OPINION
1.Plaintiffs, Joe and Genara Vigil, filed a complaint against Defendants for damages and declaratory relief arising out of an accident involving Genara Vigil and an uninsured motorist. Defendants denied coverage to Plaintiffs based on the fact that Genara Vigil had signed a form rejecting uninsured motorists coverage. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. We affirm the trial court and hold that, under the particular facts of this case, the rejection form signed by Genara Vigil was valid and Plaintiffs are not entitled to have uninsured motorists coverage read into their policy. FACTS
2. Plaintiffs, husband and wife, insured their vehicles with Defendant Dairyland Insurance Company. They purchased the insurance through Defendant Rio Grande Insurance. Prior to January 27,1992, Joe Vigil had requested a quote from Rio Grande Insurance for liability insurance only. Joe Vigil told Rio Grande Insurance that he wanted liability insurance to cover him against a lawsuit. Joe Vigil was given a quote and told that he would be required to make three months’ worth of payments in order to secure the insurance. On January 27, Joe Vigil “sent” Genara Vigil to the Rio Grande Insurance office to purchase the insurance. Genara brought enough cash to pay the liability-insurance premium in accordance with the quote. Rio Grande Insurance required a minimum payment of three months, whereas, Dairyland Insurance Company required only a minimum payment of two months. Genara signed an application form to insure a 1973 Ford Maverick, listing herself and her husband as drivers under the policy. Genara rejected uninsured motorists (UM) coverage and signed a form stating that such coverage had been explained to her, that she fully understood that her policy would not contain this coverage when issued or renewed, and that she would be able to add the coverage to the policy at any future date. Genara also signed a Coverage Explanation form which indicated that she was receiving liability insurance only and that no UM coverage would be included.
3. The Vigils were mailed a copy of the policy, along with a declarations page which indicated that they were covered by liability insurance for property damage and bodily injury. The declarations page contained language stating, “UNINSURED MOTORIST COVS REJECTED” on the front of the page and “UNINSURED MOTORISTS COVERAGES HAVE BEEN REJECTED” on the back of the page. Over the course of the next three years, Joe Vigil visited the Rio Grande Insurance office approximately five times to change coverages under the policy. According to documents included in the record proper, these changes included the addition of a 1980 Pontiac Firebird and a 1978 Chevrolet pickup. There was also a document indicating a “change” to cover the 1981 Mercury involved in the accident for which the Vigils claim coverage should have been provided. Each time that the premium was due or there were changes made in the policy, Defendants mailed a declarations page to the Vigils, which stated, “UNINSURED MOTORIST COVS REJECTED,” and “UNINSURED MOTORISTS COVERAGES HAVE BEEN REJECTED.”
4. On February 27, 1995, Genara Vigil, while driving the 1981 Mercury, was involved in an automobile accident with an uninsured motorist. At the time of the accident, Joe Vigil did not believe that he had UM coverage. Joe Vigil realized the importance of the coverage when he found out that “we weren’t covered and that we had medical bills stacking up and that it was important to have uninsured motorists.” Defendants informed the Vigils that they were not covered because they had not purchased UM coverage. The Vigils ultimately filed an amended complaint alleging that Defendants were hable for negligence, misrepresentation, fraud, violation of the insurance code, and violation of the New Mexico Unfair Claims Practice statute, NMSA 1978, Section 59A-16-20 (1993). The Vigils also claimed that they were entitled to reformation of the insurance contract to include UM coverage.
DISCUSSION
Preservation of Issues
5. On appeal, Defendants vigorously argue that the issues included in Plaintiffs’ brief in chief were not properly preserved in their pleadings. Because we affirm on the merits, we do not address this argument.
Initial Rejection of Uninsured Motorists Coverage
6. Plaintiffs challenge the validity of the initial rejection of UM coverage on three grounds: (1) Joe Vigil, the named insured, did not sign the rejection form; (2) the rejection was not made knowingly and intelligently; and (3) the application and declarations page of the insurance policy were never approved by the superintendent of insurance. We disagree with all three arguments.
7. NMSA 1978, Section 66-5-301(A) (1983) provides that:
No motor vehicle or automobile liability policy insuring against loss resulting from liability imposed by law for bodily injury or death suffered by any person ... shall be delivered or issued for delivery in New Mexico ... unless coverage is provided therein or supplemental thereto ... for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury ... resulting therefrom, according to the rules and regulations promulgated by, and under provisions filed with and approved by, the superintendent of insurance.
In essence, this subsection of the statute requires that UM coverage be included in all liability insurance policies issued in connection with automobiles. However, the statute also allows an insured to choose not to purchase UM coverage by specifically rejecting such coverage. Section 66-5-301(0 states in material part:
The named insured shall have the right to reject uninsured motorist coverage as described in Subsections A and B of this section; provided that unless the named insured requests such coverage in writing, such coverage need not be provided in or supplemental to a renewal policy where the named insured has rejected the coverage in connection with a policy previously issued to him [or her] by the same insurer.
