Case Information
*1 Before: MOORE and CLAY, Circuit Judges; HOOD, District Judge. [*]
_________________
COUNSEL ON BRIEF: Joe Bednarz, Jr., BEDNARZ & BEDNARZ, Hendersonville, Tennessee, for Appellant. J. Randolph Bibb, Jr., Ryan N. Clark, LEWIS, THOMASON, KING, KRIEG & WALDROP, P.C., Nashville, Tennessee, Stephanie A. Douglas, Jessica R. Vartanian, BUSH SEYFERTH & PAIGE PLLC, Troy, Michigan, for Appellee.
_________________
OPINION
_________________
KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. In this diversity case, Daniel A. Jackson (“Mr. Jackson”), the husband of Plaintiff-Appellant Victoria A. Jackson (“Mrs. Jackson” or “Jackson”), died in a car accident оn U.S. Highway 70 after he lost control of his 2012 Ford Focus. Mrs. Jackson, who was a passenger in the car, was seriously injured. She now alleges that Defendant-Appellee Ford Motor Company (“Ford”), the manufacturer of their car, was responsible for the accident because it equipped the car with a defective “Elеctronic Power Assisted Steering” (“EPAS”) system that caused the loss of control. Ford filed a motion to dismiss, arguing, inter alia, that Jackson did not adequately plead proximate cause. The district court granted Ford’s motion, and Jackson has appealed. For the reasons stated below, the district court demanded too much of Jackson under the familiar Iqbal and Twombly pleading requirements. Accordingly, we REVERSE the district court’s judgment dismissing the complaint and REMAND the case for further proceedings.
I. BACKGROUND
Because “[w]e . . . accept all plausible well-pled factual allegations as true,”
see City of
Cleveland v. Ameriquest Mortg. Sec., Inc.
,
“The EPAS system in the 2012 Ford Focus . . . replaces the traditional hydraulic-assist power steering pump and [consists] of a power steering control motor, electronic control unit, torque sensor and steering wheel position sensor.” ¶ 17 (Page ID #404). Jackson describes the “systemic defect” in this system as follows: “(1) seepage of conformal coating into the EPAS system’s ribbon cable, which leads to the loss of connections within the EPAS system; (2) misalignment of ribbon cable pins utilized in the EPAS system, which leads to the breakage of critical wiring and the loss of connectiоns within the EPAS system; (3) manufacturing defects in the contact plating used in the EPAS system, which causes corrosion and an interruption in electrical connections within the EPAS system; (4) defects in EPAS system’s sensors; and (5) defects in the gear assembly.” Id. ¶ 17 (Page ID #404); see also id. ¶ 47 (Page ID #412–13). Jackson claims that “[t]his defective EPAS system renders the system prone to sudden and premature failurе during ordinary and foreseeable driving situations” and that “drivers of the Defective Vehicles experience significantly increased steering effort and an increased risk of losing control of their vehicles when the EPAS system fails.” Id. ¶¶ 17–18 (Page ID #404). Jackson defined “Defective Vehicles” as vehicles that “contain the same or similar EPAS аs the Plaintiff’s 2012 Ford Focus,” which include various other Ford models. Id. ¶ 37 (Page ID #409).
The alleged EPAS defect “can, and has, caused injuries to occupants of the Defective Vehicles.” ¶ 47 (Page ID #413). Jackson points to three instances where drivers experienced steering failure in their 2012 Ford Focuses, id. ¶¶ 87–89 (Page ID #424), and several other instances where other vehicles equipped with the same or similar EPAS system suffered from steering failure, id. ¶¶ 69–86, 90–91 (Page ID #419–25). Jackson’s amended complaint alleges that Ford is strictly liable for manufacturing and design defects; strictly liable for defective warnings; liable for negligent manufacture, design, and warning; engaged in misrepresentations; and breaсhed implied and express warranties. See id. ¶¶ 105–39 (Page ID #428–35).
After Jackson filed her complaint in state court, Ford removed the case to the U.S.
District Court for the Western District of Tennessee. R. 1 (Notice of Removal at 10) (Page ID
#10). The district court then dismissed Defendants Golden Circle Ford, Lincoln, Mercury, Inc.
and Steve Marsh Ford, Inc. under the doctrine оf fraudulent joinder.
See Jackson v. Ford Motor
Co.
, No. 15-1180,
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
“We review de novo a district court’s decision to grant a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).”
