OPINION OF THE COURT
Plaintiff has frontally assaulted the Trading with the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. App. § 5(b) 1 and the Foreign Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 500 2 as being unconstitutional facially' and as applied in this case. The attack is essentially two-pronged: the statute and regulations establish an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power without adequate standards, and violate the First Amendment by prohibiting the receipt of unsolicited publications unless the addressee obtains a license, submits to a permanent record his desire to receive the proscribed publications, and proves he has made no payment.
The facts of this controversy are not in dispute. By letter dated February 17, 1970, plaintiff, an unincorporated association, received notice from the
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Regional Commissioner of Customs that a shipment of Red Chinese literature from North Vietnam had been detained and would not be released until a license had been secured. Plaintiff alleges that the publications, copies of an English language newspaper, were unsolicited and that plaintiff had no intention of making payment to anyone for them. However, rather than apply for a license, plaintiff brought suit in the district court for injunctive relief and moved for summary judgment, or in the alternative, for a preliminary injunction and the formation for a three-judge court under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2282, 2284 (1970). Defendants cross moved for summary judgment, and their motion was granted. The district court relied on Teague v. Regional Commissioner of Customs,
I
Plaintiff’s first argument is that the statute unconstitutionally delegates legislative powers without appropriate standards. In support of this contention, plaintiff has traced the history of predecessor statutes from the original Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, 40 Stat. 414, to demonstrate that the present statute “permits profoundly drastic action at the whim of the administrator” that “may be [utilized] to carry out” domestic economic policy.
3
The only restriction on this vast power, plaintiff asserts, is that it can be exercised solely in time of war or other national emergency declared by the President, and since a President’s declaration of national emergency is unreviewable,
4
“the statute contains no limitations whatsoever.” Therefore, according to plaintiff, the statutory grant of authority is repugnant to the Constitution, A. L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States,
We note that the statute contains two express limitations: (1) it becomes operative only during “the time of war” or “any other period of national emergency declared by the President,” and (2) it applies only to “property in which any foreign country or any national thereof has or has had any interest.” Ordinarily, when dealing with matters of foreign relations, Congress may lawfully delegate to the President broader discretion than would be permissible with regard to domestic affairs. Zemel v. Rusk,
But the matter is not that simple. Clearly, items entitled to First Amendment protection may be encompassed within the definition of the term “property.” When the operation of an otherwise valid law “clashes with those individual liberties protected by the Bill of Rights, it is our ‘delicate and difficult task’ to determine whether the resulting restriction on freedom can be tolerated.” United States v. Robel,
There is little doubt regarding the propriety of the purpose of the Trading with the Enemy Act. Its obvious goal is to prevent countries such as North Vietnam and Communist China from deriving any economic benefit from transactions with persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. Considering the state of our relationship with North Vietnam, and that money is an important weapon in any international struggle, we conclude that the Congressional design under-pinning the Act is wholly proper.
See
Banco National de Cuba v. Sabbatino,
The question whether the means adopted by Congress to reach its goal— delegation of authority to promulgate regulations — comport with the First Amendment does not admit to facile solution. Most, if not all, of the authoritative Supreme Court cases dealing with this issue concern instances of delegation of authority where the function of the delegatee was to determine only whether certain materials were protected by the First Amendment.
See e. g.,
United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs,
In other contexts, though, the Supreme Court has validated statutes and ordinances regulating various activities although such regulation incidentally curtailed First Amendment rights. In Valentine v. Chrestensen,
“Those who, so Congress has found, would subvert the public interest cannot escape all regulation because, at the same time, they carry on legitimate political activities.” Id. at 412,70 S.Ct. at 691 .
