delivered the opinion of the court:
Objector, Village of Arlington Heights, appeals from an order of the trial court overruling its objections to an annexation ordinance adopted by petitioner, City of Prospect Heights, and finding the ordinance to be valid. Arlington Heights also appeals from a second order declaring the territory to be annexed to Prospect Heights. On appeal Arlington Heights contends that the annexation was invalid because Prospect Heights failed to comply strictly with statutory requirements. Specifically, Arlington Heights argues that the ordinance was not validly adopted due to procedural defects and because of a prior pending рetition in the circuit court; that the legal description was materially defective; that the territory was not contiguous; and that the notice was not properly given.
This proceeding was commenced pursuant to section 7 — 1—2 of the Illinois Municipal Code. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 24, par. 7 — 1—2.) On February 6, 1980, an ordinance adopted by Prospect Heights on January 21, 1980, expressing its desire to annex certain described territory was filed with the clerk of the circuit court. A map of the territory proposed to be annexed was attached as part of the ordinance. The entire parcel comprised 74 acres and had common boundaries with both municiрalities.
On February 8,1980, the trial court set the date of March 4,1980, for hearing on the validity of the ordinance. On February 14, 1980, notices were sent to the township trustees and highway commissioner. On February 28, 1980, Arlington Heights filed objections to the validity of the ordinance. After a hearing, on August 17, 1981, the trial court overruled the objections, determined the ordinаnce to be valid, and ordered that the question of annexation be submitted to the electors of the territory. Following an election in which a majority of the electors approved the annexation, the trial court, on November 12, 1981, entered an order declaring the described territory annexed to Prospeсt Heights.
Arlington Heights initially contends that the ordinance seeking annexation was invalid because the city council of Prospect Heights failed to follow its own procedural rules. Section 35.1 of the ordinance establishing rules of order and procedure for the council provides:
“Every ordinance shall be read when introduced and lie over until the next regular meeting of the City Council provided that this rule may be suspended and an ordinance read and passed at the same meeting of the Council at which it is introduced only by the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Aldermen elected, by a roll call vote.”
In the present case a motiоn to waive the first reading of the ordinance was passed unanimously by voice vote. The ordinance was then passed at the same meeting by a two-thirds roll call vote. Arlington Heights argues that the council should have held a roll call vote specifically on the issue of suspension of the rules and that the roll call votе passing the ordinance was insufficient to suspend the rule and therefore ineffective to pass the ordinance.
The language of this rule is somewhat ambiguous. We find, however, that a more reasonable reading would require only one roll call vote both to suspend the first reading rule and pass the ordinance. Where statutory language is ambiguous, a court may look to the nature of the act and to the reason and necessity for its enactment. (Lee Lumber & Building Material Corp. v. Department of Revenue (1979),
Arlington Heights next contends that the ordinance was invalid because a petition for annexation of substantially the same territory was pending at the time this ordinance was adopted. The pending petition, to which Arlington Heights refers, filed by the landowners and elеctors of the territory in question, also sought annexation to Prospect Heights. The petition was dismissed by court order on the morning of February 6,1980, prior to the filing of the present ordinance.
Arlington Heights correctly asserts that no annexation proceeding may be initiated legally where an annexation petition is pending with rеgard to the same territory. (City of Countryside v. Village of LaGrange (1962),
Arlington Heights’ reliance on Village of Oak Lawn v. Village of Bridgeview (1968),
We next address Arlington Heights’ argument that the legal description of thе territory sought to be annexed as set forth in the ordinance was materially defective. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 24, par. 7 — 1—4.) Arlington Heights maintains further that the trial court’s attempt to amend the ordinance to correct one of the errors was not authorized by statute.
Although section 7 — 1—4 requires dismissal of an annexation ordinance where thе legal description contained therein is materially defective, such descriptions are not construed with the same strictness as those contained in deeds and contracts. If the ordinance and accompanying map, when viewed together, fairly apprise the public of the property involved, the desсription will be considered proper. People ex rel. Cameron v. New (1905),
There were two errors in the legal description in question. The first error was contained in the following language:
“* e » and along the North line of Lot 9 in Block 2 of said subdivision to the Northwest corner of said Lot 9; Thence Southerly along the West line of said Lоt 20 the North line of Oakton Street: * 0
The trial court granted Prospect Heights’ motion to amend this part of the legal description to correct a typographical error by deleting “20” and substituting the word “to.” When the language in question is considered with reference to the map, it is apparent that the “said lot” in the last portiоn of the quoted language refers to lot 9. Prospect Heights’ error in typing “20” rather than “to” was merely a typographical error, too insignificant to prevent the public from being fairly apprised as to what territory was involved. It was within the trial court’s discretion to amend the ordinance to correct this nonmaterial errоr. People ex rel. Magnuson v. Kramer (1961),
The second error involved the omission of a call from one paragraph of the legal description. The relevant portion of that description is as follows:
“Thence Northerly along said East line to the South line of the Northeast quarter of the Northeast quarter of the Sоutheast quarter of said Section 20;
Thence Westerly along said South line to the West line of East half of said Northeast quarter of Northeast quarter of Southeast quarter; Thence Northerly along said West line to the South line of the North 15 feet of said Northeast quarter of Northeast quarter of Southeast quarter;
Thence Westerly along said South line to the West line of the East half of the West half of said Northeast quarter [of Northeast quarter] of Southeast quarter.”
