*1 293 province of attor- briefing is within respond opportunity had an plaintiff Blair, v. 769 F.2d sanctions, ney”); & Stem has not he request for defendant’s Herzfeld Cir.1985) (award (10th 645, im- of fees 647 Denver See Mission his conduct. justified (if attorney “responsible for posed who Pierson, on P.2d at 366 supra, 674 v. Co. presentation”). its answer this case and requests sanctions appellee opportunity and an brief, has notice appellant the trial court on we direct respond). the amount of rea- determine remand award of that an conclude We therefore attorney costs incurred fees and sonable appeal is incurred on attorney fees and costs 38(d) and appeal on C.A.R. defendant 38(d) § 13-17- under C.A.R. warranted C.R.S.2005, 1317103, § assess that Purcell, 102(2). Marriage 879 attorney alone. against of amount attorney (awarding 468, (Colo.App.1994) affirmed. The case is judgment 38(d) as sanction under C.A.R. fees attorney fees and for an award remanded Indus., Inc. v. Mor- appeal); State frivolous appeal to be assessed costs incurred 1573, Inc., n. 10 Indus., F.2d 1581 & Flo attorney Richard K. Blundell. against (Fed.Cir.1991) unanimity (noting of decisions “just as attorney may be awarded fees Judge Judge HAWTHORNE WEBB and 38); also R.App. P. see damages” under Fed. concur. Hitachi, Ltd., Int’l, F.2d Ltd. v. Refac (sanctions (Fed.Cir.1990) imposed under present clear R.App. P. 38 for failure Fed. v. Celo arguments); Olympia Co. cogent
or Cir.1985) (5th (sanc Corp., 771 F.2d
tex R.App. Fed. P. 38 imposed under
tions attempt made no
rambling briefs rever required to obtain elements
address sal). COLORADO, OF VILLAGE HOMES of fees conclude that the award further INC., corporation, a Colorado plain- imposed against should be and costs Plaintiff-Appellee, plaintiff. attorney, and not tiffs C.R.S.2005, 13-17-102(3), §
Under attorney may payment allocate AND SURETY CASUALTY TRAVELERS attorneys par offending Casualty “the among fees Co. and Travelers COMPANY ties, severally, it deems most jointly or as Connecticut, foreign corporations, amount, portion just, may charge such Defendants-Appellants. thereof, offending attorney party.” 04CA1396. No. exclusively an award allows This section responsi attorney who sole against an bears Appeals, Court Colorado Parker v. offending conduct. bility for the Div. IV. Davis, (Colo.App.1994); Beef, Boneless Inc. Sunshine Anderson June Ctr., Inc., 878 P.2d Health Care 16, 2006. Oct. Certiorari Granted (Colo.App.1994). Where, appeal frivolous solely within the control that lie
for reasons counsel, may direct that appellate paid by counsel and costs be
an award of fees Orleans, City New
alone. See Macklin (5th Cir.2002) (requiring 300 F.3d R.App. P.
attorney under Fed. award quality of the research
38 “because *2 PC, Bradley
Roberts Levin & Patterson A. Levin, Sitcoff, Denver, Colorado, Jeremy A. Plaintiff-Appellee. LLP, Spahr Ingersoll Ballard Andrews & Eaton, Denver, Colorado, Leslie A. for De- fendants-Appellants.
CARPARELLI, J.
Defendants, Casualty and Sure- ty Company Casualty and Travelers Co. of Travelers), (collectively appeal Connecticut judgment in plaintiff, the trial court’s favor of Colorado, Village Inc. affirm. Homes of that, I.Background continuing property result of this damage, Homes was liable to them general a comprehensive Travelers issued by, among as measured other (CGL) comprehensive liability and a excess things, repairing the cost of (umbrella) policy Village n the homes. Homes, Subject a home builder. to certain *3 conditions, policy provided coverage each parties stipulations The submitted two 1, period August occurrences stipulation, they fact. To the first attached 1,1996. August copies policy, of the CGL complaints lawsuits, filed in the homeowners two April In three homeowners Vil- sued copies certified of the homeowners’ deeds. Homes, lage alleging Village that Homes They stipulated also that: liable construction related to. ex- defects (cid:127) Travelers policy issued the CGL to Vil- pansive July In soils. fourth home- Homes; lage Village on owner sued the same basis. (cid:127) Village Homes tendered defense of the August Travelers, coverage. cases to which denied 1,1996; August (cid:127) purchased three Travelers, homeowners Village alleging Homes sued prior homes from owners in underlying settled it had the two suits purchased the fourth homeowner $788,580, for approximately and that Travel- home obligated indemnify ers it for a total $315,000.