In other words, an insured has the option of either rejecting UM coverage or protecting himself or herself against a financially irresponsible motorist. See Lee v. General Accident Ins. Co.,
8. Plaintiffs argue the rejection was invalid because it was signed by Genara Vigil rather than Joe Vigil, the named insured. In this case, Joe Vigil “sent” Genara Vigil to the Rio Grande Insurance office to purchase insurance in accordance with a discussion concerning liability insurance that took place on January 27, 1992. The discussion concerned the purchase of liability insurance only — to ensure that Joe Vigil would be covered in case of a lawsuit. Because Joe Vigil was unable to go to the Rio Grande Insurance office and purchase the insurance himself, he specifically authorized Genara Vigil to do so in his place. Genara Vigil acted as Joe Vigil’s agent. See Warren v. New York Life Ins. Co.,
9. Plaintiffs also maintain that the rejection of UM coverage was not knowing and intelligent because the insurance agent did not explain the significance of UM coverage at the time of the rejection. It is clear that the forms Genara Vigil signed showed that UM coverage was not included in the policy being purchased. For example, Genara Vigil signed the portion of the application form titled, “UNINSURED MOTORIST REJECTION” which stated, “I have had Uninsured Motorists Coverage explained to me and fully understand it. I hereby reject such coverage and understand that my policy will not contain this coverage when issued or renewed. I also understand that I may add this coverage to my policy at any future date.” Genara Vigil also signed another form titled, “COVERAGE EXPLANATION” which stated, “I understand that I have purchased only the coverages indicated below with an ‘X’.” The form further stated, “I also understand that I am NOT INSURED for any coverages marked ‘NONE’.” On the Coverage Explanation form, Uninsured Motorists Bodily Injury is marked “NONE.” At the bottom of the form, it states, “I have read each item above and understand how each one affects me.” Based on the application forms completed by Genara Vigil, an insurance policy was issued to Plaintiffs which provided liability coverage, but no UM coverage. Plaintiffs do not argue that the forms signed by Genara were unclear; instead, they focus only on the question of whether the insurance agent should have explained the value of UM coverage to the Vigils, and in effect should have attempted to convince them to buy that coverage as well as the liability coverage.
10. Nothing in the applicable statute requires an insurer to make a purchaser aware of the importance of UM coverage before accepting a rejection of such coverage. In addition, the case law discussing UM insurance requires only that the insured be appropriately informed that he or she has rejected the coverage. Romero,
11. Moreover, in addition to the notice provided by the declarations page, Joe Vigil was well aware that he had not obtained UM coverage in connection with his insurance policy. In his deposition, Joe Vigil was asked, “When you found out that the other driver was uninsured, you didn’t believe that you had uninsured motorists coverage?” Joe Vigil responded, “Yeah, I didn’t believe we had it, but I didn’t realize how important it was to have it.” With respect to the validity of the initial rejection of UM coverage, the evidence clearly shows that Joe Vigil did not intend to purchase the coverage and that, both before and after the accident, he was aware that he had not purchased the coverage.
12. Plaintiffs argue that reversal is required in this case because the application form with its rejection language and the declarations page were never submitted for approval to the superintendent of insurance. Plaintiffs claim that the mere fact that these forms were not submitted to the superintendent for approval renders the policy a “nullity.” In this regard, NMSA 1978, Section 59A-18-12(A) (1993), provides that “[n]o insurance policy or annuity contract shall be delivered ... in this state, nor shall any assumption certificate, endorsement, rider or application which becomes a part of any such policy be used, until a copy of the form and the classification of risks pertaining thereto have been filed with the superintendent.”
13. We reject Plaintiffs’ argument that the policy automatically becomes a nullity if part of the policy, such as the declarations page, has not been approved by the superintendent. Such a holding would mean that Plaintiffs’ own policy is null and void, and provides no coverage of any kind, let alone UM coverage. What Plaintiffs appear to be arguing in this regard is that the portion of the policy that was not approved, the declarations page, is a nullity only to the extent Plaintiffs wish it to be — that is, that the portion indicating that UM coverage was rejected should be stricken, leaving them with such coverage. We will not interpret the statute in the manner argued by Plaintiffs. Compare Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Daddy$ Money, Inc.,
New Rejections When Vehicles Added to Policy
14. Plaintiffs argue that each time they added vehicles to the policy or made changes affecting the premiums to be paid on the policy, the policy became a “new” policy rather than a renewal policy. Therefore, Plaintiffs contend, a new rejection was required under our statute. We disagree. The pertinent statutory language is: “[Uninsured motorist] coverage need not be provided in or supplemental to a renewal policy where the named insured has rejected the coverage in connection with a policy previously issued to him [or her] by the same insurer.” Section 66-5-301(C). In our view, here we are dealing with a continuation of the original policy.
