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Versata Development Group, Inc. v. SAP America, Inc.
793 F.3d 1306
Fed. Cir.
2015
Check Treatment
Docket

*1 “broadest,” Secretary broad is or sets limits Under of Commerce for Intel parameter. Predictability to this Property, lectual Director of the Unit stability law, legal are rights, ed States Patent and Trademark Of by fuzziness and replaced uncertainty. fice, Intervenor.

(cid:127) designed The AIA the new PTO tribu- No. 2014-1194. validity nal to “review the patent.” of a United States Court of Appeals,

It was expected that the PTO would Federal Circuit. apply validity, the correct law while drawing expertise on PTO in technolo- July gy experience and PTO law.

It cannot have been intended that the

PTO apply would not the correct law

in these post-grant new proceedings. concurrence, in reinforcing denial of

en banc states that claims issued been given have their “broadest”

interpretation years, for a citing hundred interferences and reissues. See

Concurring Op. at Any 1298-99. practi-

tioner of interferences knows that PTO, in determining conception, reduc-

tion practice, corroboration, diligence,

experimental etc., support, did apply ' “broadest” interpretation of anything.

And are reissues directed to correction of error; patentee’s is to purpose correctness,

achieve not breadth. Con-

trary concurrence, question be-

fore this court is not whether to “elimi- BRI,

nate” but whether to it impose patents,

issued where it previously has not

reposed. simple

This is a question, although of

powerful consequence. As urged curiae,

amici it should be cor- answered

rectly.

VERSATA DEVELOPMENT

GROUP, INC., Appellant

v. AMERICA, INC.,

SAP SAP

AG, Appellees. *3 Inc.,

Computer, Corporation, Broadcom (USA) ZTE Corporation, HTC Inc. Byun, Ann A. Compa- Hewlett-Packard PA, ny, Wayne, for amicus curiae Hewlett- Company. Packard Joseffer, Parris, Daryl Ashley Charles LLP, DC, King Spalding Washington, & for amicus curiae The Internet Associa- tion. Joffre, Bostwick,

Michael E. Melanie L. Huber, Hansen, Todd, Kellogg, Evans & PLLC, DC, Figel, Washington, for amici *4 Inc., Inc., Facebook, Inc., eBay curiae Dell Networks, Inc., Inc., Limelight Newegg Inc., Inc., QVC, Rackspace Hosting, Red Hat, Inc., Inc., Vizio, Inc., SAS Institute Xilinx, represented by Inc. Inc. Dell also Peterman, Inc., Rock, Anthony Dell Round TX. Michel, Inc., Google Washing-

Suzanne ton, DC, Google for amicus curiae Inc. Lamken, LLP, Jeffrey A. MoloLamken Fiacco, Ware, Barbara A. Donald Ross DC, Washington, argued appellant. for LLP, Boston, Burg, Foley Hoag Sarah Linck, by Nancy represented Also Jo Mar- MA, for amici curiae 3M Company, Cater- Zoltick, Danny. Hunting- tin Moss Robert Inc., Eli pillar Lilly Company, and General ton, Rosenbloom, Rothwell, Figg, Brian S. Johnson, Company, Electric Johnson & Manbeck, P.C., Washington, Ernst & DC. Company, Amgen The Procter & Gamble Arner, Henderson, Inc., America, Finnegan, Inc., Erika BP Glaxosmithkline Dunner, Reston, Farabow, LLP, Garrett & LLC, Works, Inc., Inc., Illinois Tool Pfizer VA, argued appellees. represent- for Also Qualcomm Incorporated, Sanofi US. Jakes, Morin, by ed J. Michael Michael A. PLAGER, NEWMAN, Before DC; Reines, Weil, Washington, Edward R. HUGHES, Judges. Circuit LLP, Shores, Manges Gotshal & Redwood CA. by Opinion for the court filed Circuit Staff, Patterson, Appellate Melissa N. Judge PLAGER. Division, Department Civil United States concurring part Opinion DC, Justice, Washington, argued for dissenting part by Judge filed Circuit by F. represented intervenor. Also Stuart HUGHES. Freeman; Delery, Mark R. Scott Weiden- feller, Matal, Kelley, Joseph K. Nathan PLAGER, Judge. Circuit Lamarca, Solicitor, William Office Patent and Trademark Of- IntROduction

United States fice, Alexandria, VA. method This is a covered business (“CBM”) case, § 18 under Bagatell, Christopher

Dan L. S. Cole- Act LLP, Phoenix, AZ, Leahy-Smith America Invents man, Perkins Coie 112-29, (“AIA”), 125 Stat. 284 Pub.L. No. Corporation, amici curiae Intel Asustek (2011). It comes to us as an appeal of a special program provided §by 18 is avail final written decision the Patent Trial only able for “covered business method (“PTAB”),1 Appeal Board the recently- patents,” as that term is by defined adjudicatory created arm of the United However, statute. for purposes of con States Patent and Trademark ducting Office proceedings thereunder, § 18 is (“USPTO” “Government”).2 or The case part considered a of the broader chapter originated petition as a USPTO, provisions U.S.Code, of title govern by appellees America, submitted SAP Inc. ing post-grant (“PGR”), 35 U.S.C. “SAP”), and SAP AG (collectively, pursu- §§ 321-329; § expressly incorporates, ant to the provisions of the AIA. with certain exceptions here, not relevant the standards procedures found in requested SAP USPTO insti- 18(a)(1). chapter.5 § tute validity review of the of certain claims (“'350 6,553,350 U.S. Patent No. pat- In addition to the merits of the decision ent”). The '350 is owned (which rendered the PTAB held the appellant, Versata Development Group, invalid), claims issue the parties to the (“Versata”), Inc. had who sued SAP for appeal dispute predicate several issues. infringing the patent. petition to These include: USPTO, alleged SAP (cid:127) if the PTAB makes an initial determi- was a covered business patent. method nation 18 of the AIA that the patented Covered business invention qualifies method are for “cov- *5 subject special to the ered provisions business method” of AIA treatment un- § § 18. der See Stat. at 329-31.3 Section 18 court review that establishes a issue when separately-designated reviewing part transi- of a final program4 tional written which decision the under the invalidation USPTO conducts post-grant claims under review the proceedings §of 18? concerning (cid:127) the validity covered business if the yes, answer is purposes for method patents. As suggests, the title the post-grant the USPTO how argument case, 1. For purposes, oral de- 5.A note on terminology: potential The under I, nominated as Versata was with consolidated the AIA for more than the usual confusion Case No. from the Unit- accompanies congressional new man- ed States District for Court the Eastern Dis- part dates stems in from incidental features of Virginia, trict of involving parties, the same particular, the AIA. In proce- new various patent, the same essentially same dures intersect with procedures earlier of a issues. That case issue will as Versata II. kind, similar-sounding e.g., partes inter re- ("IPR") replaced view has partes inter reex- PTAB, 2. AIA, by § established 7 of the is amination, compare §§ 35 U.S.C. 311-318 the successor to the Board of Appeals Patent (2006) (concerning partes inter reexamina- ("BPAI”). and Interferences Compare 35 tion), (2012) (con- §§ with 35 (2006) U.S.C. 311-319 BPAI) U.S.C. 6 (concerning the with IPR). cerning (2012) employs U.S.C. 6 The statute (concerning PTAB). also iden- tical terminology to mean things, different general, the AIA is codified various in e.g., the heading of AIA 6 is entitled “Post- parts 35of U.S.Code. Section 18 of AIAis Review Proceedings,” Grant 125 Stat. at codified; not however it is found in 125 Stat. while one programs of the thereunder shares References to opinion 18 in this are to "Chapter the same 32—Post-Grant name — pages 329-31 of 125 Stat. Review.” It is not uncommon for the entirety AIAproceedings to be referred informal- program 4. The is called 'transitional' because 'post-grant ly as review.’ it is eight scheduled to years 'sunset' after implementing regulations are issued. 18(a)(3)(A).

13H we must term “covered business method which decide whether is the PTAB understood, applied the substantive for tests be and does the patent” to validity correctly, may a court deter- qualify here as a CBM patent issue mine whether as an initial matter the patent? PTAB chose the correct substantive (cid:127) correctly if the PTAB determines that apply, tests to apply and did the PTAB patent of the AIA a comes correctly them here? of a patent, within the definition CBM determining After to these answers determining what are the criteria for queries, parties, contested as ex- is excluded from patent whether the below, plained application we address their the review under 18 because to the '350 at issue. statutorily-excepted falls within the invention,” “technological category of Background criteria to the apply and hów do those The '350 Patent patent? '850 patent, owns the '350 entitled (cid:127) if, deciding the merits of the case— apparatus pricing prod “method and validity challenged of the claims in product organiza ucts multi-level upon PTAB is called —the groups.” patent, tional '350 col. ll. 1-3. construction, in claim does engage operates para The “invention under the apply general USPTO’s (the digm purchasing organiza of WHO reasonable inter- rule of the “broadest tion) (the buying product).” is WHAT Id. apply judicial or does it pretation,” 3, ll. An example at col. 24-25. of the “one correct construc- standard paradigm, pri- known WHO/WHAT tion”? according patent, depicted or art (cid:127) appeal at the final finally, on written Figure patent, reproduced of the '350 court, during stage

decision to this below: *6 4, ll. 17-18. at col. required large data tables. See id. See id. at col. 1, ll. 52-59. improve said to is however, patent, The '350 states that art and reduce the need for upon prior pricing art tables for prior WHO/WHAT large by, alia, data tables inter arranging organizational organizational hierarchy organizations) customers (purchasing into groups, where group each represents a a hierarchy groups of customer prod characteristic of the organizational group. hierarchy product ucts into a groups. 3, Id. at col. Figure ll. 24-27. 4A of the 3, 24-27, 41-42, 4, Id. at col. ll. below, 66—col. 1. patent, shows example an of an 14. WHO is defined the creation of an arrangement of organizational group: 4, ll. See id. at col. 24-25. 22, 1.12. col. Claim 28 recites a “computer storage readable media comprising: com Similarly, product group hierarchy is puter instructions to implement the meth defined that can be applied products od of claim 27.” Id. at col. ll. 13-14. (WHAT). at col. ll. Id. 41-42. Pricing 29 recites an Claim “apparatus for deter information is then associated with the mining a price of a product offered to a customer product groups. Id. at col. purchasing organization” comprising cer 8, ll. Special 17-25. adjustments pricing tain limitations. Id. at col. ll. 15-35. may be defined as applying to all members specific customer group specific or a Claim 17 representative: product group. Id. at col. ll. 26-49. A method for determining a price of a product