amount of about stipulation, parties stipu- the second lated that: facts, receiving stipulated on After the case
the court concluded that Travelers was obli- (cid:127) property damage there was four to the gated indemnify Village Homes in the homes; $200,000. amount of (cid:127) property damage resulted from an “occurrence”, Travelers contends that the trial court coverage it erred when concluded there was (cid:127) the “occurrence” was policies. disagree. We period; and (cid:127) property damage to the homes dur- Insuring Agreement II.The $200,000. period was policy obligates The CGL Travelers to stipulate parties other Village sums that legally Homes becomes Village allegations complaint made in Homes’ obligated damages prop- because of complaint. or amended (1) erty damage is caused an “occur- (2) place during rence” and takes IV.Issue Presented period. defines “occurrence” to presented parties this case to the trial accident, including mean “an continuous determine whether repeated exposure substantially the same decision United States general harmful conditions.” (Colo. Fidelity Guaranty & 1995), compels par-
Travelers concedes that because the conclusion that the CGL stipulated coverage ties that the here does not afford to Vil $200,000, lage the homes is the umbrella Homes. implicated. analysis our court, trial con- Travelers did not policy. limited to the terms of the CGL (1) Village tend that the sums Homes was legally obligated pay to the homeowners
III.Stipulated Facts did not constitute as that term is (2) alleged agreement; The homeowners insuring Village used in the damage by Village liability that was caused Homes’ Homes’ to the homeowners was not occurrence; negligent began premised stipulated construction on the date the on the through first sold and continued Homes’ did not include the $200,000 complaints. They alleged the date of the property. Coverage Triggered VI. does not contend appeal, Travelers On evidence to show insufficient there is coverage argues that Travelers liability to homeowners Village Homes’ disagree. triggered. caused was because place during the took an occurrence Trigger Coverage A. coverage” refers to “Trigger of argues on Based activate under a circumstances that triggered because was not is determined based CGL after the acquired the homes homeowners language elaims- So-called expiration coverage “for policies provide made claims the home- there is contrast, policy period”, in made *4 any during actual harm did not suffer owners coverage policy provides ’ “an occurrence policy place ‘occurrences which take all Co., v. Ins. period.” Ballow PHICO policy (Colo.1993) 1354, (emphasis Policy Interpretation and' P.2d 1357 V. 875 added). of Standard Review event Triggering occurs when a threshold determining rights and When policy’s coverage. implicates an insurance pol under an insurance obligations that exist triggered policy The fact that a has been interpre icy, apply principles of contract we may liability coverage be means that there carry parties’ attempt out tation subject policy’s policy, to the under that policy when the expectations reasonable terms, any application exclusions in insurance contracts issued. We enforce any other defenses the written, phrases their giving the words and may policy that has insurer raise. v. ordinary meaning. Corp. plain and Cotter triggered provide does not been Co., 90 P.3d Empire Surplus Lines Ins.
Am. coverage, policy trig- that has been while (Colo.2004); Thompson v. Md. Cas. 814 may coverage, may provide gered or (Colo.2004). 496 “Oúr construction P.3d 84 depending on the circumstances ‘fair, provisions must natural policy be of the case. or rather than strained and reasonable’ Cos., strictly Pub. v. Wallis & technical.” Serv. Co. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Wallis 986 Cos., 924, (Colo.1999)(quoting 939 at 937 n. 11. & 986 P.2d P.2d Family Assurance Johnson Am. Life policies, trigger In occurrence 1450, (D.Colo.1984)). F.Supp. 1453 583 coverage usually bodily injury or policy rewrite insurance “Courts should not damage during policy period. Conse unambiguous.” provisions that are clear policy an that was in quently, occurrence Littleton, City Ins. Compass Co. v. may injury damage happened when effect (Colo.1999). However, P.2d provide coverage alleging even when a claim ambigu policy are the terms an insurance policyholder that the is liable for ous, they strictly construed be many years filed until later. is not policyholder. the insurer and in favor way, this occurrence does not an Sys., Avis Allstate Ins. Rent-A-Car Co. but, rather, expire, continues in effect after Inc., (Colo.1997); & 947 P.2d Fid. U.S. ends. Inc., Budget Sys., Co. v. Rent-A-Car Guar. (Colo.1992); Family Am. 842 P.2d Trigger Regarding B. Conclusion Johnson, Ins. Co. v. 816 P.2d Mut. (Colo.1991). proper- stipulated there homes,
ty damage
purchasers’
to the
an occur-
interpreta
property damage resulted from
the trial court’s
We review
rence,
contract
novo.
occurrence was
tion of
de
Globe
damage and the
Indem. Co. Travelers Indem.
