though by blood, adoption, marriage not related shall family.” deemed to constitute
Appellees Dickmans are of a m owners house in December village and leased it 1971 for a term of 18 mbnths to Michael Bruce Truman. Boraas be- Later came Then a colessee. Anne moved into the Barish along house with three others. six These are students nearby State University at Stony Brook and none is adoption, marriage. blood, other related with an “Order to village served the Dickmans When plus ordinance,1 the owners Remedy Violations” of the thereupon this under brought action three tenants2 injunction judgment § 42 U. S. C. and a declaring the The District ordinance unconstitutional. constitutional, Supp. Court held ordinance 367 F. Appeals reversed, judge dissenting, the Court one by appeal, 476' F. 2d 806. The is here 28 U. C. case (2); we'noted'probable jurisdiction, § 1264 414 U. S. 907. brings phase
This different case to this Court a previously from we localizoning regulations have Euclid v. Realty Ambler Co., reviewed. a zoning
involved in a classifying land use into six given categories. area The Dickmans’ tracts fell *3 under U-2, three classifications: which included two-fam ily dwellings; U-3, hotels, which included apartments, churches, private clubs, city schools, hospitals, and hall like; and disposal which included sewage plants, the TJ— scrap cemeteries, gas oil incinerators, storage, storage and so Heights on. of buildings prescribed were for each zone; also, the required size of land areas for each kind pse specified. was The land litigation was vacant of. and being held for industrial development; and evidence was introduced showing that the under restricted-use 1 Younger Harris, S.U. here, not involved as on August 2, 1972, initiated, when this federal suit was no state case had been started. The effect Remedy of the “Order to Violations” was subject occupants liability the commencing August 3, 1972. During litigation the expired the lease and it was extended. Anne Parish moved out. Thereafter the other five left students and the owners now hold the home out for rent, including sale or to student groups. 2 Truman, Boraas, and Parish appellees became but not the other three. reduced, in value. greatly would be the land landowner, deprived being was the claim was-that within the process due without liberty- property Amendment.
meaning the Fourteenth under zoning ordinance The Court' sustained “which the line power State, saying of the police separates illegitimate from legitimate in this field the. capable precise delimita- power is assumption of not and conditions.” with- circumstances tion. varies1 “A Id., added: nuisance at And the Court 387. right thing wrong be in the merely place,—like , barnyard. parlor If pig instead pur- zoning validity of the classification legislative must legislative judgment be poses fairly debatable, the 388; Id., The Court listed as be allowed to control.” constitutionality bearing on the considerations buildings, collapse of fire or danger ordinances possibility evils of overcrowding people, might trades, industries, “offensive and structures” “create Ibid. nuisance” to residential sections. But. power even loom police problems those historic need not large actually in a For the given existent case. exclusion of “all not mean establishments” does industrial that “only dangerous offensive or be ex- industries will cluded.” Ibid. That fact does invalidate the ordi- nance; the Court held:
“The inclusion of a margin reasonable to insure *4 enforcement, put upon effective will law, not other- stamp wise the valid, invalidity; may Such laws justification also find their in fact that, the in some the fields, bad fades into the good such insen- capable are degrees sible two of being readily separated distinguished and in terms of Id., legislation.” at 388-389. in main thrust of the case the mind of the Court
:The apartments, in of industries and and was the exclusion keep it commented on desire to resi- respects that “disturbing free “increased noises”; dential areas automobile!?”; parked hazard of traffic”; “moving quiet children of “depriving privilege enjoyed for in more favored open spaces by those play, Id., localities.” at 394. The ordinance was sanctioned validity legislative of the was classification because “fairly and therefore debatable” could not be said be Id., arbitrary. wholly at 388. Parker, in Berman