We are offered to a concerned with purchasing organi- claims 17 and *7 26-29. zation comprising: Claim 17 arranging recites a a “method for hierar- determining price chy organizational of a of a product groups comprising offered to a purchasing a organization” plurality of such comprising cer branches that an or- tain steps. 20, ganizational Id. at 21, col. 1. group 66—col. 1. below a higher or- 29. Claim 26 ganizational recites a “computer group readable in each of the storage media comprising: computer in branches is a higher subset of the or- implement structions to ganizational the group; method of arranging a hierar- claim 17.” at col. chy Id. ll. product 61-62. Claim of groups comprising plu- a 27 recites a “computer implemented rality meth of branches such that a product od for determining price a product of a group a higher product below group in offered to a purchasing organization” com each of the branches ain subset of the prising steps. 21, 1. certain Id. at col. 63— higher product group; storing pricing source, junction by the district in a data wherein entered court. Id. information associated, information is pricing the at 1258. The case was remanded for the (ii) (i) organiza- the pricing type, with district court to enter an conforming order (iii) product groups, and the tional Id.; opinion. to our see also Versata Com pricing in- retrieving applicable groups; Solutions, AG, puter Indus. Inc. v. SAP corresponding product, formation to the (Fed.Cir.2014) Fed.Appx. (per cu purchasing organization, prod- each riam). in group product group uct above the hierarchy product of each branch Covered Business Method Patent Review product a mem- groups which the on, going While all that was SAP on ber, organizational group and each 16, 2012, September petitioned the PTAB purchasing organization above the to institute a covered business method re- hierarchy organi- each branch of the view of Versata’s '350 on the groups purchasing zational in which the grounds that claims 17 and 26-29 of the member; sorting organization is unpatentable were for failure to pricing according information 101, 102, §§ comply with 35 U.S.C. pricing types, product, purchas- paragraphs. 1st and 2nd January On ing organization, hierarchy prod- 9, 2013, granted the PTAB petition SAP’s hierarchy groups, organi- uct and the and instituted a covered business method groups; eliminating zational patent. review of the '350 In accordance that is less restric- pricing information tive; determining product price statutory instituting with the standard for using pricing the sorted information. the PTAB determined likely claims 17 and 26-29 were more than Id. at col. l. 66—col.l. unpatentable §§ under 35 U.S.C. Litigation Prior PTAB and 102. The declined to review 20, 2007, Versata, April along with On because, § 112 the claims under Software, Versata Inc. and Versata Com- view, PTAB’s SAP had not met the stan- Solutions, Inc., Industry puter sued SAP regard. dard in that did not seek for, alia, inter of the '350 infringement rehearing of the decision to institute. District for the the U.S. Court Subsequently, request, SAP’s pro- Eastern District of Texas. The case PTAB agreed forego trial, jury infringe- ceeded to and a found expedite 101 review. On June damages. ment and awarded The district 11, 2013, the PTAB issued its final written upheld infringement verdict court but cancelling decision claims 17 and 26-29 as rulings reversed other unrelated to the unpatentable 101. Versata patent, resulting in a new trial on '350 sought rehearing of the final written deci- damages. juryA then found that SAP’s sion, which the denied. Versata post-patch infringe software continued to the final written decision to appealed then damages rea- lost-profits and awarded court; that is the case we decide here. royalty damages. sonable The district upheld court those awards. Proceedings the District Court Before *8 appealed the district court’s final SAP us, turning Before to the case before In judgment to our court. Versata Soft- litigation there is one additional to be not- ware, Am., Inc., Inc. v. SAP 717 F.3d 1255 of direct relevance to this case. ed which is (Fed.Cir.2013), in- 'jury’s we affirmed the 13, 2013, award, On while the was March fringement damages verdict and in- sued permanent conducting but vacated as overbroad a its CBM Versata in the U.S. USPTO District Court issue, for mate however, merits we must ad- the Eastern District of Virginia, seeking to dress the predicate several pro- issues of set the PTAB’s aside decision to institute cess procedure parties that the raise— CBM review. SAP filed a motion to inter- issues that could have decisive effect on vene, granted. which the district court On the outcome of the case regardless of its 7, 2013, August the district court granted substantive merits. the USPTO’s to motions dismiss for lack of subject jurisdiction matter and failure to Issue Number 1—Judicial Review claim, state a and SAP’s motion to dismiss The initial decision to institute re subject jurisdiction. for lack matter view in to a response petition is the first The district court held that it lacked step in post-grant process. review In subject jurisdiction matter “because the case, this the PTAB at the initial decision AIA’s express language, detailed structure to stage institute peti determined that the and scheme for judicial administrative and tion to review patent the '350 should be review, legislative purpose, and nature of granted. making In determination, that the administrative action evince Congress’s the PTAB’s three-judge panel concluded: clear preclude subject intent to ju- matter (cid:127) that patent the '350 awas “covered risdiction over the PTAB’s decision to in- patent” business method as that term patent stitute proceed- reexamination [sic ] is statute; defined ings.” Rea, Dev. Corp. Versata v. (cid:127) that it (E.D.Va.2013). was not a F.Supp.2d “technological inven- tion,” also a statutorily-stated district court held that “the exception decision to post-grant to definition; institute that merely review is an initial step process PTAB’s to re- (cid:127) applicable was to question solve the ultimate validi- under the process; reviewed CBM ty, not a final agency action as contemplat- (cid:127) that, required 324(a), by “it is ed 5 U.S.C. 704.... Plaintiff retains more likely than not least 1 of adequate alternative remedy through challenged claims petition is appeal to the Court of Appeals for the unpatentable.” Federal Circuit.” Id. On October owner’s preliminary re- the district court denied Versata’s motion sponse at the decision to stage, institute to alter amend judgment. or Versata had challenged each of these prop- appealed the district judgment court’s ositions. The PTAB addressed Versata’s court; appeal pending as Ver- arguments rejected them. sata II. After instituted, jurisdiction review is We case, have over this Ver- I, proceeds sata to a trial pursuant PTAB, before the U.S.C. 1295(a)(4)(A). concludes with the PTAB’s ‘final written

decision’: “the [PTAB] shall issue a final Discussion written with respect decision patent- ability Ultimately the issue claim challenged by to be decided on 328(a). petitioner.” concerns the substantive Section 329 fur- merits: whether the PTAB ther provides ruled correctly appeal of that the that decision to challenged earlier-issued Appeals claims of the Court of '350 for the Federal Cir- patent are invalid for the given pursuant reasons cuit 141-144; §§ section 144 PTAB, namely, non-compliance provides with 35 that “[t]he United States Court of U.S.C. 101. Before addressing this Appeals ulti- for the Federal Circuit shall re- *9 appeal from which an is business method patent” view the decision under 18(a)(1)(E), § the Patent and taken on the record before and that the AIA authorizes subject-matter § Trademark Office.” eligibility a ground for CBM review. Before us then are the merits of the by final decision rendered the written The USPTO entered the case as interve- clear, PTAB in To it is the nor, this case. be §by as authorized 143. The USPTO merits of the final written decision that are devotes a part substantial of its brief to appeal; upon on we are not here called to argument jurisdic- that this court lacks by review the determination the PTAB tion to review the Director’s decision to review, whether to institute a CBM post-grant institute a review of the '350 expressly indeed the statute instructs that patent. its argument On face that would we not: curious, appear explained since as earlier by