$200,000.
policy period was
(Colo.App.2004).
necessary
It thus
to all conditions
granted
The trial court
the insurer’s mo-
trigger coverage.
summary judgment,
tion for
and the
affirmed, holding
that no occurrence
Nonetheless, Travelers contends that there
trigger
that would
coverage
operative
stipulation
is “no
effect” to its
damaged
purchasers’
interest while the
resulting
seller “was the insured.”
occurrence
be-
warranty performed that work by or on be- half of the seller would be done in a work- Required Trigger Accident Coverage manlike manner. Travelers also misconstrues the Browder eight years later, purchas- More than holding court’s there must be actual cracking ers discovered sagging damage party to a third trigger coverage. buildings and sued the seller for failure to construct the motel in a workmanlike Determining man- triggers coverage what event ner. The seller bankruptcy, when, filed for always easy, especially and the is not as purchasers a proof filed of claim that policy requires result- that there an “acci- be ed in a judgment. dent” policy period. Chutich, supra (policyholder v. Indem. 187 Colo.
In Samuelson
(1974),
was no
allegedly
the insured’s
to CGL
when there
P.2d 631
entitled
damage
peri
dispute
that actual
negligent act occurred
od,
bodily
period); Leprino
did not result
negligence
but the
occurred
explosion
after the
injury
Prop.
until
caused
& Cas. Ins.
it
Nationwide
policy applied only to
period. The
not en
(Colo.App.2003)(policyholder
occurred
party’s
“accidents” that
the third
titled to
when
there had
allege
and the issue
whether
complaint did not
actual
period);
been such an accident.
Union
implies a mis
that the term “accident”
ruled
at
Pac. R.R. v.
Underwriters
Certain
victim,
London,
fortune
Lloyd’s,
(Colo.App.
act that causes
“misfor
negligent
2001)(where
not the
liability in a
policyholder denied
tune.”
concluded
agency
concluded
consent decree and
the explo
at the time of
accident occurred
necessary, poli
that no remedial action
sion,
allegedly negligent
acts
not when
cyholder
requisite damage
failed to establish
Chutich,
su
committed. Samuelson
and, therefore,
was not entitled
indemnification).
when the insured’s bod- during damaged property policy peri- ily injury damage or to someone else od.
property by As the Browder owned another. Stipulated stated, 3. Accident a basic tenet of insur- party must suffer actual ance is that “a third insuring agreement obligates Travel- The damage policy period [for the in- within the be- ers all sums liability policy.” under a sured] recover legally obligated to comes supra, 893 at 134. damage property that is caused
Indeed, by period. during have occurrence of this court other divisions during the For to be an applied consistently with this under- there occurrence Browder “acei- standing policy period, there must have been an the rule. See Globe Indem. Co. exclusion, bodily injury and, thus, prop- purchasers in or dent” that resulted .the could And, erty subrogees not recover as damage period. seller. stipulated Travelers that there was an occur- The court’s discussion of Crop Garriot damage to property rence and the homes Dusting is consistent with reliance its on period. The defines Hoppy’s Oil Service Insurance Co. of accident, including to mean “an “occurrence” America, supra. North Hoppy’s The facts in repeated exposure or continuous substan- Oil were similar to those in Browder. tially general harmful the same conditions.” Browder, and, upon seller built the motel Thus, terms of completion, operated its it during owned stipulated there had Travelers been period. acquired The third party occurrence, it also had property after the ended. been an accident Oil, Hoppy’s the insured owned and premises gasoline for use as a
leased station 1985, during 1969 to from which time under- Damage Ownership Property 4. at Time of ground storage leaked. tanks The insurance also on the relies Browder policies provided coverage July Hoppy’s court’s Oil reliance Service through party June The 1985. third ac- America, Insurance Co. North quired property July 1985, immediate- (D.Mass.1992), F.Supp. ly after the last ended. distinguished holding fact that it in Gar policy in coverage Browder excluded Court, Dusting Superior Crop riott Co. v. damage property by for owned the seller. (1990). Cal.Rptr. Cal.App.3d Similarly, policy Hoppy’s Oil excluded Again, reasoning persuasive. Travelers’ is not “(1) coverage damage for property owned applied also occupied by insured, or or rented There, property “owned exclusion.” the seller insured, property by used property owned and the care, custody or control of the insured time, entire its which purpose as to the insured is for coverage rights subject to policy’s exercising physical Hoppy’s control.” Oil conditions prop- and exclusions. owned Am., supra, v. Ins. N. Serv. Co. erty expressly exclusion for barred F.Supp. or occupied owned Particularly in view the exclusion of the seller. the court concluded any damage excluded insured, the Hoppy’s Oil court concluded *7 period to motel because that predicate property the essential dam- premises by were owned dur- seller age during not could be period. that entire ownership considered without attention to property. regard, the supreme this court referred Crop to the in Dusting decision Garriott Co. rejected court in Hoppy’s Oil also Court, Superior supra, and noted party’s that that third contention it did not matter policies damaged in that property Garriott stated by that the was owned the insured property belong occurrence, “must not concluding insured.” at the time of the that Browder, 135; Garriott, supra, policies by 893 P.2d at applied to claims made third supra, Cal.Rptr. supreme parties at upon 682. The “based occurrences within the Garriott, distinguished policy period then the facts in in injury that result to their (the observing parties’) that the claimant property Hop there “had third interests.” possible subrogated Am., right pursue py’s to an action Serv. v. Co. N. Oil Ins. insurer,” F.Supp. Acknowledging 1508.
