Victor D. JACKSON, Petitioner-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent-Appellee.
No. 16-2470
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
Argued January 12, 2017. Decided June 16, 2017
495-499
With respect to the denial of certification as to this class, the defendants argue that the denial should be upheld because the plaintiffs failed to present evidence sufficient to establish the existence of an unconstitutional policy or practice and also failed to present sufficient evidence of intent. We do not understand the district court‘s decision to hold that the plaintiffs have not establishеd that their injury resulted from a policy or practice, as the defendants suggest; such an argument would be difficult to make, as the determination to process releases through the OMS system certainly appears to fall within our understanding of whаt constitutes a policy or practice. See generally Glisson v. Indiana Dept. of Corrections, 849 F.3d 372, 378-80 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc). And as to establishing deliberate indifference, we have recognized in another context that deliberate indifference can be shown by systemic and gross deficiencies in equipment or procedures that result in a deprivation of a constitutional right. See Phillips, 828 F.3d at 554. But as we discussed earlier, the district court did not consider whether the policies or practices existed, nor did it consider whether the evidence indicated deliberate indifference, because the court determined that it was not allowed to engage in an analysis of the merits, and therefore we are presented only with the evidence recited above without any factual findings by the court on those matters. The court on remand should consider all issues related to the
The decision of the district court is VACATED and the case REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
E. Brantley Webb, Attorney, Mayer Brown LLP, Washington, DC, fоr Petitioner-Appellant.
Before BAUER, SYKES, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.
BAUER, Circuit Judge.
In 2011, Petitioner Victor Jackson and codefendant Daniel Kelly were convicted of cocаine-related offenses. Jackson was convicted by a jury while Kelly pleaded guilty. Jackson was sentenced to 360 months’ imprisonment. He appealed his conviction and sentence; we affirmed his conviction but vacated his sentence, holding that he was entitled to be resentenced under the Fair Sentencing Act based on the Supreme Court‘s holding in Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260, 264 (2012). See United States v. Jackson, 491 Fed.Appx. 738, 739 (7th Cir. 2012). On remand, with a new sentencing Guidelines range of 262 to 327 months’ imprisonment, the district court sentenced Jackson to 200 months’ imprisonmеnt.
On January 31, 2014, Jackson filed a pro se
At the hearing, the magistrate judge observed thе live testimony of three witnesses: Jackson, Kelly, and Bruce Ratcliffe, Jackson‘s former counsel. Jackson testified to the various instances that led to his decision to reject the government‘s plea offer and go to trial. He testifiеd that he heard about the FSA issue and asked Ratcliffe about it, but Ratcliffe did not know about it. Jackson asserted that he rejected the government‘s plea offer because Ratcliffe advised him that the only way to preserve a FSA claim was to go to trial. Jackson testified that he went to trial based on Ratcliffe‘s advice, but he would have otherwise pleaded guilty.
Kelly testified that he entered into a conditional plea in which he reserved his right to argue on aрpeal that the FSA applied to his case at sentencing. Kelly also testified that he informed Jackson that he could enter into a plea agreement and still preserve his right to argue that the FSA applied to him on appeal. He testified that Jackson then wanted to discuss this information with Ratcliffe.
Ratcliffe testified that “Jackson never told [him] that he wanted to explore plea agreements. It was trial the entire time.”
On December 30, 2015, the magistrate judge reсommended that Jackson‘s
On April 20, 2016, the district court denied Jackson‘s
The district court rejected the magistrate judge‘s credibility determinations of both Jackson and Ratcliffe, without ever observing either testify in person. First, as
On appeal, Jackson contends that the district court erred in rejecting the magistrate judge‘s credibility findings without conducting a de novo evidentiary hearing. We agree.
The Federal Magistrate Act grants a district court judge the authority to refer a magistrate judge to conduct hearings and submit proposed findings of facts and recommendations.
In Raddatz, the Supreme Court held that the Act does not require the district court to hold a de novo hearing when accepting a magistrate judge‘s credibility findings. United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 675-76 (1980). The Court concluded “that the statutory scheme includеs sufficient procedures to alert the district court [as to when] to exercise its discretion to conduct a hearing and view the witnesses itself.” Id. at 680-81. The Court noted that:
Neither the statute nor its legislative history reveals any specific consideration of the situation where a district judge after reviewing the record in the process of making a de novo “determination” has doubts concerning the credibility findings of the magistrate. The issue is not before us, but we assume it is unlikely that a district judge would reject a magistrate‘s proposed findings on credibility when those findings are dispositive and substitute the judge‘s own appraisal; to do so without seeing and hearing the witness or witnesses whose credibility is in question could well give rise to serious questions which we do not reach.
The Raddatz Court left open the question of whether a district court may reject a magistrate judge‘s credibility findings without holding a de novo evidentiary hearing. We have not previously answered this question, but in United States v. Ornelas-Ledesma, we noted how other circuits picked up the Court‘s not-so-subtle hint that the answer is “nо.” See 16 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 1994) (collecting cases), vacated on other grounds, Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 (1996). Since the Court decided Raddatz, other circuits have taken heed of the concerns expressed by the Court and have held that a district court judge may not reject the credibility findings of a
We note that most of the other circuits’ decisions mainly rely on the Raddatz footnote in coming to this conclusion, but do not directly address the constitutional implications that were alluded to by the Court. Compare Louis, 630 F.2d at 1109 with Hill, 62 F.3d at 481-82, and Cullen, 194 F.3d at 405-07. We, like the Fifth Circuit in Louis, have “severe doubts about the constitutionality of the district judge‘s reassessment of credibility without seeing and hearing the witnesses himself.” 630 F.2d at 1109. We find the analysis of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), in Louis persuasive. See id. at 1109-10. Thus, we also conclude that Due Process is not satisfied under these сircumstances. See id.; see also Holiday v. Johnston, 313 U.S. 342, 352 (1941) (“One of the essential elements of the determination of the crucial facts is the weighing and appraising of the testimony.“); United States v. Raddatz, 592 F.2d 976, 982 (7th Cir. 1979), rev‘d, 447 U.S. 667 (1980) (“Due Process guarantees a meaningful hearing and procedures sufficient to ensure а reliable determination of the facts....” (citing Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 376-77 (1964)) (citation omitted)).
Here, the district court, to reach the conclusion that it did, rejected the magistrate judge‘s material credibility findings that were based on having observed in-person testimony. The district court erred in doing so. Moreover, by rejecting the magistrate judge‘s material credibility findings, the district court effectively denied the evidentiary hearing that we ordered and to which the parties agreed.
For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the district court‘s judgment and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Circuit Rule 36 shall apply on remand.
BAUER
CIRCUIT JUDGE