Marion VIGUE et al. v. JOHN E. FOGARTY MEMORIAL HOSPITAL and Jane Doe.
No. 81-392-Appeal.
Supreme Court of Rhode Island.
July 24, 1984.
Dennis J. McCarten, Hanson, Curran & Parks, Providence, for defendants.
OPINION
MURRAY, Justice.
The plaintiffs, Marion and Philip Vigue, appeal from a dismissal order entered against them in the Superior Court and in favor of the defendants, John E. Fogarty Memorial Hospital (hereinafter the “hospital“) and an unknown nurse.
On July 28, 1980, plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging that on or about July 29, 1977, the hospital and an unknown nurse employed by the hospital breached their duty of care to Marion Vigue (hereinafter
On April 1, 1981, the hospital filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiffs’ claim was barred by
In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, we view the allegations of the complaint as true and in the light most favorable to plaintiffs. Unless it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a plaintiff will be unable to prove his right to relief and it appears to a certainty that he will not be entitled to relief under any set of circumstances, his complaint shall not be dismissed. Rosen v. Restrepo, 119 R.I. 382, 401-02, 380 A.2d 960, 962 (1977); Bragg v. Warwick Shoppers World, Inc., 102 R.I. 8, 12, 227 A.2d 582, 584 (1967).
Applying this standard to the case at bar, we note that the sole issue presented in this appeal is which statute of limitations should apply—the two-year period provided for medical-malpractice actions or the three-year period specified for negligence actions. If two years is the appropriate limitations period for this action, it is clear that plaintiffs are not entitled to relief and that the trial justice‘s dismissal of their action was proper—no conceivable set of facts could exist to support an award in their favor if their action had not been filed within the statutory period.
Before proceeding to the merits of this appeal, we note a substantial change between the legal environment faced by the trial justice at the time of his ruling and that confronting us today. In dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint, the trial justice based his decision on two different grounds, one of which no longer has the force of law. Specifically, the trial justice relied upon the language of
In determining whether the hospital‘s conduct on July 29, 1977, constituted medical malpractice under
“any tort or breach of contract based on health care or professional services rendered, or which should have been rendered, by a licensed physician, hospital, clinic, health maintenance organization or professional service corporation providing health care services and organized under chapter 5.1 of title 7, to a patient.”
A plain reading of this provision reveals that tortious conduct based upon professional services that were rendered or which should have been rendered by a hospital is included within the definition of malpractice. We would first note that plaintiffs’ complaint clearly sounds in tort—it is an action against the hospital based upon the negligent supervision of Mrs. Vigue by its employee nurse. Additionally, it involves services that were rendered—administration of medication—or which should have been rendered—assisting Mrs. Vigue to the bathroom to obtain a urine sample—by the hospital through its employee nurse. The only close question concerning the applicability of
It has been stated that in determining whether a particular act involves the rendition of professional services, a court “must look not to the title or character of the party performing the act, but to the act itself.” Swassing v. Baum, 195 Neb. 651, 656, 240 N.W.2d 24, 27 (1976) (quoting Marx v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 183 Neb. 12, 157 N.W.2d 870 (1968)). The title of the individual performing the act is not relevant in this determination—it is “the nature of the act itself and the circumstances under which it [is] performed [that determine whether professional services are involved].” Swassing v. Baum, 195 Neb. at 656, 240 N.W.2d at 27. The Supreme Court of Nebraska further stated that in adopting a shorter statute of limitations for actions of professional negligence than the one provided for ordinary negligence, its legislature did not intend “that the various aspects of the whole professional relationship should be separated [for purposes of applying the statute of limitations].” Id. at 657, 240 N.W.2d at 28. If the acts complained of constituted a necessary, essential, and integral part in the rendition of professional services to the patient, they are subject to the shorter statute of limitations provided for actions of professional negligence. See id. at 657-68, 240 N.W.2d at 28.
Applying these rules to the case at bar, we note initially that the title of the hospital staff member who administered the medication to Mrs. Vigue and that of the unknown nurse who awakened her and requested a urine sample are both irrelevant in determining whether the hospital was engaged in the rendition of professional services. We recognize further that as long as the acts performed by the hospital
We recognize that another statutory provision in this jurisdiction specifically defines the term “professional services” in a manner inconsistent with this holding.
The short response to the argument that the definition of professional services contained in
A second reason exists to support our conclusion that the definition of “professional services” found in
In light of the foregoing, we conclude that this complaint does involve a claim for medical malpractice as that term is defined in
For the reasons stated, the plaintiffs’ appeal is denied and dismissed, the judgment of the Superior Court is hereby affirmed, and the papers in the case may be remanded to the Superior Court.
SHEA, Justice, with whom KELLEHER, Justice, joins, dissenting.