P.2d at yet but that the seller the state court had not consid only party it, in precise Hoppy’s Browder who sustained ered the issue before seller Oil court stated that its conclusion was con expressly precluded asserting precedent holding from a cover- with state sistent relevant age property claim because of owned that an accident occurs at the time party Village act, complaining the cause
wrongful
but when the
liability
actually damaged. Hoppy’s Oil Serv.
Homes’
to the homeowners.
Am., supra,
F.Supp. at
Ins.
N.
Co. of
correctly
conclude that the trial court
that,
held
under the terms of
Oil,
Hoppy’s
the Browder
Citing
$200,000
pay
Travelers must
total sum
protect an
policies
“[o]ccurrence
stated that
obligated
Village Homes is
parties
against claims ‘made
third
insured
homeowners.
pe-
within the
upon occurrences
based
judgment
is affirmed.
(the
third
to their
riod that result
’ Browder,
interest.”
su-
parties’) property
ROY, J., specially concurs.
on the court’s
pra,
P.2d at 134. Based
Oil,
apparent
it is
Hoppy’s
citation to
RUSSEL, J., dissents.
rule
simply emphasized the
this statement
that,
Judge
specially concurring.
property exclu-
there is an owned
ROY
sion, (1)
coverage
no
colleague
majority
my
I
with
in the
concur
insured,
it
by the
we must enforce insurance
contracts
allow
contrary to
that exclusion
would be
written,
phrases
giving the words and
their
damaged prop-
to transfer title of
owner
ordinary meaning;
plain and
that the cover-
cover-
erty
party and then
seek
to a third
triggered;
judgment
age was
liability arising
that same dam-
age for
affirmed, the
he
should be
result
reaches.
age.
they
My colleagues
either follow
feel
Here, however,
the owned
exclu-
Fidelity
Browder v. United States
& Guar-
homeowners’ suit
sion was not
issue. The
(Colo.1995),
anty
as does
893 P.2d
against Village
alleged
prop-
that the
dissent;
my
it
colleague
distinguish
erty damage began on
date the homes
analysis
my
within the context of its
as does
through the
continued
were first sold and
colleague
majority.
in the
And,
in the
complaints.
date of the
because,
view,
separately
in my
I write
suit,
proper-
that the
allege
Travelers did not
limited
unique
Browder should be
to its
facts
Village Homes
ty damage occurred while
analysis
applied
and its
be
should not
property,
owned the
general
cover-
commercial
barred
the owned
exclusion.
or,
alternative,
ages
it should be revis-
contention,
reject
we
Travelers’
latter,
I
I
suggest
ited.
can
While
Hoppy’s
based on
Oil and
I
compelled
feel
do the former.
conclude
Village
Homes is not entitled
application
has
this case.
whom
the homeowners to
constructed, oper-
the insured
obligated
Homes is
ated,
plaintiffs.
a motel to the
and then sold
own
Apparently, during the later few months of
phase
the construction
and then into the
VII. Conclusion
un-
operation phase, the insured was insured
*8
stipulated
proper-
Travelers
that there was
der, among
special multi-
policies,
other
homes,
ty
it
damage to
resulted
policy
by the
peril insurance
issued
insurer.