The determination the Director the issue on court only before the is whether to institute a post-grant review the merits of written decision. final However, under this section shall be final and the USPTO makes the point that nonappealable. question patent whether the at issue scope here falls within the of the PTAB’s 324(e) added). § (emphasis 35 U.S.C. As § authority under 18 as “covered busi- noted, applicable post- this statute is (not patent” claiming ness method one grant proceedings; reviews and CBM invention”) “technological by was decided PTAB acts for the Director in deciding the PTAB at the decision to institute see 35 U.S.C. review, whether to institute a stage, and on that it basis is immunized (2014). 326(c); § § 37 C.F.R. 42.4 judicial from later review at the final deci- merits, PTAB, Turning stage. sion decision, final written held Versata’s CBM SAP, USPTO, but not the makes patent unpatentable claims 17 and 26-29 that, argument specif- additional under the under 35 them U.S.C. ordered judicial ic terms review bar appeal challenges cancelled. on 324(e), supra, not authority we do have holding multiple grounds: any questions to review decided (cid:127) patent Versata’s does not claim a “cov- making PTAB in the course of its initial method,” ered business and in including decision to institute event falls within the safe harbor of ineligibility per- whether 101 is a invention”; “technological ground missible for invalidation under the (cid:127) authority The PTAB does not have authority CBM invoked the PTAB. subject-mat- CBM 101; Thus, eligibility ter under 35 U.S.C. the USPTO contends that (cid:127) CBM-speeific invalidation here must be The PTAB’s claim construction is upheld incorrectly even if the inter- it

wrong, applied the “broadest reason- preted regarding the statute what is a interpretation” able to its claim con- and the not a CBM is CBM struction, have, which it should not law, patent under the correct and SAP correctly analyzed § and had it further contends that the invalidation un- proper under the claim it construction if upheld der 101 must be even not holding would have reached the it PTAB’s CBM-invalidation does did. permit invalidation under that, responds finding SAP absent a challenging This the first non-appealable these issues are either or case 324(e) waived, scope on the at the final written deci- merits USPTO correct- however, are, ly stage. held that the '350 is a “covered sion There several *10 1316 by

recent cases decided this court constru- the inter partes review provisions, the ing a parallel statutory 314(d) language review bar— of section within that 314(d) separate chapter structure, under 31 of the jurisdictional and on our statute AIA, Inter Partes Review. With one ex- read in light of those provisions.” Id. at ception later, to be addressed these cases 1375. have in the attempts arisen context of at day Jude, The same the court issued St.

interlocutory review of PTAB IPR deci- we two opinions issued other reaching the sions to institute. same result statute, under the same Medical,

In St. Jude Cardiology though Divi- in different procedural contexts. sion, Inc. v. Corp., Volcano 749 Solutions, F.3d 1373 See In re Dominion Dealer (Fed.Cir.2014), LLC, (Fed. Cir.2014) (PTAB the first of the interlocu- 749 F.3d 1379 cases, tory patentee review the review; held, had initi- declined to institute IPR ated an infringement Jude, suit. the explained The defendant reasons in St. we did counterclaimed, jurisdiction the not suit have asserting petitioner’s in- to hear fringement .of the mandamus action challenging defendant’s patent the PTAB’s decision); initiating patentee. Co., the In re Procter initiating pat- & Gamble 749 (Fed.Cir.2014) (PTAB F.3d 1377 sought post-grant entee then review of the granted rather than defendant’s under refused to provi- the institute IPR review; held, IPR sions. that The PTAB for the same rea- decided not to institute sons, the difference between a denial and patentee decision the appealed grant of review made no directly to difference to this court. our jurisdiction mandamus re- —“immediate We held patentee’s that the appeal of view of such a decision available in the PTAB'decision was statutorily barred court.”). this 314(d), §by granted the motion opinion its in In re Procter & Gamble defendant and the USPTO to dismiss Co., the court explained what it was not appeal. In its decision deny direct deciding: review, our court examined application 314(d) §of It is a separate question noted, the case. whether As section 314(d) 314(d)—is means that the decision to insti- counter-part to the section— tute one unchallengeable with which we' are review is la- concerned here— 324(e), 314(d) ter —if the Board except applies reaches a specifi- decision un- 318(a) cally cases, der 324(e) to IPR section appeal whereas applies is taken (§ 18) to PGR and section [appeal 319 CBM cases. to this court of PTAB], the final written decision of the 314(d) The court commented 314(d)’s Perhaps section broad language “may preclude well all by any precludes judicial all of review the insti- route, which we need not It decide. cer- decision, tution even in an eventual sec- tainly bars an the non-institution tion appeal. 319 We need not decide decision here.” F.3d at 1376. The question, which can be addressed court distinguished thus question a section appeal. Nor need we ad- availability immediate un- “appeal” dress whether an immediate challenge 141(c) der §§ 35 U.S.C. which it could be brought in district court deciding, was from question of “re- [through an APA action]. (in view” the course of bringing other ac- F.3d tions, such as appeals from final decisions

or APA actions district which it Again, statutory cqurt), references are to expressly it said was not deciding. The which, IPR ch. provisions, though court based holding “on directly structure of not applicable cases, to CBM par- Inc., (Fed.Cir.2014), provisions 767 F.3d 1383 the PGR ch. 32 allel those of question was whether a district court deci- here. we are concerned with which grant stay proceedings sion to was *11 by this court opinions Two other recent proper pending on-going the outcome of an directly they since arise warrant comment post-grant review at the PTAB. 18, and, though § chapter under 32 patentee’s argument appeal from sole on settings different fact they involve above, on not they light cast was the USPTO could institute those discussed In proceedings patent are to understand 18.6 Vir review of a CBM on how we Inc., Salesforce.com, tualAgility grounds Inc. v. the' of a violation of 101. Sec- (Fed.Cir.2014), the issue was F.3d 1307 tion 101 the specifies kinds inventions properly court had de whether a district patentable that are and is an issue this request stay previously- a for a nied In affirming case as well. the district “ The defendant litigation. determination, commenced stay court’s we said ‘[t]he litigation petitioned court had the district stay determination is not the time or the of an post-grant for review USPTO place to review the PTAB’s decisions to ” under 18. The alleged patent CBM proceeding.’ institute a CBM Id. at 1386 review, had instituted and trial 1313). (quoting VirtualAgility, 759 F.3d at validity patent the PTAB of the of the added: We then stay was on-going claims was when say This is not to that a patent owner requested. attack the could never PTAB’s ‘ Indeed, to conduct Appel- CBM review. court’s This court reversed the district potentially challenge lants might stay. noted that denial of We authority in the a ap- context of direct court had erred to the extent it district final peal of the PTAB’s decision.... had undertaken review merits They cannot mount simply PTAB decision to institute review. such chal- lenge opposition as a collateral attack We said: rejected stay. Having Appellants’ to a Indeed, to the PTAB’s challenge argument impermissible as an collateral likely not” “more than determination attack, underlying do not address the we stage improper amounts to an col- attack, namely merits of that whether attack on PTAB’s decision to lateral ground a valid review. allowing it 101 is CBM institute CBM practical prob- would create serious Id. Congress clearly .... did not in-

lems us, Returning to the case before Versa- district courts to hold mini-trials tend noted, ta, brought as earlier had an action reviewing the PTAB’s decision in the for the Eastern U.S. District Court stay merits of the CBM review.... The under the Administra- Virginia, District of not the or the determination is time (“APA”), prevent Act tive Procedure to review the PTAB’s decisions to place proceeding PTAB from with the proceeding. institute a CBM patent at issue in CBM review of the '350 Id. at 1313.7 challenged the authori- this case. Versata ty PTAB to have instituted the Funding Systems And in LLC v. Benefit 18; of the '350 under SAP Advance America Cash Advance Centers GTNX, INTTBA, Inc., ground Judge dissented on the 6. Inc. v. Nos. 7. Newman See also -1353, 151349, -1350, -1352, was not that the district court in its decision (Fed.Cir. 16, 2015) (a WL June given to which it was entitled. the deference case). third and the USPTO moved dismiss the com- tion. Its nonreviewability argument plaint. limited to the contention that we review whether the '350 is a CBM of its support dismiss, motions to (Judge Hughes like- argued, USPTO consistent with sug- wise limits his Dissent in Part to the CBM gestion noted supra Funding, Benefit question.) that there was an available remedy under the AIA statute —the issues decided In response to the Government’s new PTAB at the institution stage pre- are position, argues that the Govern- served for review at the time of ment is estopped from reconsidering its to the Federal Circuit of the PTAJB’sfinal position in the district action, court APA *12 written decision. grant- The district court citing Maine, New Hampshire v. 532 U.S. ed the USPTO’s motions and SAP’s motion 742, 749, 121 S.Ct. 149 L.Ed.2d 968 and dismissed Versata’s APA complaint on (2001). The Government responds that it two grounds, alternative including that “an is better that it acknowledges its errors adequate remedy by way exists of direct rather than compound them. appeal the final [of written to the decision] Ordinarily, the willingness Government’s Federal Circuit.” Dev. Corp., to confess error should be encouraged. at F.Supp.2d 927. However, given the fact that the district The district court suit involved essential- court action and this appeal share the ly the parties, same the patent, same parties, same patent, same and the the same basic issues. Accordingly, based issues, same contested there ais ‘bait-and- on representations USPTO’s aspect switeh’ newly- Government’s court, (or despite district in accordance position: arrived-at when it helps the Gov- with) provisions 324(e), this court position, ernment’s predicate issue, they should entertain and decide the predicate argue, can be reviewed appeal; but questions raised parties regarding hurt, when it might the issue becomes not authority USPTO’s over patent, reviewable. and whether the proper applied. law was Fortunately, we need not judge the as- This is so even though the deci- challenged tuteness of the Government’s confession. sions initially were made at the decision to Nor, in deciding question of reviewabil- stage. institute ity, need we decide the strength Versa- USPTO, however, represented now ta’s estoppel position. This is because the in this appeal by Department of Jus Government right was the first time—for tice Civil Division Appellate Staff, advises the reasons we explain, shall next its origi- the court that the Government recon has position nal on reviewability, with some position. sidered its The Government now clarification, was the correct one. argues for what it “ju characterizes aas have We before us bar Versata’s risdiction[al]” on this court’s review of from the at final least some written of the decision of issues at decided initial PTAB invalidating decision to patent institute Versata’s stage. Interve authority, nor’s Br. at Some of authority the Government’s limited to language suggests patents. CBM a bar on On the reviewing any reviewability issue PTAB determination made when divides institut Versata and Government, ing review. This language Versata argues would seem to that the invalidation must cover even whether 101 is an be beyond available reversed as 18 authority ground of invalidation, but the Govern because the '350 actually ment not expressly does make that conten- CBM under the if properly law 324(e) understood, applies only the PTAB’s to the decision to and so is outside authority under 18. The invalidation institute. contrary: as contends to the Government agency The distinct actions do not be matter, we not review— a threshold just agency come- the same because the indeed, “jurisdiction” no to de- we have stages decides certain issues both of the cide—whether the '350 is CBM process. they Nor do become the same initially patent since that was decided chooses, just agency because the or even stage. Inter- the PTAB at the institution directive, follows a congressional to decide Br. at 13. venor’s determining authority an issue final-action issue, reviewability To determine this stage at the initiation and then does not questions two related must be answered: Early-stage revisit the issue later. deci 324(e) judicial