Our decision 348 U. sus- project tained a land-use the District Columbia against taking landowner’s claim that violated the Compensation Due Process Clause and the Just Clause n of the Fifth Amendment. essence of argument against the law while was, taking property ridding permissible, an area of slums taking was it “merely to develop balanced, a better more community” attractive id., not, was at 31. We refused to concept limit of public may welfare that enhanced zoning regu- . lations.3 said: We'
“Misc.able and disreputable housing conditions do more than spread disease and crime and immo- comprehensive has- Vermont enacted statewide land-use controls which develop plans direct local boards to ordering the uses of local alia, land, inter transportation, “create conditions favorable to health, safety, civic activities and educational and cultural oppor tunities, reduce the wastes of [and] financial and human resources which result from either congestion excessive scattering or excessive ” population . Ann., . . Vt. Stat. Tit. §6042 legislation Federal has designed been propose^ assist States and developing localities objective such guidelines. broad' land-use See Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Policy Land Use Planning Act, Rep. Assistance No. 93-197
6 reduc- spirit may suffocate They also
rality. cattle. the status there to who live people ing insufferable almost living an may make indeed They blight a' sore, ugly may also be an They burden. which charm, it of community robs which on the misery The men turn. which place a from makes it community open as an may despoil a housing river. may ruin a sewer particular a whether determine not sit to “We do concept desirable. or project is is housing . . iiiclusive. . is broad and public welfare phys- spiritual as well as represents aré The values it ical, within monetary. well as as aesthetic determine that power legislature of the well community healthy, beautiful as as should be as as well clean, well well-balanced spacious as Id., carefully at 32-33. patrolled.” only race, If for one the ordinance one área segregated immediately suspect reasoning under the it would 60, Buchanan v. where the 'Court' Warley, 245 S.U. acquir city barring a ordinance a black from invalidated ing property in white residential area reason of real Congress, 27, 1866 Act of Stat. now U. S. C. 144, 1982, Act, § § and an 1870 16 Stat. now C. 1981,, § enforcing both the Fourteenth Amendment. 245 S., Mayer at 78-82. See Jones v. Co., U. S. 409. In Roberge, Seattle Trust Co. v. Seattle “ perrhitted had a zoning ‘philanthropic ” home for children for old people’ particular dis- “ trict ‘when the written consent shall have been obtained of the owners of property two-thirds of the within four ” (400) hundred proposed Id., feet of the building.’ 118. The Court provision held that of the ordinance un- constitutional, saying that the existing owners could “withhold consent for selfish reasons or arbitrarily and caprice.” to their will trustee subject the [owner] Co. (e. g., Cusack cases the billboard at 122. Unlike Id., *6 Chicago, 526), the Court concluded City v. proposed since the ordinance was invalid the that Seattle by poor not its maintenance home for the was shown aged or any injury, inconvenience “to work and construction any annoyance peison.” district community, to the the S., 278 U. at 122. present challenged grounds: several ordinance is on person’s it interferes to that it right travel;
that with migrate interferes to to and settle within a right with State; that it people uncongenial bars who are present expresses the residents; prefer- that social for groups congenial ences of the residents will be that to them; homogeneity that social a legitimate is not interest government; that the restriction do neighbors whom not like on trenches the new- rights comers’ privacy; that it is no rightful concern villagers whether residents are married or unmar- ried; that the ordinance is antithetical to the Nation’s experience, ideology, and self-perception open, as an egalitarian, and integrated society.4
We find none of these
in the
reasons
record before us.
It is
aimed at
Shapiro
not
transients.
Thompson,
Cf.
v.
icut, 479; 405 U. 381 U. Eisenstadt legislation We with economic and social 453-454. deal legislatures historically lines which where have drawn Equal respect against charge of violation of we “ not arbi Protection if law be Clause 'reasonable, ” Virginia, Co. trary’ Guano (quoting Royster [per 412, 415) relationship “a rational bears Reed, state Reed missible] objéctive.” 76. can said, people if however, .that two-unmarried why three or “family,”
constitute a no reason there is every legislature four drawn not. But line included.5 might some out have been leaves well exercise discretion, however, legislative, That is a *7 a judicial, function.