15. A policy consists of a contract of insurance between an insurer and an insured, including “all clauses, riders, endorsements and papers which are a part thereof.” See NMSA 1978, § 59A-18-2 (1984). Insurance policies are personal, inuring to the person, not the vehicle to be covered under the policy. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Jackson,
16. We are of the opinion that, under circumstances such as those involved in this case, the addition of vehicles or changes made which may affect the premiums owed under an insurance policy do not constitute changes such that a new policy is created. Based on the automatic coverage provision in the policy and. our statutory definition of “pohcy,” we hold that when Plaintiffs added or replaced vehicles under the policy, no new contract was created, but the change merely amounted to a continuation of the original policy. Other jurisdictions have ruled in a similar fashion. See, e.g., Sentry Ins. A Mut. Co. v. McGowan,
17. It is true that in some jurisdictions, the addition of a vehicle to a policy is considered an event requiring a new rejection of UM coverage. See, e.g., Perkins v. Guaranty Nat’l Ins. Co.,
Defendants’ Change Form
18. Plaintiffs contend that the policy change form used by Defendants, by its language, requires that UM coverage be provided when a vehicle is added to the policy unless a new rejection is signed by the insured. Each time that Joe Vigil made changes to his insurance policy, he signed the front of a form titled “AUTO/CYCLE POLICY CHANGE REQUEST.” The form includes areas for providing driver information, vehicle information, and coverages/lienholder information. A note at the top of the form states, “[w]hen changing name of insured, adding vehicles, changing limits or adding coverages, applicable selections must be made on the reverse of this form.” The reverse side of the form provides,
[i]f the changes requested on the reverse side of this form involve adding a vehicle, change of name, change of limits or addition of coverages, the following applicable selections must be indicated. If a selection has not been made, or is unsigned, we will provide UM/UIM limits as required by individual state law.
Defendants’ agent explained that the form is a generic form used for all states and that, if a state does not require signatures for changes made on the policy, then no signature is requested. The agent testified that the only time that a signature would be required on the form would be if a policy included certain coverages and the insured desired to reject the existing coverage.
19. Joe Vigil signed a policy change request for the vehicle involved in the accident — a 1981 Mercury. The code “C = change,” rather that “A = Add,” is used on the change form, indicating that the change regarding the 1981 Mercury was not considered an addition of a vehicle thereby triggering any necessity to fill out the back of the form. According to the form itself, the back was to be used only when changing the name of the insured, adding vehicles, changing limits, or adding coverages. The change here was a change, not an add, and did not involve a change of name or of limits. Therefore, with respect to the 1981 Mercury, there was no need to make selections on the reverse side of the form since the front of the form excluded the applicability of the reverse side of the form.
Negligent Misrepresentation!Constructive Fraud/Unfair Claims Practice
20. Plaintiffs included in their complaint several arguments pertaining to their claim that Defendants did not provide adequate information with respect to coverages available. Along these lines, Plaintiffs claim that Defendants are liable for negligent misrepresentation in that they did not explain the importance of UM coverage to either Plaintiff, and they also sent “misleading” declarations pages to Joe Vigil, that caused him to think he had been rejected for UM coverage. A defendant may be held liable for negligent misrepresentation if the defendant breached a duty of disclosure owed to plaintiff, plaintiff had a right to rely on the misinformation, and plaintiff sustained damages as a result. Ruiz v. Garcia,
21. We have already explained that Defendants had no duty to inform Plaintiffs of the significance of UM coverage. Absent such a duty, their failure to do so in this case cannot give rise to liability for negligent misrepresentation. Ruiz,
22. Plaintiffs also refer to claims for constructive fraud and unfair claims practice based on the repeated argument that Defendants’ agent did not fully explain the significance of UM coverage and based on the fact that Rio Grande Insurance required three monthly payments to initiate the policy even though Dairyland Insurance only required two such payments. For these reasons, Plaintiffs claim they were treated unfairly by Defendants. We reiterate that Defendants owed no duty to Plaintiffs to explain the significance of UM coverage. In addition, Plaintiffs have no grounds for them claims. Constructive fraud is the breach of a legal or equitable duty which the law terms fraudulent because of the tendency to deceive others. See Parker,
Ratification
23. Plaintiffs make a very unclear argument that a claim for ratification exists in this case. As far as we can tell, Plaintiffs are claiming that Dairyland Insurance ratified the actions of Rio Grande Insurance, and, therefore it is liable for damages to Plaintiff. Since we hold that Rio Grande Insurance is not liable to Plaintiffs, we also hold that Dairyland Insurance is not liable, even if it ratified the actions of Rio Grande Insurance.
CONCLUSION
24. We are aware that, in our state, many drivers choose not to purchase UM coverage. If, in cases such as this, we were to require an insurer to furnish UM coverage when the insured had no intention of securing such protection, we would be violating the doctrine of freedom of contract. Although we acknowledge that UM coverage is important given the number of uninsured drivers in New Mexico, we decline to require an insurer to provide UM coverage in the face of clear evidence that the insured did not choose such coverage and knew it was not included in the policy.
25. As we have discussed above, Plaintiffs have failed to show that any triable issues of fact exist in this case. Therefore, for the reasons stated in this opinion, we affirm the trial court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants,
26. IT IS SO ORDERED,
Notes
. Plaintiffs point to an affidavit signed by Joe Vigil, which was attached to the motion for reconsideration presented to the trial court and stated that, even if Joe Vigil expressed a desire to (have liability coverage only, he did not intend to waive his right to UM coverage. We do not consider that affidavit. See Schmidt v. St. Joseph’s Hosp.,