period,
policy
an
and
occurrence
damage
policy provided
that the insurer would
to the homes
And,
$200,000.
obligated
pay
all
policy
pay
sums
insured was
period was
occurrence,
by
damage ...
an oc-
policy’s
“property
caused
definition of
arising
ownership,
acci-
out
thus
been an
currence and
had
$200,000
premises
damage
maintenance
use of
insured
property
dent and
in
necessary
all
policy period.
insuring agree-
operations
or incidental
Under the
named
conducted
obligated
ment Travelers was
business
insured
premises.”
legally obligated
sums
at or from
insured
“Occur-
Homes was
accident,”
“an
rence” was defined as
which
the homeowners.
Travelers did
And
“including
$200,000
injurious exposure
as
damage
was defined
contend that the
conditions,
results,
which
[plaintiffs]
We find the
did not sustain
bodily injury
in
property damage
actual
to their
during the
expected
neither
nor
intended from the
applicable policy period and therefore no
standpoint
Property
of the insured.”
dam-
triggered
under
age
“injury
meant
to or
tangi-
destruction of
policy.
the ...
Even assuming that cover-
property.”
supra,
ble
893 P.2d at
age
exists under the
[plaintiffs]
134. The
also had an
proper-
“owned
cannot
subrogees
recover as
due to the
ty”
provided,
exclusion which
“This insurance
owned
prevents
exclusion which
apply
does not
...
property damage
[the
from maintaining any
insured]
claim
occupied by
owned or
or rented to
against
[plain-
[the insurer] to which the
Browder, supra,
the insured.”
893 P.2d at
subrogated.
tiffs] could be
Browder, supra,
Subrogation is defined as the substitution
negligence
cover the insured for
in construc-
person
...
place
“one
of another
motel;
tion of the
appeals
the court of
claim,
with reference to a lawful
demand or
opinion,
stated in its
see Browder
right
v. U.S.
other
relation to
Fid.
the debt or
(Colo.App.1993),
& Cas.
claim,
rights,
and its
remedies or securities.”
completed
July 1975;
construction
damages
its
Therefore,
of
v.
proposition.
Hoang
it was the'nature
Monterra Homes
negligence.
(Powderhorn) LLC,
subrogation that
coverages
(Colo.App.2005)
dic-
the
and the
(c
Based on these
in Browder.
granted
the result
tated
Mar.
WL
ert.
view,
Browder, my
circumstances,
in
no
1586645);
haü
v.
Globe Indem. Co. Travelers In
Co.,
application
(Colo.App.2004); Lep
here.
P.3d 971
dem.
Prop.
& Cas. Ins.
rino Nationwide
Here,
dealing with a commercial
we are
(Colo.App.2003);
Pac. R.R.
P.3d 487
Union
to a “contrac-
general liability policy issued
London,
Lloyd’s,
Underwriters at
Certain
(1) requires the insurer to
tor.” The
(Colo.App.2001).
For the rea
the insured becomes
“pay
that
those sums
stated,
eases,
sons
I would not follow these
legally obligated
”
proposi
nor would I cite Browder
damage’
“to
‘bodily injury’
‘property
of
tion.
(2) provides
applies”,
this
which
insurance
injury”
“bodily
“proper-
and
applies to
that it
Finally,
my
I
in
support
position
find
by an
ty
caused
‘occurrence’
damage” that “is
incongruity
majority
.an
in
what I view as
the
,
territory’
place
‘coverage
takes
opinion
majority
in
cited
Browder. The
with
policy period”;
the
during
...
occurs
and
Service,
approval Hoppy’s Oil
Inc.
Insur-
(3)
territory” as
“coverage
and
defines
America,
F.Supp.
ance Co. North
of
(including its
America
terri-
United States of
(D.Mass.1992),
analysis
rejected
and
and
Rico, Canada,
possessions), Puerto
and
tories
in
reached
Trustees
conclusion
Uni-
Tufts
(with
airspace
limi-
and
international waters
versity v.
Insurance
Commercial Union
(with
tations),
parts of
world
and all
(1993).