It is said that the an Belle Terre ordinance reeks with live, animosity to couples together.® unmarried who ho There is support it; evidence to and of -provision the the ordinance “family” bringing the definition of a within two unmarried people belies charge. the 5 Mr. ago.. Justice made point century Holmes the half .a legal a determined, “When distinction is as no doubts that one- be, it night day, maturity any between and childhood Or and extremes, other point a drawn, has to or be fixed a line has or to- gradually picked .by decisions, out successive the to mark whEre change place. byjtself takes Looked regard to the neces without sity behind.it point the or arbitrary. line might-as seems It well nearly be, as well a little more to one side or the But when other.. it is seen that point be, line or there must’ -and there is no that .a^ mathematical way fixing of it logical, precisely, the decision of legislature the accepted must be s'ay very we cam unless it is that any wide of reasonable mark.” Coleman, Louisville Gas Co. v. ). U. (dissenting opinion “Department Agriculture Moreno, is of therefore inapt a as there containing anyone household unrelated to the 'rest was denied food stámps. forms as- on other no ban places The ordinance is far the ordinance may, so “family”, sociation, a likes. entertain whomever concerned, houses, and fraternity boarding houses, regimés The occupy people More a problems. urban present like continuously more pass by; rather more cars space; given crowds. with parked; noise travels are cars people few, and yards wide, quiet place A where arc in a legitimate guidelines restricted are motor vehicles family This is goal needs. project land-use addressed Parker, supra. Berman The one within permissible a filth, stench, confined elimination ..police power is not lay zones where ample out unhealthy places. and quiet youth blessings family values, values, sanctuary for clean air make the area seclusion people. need not may be moot the case suggestion impact usually has A us.
detain But property regulates. which it on the value of precise impact of the ordinance the fact that spite of Euclid not piece property was given on a sustained considering blown, S., Court, 272 U. at 397, city controversy in sus planning, the realm matter to the step Here we are closer tained ordinance. ordinance on the value of lessor’s impact only acquired property. He lost six tenants has only obvious the scale of two in their it is place; (cid:127) today. what decide When rental values rides on we *8 Berman whether an entire reached us was not certain only or the on buildings tract would be taken it and a S., 348 at 36. But did scenic easement. U. not any controversy make the the case less a the constitu Mr. Holmes tional sense. When Justice said Hirsh, Block v. 135, 155, “property Court 256 U. may down, taken,, be cut to that extent with- rights 10 in most As is true here. the issue pay,”
out he stated may, at impact on value precise cases, be known. yet litigation validity, over threshold of
Reversed. Brennan, dissenting. Mr. Justice village ordinance challenge constitutional premised solely of associational alleged infringement is on tenants. But rights and other constitutional raising appellees quit house, thus named tenant have cognizable whether there now exists a question serious controversy” indispensable “case that satisfies that Ill requisite of Art. of the Constitution. Existence every controversy must, appear a case or of course, Wade, g., e. stage Roe v. review, see, 113, Thompson, (1973); 459 n. Steffel my In appear stage view it does not at this this case.
Plainly there no case or controversy as to named appellees since, they tenant having out, moved no longer interest, have associational, economic or otherwise, to be vindicated invalidation of the ordi- nance. Whether there cognizable is a case or contro- versy must therefore turn on whether the lessor appellees may attack the on the basis of the constitu- tional rights of their tenants.
The general “weighty” rule of practice is liti- “that a gant only assert his own constitutional rights immunities,” United Raines, States pertinent A exception, however, ordinarily limits litigant assertion of the alleged denial of another’s constitutional rights to in which situations there is: (1) evidence that as a direct consequence of the denial of constitutional rights of the litigant others, faces substantial economic injury, Pierce Society
11 Barrows v. Jack Sisters, 510, (1925); 268 535-536 prosecu son, (1953), or criminal 346 U. 255-256 249, (1965); Connecticut, 479, 481 Griswold tion, E Baird, (2) (1972), U. isenstadt in interests showing litigant’s others’ litigant and unless the constitu may. tertwine assert effectively rights others, rights tional of the cannot Connecticut, Eisen supra; Griswold v. be vindicated. y. Baird, Alabama, supra; stadt also NAACP v. see U. S. 449 not, my view, appellees present
In lessor do on the satisfy record, requirement exception. either of the Their any own brief negates they claim that face eco 'nomic loss. The brief nothing states that “there is in the support record to class, the contention that a middle community suburban residential like Terre,, Belle tradi willing tional families are pay more less than stu dents limited Appellees.” means like the Brief xyith . for Appellees they 54—55. And whether face criminal prosecution for the. violations is at least of. criminal, unclear. The summons served on them on July 1972, was withdrawn because not preceded, as required by village’s procedure, by an requiring order discontinuance violations within An 48 hours. order to discontinue violation was July served thereafter on but was followed service of a criminal summons when the violation was not discontinued within 48 hours.* argues