first, does the review bar authority question sion of a basic can make permit judicial when conducted efficiency sense as an matter. There is no decision, regard to the final written with good proceeding reason to launch a if it is any requirement with compliance agency clear that the will have no authori that involves the ultimate ty to act at its conclusion. On the other second, if patent; PTAB to invalidate a *13 hand, normally some determinations made § yes, is the restriction of 18 to CBM stage may at the initiation not affect au such a limit. answer both We thority to render a final decision whenever affirmative, questions and therefore made. reject the contention that we not re- determinative, of is not Overlap issues the '350 is a CBM view whether timing neither is the determinative. In- § by covered 18. deed, implicitly agrees. the Government question: first what As SAP, pointedly Unlike it does contend not 324(e) says § that determination “[t]he 324(e) § that our of bars review whether by post- whether to institute a [PTAB] ground § 101 is an available for invalida- grant review under this section shall be 18, § regardless tion under of when the nonappealable.” final and 35 U.S.C. PTAB considered that issue. added). 324(e) (emphasis language § That only It run counter to would by apply does not its terms to limits on 324(e) language of to read it as authority to enter a “final written decision” barring review of whether the PTAB ex in invalidating patent. Institution and statutory authority ceeded limits on its validation are distinct actions two It run counter to invalidate. would also being deeply PTAB. addition to embed long judicial our tradition review of law,8 of ded in federal administrative the dis government legal actions that alter the tinction is built into the structure of this statute, above, person, an a hallmark of particular explained rights AIA of affected APA, (Fed.Cir.2015) agency pro (adopting 8. an initiation of the Government’s Under action, 702, ceedings agency 5 is an U.S.C. argument that even a to continue a decision commonly action, but it is not a reviewable "final proceeding agency is not a final which action,” agency id. 704. See Bennett v. generally only upon will occur conclusion of 1154, 154, Spear, 117 S.Ct. 137 520 U.S. - EPA, proceeding); Sackett v. see also (1997); L.Ed.2d 281 FTC v. Standard Oil Co. -, 1367, U.S. 132 S.Ct. 182 L.Ed.2d 367 Cal., 232, 488, 449 101 S.Ct. 66 U.S. al., (2012); Wright 16 Charles Alan et Federal (1980); Ry. v. L.Ed.2d 416 S. Co. Seaboard 3942; Practice & Procedure 32 Charles 444, 452, Milling Corp., 442 U.S. Allied 99 al., Wright et Federal Practice & Proce- Alan (1979); S.Ct. 60 L.Ed.2d 1017 Automated dure 8220. Lee, Sys., M erch. Inc. v. 782 F.3d 1376 - -, 1645, 1651, (generally between review- U.S. the distinction S.Ct. able) (2015). agency (generally final action and L.Ed.2d 607 unreviewable) agency merely action that Congress explained the anomalous na to consider such an al- process initiates a judicial of a ture bar to review of final Bennett, 177-78, 520 U.S. at teration. See : agency action 117 S.Ct. 1154. Very rarely do judicial statutes withhold long

It the law that “[a]d- has been review. It has never been the policy of must have a ministrative determinations Congress prevent the administration grant and must be within the basis law of its own from being judicially statutes authority.... agency may An not final ed scope authority confined to the grant- ly statutory power. decide limits of its objectives ed or to the specified. Its judicial That is a function.” Soc. Sec. Bd. policy otherwise, could not be for in such Nierotko, 358, 369, v. 327 U.S. 66 S.Ct. a case statutes would in effect blank be (1946). Supreme 90 L.Ed. checks drawn to the credit of some ad- repeatedly emphasized has Court “the ministrative officer or board. Congress strong presumption intends 79-752, (1945); S.Rep. No. at 26 H.R.Rep. judicial action,” review of administrative (1946) 79-1980, (same); Bowen, No. at 41 beginning and that ‘our “[f]rom cases 476 U.S. at 106 S.Ct. (quoting judicial review of a [have established] same). agency aggrieved final action person Here, 324(e) nothing in high meets the persua will not be cut off unless there is standard for precluding review of whether sive reason to believe such was the limit has violated a on its invali- ” purpose Congress.’ Bowen v. Mich. dation Family Physicians, Acad. 476 U.S. *14 (1986) 670, 2133, question 90 to the second implicit S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 623 As Gardner, v. (quoting Abbott Labs. 387 U.S. the Government’s nonreviewability con 136, 140, 1507, § 87 S.Ct. 18 L.Ed.2d 681 tention: one of the limits on 18 invalida (1967)).9 authority tion is that the at issue be patent. Congress CBM a spe created specifically, More when doubt cial regime, review over and any above exists, congressional about intent gen have, authority other the PTAB might eral presumption favoring judicial review reviewing and invalidating patents that of rights-changing administrative action is qualify patents. as CBM it put And a time controlling. Cmty. Block v. Nutrition (eight limit years) on the authority PTAB’s Inst., 340, 351, 2450, 467 U.S. 104 S.Ct. regime. under that This requirement de (1984). result, L.Ed.2d 270 As a an agen authority fines the-PTAB’s to invalidate cy seeking to strong pre overcome this If a particular patent 18. is not a sumption “heavy faces a burden”' and must patent, CBM proper there is no pleading do so convincing” “clear and evidence. that could bring be filed to it within the Bowen, 671-72, at U.S. 106 S.Ct. 2133. authority. PTAB’s 18 Supreme The recently Court reiterated agency’s heavy concluding, burden to overcome the so we need not and do not strong presumption against unreviewabili consider all of the various determinations ty. E.E.O.C., Mining, See Mach LLC v. PTAB may make to initiate proceed- 9. See Long Shalala v. Illinois application specific Council on ment of Bowen’s to Medi- Care, Inc., 1, Term 529 U.S. 120 S.Ct. care statutes. (2000), 146 L.Ed.2d 1 for the Court's refine- act, ings guage and which constitute limits on of the not on what its advocates authority, ultimate invalidation reviewable may say and detractors about it. a final -written decision appeal from Looking at the structure of

invalidating patent. enough It is for us Government, in support of its new-found defining to determine here that the charac- position against judicial notes that patent, as a teristic of CBM sub- only provision of the AIA that allows jecting special power it to a to an appeal post-grant to this court from a invalidate, limit.10 is such a 329; proceeding is that section The Government and SAP have not judicial authorizes review of the “final any identified reason to draw different written decision” of the PTAB pur- made legislative conclusions. It is clear from the 328(a). government suant to The reads AIA history Congress purpose of the that this as limiting only review to the final ly relatively simple set out to create a decision, anything written and not in the See, expedited process. administrative initial decision to institute. But that of 112-98, (2011), e.g., H.R.Rep. No. begs question aspects of course —what However, 2011 U.S.C.C.A.N. noth the final subject written decision are ing purpose precludes argues or review? court, against this in an appeal of a final significance The Government finds decision, deciding written ques contested 328(a) in the fact the PTAB directs regarding premises necessary tions to the respect issue a decision with agency’s ultimate relied-on patentability Putting claim. appeal here, take the action on invalida — this provision with together tion of the patent claims under the CBM argues Government that on appeal just agency because the authorization — only court is limited to what the PTAB is premises first addressed those at the initi directed to do. But is a non-sequitur. stage proceeding. ation The statutory description agency’s of an delays, process, already with inherent necessarily decisional duties does not de Any delay committed. further caused appellate fine the of an ulti scope court’s having the court part decide as the basic mate merits considerations. predicate merits ease a issue such here, Indeed, raised would be limited. parallels The Government also draws *15 predicate when the answers to these issues between the AIA this issue under and the precedent, are decided as a matter of fur in practice prior-established USPTO’s the delay, any, minimal, ther if will be if not parte proceedings, ex reexamination and in essentially disappear. the prior practice now-supersed- under parties, provisions partes The ed for inter reexamina- digging through legisla- the record, up tive come with tion. We do not find that either of those competing state- legislators proceedings, ments from various regard with established under different possible scope statutory provisions dealing of the issues to be with dif- issues, heard on appeal. assuming controlling Even such ferent is here. It relevant, however, thought noting, statements are to be the worth that the pre-AIA variety of conflicting why views illustrates case law made clear that limitations on the we must focus on the structure lan- scope authority of reexamination were re- issue, argue predicate necessary part 10. The Government and SAP that the and a during PTAB found Versata waived this issue appeal. record on explained, the trial. As we have this is 1322 final To in questions the decision even take the two reverse upon