In re Darvocet, Darvon, & Propoxyphene Prods. Liab.
Litig.
, 756 F.3d 917, 926 (6th Cir. 2014). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly
,
Jackson argues that “complex product liability cases are unique and do not lend
themselves to rigid rules of pleading.” Appellant’s Br. at 24. However, Jackson did not raise
this argument in the district court, R. 27 (Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss) (Page ID #361–66), so she
has forfeited the right to have it addressed on appeal,
see Armstrong v. City of Melvindale
,
432 F.3d 695, 699–700 (6th Cir. 2006). Nevertheless, we note that we have followed the
standard set forth in
Iqbal
and
Twombly
in other products liability cases.
See, e.g.
,
In re
Darvocet, Darvon, & Propoxyphene Prods. Liab. Litig.
,
B. Applicable Law
“Because this suit is before us pursuant to our diversity jurisdiction, we apply the
substantive law of [Tennessee] and federal procedural law. Whеn applying the substantive law
of [Tennessee], we must follow the decisions of the state’s highest court when that court has
addressed the relevant issue. If the issue has not been directly addressed, we must anticipate how
the relevant state’s highest court would rule in the case and are bound by controlling decisions of
that court.”
City of Cleveland
,
C. Ford’s Motion to Dismiss
On appeal, Jackson argues that the district court improperly dismissed her amended
complaint on the ground that she did not sufficiently plead causation.
See
Appellant’s Br. at 8.
The district court held that Jackson’s amended complaint consisted of “conclusory statements
regarding proximate cause.”
Jackson
,
As we explain below, we hold that Jackson has stated a plausible claim to relief.
Therefore, we reverse and remand.
Under the Tennessee Products Liability Act of 1978 (“TPLA”), “[a] manufacturer or
seller of a product shall not be liable for any injury to a person or property caused by the product
unless the product is determined to be in a defective condition or unreasonably dangerous at the
time it left the control of the manufacturer or seller.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-105(a) (West
2002). A “‘[p]roduct liability action’ includes, but is not limited to, all actions based upon the
following theories: strict liability in tort; negligence; breach of warranty, express or implied;
breach of or failure to discharge a duty to warn or instruct, whether negligent, or innocent;
misrepresentation, concealment, or nondisclosure, whether negligent, or innocent; or under any
other substantive legal theory in tort or contract whatsoever.”
Id.
§ 29-28-102(6). “The plaintiff
also must trace his or her injury to the defect.”
Brown v. Crown Equip. Corp.
,
Because “Ford does not dispute that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint plausibly pleads a defect in the EPAS system,” Appellee’s Br. at 12, Jackson must plausibly plead the remaining element of a products liability action in Tennessee: causation. Indeed, she has. Under Tennessee law, “a three-pronged test for proximate cause is applied: (1) the tortfeasor’s conduct must hаve been a ‘substantial factor’ in bringing about the harm being complained of; and (2) there is no rule or policy that should relieve the wrongdoer from liability because of the manner in which the negligence has resulted in the harm; and (3) the harm giving rise to the action could have reasonably been foreseen or anticipаted by a person of ordinary intelligence and prudence.” Haynes v. Hamilton Cty. , 883 S.W.2d 606, 611–12 (Tenn. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). Referencing the proximate cause standard set forth by the United States Supreme Court, which bears strong resemblance to the Tennessee Supreme Court’s standard, [3] we have held that “causal weaknesses will more often be fodder for a summary- judgment motion under Rule 56 than a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).” Trollinger v. Tyson Foods, Inc. , 370 F.3d 602, 615 (6th Cir. 2004); see also Haynes , 883 S.W.2d at 612 (“Proximate cause . . . [is] ordinarily [a] jury question[], unless the uncontroverted facts and inferences to be drawn from them make it so clear that all reasonable persons must agree on the proper outcome.”).
Applying the first prong in
Haynes
, we conclude that Jacksоn has plausibly alleged that a
defect in the 2012 Ford Focus’s EPAS system was a substantial factor in bringing about the
accident. This is apparent from the litany of other accidents identified by Jackson where the
EPAS system allegedly failed, causing the driver to lose control of the vehicle.
[4]
See id.
¶¶ 69–
86, 90–91 (Page ID #419–25). In addition, the loss of control caused by a defective EPAS
system is plainly consistent with “the Ford Focus dart[ing] left across the center line into
oncoming traffic.”
