Vestal v. GarrettVestal v. Garrett
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Wilkin
delivered the opinion of the court:
On the 23d day of February, 1892, William Laiferty deeded to Richard Garrett and his two sons, David J. and Douglas, jointly, the south-west quarter and the west half of the south-east quarter of section 33, township 13, north, range 3, west, in Mercer county, this State. On the 13th day of July, 1893, Richard Garrett made a will, by which he disposed of all his real estate, consisting of over three hundred acres, besides the above described land conveyed to him and his said sons jointly, and also of his personal property. The sixth clause of the will is as follows:
“Sixth—I give and devise to my sons David J. Garrett and Douglas Garrett, their heirs and assigns, and to my daughter Martha A. Vestal, her heirs and assigns, the following tracts or parcels of land: Fifteen acres to David J. Garrett; fifteen acres to Douglas Garrett and fifty acres to Martha A. Vestal, of the undivided southwest three-fourths of the south half of the south-west quarter and the west half of the south-east quarter of section
On the 29th day of March, 1895, he made the following codicil:
“Whereas, I, Richard Garrett, * * * have made my last will and testament, * * * in and by which I have given and bequeathed to my daughter Martha A. Vestal fifty acres of land of the undivided south-west three-fourths of the south one-half of the south-west quarter, and the west one-half of the south-east quarter of section 33, township 13, north, range 3, west of the fourth principal meridian. Now, therefore, (my said daughter Martha A. Vestal having received other property in lieu of said bequest,) I do by this writing, which I declare to be a codicil to my last will and testament and to be taken as a part thereof, order and declare it my will that the above described premises be given and devised to my wife, Juliette Garrett, for her sole use and benefit during her life; and lastly, it is my desire that this codicil be annexed to and made a part of my 1 ast will and testament, as aforesaid, to all intents and purposes.
“In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and seal this 29th day of March, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and ninety-five.”
The testator died on the 14th day of December, 1897, leaving his widow, Juliette, and twelve children, surviving him, and thereupon his said will, with the codicil attached, was duly admitted to probate. Peyton Garrett, one of the sons, died subsequent to the death of his father, leaving a widow, Maude, and one infant son, Peyton, Jr., surviving” him. Douglas Garrett and David J. Garrett, joint grantees in the Lafierty deed, with their other brothers and
Martha A. Vestal, by her assignments of error, questions only the decree of the court below in so far as it holds that the codicil revoked the devise to her made by the sixth clause of the will. Maude and Peyton Garrett, Jr., assign for error the refusal of the court to hold the said sixth clause of the will, and the codicil, void for uncertainty. It will be proper to consider this last question first, because if the contention of appellants Maude and Peyton Garrett, Jr., prevails in that regard, the claim of Martha A. Vestal will also be thereby disposed of.
Manifestly, the testator intended by the sixth clause of his will to dispose of his entire interest in the southwest quarter and the west half of the south-east quarter of said section 33. That intention is evidenced, first, by the presumption that a person who makes and publishes a will intends to dispose of his whole estate thereby, unless there is something in the will to rebut that presumption; (Higgins v. Dwen, 100 Ill. 554; Woman’s Union Missionary Society v. Mead, 131 id. 338;) and secondly, by the fact that he did dispose of all his other property by will and attempted to devise the exact quantity of land he owned in said tracts,—that is to say, he devised to his sons David J. Garrett and Douglas Garrett thirty acres,—fifteen to each,—and to his daughter Martha A. Vestal fifty acres, making in all eighty acres, the undivided one-third of two hundred and forty acres which he owned jointly with his two sons. The difficulty, if any, upon this branch of the case, is to determine whether effect can be given to that intention without doing violence to settled and recognized rules for the construction of wills. Inasmuch as our statute requires all last wills and testaments to be in writing and properly witnessed, extrinsic evidence is never admissible to alter, detract from or add
Although it is urged that this court departed from the above rule in Whitcomb v. Rodman, 156 Ill. 116, and although it is said in a note to section 489 of Paige on Wills (p. 573) that Whitcomb v. Rodman tacitly overrules Bingel v. Volz; the intention to do so was expressly disclaimed in the later case of Huffman v. Young, 170 Ill. 290. We regard the rule as founded upon authority and reason and not to be disregarded, otherwise the courts may in every such case make a will.for a testator under the guise of construing and enforcing it. When, however, there is a latent ambiguity in the description of the object or subject of the gift, and such ambiguity can be removed by rejecting” false words, leaving a complete, intelligible description, it is the duty of courts to do so, as where there are two descriptions, one good and the other bad, the authorities are uniform to the effect that the latter may be rejected. (Emmert v. Hays, 89 Ill. 11.) The same principle is announced in Myers v. Ladd, 26 Ill. 415, and Swift v. Lee, 65 id. 336. We said in Bowen v. Allen, 113 Ill. 53, when there is, from the entire description, ambiguity and doubt as to the identity of the property, courts have uniformly held that any contradictory or useless portion of the description may be disregarded, so as to render the description certain and complete. See, also, Decker v. Decker, 121 Ill. 341; Whitcomb v. Rodman, supra; Huffman v. Young, supra.
The description, “of the undivided south-west three-fourths of the south one-half of the south-west quarter,” is certainly ambiguous, if not meaningless, on the face of it. It means, if anything, the undivided south-west three-fourths
We are of the opinion, then, that the circuit court did not err in holding that the sixth clause of the will and the codicil were valid and not void for uncertainty.
It remains, therefore, to be determinéd whether the codicil revoked the devise to the daughter Martha A.
We think the chancellor erred in holding that the codicil revoked the devise to Martha A. Vestal in fee, and in that particular the decree below must be reversed, otherwise it will be affirmed. The cause will be remanded to the circuit court with directions to proceed in conformity with the views herein expressed. The appellees, except the widow, Juliette Garrett, and the appellants Maude Garrett and Peyton Garrett, Jr., should each pay one-half of the costs of this appeal.
Reversed in part and remanded, with directions.