The Court that, because a zoning ordinance impact “has an on the valüe the property which regulates,” there is a cognizable case or controversy. But *In circumstances, agree these I with the Court ho criminal “pending” action was brought when this suit was and that therefore correctly the District Court apply principles declined to the' Younger Harris, 37S. personal have reason for that appellees if lessor
even *10 tenant landlord were to concede that and we stake, I cannot ordinance, respect of the in intertwine interests that concluded it can be record, how present see, on the v. Jack- impossible,” Barrows if not would be difficult “it unrelated prospective son, present at supra, rights own to assert their more than two tenant of groups appellees tenant departed before the since courts, require- Thus, the difficulty doing had so. no. second be presently appear exception would not ment of the wás the house Accordingly it is irrelevant that satisfied. unrelated tenants let, informed, as now to other we are" appellees after the tenant on a month-to-month basis sought has out. None of new tenants moved Indéed, appears, they intervene in this suit. for-all that vacant; may may house too have moved out and the I judgment dissent and would of the Court vacate Appeals and remand to the District Court for further n proceedings. If that the District Court determines cognizable longer case or no controversy exists, thé com- Zwickler, plaint should' be dismissed. Golden v 103 (1969). Mr. Marshall, dissenting. Justice This question constitutionality case draws into a zoning incorporated village ordinance of the of Belle Terre, York, New which prohibits groups more than two unrelated persons; distinguished groups from consisting of.any number persons related blood, adoption, or from marriage, occupying residence within- the confines of the township.1 Lessor-appellees, the two owners of a Belle Terre residence, and three unrelated student challenged tenants the ordinance on the ground that it establishes a classification between households of reprinted The text the ordinance is part, .ante, at 2. deprives them of individuals, which and unrelated related view, disputed In my of the laws. equal protection rights students’ fundamental burdens the classification Four- by the First and privacy guaranteed association application of. Because the strict teenth Amendments. I scrutiny required, am protection therefore equal that the ordinance my with Brethren’s conclusion odds bears a rational may showing on be sustained legitimate gov- relationship accomplishment to the objectives. ernmental I in full with agreement majority am ’ complex of the important
is a function State. performed by indeed'be function the most essential *11 by is primary for it one of means local government, protect which we sometimes difficult to con that define I cept quality of of life. therefore continue to adhere Co., Euclid Realty Ambler principle to the v. 365 (1926), to given that deference should be governmental judgments concerning proper land-use principle allocation. That deference is a which has served this Court well and which necessary is for the development continued zoning effective and land-use control mechanisms. Had the alone brought owners this alleging suit that the restrictive deprived ordinance them property of their or was an legislative irrational classifica I would tion, agree that would have to sustained. Our role is not and should hot be to as sit zoning appeals. board of
I
agree
also
would
with
majority
that
zoning
local
authorities.may properly act in
objec-
furtherance
asserted to be
tives
served
the ordinance at issue here:
restricting uncontrolled growth, solving traffic problems,
rental
keeping
costs at
level,
reasonable
making community attractive
to
police
families.
The
power
provides
which
the justification for zoning is
narrowly
not
Parker,
(1954).
348 U. S.
Berman
confined. See
authorities
zoning
that we
And,
appropriate
is
afford
by which
choosing
latitude
means
considerable
does not
But deference
purposes.
implement
to
such
to en-
obligation,
This Court has'
mean abdication.
in fur-
ordinances,
adopted
when
zoning
sure that
even
infringe
legitimate aims,
upon
of such
do not
therance
rights.
fundamental constitutional
separate
accepted constitu
equal
When
but
was still
dogma,
racially
tional
struck
restrictive
this Court
down
zoning
Warley,
Buchanan
U. S. 60
ordinance.
I
am
sure
Court would not be hesitant
today.
invalidate that ordinance
federal
lower
procedural aspects
courts have
zoning,2
considered
acted to insure
land-use
that
controls are
used as
means
confining
poor
ghettos
minorities
to the
of our central cities.3 These are limited but neces
sary intrusions on
the discretion of
authorities.
By the
I
token,
same
think it clear that the First Amend
provides
ment
some limitation on zoning
laws.
inconceivable to
me
we would allow the exercise
zoning power
to burden First Amendment free
doms, ordinances
occupancy
restrict
individuals adhering
particular
religious, political,
or scientific beliefs. Zoning
properly
officials
con-
Georgetown
Zoning
See Citizens Assn.