viewable such limita the considered though USPTO order: Cuozzo did not decide sta- whether stage the initiation and initi solely tions at tus as CBM was on invali- limit long held to be unreview ation itself was authority dation of It could NTP, Inc., re 654 F.3d 1268 able. See In hardly have done so. Cuozzo did not in- Co., (Fed.Cir.2011); In re Hiniker purported volve a CBM or the (Fed.Cir.1998); In re Portola F.3d authority. PTAB’s 18 (Fed.Cir. Inc., 110 F.3d 786 Packaging, 1997), recognized statute as superseded address, broadly, More did not Cuozzo Inc., 1277; NTP, 654 F.3d at In in In re address, and had no occasion to F.3d Corp., re Recreative Techs. 314(d)) question (despite whether a fi- (Fed.Cir.1996). nal decision can written be reviewed short, find that we do not the Govern- compliance with a limit on the PTAB’s approach meeting arguments ment’s authority. Recognizing invalidation persuasion “heavy burden” needed to distinction between initiation and final in- “strong presumption” ju- overcome validation, Cuozzo, 793 F.3d at 1272-74 Congress, by limiting dicial review. only court ruled on review of the ini- the review scope of bar 324 we itself, tiation decision not about whether described, have struck a balance between final any decision breached limit on for a Congress’s prompt desire and effi- authority. invalidation USPTO, process cient at the other, hand, and, necessary one on the And that focus was inherent the sub judi- recognition of the traditional role of challenge, stance of the for a reason Cuoz agency cial final action. review of We find challenge zo noted. The was simply carefully that balance crafted and consis- petition the IPR at issue had not cited assigns tent the roles the with Constitution particular prior ultimately art the PTAB to the Judicial' and Executive Branches. proper peti relied on for invalidation. A LLC, Speed In re Cuozzo Technologies, it, tion undisputedly could have cited 14-1301, No. 2015 WL thereby plainly giving (Fed.Cir. 8, 2015), July decided to invalidate issue the court after the briefing had concluded alleged IPR. Id. at 1273-74. The error in case, contrary.11 is not to the initiation was “irrelevant” it because was court in Cuozzo did not answer either of like the error that was “washed clean” in questions the two in concluding we decide Hiniker. Id. The court in Cuozzo did not that we pat review whether Versata’s rule on or have before it an asserted viola ent is a patent. CBM That is clear even tion a limit on the PTAB’s ultimate putting aside might difference there *16 authority to invalidate that 314(d) could have § be between in issue Cuozzo— — at 324(e) § issue here. proper pleading.12 been cured a — at original opinion 11. light, following The and dissent in 12. In that the issuance of Cuozzo February Cuozzo, Versata, issued on 2015. 778 F.3d 1271 original opinion in a (Newman, J., dissenting). panel A revised citing authority, requested supplemental letter opinion July and dissent issued on necessary that if be treated as a day, petition On the same the court denied a petition. disposi- mandamus In view of our rehearing for en banc with a concurrence and case, request tion of the is moot. two dissents to the denial. reasons, Congress, we hold that foregoing specific For the addition to the au- authority to review whether the we have thorization to the USPTO to adopt regula- § patent is within the PTAB’s '350 defining tions meaning “technologi- of authority. invention,” cal gave also the USPTO broad authority § over the entire program—

Issue Number 2—Is the '350 Patent regulations to “issue establishing a Business Method “Covered a implementing post-grant transitional Patent”? review proceeding for review of the validi- a post- AIA section 18 establishes ty of patents.” covered business method grant proceeding “for review the 18(a)(1). § Pursuant to that broad author- validity method pat of covered business ity, adopted the USPTO regula- extensive 18(a)(1). anyone § In case wished ents.” § governing program. tions See 37 argue question, Congress left no §§ C.F.R. regula- 42.300-.304. Thus the § scope doubt about the 18: “The Di tions, in addition to a definition of “techno- proceed rector institute a transitional invention,” logical 42.301(b), §id. also con- only a ing patent for that is [under 18] tain a definition of “covered business patent.” covered business method 42.301(a). patent,” method id. 18(a)(1)(E). what, We first consider under the stat- The statute defines “covered business ute and the issued regulations, is a “cov- patent” method as: patent,” ered business method and wheth- patent that claims a or method corre- applies er the term at issue sponding apparatus performing for data in this case. Subsequently we consider processing operations or other used in what the regulations, USPTO in the ab- administration, practice, or manage- definition, a statutory sence of understand product ment of a financial or ser- exception for a “technological inven- vice. ... be, again tion” to its application to this 18(d)(1). disagreement A basic between patent. parties broadly to this case is how read, language should be and accordingly, Scope The the Term “Covered ” it encompasses whether the invention set Business Method Patent patent. out in the '350 out statutory We set above the definition In addition to the boundaries inherent of a “covered patent” business method definition, statutory Congress pro- also 18(d)(1). found in regula- The USPTO’s specific exception: vided a “the term [cov- tion, term, defining the same restates ver- patent] ered business method in- does not statutory batim the nothing definition and technological clude inventions.” Though any question more. that avoids Unhelpfully, Id. Congress did not then de- regulation whether the with is consistent invention,” fine a “technological but in- statute, regrettably nothing it adds stead instructed the reg- USPTO to “issue our understanding scope question. for determining ulations whether a In response objection to Versata’s 18(d)(2). is for a technological invention.” the '350 was not a covered business by regulation The USPTO has promulgat- patent, method was therefore ed its version of a definition of a “techno- 42.301(b). left to its own devices. The PTAB under- logical invention.” 37 C.F.R. analysis regarding took an whether Versa- parties disagree whether necessarily ta’s claims 17 and 26-29 must excepted invention this case is such an *17 “technological products be directed to “financial or invention.” ser-