Id.
¶ 14 (Page ID #403). Applying the second prong, we conclude that the
TPLA creates a cause of action for the strict liability, negligence, breach of warranty, and
misrepresentation claims raised in Jaсkson’s amended complaint,
see
Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-
102(6); there is no rule or policy that should relieve Ford of liability if indeed it equipped
Jackson’s Focus with a defective EPAS system. Finally, that this accident could have reasonably
been foreseen by a person of ordinary intelligence and prudence is apparent from thе defect in
the EPAS system. In her amended complaint, Jackson alleged that “[t]he ‘EPAS’ was the cause
of the Plaintiff[’]s vehicle darting left into oncoming traffic.” R. 36 (Am. Compl. ¶ 16) (Page ID
#403). She explained how “seepage of conformal coating into the EPAS system’s ribbon cable,”
“misalignment of ribbon cable pins,” “manufacturing defects in the contact plating,” “defects in
[the] EPAS system’s sensors,” and “defects in the gear assembly” all result in a system that is
convenient.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Finally, Tennessee courts have referenced the federal proximate-
cause standard in their analysis of proximate cause.
See, e.g.
,
Steamfitters Local Union No. 614 v. Philip Morris,
Inc.
, No. W1999-01061-COA-R9-CV,
[4] Ford argues that the EPAS system failures in other vehicles “are not ‘substantially similar’ to the incident alleged in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint.” Appellee’s Br. at 14. However, Croskey v. BMW of North America, Inc. , the case that Ford cites for the proposition that “[t]he plaintiff hаs the burden of showing the substantial similarity between prior accidents and his own,” addressed the plaintiff’s burden for the admitting evidence at trial. 532 F.3d 511, 518 (6th Cir. 2008). At this stage, Jackson’s description of other vehicles with the same EPAS system losing control, along with her other allegations, is sufficient to plead causation.
“prone to sudden and premature failure during ordinary and foreseeable driving situations.” ¶ 17 (Page ID #404). This failure, Jackson alleges, causes “drivers of the Defective Vehicles [to] experience significantly increased steering effort and an increased risk of losing control of their vehicles,” id. ¶ 18 (Page ID #404), precisely what happened in Jackson’s casе.
Ford’s hypertechnical arguments regarding the allegations in Jackson’s amended
complaint rest on an inaccurate understanding of notice pleading. We accept the truth of
Jackson’s well-pleaded facts and apply our “judicial experience and common sense.”
See Iqbal
,
Ford’s plausibility arguments are likewise without merit. Even if Mr. Jаckson were
driving in a straight direction, it is plausible that he could lose control, cross the center line, and
hit a wrecker.
See id.
¶ 104. For instance, if Mr. Jackson lost his ability to steer while driving
around a bend, he could have crossed the center line without ever steering in a particular
direction. Similarly, difficulty steering while driving around a bend cоuld cause “
sudden
steering or
darting
,”
see
Appellee’s Br. at 14, depending on how sharp the bend is.
Alternatively, difficulty steering while driving straight could have caused Mr. Jackson to
overcompensate, which in turn could cause sudden steering or darting. In sum, these competing
inferences may be proven or disproven in discovery or at trial. But for the time being, and in
light оf our admonition that “causal weaknesses will more often be fodder for a summary-
judgment motion under Rule 56 than a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6),”
Trollinger
,
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the district court’s judgment dismissing the complaint and REMAND the case for further proceedings.
Notes
[*] The Honorable Joseph M. Hоod, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Kentucky, sitting by designation. 1
[1] Although Ford filed its supplemental motion to dismiss one day before Jackson’s amended complaint, it addresses the changes that Jackson made in her amended complaint.
[2]
Jackson argues that
King
“applied a much different standard than should be applied to the current mоtion
to dismiss” because it addressed a motion for summary judgment. Appellant’s Br. at 24. However, causation is an
element of a products-liability action under Tennessee law.
See Brown
,
[3]
Similarly to the Tennessee Supreme Court standard described above, the United States Supreme Court has
held that proximate cause is established when there is “some direct relation between the injury asserted and the
injurious conduct alleged. Thus, a plaintiff who complained of harm flowing merely from the misfortunes visited
upon a third person by the defendant’s acts was generally said to stand at too remote a distance to recover.”
See
Holmes v. Sec. Inv’r Prot. Corp.
,