I cannot agree with the majority‘s holding that the two-year statute of limitations for medical-malpractice actions should apply to this case.
The plaintiffs, Marion and Philip Vigue, have brought a claim against an unnamed nurse and the hospital where the nurse is employed and where Marion Vigue was a patient. Mrs. Vigue alleges that she fell and injured herself because the nurse allowed her to walk to the bathroom unattended. The plaintiffs filed their complaint within the three-year statute-of-limitations period applicable to personal-injury claims (
The outcome of this appeal and the ability of the Vigues to obtain their day in court turns on the meaning and application of the statutory term “medical malpractice.” The ultimate question is whether lack of due care by a nurse falls within the limited area of negligence known as medical malpractice. The Legislature has not defined the term; therefore, we must use the rules of statutory construction to determine its meaning. The majority‘s reliance on the definition of the term “malpractice” contained in
It appears to be the unanimous holding in states with similar statutes of limitations for medical-malpractice claims that the negligence of a nurse constitutes ordinary negligence rather than medical malpractice. Kambas v. St. Joseph‘s Mercy Hospital, 389 Mich. 249, 205 N.W.2d 431 (1973); Wolff v. Jamaica Hospital, 11 A.D.2d 801, 205 N.Y.S.2d 152 (1960); Richardson v. Doe, 176 Ohio St. 370, 199 N.E.2d 878 (1964); see Lillich, The Malpractice Statute of Limitations in New York and Other Jurisdictions, 47 Cornell L.Q. 339, 340 (1962); Note, When is Malpractice by a Physician Actionable?, 21 St. John‘s L.Rev. 77, 78 (1946); Annot., 8 A.L.R.3d 1336 (1966).
The legislation that enacted the lower period in which to bring a claim for medical malpractice was passed by the Legislature in 1976 in response to the alleged “mid-1970s medical malpractice crisis.” Boucher v. Sayeed, R.I., 459 A.2d 87, 88 (1983). The Legislature apparently sought a response to a threatened “doctors’ strike” because “physicians * * * were resentful of ‘steep increases in premium rates.‘” Id. at 89. (Emphasis added.) Nowhere does it appear that the Legislature intended the shorter two-year statute of limitations to extend beyond claims against physicians.6 The term “malpractice” has been consistently used at common law to apply only to the negligence of physicians and surgeons. Blastos v. Elliot Community Hospital, 105 N.H. 391, 392, 200 A.2d 854, 856 (1964).7 We should not imply that the Legislature intended a broader meaning for this term than that established at common law absent a specific indication otherwise. Richardson v. Doe, 176 Ohio St. at 372-73, 199 N.E.2d at 880.
We should not extend the meaning of the term “medical malpractice” beyond claims against physicians and surgeons merely because a hospital is named as a defendant. To extend the term as the majority has done invites inclusion under the term “medical malpractice” of alleged negligent actions by orderlies, administrative staff, and maintenance workers. I do not believe that the Legislature intended such a broad meaning.
There does not appear to be any compelling reason to include nurses within the term “medical malpractice“. Physicians are required to exercise their independent judgment on matters that may mean the difference between life and death. The duty they owe to plaintiffs is generally based on the physician-patient relationship. A nurse, although highly skilled, well trained, and essential to the delivery of health care, is not in the same category as a physician. A nurse is not authorized to practice medicine. See generally
“[A nurse‘s] primary function is to observe and record the symptoms and reactions of patients. A nurse is not permitted to exercise judgment in diagnosing or treating any symptoms which the patient develops. Her duty is to report them to the physician. * * * It is in the areas of diagnosis and prescription that there is the greatest danger of unwarranted
claims. A nurse by the very nature of her occupation is prohibited from exercising an independent judgment in those areas and thus is not subject to such claims.” Richardson v. Doe, 176 Ohio St. at 373, 199 N.E.2d at 880.
Medical malpractice is nothing more than a specialized subsection of the theory of negligence applicable to physicians and surgeons because of the special knowledge, training, and skill they possess.
In the present case, Mrs. Vigue alleges that the nurse negligently allowed her to walk to the bathroom unattended when she knew or should have known that Mrs. Vigue was not able to walk without assistance. The failure to assist her adequately, if proved, would simply represent a claim based on ordinary negligence. No negligence is alleged against any physician or surgeon but only against a nurse employed by the defendant hospital. In view of this fact, I conclude that the plaintiffs’ action should not be deemed one for medical malpractice. The hospital, being liable in the present case solely on the basis of respondeat superior, can be in no different position from that of the agent through whom it acts. Because I conclude that the three-year statute of limitations applicable to personal injury claims should apply, I would reverse the judgment of the Superior Court and remand the case to allow the plaintiffs to proceed with their claim.