415 Mass.
303 thought necessary suggests period, recognized that Brow the and it and, least, jurisdictions at the courts in der should revisited other had re- be allowed for lief claimants in similar But clarified. situations. that, trigger coverage, the court concluded supreme may revisit Browder The a legally cognizable claimant must have a Hoang it decides v. Monterra Homes interest property during (Powderhorn) LLC, (Colo.App.2005) period: (ce granted Mar. 2006 WL rt. 1586645). reasoning We find the abrogated [Trustees Until Browder is Tufts modified, however, decision, written, University v. Commercial Union Insur- Co., unpersuasive. supra] Although ance binding precedent. I think Browder controls expressly require not requires I think it a result does different majority. property during [claimants] one reached own from the period, the [claimants] must issue is whether Travelers cover legally recognizable have injury some claims occurred their interests though even [plaintiffs] order to recover. The sus- claimants had no interest in the homes dur- they tained no their interest until ing that property. owned the motel Village Homes that it contends should not Co., & supra, Browder U.S. Fid. Guar. 893 any make difference whether claimants at P.2d policy period. I acknowledge position that its has merit un under the claimant must plain language policies. der the See property during have interest in the Trs. Univ. Commercial Union trigger in order to Tufts Co., 844, 68, Ins. 415 Mass. N.E.2d 72 616 general liability under a commercial (1993) (construing language (Powderh similar to find Hoang See v. Monterra Homes orn) coverage where not LLC, the claimant did have an 1037; supra, 129 P.3d at see also property during interest Co., Globe Indem. Co. v. Travelers Indem. period); Century see also Indem. Co. v. He at (Colo.App.2004); Leprino P.3d v. Na arrean, Cal.App.4th Cal.Rptr.2d Prop. tionwide & Ins. Cas. 490 (Colo.App.2003); Union (2002). Pac. R.R. London, Lloyd’s, Certain Underwriters conclude, however, Village I Homes’ ju (Colo.App.2001). In other
position is defeated under Browder. risdictions, recognized Browder is as authori bought liability a builder in- ty for proposition. Spartan this Petro to cover its activities the con- surance Co. v. Mut. leum Federated Ins. operation struction of motel. On the (4th Cir.1998); Century F.3d 810 n. 3 day policy expired, that the the builder sold Hearrean, Indem. Co. v. 120 Cal. motel, along rights with its Rptr.2d at 70 n. 2. plaintiffs. After dis- recognize I im- potentially that there is a defects, covering plaintiffs construction portant this difference between Browder and judgment obtained the builder. case, but I conclude plaintiffs then sued the insurance com- not entitled to relief on this basis. subrogees pany as the builder’s to recover judgment. the amount of their plaintiffs were foreclosed they grounds: trigger on two held could not they coverage by asserting expe- could recover because “did not their own claims faulty they rience actual from the had no inter- they purchased proper- property during construction until est in the period; ty.” they trigger coverage v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. could recog- asserting orig- 893 P.2d at The court subrogees 134-35. claims as the expressly they bought nized that re- inal owner because from insured, quire expressly entity precluded claimant own the dur- *11 Ac- s occurred asserting claims cordingly, judgment. I would reverse See Browder v. U.S. property” exclusion. 135-36 Fid. & Guar. Dusting Crop v.Co.
(distinguishing Garriott Court, Cal.App.3d 270 Cal.
Superior (1990)).
Rptr. 678 homes,
Here, bought their claimants builder, but from the insured parties who suf- original homeowners —third In re the MARRIAGE OF Louise damage during policy pe- fered Appellee, YATES, A. unlike the riod. have triggered could the claimants policies asserting Appellant. Yates, Dan A. original subrogees owners. claims No. 04CA1310. However, the record indicates Appeals, Colorado Court sue Homes as sub- claimants did not III. Div. rogees original owners: (cid:127) warranty The record contains the deeds June 2006. conveyed origi from the Certiorari Denied Nov. nal owners to claimants. deeds language used to
contain traditional
convey property. None of the real right convey the purport
deeds to sue Hoang v. property damage. (Powderhorn) LLC,
Monterra Homes (“We are P.3d at 1037 aware holding authority that a Colorado
subrogation assignment of oc claims upon the
curs as matter of law transfer property.”); Ford v.
of title to real Sum Ltd.
mertree Lane Liab. (a (Colo.App.2002) general warran
ty conveying deed real does not claims).
convey or contract tort
(cid:127) complaints also contains the record against Village claimants filed Although claimants
Homes. assert theories, they
ed various mention
subrogation. The claims are based on rights,
the claimants’ own on the
rights predecessors interest. of their Beef,
See Neb. Ltd. Universal Sur. V.[v.] 40,] Neb.App. [9 607 N.W.2d (“Ordinarily, (Neb.Ct.App.2000) one
seeking subrogation plead it and must right
set forth the facts from which the arises.”).
of subrogation
I the trial-court therefore conclude ruling
erred in indemni-
fy Village