Comm’n,
App.
D. C.
15 with, example, with the cern uses of themselves land — constructed dwellings and kind of the number persons the number of neighborhood in a certain or au- dwellings. in those But who can reside validly persons who are, thorities cannot consider those they they or whether believe, live, what how choose to they Republican are or Negro white, Jew, Catholic Democrat, married or unmarried.
My disagreement upon with the today Court is based my unnecessarily view that this ordinance in case appellees’ .First Amendment freedom of associa burdens tion constitutionally guaranteed right pri and their vacy. Our decisions the First establish protect Fourteenth Amendments choose freedom to Button, NAACP one’s associates. v.
430 protection extended, Constitutional is only to political modes that are association usual pertain but also to social sense, to the Id., and economic benefit of the 430-431; members. Bar, Virginia Brotherhood Railroad Trainmen v. 377 1 (1964). Transportation See United Union v. Michigan, State Bar Mine Work (1971) 576 ; U. S. Assn., Illinois ers State Bar 389 U. companions living selection one’s involves similar choices social, or economic emotional, benefits from living to be derived arrangements. alternative The freedom inextiicably association often en the constitutionally guaranteed twined with right pri right vacy. The to “establish a home” is ai essential part liberty guaranteed of the by the Fourteenth Amend Meyer Nebraska, ment. U. S. (1923); Connecticut, Griswold 479, 495 (Gold (1965) berg, concurring). J., And the Constitution secures to satisfy an individual freedom “to his intellectual and needs emotional privacy his own home.” Stan- *13 16 (1969); 565 see Paris Georgia, 557, 394
ley v. S. Adult U. Slaton, 49, 66-67 Consti I 413 S. v. U. Theatre privacy is, in Mr. Justice Brandéis’ protected tutionally Government, right to be let against the words, “as civilized man.” Olm right by valued alone . . . the most States, (dissent 277 438, (1928) 478 stead v. United S. companions ing opinion). The household choice —of “intellectual and emotional needs” are person’s whether living family, friends, professional met asso by best with personal deeply or others —involves considerations ciates', relationships within thq quality kind and of intimate surely That decision falls within the home. the ambit right privacy protected by Constitution. Wade, v. 410 U. 113, (1973); See Roe Eisenstadt Baird, (1972); Stanley Georgia, 405 U. v. Connecticut, Griswold supra, 564-565; supra, at 483, 486; supra, Olmstead v. United States, at 478 (Brandeis, Agri Moreno J., dissenting); Department culture, Supp. (DC 345 F. 1972), aff’d, 413 U. S.
The instant ordinance discriminates on the basis of just personal lifestyle such a choice as to household related, companions. permits any persons number of by marriage, blood it two or to live in a twenty, single but household, limits to number of two the persons bound profession, love, friendship, unrelated religious political affiliation, or mere economics who occupy can a single home. imposes upon Belle Terre who deviate from the community norm in their choice of living companions significantly greater restric- than applied tions are to residential groups who are related blood or marriage, and compose the estab- lished order within the community.4 The village has, 4 “Perhaps world, planning ideal would be done regiotid basis, given on a community so that a apart- would have *14 choice whose individuals those out fence effect, to acted residents.5 its current of from that lifestyle differs of to being asked is where Court not a case This is resi its maintain efforts to township’s sincere nullify a room of operation by preventing character dential other commercial houses, fraternity houses, ing town a Unquestionably,' uses. residental jbigh-density general a Moreover, as uses. is free to restrict such' in a town’s infirmity I no constitutional proposition, see by zoning areas use in residential density of limiting of basis on discriminate regulations which do not ordinance, how This constitutionally suspect criteria.6 homes ever, density occupancy only limits the of beyond. It reaches occupied by persons. unrelated thus density population, use of land or the control way people choose to regulate and undertakes to own privacy each other within the of their associate with homes. majority, is no answer to that say, as does the
associational
Belle
infringed
interests are not
because
Terre
residents
entertain
choose.
they
whomever
Douglas
Only last Term Mr. Justice
in con-
indicated
currence that he saw the right of
protected
association
by the First Amendment as involving far more than the
right to entertain visitors. He found
right infringed
that
by a restriction on food stamp assistance, penalizing
merits,
adjoining
while an
community
long
would not. But as
zoning
we allow
community by
to be done
community,
intoler
is
able
municipality
(or
to allow one.
many municipalities)
its
close
(cid:127)
expense
doors at
of surrounding communities and the central
city.” Appeal
Girsh,
237,
4,
395,
Pa.
