69 So. 480 | Ala. | 1915
Appellee, Thomas L. Lloyd, filed this bill against John R. Yidmer and others, appellants, to quiet the title to a tract of land in Mobile county, Ala., described as “section 14, township 5 south, range 2 west of Mobile county.” The averments of the bill were in conformity with the requirements of our statutory provision in the cases of this character. —Code, § 5443 et seq.
The evidence in the case has been carefully examined, and we are reasonably satisfied of the following facts established thereby: That J. M. and Adele Rabby went into possession of this property in 1866, under a quitclaim deed of Harriet McGill; that Harriet McGill derived her title from the will of her husband, duly admitted to probate in November, 1864, and that under said will Harriet McGill received a life estate; that the title of her husband appears to have been a tax certificate of the tax collector of Mobile county, showing a sale of said land for taxes, assessed against owners unknown, due on the property, and certifying that the said William McGill purchased it at such sale. It is not shown that the said McGills were ever in possession of, or exercised any acts of ownership over, the property. It further appears that Harriet McGill died in 1896.
We are further of the opinion that the evidence sufficiently establishes the facts that the complainant purchased from J. M. Rabby under a contract whereby he was to acquire a “clear title”; that these negotiations were had while complainant was in possession of •the property, and when he was aware of the fact that .Adele Rabby had only a deed from one claiming a life ■estate, and was therefore in no position to convey a good title; and that J. M. Rabby agreed for a consideration of $900, to acquire a “clear title,” and convey the same to complainant. We are persuaded that this contract was made with J. M. Rabby, and not with Adele Rabby and that the full purchase price was paid pri- or to the death of Adele Rabby, and at which time ■complainant Avas in the open and adverse possession ■of the property.
The reasoning of this rule being founded upon the presumption of title in the plaintiff because of such
The situation in this aspect of the case is, therefore, that Adele Rabby is shown to be in possession under a quitclaim deed from a life tenant, and which life estate fell in, in 1896, the year Harriet McGill died, and the open, notorious adverse possession of complainant has continued from that time until the present. The deed to Adele Rabby, executed by Vickers, Sadler and Riley in 1870, can be of no service to respondents, as ■these parties are shown not to have had any title to the property, but rather the contrary appears, and are shown never to have had possession; nor to have exercised any act of ownership over the same, and at the time of ex-
Therefore the only title to look to, so far as Adele Rabby is concerned, is the deed of the life tenant, Harriet McGill, and so far as that title is concerned it would appear to rest in residuary legatees of the will of William McGill named therein; and as the life tenant, Harriet McGill, died in 1896, they would seem to have long since been barred, so far as this record discloses, by the statute of limitation of 10 years. Indeed, if they or their heirs are parties to' this suit, they have offered no resistance to the relief here sought. It therefore appears that the title of Adele Rabby, as shown by the respondents, falls of its own Aveight. It would further appear, however, that complainant, under- the view Ave have taken of the evidence as herein expressed, is entitled to the .relief upon still another theory.
The contract having been made with J. M. Rabby for a clear title, the consideration for which was paid in full by complainant during the lifetime of Adele Rabby, we are unable to see how the fact that the deed from 3T. M. Rabby Avas executed after the death of his Avife should conclude the complainant as having purchased only a life estate. Under these facts, and the complainant having received possession from neither J. M. nor Adele Rabby, we do not see that any question of estoppel can here militate against him. He bargained and paid for the full title, and under the claim of ownership had been in the adverse possession of the property for more than 40 years.
The evidence in this record not only fails to show that complainant Avas purchasing only a life estate, but, on the contrary, refutes such a theory in every particular. The title thus acquired by complainant, by this long-continued adverse possession, has not been overcome by the respondents. We therefore conclude that, from either aspect here discussed, without reference to other reasons urged, complainant was entitled to relief. The decree appealed from is accordingly affirmed.
Affirmed.