vices,” primarily terms are used the ered to be focused on financial as these that, such.)14 part The PTAB noted definition.13 institutions as implementing the process of the agency The PTAB noted that the sum- proposed notices of published had USPTO Instead, marily rejected proposals. these rulemaking, among and that the final the stated that: USPTO subsequently adopted proposed rules clarify suggestion The to that the term the definition of “covered business was “financial or product service” is limited patent” method contained 37 C.F.R. products to the or of the finan- services 42.301(a), the definition described above. industry adopted. cial services is not PTAB that in its notices observed a narrow construction of the term Such legislative considered the de USPTO limit scope would definition of as the overall history, bates and as well patents beyond covered business method itself. J.A. 21- program transitional See 18(d)(1) intent of section of the AIA. Program for (citing Transitional Cov Id. ered Business Method Patent s —Defini The PTAB thus declined to interpret the tions of Business Method Patent Covered requiring patent’s statute as that the in- Invention, 77 Technological Fed.Reg. literally comprehend vention a financial 2012)). Also, (Aug. product or service: “The term financial is that in final notice of observed adjective simply relating that means to rulemaking agency explained that the monetary matters.” J.A. 23. The PTAB history supported the legislative proposi concluded “Versata’s '350 broadly tion that the definition be inter products claims methods and for determin- preted “encompass patents claiming claims, ing price and that these which nature, that are financial in inci activities complementary activity are to a financial activity dental a financial or comple matters, monetary and relate to are con- a financial mentary activity.” Id. products sidered financial and services un- Further, in the Register Federal notice 18(d)(1).” §der Id. explaining agency’s adopt decision to here, In its Versata renews its rule, agency its final notice observes argument against the PTAB position. responding that one commentator position Congress Versata takes rule proposal suggested regulato- that the phrase used the “financial product or ser- ry definition of covered business method vice” for a plain reason and that the mean- specifically should be limited to the prod- ing of the text of the statute limits the ucts and services the financial services jurisdiction PTAB’s to products or services industry. Fed.Reg. Another 48736. i.e., banks, from the financial suggestion bro- agency was should sector — insurance, kerages, holding make specific companies, reference in the definition to Class 705 of the United States Classifica- similar institutions with a finance focus. If System, Congress scope tion used examiners. had intended the USPTO (This generally Id. classification capture things consid- definition to other ineiden- earlier, See, early As noted this issue was addressed that issued in 2000s. (2011). in the PTAB's decision to institute e.g., Cong. Rec. 3432 Class 705 in its final written decision. apparently original temp- itself served as the late definition of a "covered business history 14. There is a considerable amount of method,” thought but was to be too narrow. regarding technology Class 705—the as- class Id. at 13167. sociated with the volume of business method *18 18(d)(1) so, commerce, any limits AIA to one sector or it could have said tal to Further, industry. legislative history different words. it would have used Thus, supports the broader definition. ar- patent the '350 responds SAP USPTO, gues interpreta- PTAB’s determining price a method “[a] claims . arbitrary capricious. tion was not or organ a purchasing offered to product of Appellees’ (quoting Br. at 45 ization.” that, agree We with the USPTO as 57-58). 19, col. ll. Under patent '350 construction, statutory a matter of the def definition, statutory of the interpretation inition of “covered pat business method SAP, fall argues price plainly calculations is not to products ent” limited and services administration, or “practice, within the only industry, patents of the financial or to product of a financial or ser management by directly affecting owned or the activi 18(d)(1). if language of AIA Even vice” ties of financial institutions such as banks regard could be Congress’s intent this brokerage plain houses. The text of unclear, interpre considered the USPTO’s statutory definition contained 18(d)(1) broadly interpreted tation of § 18(d)(1) “performing operations ... — “encompassing] patents claiming ac administration, practice, used in the or nature, that are financial inciden tivities management product of a financial or ser activity complementary tal to a financial or range vice”—on its face covers wide of is, according to activity,” to a financial statutory finance-related activities. The SAP, Cooper to deference under entitled definition makes no reference financial to Dudas, v. Technologies Co. such, not limit' institutions as and does (Fed.Cir.2008). SAP, According to only itself to those institutions. claims a “method for determin argues To limit the definition as Versata l. ing price,” patent, '350 col. require reading would limitations into the something calls a “hierarchical statute that are not there. This under- engine.” Appellees’ Br. at 49. pricing standing of the text is reinforced specific findings PTAB made that the scope program, of the entire and the ... steps performed claimed “could be concern, including the halls general within pencil paper,” specific, with and “no Congress, regarding litigation abuse software, equip computer unconventional patents. over business method These con- ment, processing capabilities or are tools Congress special cerns caused to create a findings, 27-28. These required.” J.A. in the first program for these SAP, argues support its determination. place. The USPTO in its brief as intervenor Furthermore, expertise interpretation PTAB’s *19 fall if comprises questions granted— it well within the ultimate review is vention statutory definition of a “cov- terms of the did the err in the first instance USPTO patent.” method ered business it originally when determined that the in- vention was novel and nonobvious? “Technological Meaning The Putting part regulation’s this defi- ” Invention aside, nition left with a we are definition of 18(d) states that the term Section “technological essentially a invention” as patent” method does not “covered business having “technological” one a that feature “technological include for inven a problem using solves “technical” a “tech- dispute parties tions.” The whether the Defining nical” solution. in term terms technological for a invention. patent '350 is help. of itself does not seem to offer much requires This that we first determine what short, punt neither the statute’s term, by is meant and then whether agency’s nor the USPTO lateral of the ball finding in pat was correct this anything very offer useful in-understand- ent not such an earlier invention. As ing the meaning “technological of the term noted, term, Congress not define the did invention.” but left it to the to do. USPTO The PTAB, in concluding Thus the it instructions, Congress’s USPTO followed jurisdiction had over the '350 aas 42.301(b) promulgated in 37 C.F.R. covered business method that was its definition. exception not within the for a technical According regulation, a “techno- invention, had to craft its own understand- one in logical invention” is which “the ing by of what is meant a “technological subject claimed matter as a whole recites a First, invention.” the PTAB recited the technological feature that is novel and adopted fact that the USPTO had a defini- art; prior unobvious over and solves a notice, published tion and had a related see problem using technical a technical solu- Guide, Office Patent Trial Practice 77 Fed. regulation specifies tion.” Id. The 2012). Reg. (Aug. 48763-64 The these criteria be considered “on a will notice which, listed certain characteristics case-by-case basis.” Id. This definition is if present, help did not support finding say it notable as much for what does not that the invention was within the “techno- say. for what it does logical invention” exception from CBM First,.the that a requirement technologi- 1) treatment. These are: mere “recitation cal invention should be novel and nonobvi- 2) technologies”; of known “reciting the ous art prior over the could be said to be 3) prior technology”; use of known art obvious, rather and not novel. This is “combining prior art structures to achieve eligible patent- because in order to be normal, expected, predictable or result ing place, the first invention must of that combination.” Id. at 48764. (35 102) be novel U.S.C. and nonobvious PTAB, taking position that the (35 103); presumably U.S.C. the inven- presence single qualifying of a claim is review, tion already since it has sufficient to institute covered business by patent, been covered an issued was method claim 17 for closer selected earlier determined the USPTO to be (Claim analysis. 17 is set out in extenso novel At early stage and nonobvious. section, Yersata, ‘Background’ supra.) process, when the USPTO is first in its effort to avoid CBM review of the determining whether the at issue is CBM, argued even a '350 that claim patent, there would seem to be little like all cause to determine what will be one of the patent, claims recited a novel “ technological ‘leveraged feature. the invention the hierarchal and nonobvious a “hierarchical data This was described as data large companies structures used ” a soft- structure” used combination with information,’ organize pricing agree we ware-implemented pricing procedure. with the PTAB that this is not technical that the claims further contended solution but more akin to creating organi- computer the use of a and the require all (citation management zational charts. Id. numbers that are to use of “denormalized” omitted). PTAB, Like the for many *20 in “run re- be determined time.” SAP reasons, of the same we conclude that sponded that claim 17 lacked a novel and may sweep whatever be the full of the technological nonobvious feature as the invention,” “technological term the inven- merely claim directed to a business was tion that comprises patent '350 is es- process determining product prices of sentially technological not a one as that computer-related lack even minimal recita- ordinarily term would be understood. The PTAB concluded that claim 17 tions. Accordingly, we affirm the PTAB’s con- technological did not recite a invention. clusion that Versata’s '350 is a cov- accept We the PTAB’s use of claim as ered method patent, business and that it correctly As PTAB representative. not fall within the exception does for tech- noted, if required even the invention inventions, nological excep- whatever that not consti computer, use of a the claim did tion otherwise mean.15 tute a invention. As we are technological instructed, of a presence general now Issue Number 3—Claim Construction computer operations to facilitate purpose Standards through steps change uninventive does not addressing the ultimate in When merits character of an fundamental invention. question compliance this case—the of by v. Corp. Pty. See Ltd. CLS Alice Bank requirements with the - Int'l, -, U.S. 134 S.Ct. . PTAB 101—the issue of claim faced (2014) L.Ed.2d 296 PTAB applied construction. The its typified The PTAB viewed the invention interpretation” “broadest reasonable by basically claim 17 as a method of deter (“BRI”) issue, the stan- standard mining price. This was a determination in adopted dard the USPTO for any type that could be achieved “in post-grant proceedings, generally AIA computer system programming pro or or used in USPTO office actions. Versata environment,” cessing accordingly “no challenges application of that standard software, specific, comput unconventional in its claims this case.16 equipment, processing capabili er tools or required.” (citing ties are J.A. 28 Dealer PTAB, decision, The in final written track, Huber, Inc. v. 1333 construed four claim of which the terms (Fed.Cir.2012)). parties sought appeal, construction. On out, points correctly, PTAB’s agree

We with the determina- PTAB BRI applied the standard to each of tion that claim 17 does not solve a techni- its claim constructions. Versata conse- problem using cal In- technical solution. deed, contrary quently challenges generally, the PTAB’s argument to Versata’s Internet Brief et al. as Amici Curiae in See also Brief of The Association of Dell Inc. Intervenor; Support Appellees. as Amicus Curiae in Support Appellees Brief of Corp. Supporting Amici Curiae Intel et al. Agency’s Compa- Intervenors and Affirmance of the 16. See also Amici Curiae Brief of 3M Party. ny Support et al. in of Neither But see Decision. standard, case, majority approved in this particular the BRI use of meaning “pric- of the term use of the BRI in PTAB claim on the USPTO’s its effect information,” and whether that term construction. 793 F.3d at 1301-05. As a ing require “denormal- rule, construed our own general should be are bound we and, ized numbers.”17 prior precedents, though the rules governing IPR matters at issue in Cuozzo Versata, both Versata and According to necessarily govern will not all PGR/CBM proceed1- outset of the agreed at the SAP matters, distinguishing we see no basis for require denormal- that the term did ings proceedings purposes the two between to so declined ized numbers. of the PTAB’s use of BRI claim con- and, term, applica based on construe the struction here. standard, BRI decided that the of the tion require did not invention in the '350 Furthermore, on careful of the denormalized numbers. it light parties’ arguments, record than clear that the outcome less that such a claim con- *21 argues

Versata case would be different under a different a permissible not number struction is regime. claim construction This is be- reasons, adversely use im- and that its of cause, applying even the usual court-uti- validity determination of the pacted the formula, lized “one correct construction” analy- PTAB’s 101 '350 under the Versata, interpreta- we conclude that the PTAB’s Accordingly, argues ap- on sis. claims, tion of the for the same reasons for the court is to peal one alternative PTAB analy- given by the after careful consider- and remand for new 101 reverse ation, particularly claim construction. is correct. This is the proper sis under a 17, which, regarding light case claim in of SAP, position whatever its the earlier principles the of claim differentiation and been, may posi have takes the litigation understandings the derived from the writ- PTAB, applying that the tion this above, description, ten as described is BRI, construed the claims properly broad limited to denormalized numbers. to “denormalized num ly as not limited without, points to the fact that Thus, bers.” SAP guidance provid- even dependent claims recite “denormalized Cuozzo, ed under either formulation of independent numbers” and the claims do the claim construction standard the result not, description and the written describes likely is the same in this case. The “ only aspect’ this feature as of the ‘[o]ne PTAB’s claim constructions are affirmed. purported Appellees’ invention.” Br. at Issue Number 4—The Merits 39). 8, (quoting patent, '350 col. l.

