274 F. Supp. 985 | S.D.N.Y. | 1967
OPINION
The defendant, committed on January 4, 1962, under section 5010(b) of the Youth Corrections Act, seeks credit for thirty-one days of presentence custody served because of alleged inability to make bail. Defendant relies on Stapf v. United States,
Even assuming arguendo, and only arguendo, however, that one under “sentence of imprisonment” is entitled to credit for pretrial confinement resulting from inability to make bail, this defendant’s contention is without merit. In view of the purposes of the Youth Corrections Act and the benefits available to a defendant committed thereunder, it is both appropriate and rational to distinguish youth offenders from defendants not granted such treatment. Accordingly, defendant’s reliance on the
Under that statute, defendant’s sentence was not one of imprisonment for a fixed term; it was for corrective treatment as defined therein in lieu of the penalty of imprisonment otherwise provided by law. The Youth Corrections Act was enacted to provide corrective training and treatment of youth offenders as a substitute for a “sentence of imprisonment,” referred to in section 3568 and in the general provisions for imprisonment under other applicable laws. Departing from the “mere punitive idea of dealing with criminals”, the Youth Corrections Act “looks primarily to the objective idea -of rehabilitation.”
Other factors warrant a distinction between a “sentence of imprisonment” and a commitment under the Youth Corrections Act. The advantages to a youth offender include not only the quality of the treatment, but also the opportunity to secure a vacatur of the judgment of conviction upon an unconditional discharge.
The application is denied.
. 125 U.S.App.D.C. 100, 367 F.2d 326 (1966).
. 376 F.2d 191 (4th Cir. 1967).
. Prior to its amendment in 1966, § 3568 provided for presentence custody credit when the “sentence of imprisonment” was imposed under a “statute [which] requires the imposition of a minimum mandatory sentence.” The amendment deleted the restrictive provision and thus provided for pre-custody credit in all cases of a “sentence of imprisonment.”
. It is not without interest to note that in Btupf the court observed: “Neither deterrence, retribution, reform nor any other consideration was offered by the Government for our consideration, as providing a rationale for this discrimination.” 307 F.2d at 329.
. H.R.Rep. No. 2979, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950), in 1950 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad. News pp. 3983, 3985.
. 18 U.S.C. § 5000(g).
. 18 U.S.C. § 5021(a). See Tatum v. United States, 114 U.S.App.D.C. 49, 310 F.2d 854 (1902).
. See Fish v. United States, 254 F.Supp. 900 (D.Md.1966). Compare 18 U.S.C. § 5017(c) with Baber v. United States, 368 F.2d 463 (5th Cir. 1906); Thomas v. United States, 327 F.2d 795 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1000, 84 S.Ct. 1936, 12 L.Ed.2d 1051 (1964); Kaplan v. Hecht, 24 F.2d 664 (2d Cir. 1928).