Adderly v. Florida,
The essence of these cases is that a statute is not overly broad and thus violative of the First Amendment merely because it regulates incident to its scheme protected activities or property. It is only where the statute
directly
regulates speech or expression arguably protected by the First Amendment, or where as its mechanism the statute has granted discretion to a delegatee to determine whether particular items of expression may be prohibited on the basis of their content, that the question of ov-erbreadth arises. Section 5(b) does not directly regulate First Amendment protected material, rather it controls transactions concerning property in which an enemy has an economic interest. The purport of the statute is clear on its face, and therefore provides guidance to the delegatee with regard to the exercise of his functions. Were Section 5(b) applied by the President or his delegatee in such fashion that only First Amendment materials were excluded or regulated, we would have the power to construe that statute in a manner which would avoid the Constitutional defect. United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs,
II
Plaintiff next assails the statute and regulations with the charge that the regulatory scheme constitutes a prior restraint on its First Amendment freedoms. Here, using Lamont v. Postmaster General,
But the Lamont case is not as broad as plaintiff asserts. As the concurring opinion points out:
“[W]e ‘have consistently held that only a compelling [governmental] interest in the regulation of a subject within [governmental] constitutional power to regulate can justify limiting First Amendment freedoms.’ NAACP v. Button,371 U.S. 415 , 438 [83 S.Ct. 328 , 341,9 L.Ed.2d 405 ]. The Government’s brief expressly disavows any support for this statute ‘in large public interests such as would be needed to justify a true restriction upon freedom of expression or inquiry.’”381 U.S. at 308-309 ,85 S. Ct. at 1497 .
Here, as discussed in Section I, supra, the Government has a compelling interest in regulating the flow of money to certain countries. And because plaintiff has not alleged — indeed, with regard to the posture of the case as plaintiff fashioned it, could not allege— that the Office of Foreign Assets Control has acted in bad faith, we must assume that the responsible officials will carry out their duties in accordance with constitutionally acceptable standards. It is in light of these factors that the licensing scheme must be evaluated.
A. Burden and Delay
In order to obtain a license, the applicant must submit either of two forms: TFAC-1 or TFAC-4. The first form applies solely to commercial importations, and since the importation here is not commercial, that form need not be further considered. Form TFAC-4, which applies to noncommercial importation, is rather brief. It requests only the following information: (1) the applicant’s name, address and occupation; (2) the description and value of the merchandise; (3) the details of purchase, if the merchandise was purchased; (4) whether the applicant paid or intends to pay for the materials, and if so, how much and to whom; (5) if the merchandise was purchased or ordered, whether the applicant had knowledge of the Foreign Assets Control Regulations; (6) the use to be made of the materials; (7) whether the applicant has ever applied for such a license in the past. In view of the great importance in assuring that United States currency does not fall into the wrong hands, we do not believe that the burden imposed by answering the interrogatories on this form are unreasonable or excessive.
With regard to delay, we observe that the Notice of Detention contemplates 45 days, which may be extended to a maximum of ninety days. Because plaintiff did not request a license, we do not know exactly how long the administrative process takes, but if the Office of Foreign Assets Control expedites applications for licenses for materials protected by the First Amendment, it does not appear that this delay will be unduly burdensome. Because the administrative determinations go only to the factual questions regarding the financial aspects of the transaction and not to a decision based on the contents of the materials, this delay would not appear to be extraordinarily lengthy.
See Thirty-Seven Photographs,
B. Unlimited Discretion
It does not seem that the regulations vest unlimited discretion in the Government to deny a license. The whole thrust of the Act and regulations is to ensure that certain countries do not
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achieve economic benefit from transactions involving persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. If the Office of Foreign Assets Control attempted to apply any other standard, its actions might well be unconstitutional.
See
Kent v. Dulles,
C. Loss of Anonymity
We find troublesome the loss of anonymity accompanying the maintenance of records regarding the importation of First Amendment materials. See Lamont, supra. However, the necessity to maintain records of this sort appears to be an important adjunct to the adequate control and regulation of the flow of cash to certain countries. Such records enable the Office of Foreign Assets Control to check the prior importation of materials from the enumerated countries by individual applicants, and perhaps facilitate the detection of patterns of conduct indicative of violations, of the act. Where there is a need to regulate, it is essential to record the regulatory activity. We hesitate to invalidate such requirement without allegations or proof that the purpose of the recordation is to embarrass the recipient of materials or to chill the exercise of his right to receive them. Our disquietude would be considerably ameliorated if the Office of Foreign Assets Control would keep their records confidential so as to lessen the impact that may be caused by the retention of such documents.