57-58 Determination Further, SAP, argues even if the PTAB construction, erred in its the error is decision, In final its written its correction would not harmless because PTAB held that claims 17 and 26-29 of the change the result. unpatentable '350 were 35 § 101 In U.S.C. as “abstract ideas.” re question propriety

On the basic of the whether, sponse, challenges first Versata PTAB BRI applying standard in statutes, governing under the it is within on decision-making, this is an issue which In to invoke 101 we need not elaborate here. Cuozzo, view, argument validity. case that issued after as a test of Versata’s numbers, according during time 17. Denormalized to Ver- mined the software run sata, depending pricing operation do not have fixed units and assume is units, being meaning performed. a different deter- different

1329 goes authorize the PTAB to test review power statutes to the of the PTAB to in a validity challenged Thus, claims CBM presented decide the case to it. like requirements on the basis of the set review the issue we discussed Issue Number §§ not on forth 103 and but supra, it engages analysis the same as did requirements basis of the set forth in that issue. And for the same reasons set Second, §if 101 a permis- even is there, forth the answer must be the same. test, argues that the PTAB sible jurisdiction We have question to decide the finding nothing erred in these claims more decided, though even it is as it inwas idea,” than an “abstract as that is under- case, initially by the PTAB at the decision §in jurisprudence. stood to institute stage. turnWe then to the more chal Is Proper Section the Patent Act a lenging question of whether the PTAB was Cases, in CBM and Is That Referent statutory within its invalidation authority Question Open to Judicial Review? apply § when it chose to jurisprudence matter, preliminary As a we address the in determining validity of the chal question of whether we can aas lenged Admittedly, claims. statutory law, matter of whether the PTAB is au- subject text competing understand thorized to invoke 101 as a test of validi- ings. chapter Under governing post- ty in CBM cases. It was at the decision to grant cases, review and the PTAB stage institute when the PTAB determined “shall issue a final written decision with there All was issue. the same respect patentability arguments against judicial for and *22 ” 328(a) § claim challenged.... (emphasis of an issue first decided the institution added). time, 321(b), § At the same enti stage presumably are available. The ques- “Scope,” tled petitioner states that a in a again

tion is whether can we reach this “may request PGR review to cancel as issue now on of the final written unpatentable 1 or patent more claims of a decision. yes, The answer is and for es- any ground on that could be raised under sentially the same reasons. (2) (3) (re 282(b) paragraph or section First, an appeal of the PTAB’s lating to invalidity any of the or decision, questions final written all that claim).” added.) (Emphasis relate to the ultimate merits of the case 282(b) Section in specifies turn the de- are before us. Since the merits of this fenses that be. in raised an action law, application § case turn on an 101 involving validity or infringement of a step deciding first in those merits is neces patent. Among the defenses listed are: sarily satisfying that ourselves the PTAB’s (b)(2) invalidity of any or — merits decision was based on a correct any ground claim on “specified part in II understanding of the law. Thus we must patentability”; as a condition for assure compliance ourselves that with (b)(3) invalidity any of the or § 101 applicable is the test for — claim comply for failure to with to have used in judging validity of the mode) § requirement of 112 (except best in patent. claims the '350 § or 251. Second, all the same reasons we 324(e) argues that a earlier, post-grant CBM §

discussed does not bar ground must be limited to a that reviewing this court from and deciding this (2) (3) predicate paragraph issue could be raised under or when raised. The authori- 282(b). ty of the PTAB under the relevant of section statutes Versata then reasons 282(b)(2) apply § § 101 law to the claims under that authorizes defenses on 1330 Tech., (Fed.Cir.

any ground “specified part 657, in II as a condi- 661 n. 3 patentability,” 2008). tion for and that the II part reference includes under the in headings It require hyper-technical would compiled only statutes “conditions for adherence to form rather than an under- i.e., §§ patentability,” 102 and but not standing of substance to arrive at a conclu- § 101. Based on the in headings part II sion that ground is not a available to statutes, Versata draws a distinction test under either the PGR or heading between the under which processes. validity Section 101 challenges appears, patentable,” “inventions and “con- today major are industry, they ap- patentability” ditions of under which pear in case after case our court and in §§ 102 and 103 are listed. cases, Supreme Court not to mention now SAP counters that it is generally under- in final written decisions reviews under that invalidity stood 101 is an defense the AIA. The numerous cases in our court and that Versata’s reliance Supreme Court need no cita- on the is headings improper. SAP also tion; sample cases, see, for a of PTAB e.g., argues legislative that the history suggests America, Search Inc. v. Transunion Intel- any ground validity raised, may be LLC, ligence, CBM2013-00037, 2015 WL including 101. (Feb. 3, 2015); Bancorp U.S. v. The USPTO echoes arguments, these Capital Retirement Management Access Co., and cites to Graham v. John Deere Co., CBM2013-00014, 2014 WL 4229953 1, 12, 684, 15 383 U.S. 86 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 545 2014). (Aug. (1966), for the statement that the Patent said, It is not, often whether accurate or Act “sets out the patentabili conditions of Congress presumed to know the ty sections,” 101, 102, in three and 103. background against which it is legislating. The USPTO adds rejected that this court Excluding § 101 considerations from the argument

Versata’s regarding processes ameliorative in the AIA would Dealertrack, Inc., 674 F.3d at 1330 n. be a substantial change in the law as it is adds it would be particularly ano understood, and requires something more malous to conclude that Congress foreclos *23 than some inconsistent headings section § ed consideration of 101 issues CBM a statute’s codification. agree We with the very reviews since the purpose spe USPTO that, and SAP and we so hold process cial permit CBM was to the USP- looking at the entirety of the statutory TO to validity reconsider the of a salient framework and considering the basic pur- category of patents. business method pose reviews, of CBM the PTAB acted Versata is correct that a strict adher- scope within the of authority its delineated ence to the section titles can support an by Congress in permitting §a 101 chal- argument that 101 is not listed as a lenge under AIA 18. patentability,” “condition of but rather has the heading of patentable.” “inventions Finally, the Merits of However, USPTO, as noted both PTAB Decision our opinions Supreme and the Court’s Having determined that opinions years over the have established PTAB had validity that test the of challenges validity constitute the challenged claims under patentability we turn challenges. See also Co., question Standard now to the Cyanamid Oil Co. v. Am. of whether the conclu (Fed.Cir.1985); F.2d sion reached regard Aristo- with to that test was crat Pty. Techs. Austl. Ltd. v. Int’l Game correct: that challenged claims were (and constituting invalid as an “abstract idea” ments of 101 of the Patent Act constructions) as that term is understood. The PTAB law, as questions of without challenged that “each of the determined deference to the trial forum. Ultramer claims involves the use of an idea: abstract cial, Hulu, LLC, Inc. v.

determining using organization a price (Fed.Cir.2014). As necessary predicate a hierarchies, product group which are akin conclusions, to our briefly we must summa management organizational charts.” applicable rize the law. According PTAB, J.A. 72. Versa- Section 101 of the Patent Act defines concept organizational ta’s hierarchies patent-eligible subject matter: “Whoever products and customers is abstract be- any invents or discovers new and useful represents cause it a concept, disembodied machine, process, manufacture, or compo- building ingenu- a basic block of human matter, sition of or new and useful ity determining is little more than a —it thereof, improvement may obtain patent price, essentially calculating. a method of therefor, subject to the conditions and re- analyzed The PTAB further whether quirements of this title.” 35 U.S.C. incorporated meaningful claims “sufficient Supreme The Court has found 101 an they limitations” to ensure that recited implicit exception nature, for laws of natu- idea, than an more abstract and deter- phenomena, ral and abstract ideas.18 Al- mined the claims did not add mean- ice, (citing 134 S.Ct. at 2354 dating cases beyond ingful limitations the abstract idea. 1853). part analysis, of this PTAB As con- Generally, the courts have found that that, although cluded the claims were applying task of the first two of these computer drafted to include hardware limi- judicially-crafted exceptions of na- tations, underlying process “could also —laws phenomena ture and natural particu- be performed pen paper.” via J.A. 73. —not difficult;19 larly there are a number of The PTAB determined the recitation providing cases or guid- more less clear generic general purpose computer hard- apply concepts. ance how to these routine, The represented ware in the claims exception third ideas—is more well-understood conventional hardware —abstract problem, problem failed to narrow the claims relative to inherent in the the abstract idea. also credit- search for a definition anof “abstract idea” testimony expert, ed the of SAP’s Dr. Sie- that is not itself abstract. gel, over that of expert, Versata’s Dr. Lie- current thinking Under about how to

bich, additionally and found that idea,” understand .an “abstract inventions steps storing, retrieving, claimed sort- thought that are to be based on an ab- ing, eliminating, receiving were “well- stract idea as such are per unpat- se *24 known, routine, and conventional steps.” inventions, level, All entable. at some J.A. 75-77. use, reflect, “embody, rest upon, apply or nature, questions phenomena,

We review laws of natural concerning or ab- (citation compliance ideas.” Id. require- with the doctrinal stract quotation Supreme alternately 18. The Pathology Court has re- 19. But see Ass’n Molecular v. for - specific exceptions” Genetics, Inc., U.S. -, ferred to the "three to Myriad 133 S.Ct. 101, Kappos, section 593, 601, see Bilski v. 561 U.S. 2107, (2013) (naturally 186 L.Ed.2d 124 oc 3218, 130 S.Ct. 177 L.Ed.2d 792 curring segment patentable, DNA is not but (2010), [single] exception” or to “the . naturally occurring segment pat DNA encompassing exceptions together, all three entable). Alice, see 134 S.Ct. at 2354. omitted). an Consequently, limiting ineligible concept determin- the use of marks exception section 101 for particular technological whether the to a environment. ing distinguish- involves applies abstract ideas Id. that claim the build- ing patents between This court in its efforts to make an ingenuity human there- ing blocks of —and developed the “abstract idea” less abstract pre-emption of basic fore risk broad machine-or-transformation test. The Su integrate those ideas—and has said the test can serve as preme Court more, something into building blocks determining clue for whether useful specific transform them into enough to un eligible processes some inventions are inventions. Id. at 2354-55. patent-eligible 101, der section but that this test is not the has identified a Supreme Thus the Court an deciding sole test for whether invention First, two-step framework. determine Bilski, patent-eligible process. is a at are directed to

