Vieceli v. CummingsVieceli v. Cummings
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Burke
delivered the opinion of the court.
In a complaint filed in the superior court of Cook county by John Vieeeli against the receivers of the corporations doing business as Chicago Surface Lines, plaintiff asked damages for personal injuries suffered because of negligence in the operation of a bus and also because of the wiful, wanton and malicious conduct in the operation of the bus. Issue was joined and the
In assailing the judgment plaintiff states’ that the right of a party litigant to address the jury by his counsel is absolute, and that it is the duty of the court to give instructions stating the law applicable to the evidence on the issues raised. To sustain the judgment, defendants maintain that the verdict was the only verdict warranted by the evidence, and that the court should have directed such verdict when requested at the close of all the evidence. The law is well settled that argument of counsel is a matter of right. Argument of a case is as much a part of the trial as the hearing of the evidence. A party to a civil suit has a right- to be heard, either by himself or by counsel, not only in the testimony, but in the argument of his case. No matter how weak or inconclusive the case may be, if it is enough to present a disputed question of fact, the counsel of the party has a right to present his client’s case to the jury. Carpenter v. First Nat. Bank, 19 Ill. App. 549; Thompson v. People of State of Illinois, 144 Ill. 378; Lanan v. Hibbard, Spencer, Bartlett & Co., 63 Ill. App. 54. The office of instructions is to give information to the jury concerning the law of the case for application to the subject matter before them. It is a well-settled rule of law that each side in any litigation
Defendants do not oppose the argument of plaintiff that where a case is submitted to a jury the respective parties have the right to argue the case before the jury, and that the parties have the right to have the jury instructed as to the law applicable to the case. They assert that the verdict returned by the jury is the verdict which they requested the court to direct; that the judgment entered is the judgment sought by them; and that haying eventually obtained the judgment which they sought, they have no cause to appeal either directly or by cross-appeal. On this appeal defendants are entitled to urge every ground presented by the record which supports the judgment in their favor. In People v. Bradford, 372 Ill. 63, our Supreme Court said (65, 66):
“The judgment appealed from was for appellees, and no part of it was adverse to them. They were, therefore, in no position to prosecute a cross-appeal. Having obtained all the relief they deemed themselves entitled to, they may sustain the judgment upon any ground warranted by the record, though they may wish to show the court below erred in not giving it to them on different or additional grounds.”
See also McNulty v. Hotel Sherman Co., 280 ILl. App. 325, 331; Hillmer v. Chicago Bank of Commerce,
“We regret that we are unable to say that the evidence in this case was so clear that the court might properly have instructed the jury to find for the plain-tiff the amount recovered by him, in which case appellant would have had no right to address the jury.”
Defendants analyze the evidence in furtherance of their argument and state that, admitting the evidence in favor of plaintiff to be true, together with all legitimate inferences, such evidence does not sustain plaintiff’s cause of action, and that it was the duty of the court to direct a verdict. We have read the transcript of the testimony in order to determine whether under the rules we have announced, plaintiff made out a case which should have been submitted to the jury. In doing so, we consider the point urged by defendants as though the court had directed a verdict for the defendants.
The collision out of which this case arose, occurred at Belmont and Pacific avenues, Chicago, on Wednesday, August 6, 1941 at about 7:00 p. m.- Belmont avenue runs in an easterly and westerly direction and Pacific avenue in a northerly and southerly direction. Belmont avenue is 53 feet 6 inches wide from curb to curb, and Pacific avenue is 33 feet 5 inches wide from curb to curb. Defendants controlled and operated buses on Belmont avenue as far west as Pacific avenue. The power for the buses came from overhead trolley wires. The trolley wires for westbound buses iyere strung in an easterly and westerly direction 12 feet south of the north curb, and the wires for the eastbound buses were strung in an easterly and westerly direction about 13 feet north of the south curb. A drawing in evidence portrays the scene of the accident. Buses moving in a westerly direction make a wide circle to the
Plaintiff testified that he was driving his 1936 Plymouth automobile west on Belmont avenue; that he got onto Belmont avenue from Orange street, which is one block east of Pacific avenue; that the weather was clear and dry; that he saw the bus down the street; that it was about 300 feet west of him; that the bus was going west in the north lane of Belmont avenue about three feet from the curb; that he was driving about 20 or 25 miles an hour; that when he reached Pacific avenue the bus made a sharp turn and struck the rear fender of his automobile; that he became unconscious and lost control of his automobile; that he regained consciousness in the West Suburban hospital; that he felt pain all over his head, side, shoulder, back and leg; that a bandage was put on his head; that he had bruises all over his shoulder, head and legs; that there were 12 stitches in his head; that it took three weeks before he was able to walk around; that his head still pains him; that at the time of the accident he was employed and was earning $39.75, plus a bonus each week; that he went back to work after three weeks; that before the occurrence he was running a machine at work; that after the accident he got a lighter job for seven
Bichard Boerstal, called by plaintiff, testified that he was in a store on the northeast corner of Pacific and Belmont avenues; that the bus came to the corner going west on Belmont avenue, traveling 10 miles an hour; that it continued going, making* a left hand turn; that he saw the automobile traveling west on Belmont avenue; that the automobile was going approximately 25 to 30 miles an hour, but it started to slow down after he first saw it about 50 feet east of the intersection; that the bus was traveling west until it started to make a left hand turn going south; that before the bus made this turn it was traveling in the north lane of Belmont avenue next to the curb; that the rear end of the automobile collided with the side of the bus; that the automobile tried to avoid the bus before the collision took place; that the front side of the bus came in contact with the right rear of the automobile; that the bus did not stop until it came in contact with the automobile; that there were no passengers on the bus at the time of the accident; that there is a 35 mile an hour speed limit; that the automobile was knocked into a tree on the south side of Belmont avenue about 50 or 75 feet west of Pacific avenue; that the driver of the automobile
Pacific avenue is at the end of the Belmont avenue bus line. At that place westbound buses proceed around a loop and turn back to the east. The buses get their power from the trolley wires overhead. They cannot operate unless the trolley wheel is on this trolley wire. The trolley wire was over the street in plain view, and it turned around a loop there. If the bus moved at all it could go nowhere else except
There is much force in the argument of defendants that there is no evidence to warrant a verdict finding the defendants guilty of negligence, which was the proximate cause of the injuries. However, in view of our finding that under the principles of law discussed it was the duty of the court to direct a verdict for the defendants on plaintiff’s failure to prove his allegation that he was in the exercise of due care and caution for his own safety, it is unnecessary for us to decide whether there was any evidence to sustain the charge of negligence. It will be observed that there was also a charge of wilful and wanton conduct. No attempt was made to prove this charge, and no instructions were requested by plaintiff dealing with that charge. On the contrary, plaintiff’s requested instructions were‘based upon the exercise of due care, and although they were not given to the jury, they may be considered in determining whether the plaintiff intended to submit the wilful and wanton charge to the jury. It is well established that an appellant is bound on appeal by the theory upon which he tried the case in the trial court. We find that the charge of wilful and wanton conduct was abandoned by the plaintiff. Our view is that it
Judgment affirmed.
Hebel, P. J., and Kilby, J., concur.