Curtis Franklyn, an employee of Arlington Heights, and Robert Carlson, a land surveyor, both testified that if the legal description were followed precisely it would be impossible to come up with a totаlly enclosed parcel of land. Relying on People ex rel. Shrontz v. Astle (1929),
In the present case both witnesses testified that when the map and legal descriptiоn were considered together it was obvious that the call “Northeast quarter” had been erroneously omitted from the language in question. In a letter, dated August 6, 1980, Franklyn had previously advised Arlington Heights of both the error and the missing call. When the correct call is inserted, the ordinance accurately describes the parcel of land sought to be annexed. We therefore hold that the ordinance fairly apprised the public of the property involved and that the description was not materially defective.
Arlington Heights also contends that the property sought to be annexed is not contiguous to Prospect Heights as required by statute. (Ill. Rev. Stаt. 1979, ch. 24, par. 7 — 1—1.) Contiguity under the statute requires a touching or adjoining in a reasonably substantial sense. (People ex rel. County of St. Clair v. City of Belleville (1981),
A substantial common boundary between the territory to be annexed and the annexing entity is essential to a finding of contiguity. (People ex rel. County of St. Clair v. City of Belleville.) The 74 acres sought to be annexed in the present case touch Prospect Heights at three locations which measure 300 feet, 200 feet and 100 feet. Although there is no steadfast rule with regard to the minimum common boundary considered to be substantial, a common boundary of 360 feet has been deemed sufficient. (In re Annexation to Village of Green Oaks (1971),
Although the boundaries of the territory to be annexed in the present case are somewhat irregular, this in itself is not a fatal defect. (In re Annexation to Village of Glen Carbon (1970),
Arlington Heights finally contends that Prospect Heights failed to serve timely notice on the Wheeling Township Commissioner of Highways and Wheeling Township Board of Town Auditors and that such failure rendered the ordinance void. The stаtute requires that when land proposed to be annexed includes a highway under the jurisdiction of any township, the township commissioner of highways and the board of town auditors shall be notified “before any court hearing or other action is taken for annexation.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 24, par. 7 — 1—1.) It is undisputed that Prospect Heights did serve noticе on the proper officials and that the notice was served prior to “any court hearing.” Arlington Heights argues, however, that Prospect Heights’ prior adoption of the initial ordinance expressing its desire to annex the property constituted “other action * * * taken for annexation” and that its failure to serve thе notice in question prior to the adoption of the ordinance rendered it void.
This issue turns on what the legislature meant by “other action * * * taken for annexation.” The annexation proceedings here were undertaken pursuant to statute. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 24, par. 7 — 1—2.) That section provides for initiation of the annexation рrocess either by filing a written petition signed by a majority of landowners in the territory to be annexed and a majority of the electors residing in such territory or, as here, by the enactment and filing of an ordinance by the corporate authorities expressing their desire to annex. Notice of the petition or ordinance must then be published, and a date is set for a court hearing. If the court finds that the petition or ordinance is valid, the court directs that the question of annexation be submitted either to the corporate authorities of the annexing municipality (if initiated by petition) or to the electors of the territory (if initiated by ordinance) for final action.
Section 7 — 1—2 is the only procedure for annexation under the act which requires a court hearing. Other sections provide for situations in which annexation proceedings may be initiated by petition (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 24, par. 7 — 1—8), or by resolution (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 24, par. 7 — 1—14), and finalized by adoption of an ordinance by the corporate authorities of the municipality to which annexation is sought; in certain circumstances annexation is accomplished by ordinance alone (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 24, par. 7 — 1—13). When the statute is considered as a whole it therefore becomes obvious that the legislature intended that the notice in question be given рrior to the court hearing, as here in a section 7 — 1—2 annexation, and prior to “other action * * ° taken for annexation” in annexation procedures undertaken pursuant to some other section which requires no hearing. We reject Arlington Heights’ theory to the contrary, that “or other action” applies herе and refers to the initial ordinance expressing a desire to annex. Such an interpretation would in effect require that the notice in question be given either before the initial ordinance or later, prior to the court hearing. Since Arlington Heights also argues that any time after adoption of the initial ordinance is too late, this interpretation of section 7 — 1—1 would render the phrase “before any court hearing” meaningless. Where a statute can be reasonably interpreted so as to give effect to all its provisions, a court will not adopt a strained reading which renders one part superfluous. Jarecki v. G. D. Searle & Co. (1961),
Arlington Hеights’ reliance on People ex rel. County of St. Clair v. City of Belleville is misplaced. In that case, the court, in construing the same language present in this case, made it clear that the section 7 — 1—1 notice must be given prior to the court hearing for one type of annexation and prior to the city council meeting for the other type. County of St. Clair, however, involved a section 7 — 1—8 proceeding which has no provisions for a hearing. Thus notice was required prior to the city council meeting. Prospect Heights gave timely notice in the present case.
For the reasons stated, the orders of the circuit court of Cook County are affirmed.
Orders affirmed.
WHITE, P. J., and McGILLICUDDY, J., concur.