18 Conn. App. 515 | Conn. App. Ct. | 1989
The plaintiffs
The undisputed facts are as follows. In September, 1982, the plaintiffs brought an action against the town of Cheshire to collect money damages for injuries allegedly sustained on September 8,1980, on the premises of a school owned and operated by the defendant town. The plaintiffs brought this action against the town of Cheshire alone, alleging negligence in the first count and that a nuisance was created and maintained by the town in the second count.
On May 23, 1984, the defendant town filed a motion to strike both counts of the complaint for the reasons that the first count was inappropriate due to the town’s governmental immunity and that the second count failed to state a cause of action. The court granted the motion pursuant to Practice Book § 155 on June 13, 1984. On December 7,1984, the court rendered a judgment of dismissal for failure to prosecute with due diligence pursuant to § 251 of the Practice Book. The plaintiffs did not appeal from that judgment.
On January 10,1985, the plaintiffs filed a motion to open the judgment of dismissal. The trial court denied the motion on January 25,1985. On February 5,1985, the plaintiffs filed a motion to reargue, which was
On June 13, 1985, the plaintiffs filed a second lawsuit. That action was brought against the named defendant, Carl Hollenbeck, and the town of Cheshire to collect money damages for the injuries the plaintiff allegedly sustained on September 8,1980. The lawsuit was in three counts. The first count alleged that the defendant Hollenbeck, a custodian at the school, was negligent. The second count, against the town of Cheshire, sought indemnification from the town for any judgment against the defendant Hollenbeck pursuant to General Statutes § 7-465,
On November 25,1985, the defendants filed a motion to strike all three counts. On July 14, 1986, the court denied the motion as to the first two counts and granted it as to the third count. The plaintiffs filed a substitute complaint on July 28,1986, that included only the first two counts of the original complaint. On October 21, 1987, the court, J. Flanagan, J., granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
The plaintiffs’ first claim is that the trial court erred in concluding that General Statutes §§ 52-592 and 52-593 were inapplicable to save the plaintiffs’ action against the defendants. The plaintiff’s alleged injury occurred on September 8, 1980. The plaintiffs first filed suit against the named defendant Hollenbeck on June 13, 1985, alleging that Hollenbeck’s negligence caused the
The plaintiffs’ next claim is that the trial court erred in concluding that General Statutes § 52-593 was inapplicable to save the plaintiffs’ action against the defend
The plaintiffs’ next claim is that the trial court’s rendering of summary judgment for the defendants premised on the inapplicability of General Statutes §§ 52-592 and 52-593 violates the plaintiffs’ right to redress guaranteed by article first, § 10, of the Connecticut constitution.
The plaintiffs’ last claim is that the trial court erred in granting the defendants’ motion for summary judg
There is no error.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
The plaintiffs are husband and wife. The wife’s claim is a derivative one for loss of consortium.
General Statutes § 7-465 provides in pertinent part: “(a) Any town, city or borough, notwithstanding any inconsistent provision of law, general, special or local, shall pay on behalf of any employee of such municipality ... all sums which such employee becomes obligated to pay by reason of the liability imposed upon such employee by law for damages awarded ... for physical damages to person . . . .”
Practice Book § 251 provides in pertinent part: “If a party shall fail to prosecute an action with reasonable diligence, the court may, after hearing, on motion by any party to the action pursuant to Sec. 196, or on its own motion, render a judgment dismissing the action .with costs.”
The Connecticut constitution article first, § 10 provides: “All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial or delay.”