D. Burden of Proof
The Notice of Detention received by plaintiff stated, with regard to license applications, that:
“Such applications are, however, normally granted only if they are supported by clear and complete documentary proof of the non-Chinese origin of the merchandise affected by the Regulations. * * * It should be noted that the Foreign Assets Control does not regard statements of sellers or shippers (or documents based thereon) as affording a basis for issuing licenses.”
Here, there is no dispute regarding the country of origin of the merchandise. Rather, in this case, the only inquiry before the Office of Foreign Assets Control would be whether payment would be made, if at all, in such manner that the funds would be likely to be available to the listed countries. In this respect, and in the context of this case, Form TFAC-4 asks only: “Did the applicant pay or does he intend to pay for this merchandise, directly or indirectly * * *?” The simple answer “No”, folowed by the certification of truth printed on the form and the applicant’s signature would satisfy the Act and regulations and thereby mandate the materials be released, unless the Office of Foreign Assets Control possessed contrary information from another source. This duty does not appear to be excessively onerous, and in the absence of proof that a more convincing showing is required by the Government, we cannot hold that the burden is so high as to render the Act and regulations unconstitutional as applied. 9
Ill
For the reasons stated in Sections I and II, we hold with regard to the facts of this case that Section 5(b) *684 of the Trading with the Enemy Act and Part 500 of the Foreign Assets Control Regulations are Constitutional both facially and as applied.
Accordingly, the order of the district court will be affirmed.
Notes
. Section 5(b) authorizes the President, in time of war or national emergency, to regulate or prohibit transactions “involving, any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest.” This authority was delegated to the Secretary of the Treasury in 1942. 7 Fed. Reg. 1409 (February 12, 1942) ; Executive Order 9693 (July 6, 1942). The Secretary, in turn, has delegated his authority to the Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control. Treas. Dept. Order No. 120, December 19, 1950, as amended, 32 Fed.Reg. 3472.
This country is currently in a state of national emergency. This emergency was first declared by President Truman on December 16, 1950, and was reaffirmed by Proclamation 3004, 67 Stat.
C31,
January 17, 1953. Subsequent Presidents have recognized the continued existence of this national emergency. Executive Order No. 10896, 3 C.F.R. (November 29, 1960); Executive Order No. 10905, 3 C.F.R. (January 14, 1961); Executive Order No. 11037, 3 C.F.R. (July 24, 1962); Executive Order No. 11387, 33 Fed.Reg. 47 (January 1, 1968).
See
Sardino v. Federal Reserve Bank,
. Section 500.204(a) of the Foreign Assets Control Regulations prohibits unauthorized dealings in merchandise orginating in, inter alia, North Vietnam. Paragraph 108 of the Appendix to Section 500.204 provides for licenses for the importation of films and publications from North Vietnam, North Korea and Communist China where such films or publications are bona fide gifts not involving “any direct or indirect commercial benefit to [the] designated countries,” where payments for such items are made into blocked accounts, or where such materials are sent to libraries, universities, etc., or where they are received in “exchange for publications from the United States.”
Section 500.801(b) sets forth the licensing procedure, and Section 500.803 provides that the Office of Foreign Assets Control or the Federal Reserve Bank of New York will make final decisions respecting applications for licenses.
. The district court denied the alternative relief on the ground that a substantial constitutional question had not been presented in view of the following cases: Kaufman v. Societe Internationale,
. However, there is nothing in this case to indicate that the statute has been utilized other than in connection with foreign relations.
.
See
Teague v. Regional Commissioner of Customs,
. Similarly, in
Robel, supra,
the key to the decision was that the operative effect of the statute there invalidated depended upon “the exercise of an individual’s right of association, which is protected by the provisions of the First Amendment.”
.
See also,
Williamson v. Lee Optical Co.,
.
See also,
Kovacs v. Cooper,
Cammarano v. United States,
. There is a serious question whether plaintiff has the standing necessary to raise the argument that the statute is void for overbreadth because it might be utilized only to restrict access to materials protected by the First Amendment.
See
Mr. Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion in
Thirty-Seven Photographs,
. Had tlie plaintiff applied for a license, and in sucli application, answered the question in the negative, and were such application then denied, with or without a hearing or statement of reasons, we would be faced with different Constitutional questions that we need not now resolve.
