24 Pa. 105 | Pa. | 1854
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
In Autwater v. Mathiot, 9 Ser. & R. 397, and McMullen v. Wenner, 16 Ser. & R. 18, it was held that judgments against vendors and vendees under articles of agreement bind the interests of each judgment-debtor, and nothing beyond. So that on a sale of the interest of the vendor on a judgment against him, the purchaser at sheriff’s sale takes precisely his title subject to the equitable estate of the vendee, and the proceeds of the sale are distributed among the lien creditors of the vendor according to their priority. In like manner, on a sale of the vendee’s interest the purchaser at sheriff’s sale takes the equitable title subject to the payment of the unpaid purchase-money. The exception to this rule is, where the vendor obtains judgment for the purchase-money and sells the land by means of process issued upon it. In such a case it has been held that he “ must be considered as selling all that estate in the land, whatever it may be, which he agreed to sell and convey to the defendant:” Love v. Jones, 4 Watts 471; Horbach v. Riley, 7 Barr 81. As this was the whole legal and equitable estate, it necessarily followed that the vendor was entitled to be paid out of the proceeds, not by virtue of the supposed lien of his judgment (for it was immaterial whether this was prior or subsequent to other judgments against the vendee), but by virtue of his paramount title as owner of the land. Any other principle of distribution would leave him without remedy for his money. It was thought in Wilson v. Stoxo, 10 Watts 436, and in Day v. Lowrie, 5 Watts 417, that this effect was produced only in cases where the vendor himself was the purchaser at the sheriff’s sale. But this was contrary to the previous decision of the very point in Love v. Jones, and is at variance with the doctrine of the subsequent ease of Horbach v. Riley, 7 Barr 81. Neither the title of the sheriff’s vendee, nor the course of distribution, can depend upon the previous claims of the person
From the facts stated in the auditor’s report, we regard the judgment in favor of Swartz as extinguished by the substitution of another in lieu of it, under an agreement with the equitable owner that it was to be satisfied.
Where one of two judgment-debtors has a judgment against the other, and both judgments are entered on the same day, and the land of one is sold by the sheriff, the other cannot claim any part of the proceeds against his own judgment-creditor. The liens are of equal priority as to time, but the equity of the creditor is superior to that of the debtor.
Decree affirmed.