245 n.
263 A. 2d
n. 4
generally Note,
See
Privacy:
On
Constitutional
Protection
Liberty,
Personal
48 N.
Y. U. L. Rev.
740-750
6 See Palo Alto Tenants’ Union Morgan,
(CA9
households
Justice
encompasses
Douglas
freedom of association
said,
there
stranger
only
into one’s home” not
“right to invite the
as well.
join
but
the household
for “entertainment”
Moreno,
Department
Agriculture
538-
per-
I
(1973)
(concurring opinion).
am still
one’s
will form
suaded that
the choice
those who.
implicates constitutionally protected rights.
household
I
. Because
believe
this
creates
per-
impinges upon
classification which
fundamental
scrutiny
sonal
it can withstand constitutional
rights,
only upon
showing
clear
imposed
the burden
necessary
protect
compelling
gov-
and substantial
*15
interest, Shapiro
Thompson,
ernmental
And, once
be
determined that a
burden
placed upon
has been
a
right,
constitutional
onus of demonstrating
no
less intrusive means will
adequately protect the compelling state interest and that
challenged
statute is sufficiently narrowly drawn, is
upon
party seeking
to
justify
burden. See
Memorial Hospital Maricopa
County,
A variety justifications been proffered have sup- in port of village’s ordinance. It is claimed that population controls density, prevents noise, traffic and parking problems, and preserves the rent structure of the community its attractiveness to families. IAs noted earlier, these are legitimate all substantial government. interests of IBut think it clear that the means chosen to accomplish these purposes are both overinclusive and underinclusive, and that the as- goals serted could be as effectivély achieved by means an ordinance that did not discriminate on the basis of constitutionally protected choices of lifestyle. The ordi- imposes nance no restriction whatsoever on the number long they are house, as may live in a persons who no presumably sanguinary marital related bonds— Nor does relationship. their matter how distant may who of income earners the number ordinance restrict number household, or the such a rent contribute occupants. its may maintained of automobiles that theOn is underinclusive. In that sense the ordinance unre- hand, the number of other the statute restricts than home no more persons lated who live a prevent people two. It would therefore three unrelated occupying dwelling among they from even if them had but one income and no vehicles. While extended family might bunga- dozen more live in a small low, elderly and persons occupy three retired could not the large house next door. manor Thus statute is grossly also accomplish overinclusive to its intended purposes.
There are some 220 residences in
Terre occupied
Belle
by about
persons.
density
just
is therefore
three, per
above
household. The village
justifiably
concerned with density
population
and the related
problems of noise, traffic, and the like.
It could deal
with
problems,
by limiting each
household
specified
adults,
number of
two or three perhaps, without
limitation on the number of dependent children.7 The
burden of such an ordinance would fall equally upon all
*16
segments of
community.
surely
It would
be better
tailored to the goals
asserted
the village than the
ordinance before us today, for it would more-realistically
7 By providing
exception
dependent
children,
village
any
would avoid
might
doubts that
posed by
otherwise be
con
protection
stitutional
afforded the
of
choice
whether to
bear
child.
Mayor
See Molino
&
Glassboro,
Council
Super.
116 N. J.
(1971);
restrict mecha- statutory environmental other costs. Various . suggest nisms solutions to Belle Terre’s also themselves as problems control, on the number of vehicles limits —rent per household, forth, but, course, and so such schemes legislative are judgment matters and not for this Court. Appellants necessity also maintaining refer family village. character There not a shred of evidence in the indicating record if Belle permitted Terre limited number of persons unrelated a. to live together, the residential, familial character of the . community would be fundamentally affected. By limiting unrelated persons households to two while placing no limitation on households of individuals, related has village upon embarked its commendable course in a constitutionally faulty Cf. vessel. Marshall v. United States, 414 U. 430 (1974) I (dissenting opinion). would find the challenged ordinance unconstitutional. But I would not ask the village to abandon its goal providing quiet streets, little traffic, pleasant and a reasonably priced environment in which might families raise their Rather, children. I would commend village pursue continue to purposes but means of more carefully drawn and legislation. even-handed
I respectfully dissent.