whether the claims issue 604, 130 at U.S. S.Ct. 3218. concepts. patent-ineligible one of the Id. years Supreme In recent Court 2355; Mayo at see also Collaborative this court have examined claims directed - Labs., Inc., v. Prometheus U.S. Servs. to abstract ideas on number of occasions. 1289, 1296-97, -, 132 S.Ct. 182 L.Ed.2d ap- Extensive discussion of these cases (2012) (setting two-step forth the same pears many opinions, and we do not framework). Second, if the claims are di repeat litany helpful, here. It be matter, patent-ineligible subject rected to nevertheless, “ highlight briefly a few sa- else is there in the claims ask ‘[w]hat ” points comparison lient as a means of Alice, (quot 134 S.Ct. at 2355 before us?’ patent. the invention and claims in the '350 1297). ing Mayo, 132 S.Ct. Alice, In held that Court claims question, To answer second directed to the abstract idea of intermedi- we consider the limitations of each claim unpatentable, ated settlement were even individually both and as an ordered combi though required gener some of the claims nation whether the additional to determine Bilski, computer implementation. ic In limitations transform the nature of the the Court held that claims directed to the patent-eligible application claim into a of a hedging unpat abstract idea of risk were patent-ineligible concept. Id. Su Flook, entable. In Parker v. 437 U.S. preme has Court described this second (1978), 98 S.Ct. 57 L.Ed.2d 451 step concept— as a search for an inventive Court held that a mathematical formula a limitation or combination of limitations alarm computer catalytic for limits in a that is sufficient to that the ensure process conversion a patent-ineligible was practice amounts to significantly more Benson, In abstract idea. v. Gottschalk than a patent upon ineligible concept an 409 U.S. 93 S.Ct. 34 L.Ed.2d 273 itself. Id. (1972),the involving Court held claims words, reciting other a claim an an algorithm converting binary-coded abstract idea must include additional fea pure binary decimal numerals into form tures to ensure that the claim is more than was, unpatentable were since the a drafting designed monopolize effort effect, practical algorithm on the requires abstract idea. Id. at 2357. This itself. more than simply stating an abstract idea *25 may These cases be contrasted with Di- adding while it” “apply “ap words or Diehr, amond v. 450 U.S. ply it S.Ct. computer.” with a id. at See 2358. (1981), in Similarly, 67 L.Ed.2d 155 which the prohibition patenting an ineligible concept cannot be circumvented that a computer-implemented Court held eligi- human or a process curing using pen for rubber was mind human a though employed even it a well-known ble paper. and equa- It used the equation. mathematical These cases be contrasted with in technological in a process tion. a to solve stances in which we have found industry problem practice. in conventional patent-eligible subject directed to matter. Our court on numerous occasions has example, For in DDR Holdings, v. LLC claims directed to abstract ideas. examined Hotels.com, L.P., (Fed.Cir. 773 F.3d 1245 In Content Extraction & Transmission 2014), reciting we found that claims a solu Bank, Ass’n, v. Fargo LLC Wells National necessarily tion that was in comput rooted (Fed.Cir.2014), 776 F.3d 1348 we found technology er problem spe overcome a that claims directed to the abstract idea of in cifically arising computer the realm of documents, collecting hard-copy data from eligible. networks were a We drew distinc recognizing certain information within the tion between the patent-eligible claims at data, storing collected that information issue patent-ineligible claims in the memory in ineligible. were This true was past merely commonplace had recited that, if despite noting claims were con- processing methods aimed at business strued the most favorable manner information, business known busi applying appellants, require the claims would scan- processes particular technological ness ning processing technology. at Id. environments. Ultramercial, In we found that claims Applying step the first of the Al- directed to the an using abstract idea framework, ice/Mayo agree with the we exchange currency as an or advertisement analyses PTAB’s claims issue. ineligible even though

were the claims 17 and Claims 26-29 of the '350 are general were tied a purpose computer directed to the abstract idea of determin- buySAFE, and invoked the Internet. ing a price, using organizational prod- Inc., (Fed. Google, Inc. v. 765 F.3d 1350 hierarchies, uct group way same Cir.2014), we found claims directed to that the claims in Alice were directed to of creating idea contractual abstract a the abstract idea of intermediated settle- relationship performance transaction —a ment, and the claims in Bilski were direct- guaranty ineligible despite reci —were hedging. ed to the abstract idea of risk computer tation of a that received and sent specifically, claim 17 More to a is directed information over a network. determining price. method of a Claim 27 Services, In Bancorp L.L.C. v. Sun Life to a computer-implemented directed (U.S.), Assurance Co. Canada determining price, a and claims method (Fed.Cir.2012), ineligible we found computer-reada- and 28 are directed to claims directed to the abstract idea of storage comprising computer ble media in- managing a stable value life insurance poli implement structions to the methods of cy. And in CyberSource Corp. v. Retail claims 17 and 28. 29 is directed to Claim (Fed.Cir. Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366 apparatus determining price 2011), broadly we found that a worded includes computer program instructions reciting method claim and a claim a com capable performing the same method puter executing readable medium for steps Using organiza- recited in claim 27. claim ineligible. method were We conclud product group tional and hierarchies to ed the claims were drawn to method of price determine a is an abstract idea that verifying validity of credit card trans Internet, particular tangible actions has no concrete or form steps over the and the block, performed the method could application. building be or It is a *26 conceptual basic framework for organizing by nation using organizational product and information, involving similar claims group performed hierarchies as by ge- collecting, recognizing, storing data in computer. neric Cy Content Extraction and the claims in This court found similar claims to be berSource. ineligible despite the recitation gener of a step the second of Applying the Al- al purpose computer or the in Internet , framework, ice/Mayo agree we with the Ultramercial, Content bu Extraction that, considering PTAB after the limita- ySAFE, Bancorp, CyberSource. See individually tions each claim and as an also Intellectual I Capi Ventures LLC v. combination, ordered none of the claims (USA), Ass’n, tal One Bank Nat’l 14- No. have sufficient additional limitations to 1506, 792 F.3d 2015 WL 4068798 transform the nature of claim into a (Fed.Cir. 6, 2015); July Techs., OIP Inc. v. patent-eligible application of an abstract Amazon.com, Inc., 12-1696, No. idea. Taking the claim sepa- limitations (Fed.Cir. 2015 WL 3622181 June rately, performed the function by the com- 2015). The Supreme Court found similar puter at each step purely conventional. claims to be ineligible despite recitation of example, For the limitations of claim 17 a general purpose Alice, computer arranging hierarchy involve organiza- Flook, Moreover, and Benson. the claims product groups, tional and storing pricing at issue are not sufficiently similar to the information, retrieving applicable pricing claims Diehr and DDR Holdings to information, sorting pricing information, demonstrate that Versata’s claims pat are eliminating pricing less restrictive informa- eligible. ent tion, determining price. All of Diehr, Unlike claims issue do not well-understood, these are limitations rou- improve some existing technological pro- tine, conventional activities previously cess or solve some technological problem industry. 'known to the industry conventional practice. Unlike The same is true of the limitations in DDR Holdings, the claims at issue are not claims 26-29. The limitations are either rooted in computer technology to solve a inherent the abstract idea of determin- problem specifically arising in aspect some ing price using organization product of computer technology. Instead, group e.g., arranging the hi- hierarchies — claims at issue are more like the claims we erarchies —or conventional and well-known summarized in DDR Holdings as insuffi- involving limitations a computer e.g.,— cient to reach eligibility reciting a —claims storing pricing information. commonplace business method aimed at specifically examined this issue and credit- processing business information despite ed testimony expert SAP’s over being applied general on a purpose com- expert Versata’s to determine that the ad- puter. ditionally steps of storing,.retriev- claimed ing, sorting, eliminating and receiving Versata raises arguments several sup- “well-known, routine, were and convention- port position that its claims are al steps.” J.A. 77. eligible under section but argu- these ments persuasive are not and are Similarly, when effective- considered as an or- ly combination, by countered dered USPTO and components of SAP. each First, claim nothing argues add already is not that the PTAB pres- erred ent when steps improperly are considered sepa- dissecting the claims and rately. whole, Viewed aas failing the claims to consider the claims as a whole. simply recite concept price determi- The record reflects that this is not so.

1335 analysis PTAB in its followed the er than solely function as an obvious mech in Supreme of the Court Alice and dictates anism for a permitting solution to be examining the claims as a whole Mayo by i.e., quickly, achieved more through the and in terms of each claim’s limitations. computer utilization of a for performing Tech., calculations.” SiRF Inc. v. Int’l argues

Versata that its claims recite “a Comm’n, (Fed. Trade specific approach determining price to Cir.2010); Bancorp, see also at F.3d product computer, using of a on a hier- 1277-78. Versata’s claims do not meet archies so as to enable the desired benefit test, solely and instead function as a computing for the environment: fewer searches, mechanism for permitting price deter leading software tables and to performed mination to be more improvements computer performance quickly. Appellant’s and ease of maintenance.” Br. Versata asserts that the PTAB con However, all parties— 43-44. strued the claim term “data source” in including recognize that these Versata — 17, 27, claim 17—and found claims and supposed benefits are not recited in the “computer 29—as a storage medium” and claims at issue. Versata contends that the that this is inconsistent with the PTAB’s Inst., benefits are relevant under Genetics finding underlying process that the could Diagnostics, LLC v. Novartis Vaccines & performed be pen paper. via Howev Inc., (Fed.Cir.2011), 655 F.3d 1291 but this er, there is no inconsistency. Courts have since it inapposite case is does not concern required examined claims that the use of a section 101. computer underly and still found that the Examination of the a claims-—-as whole ing, patent-ineligible invention be could and in terms of each claim’s limitations— performed pen paper via or in a per reveals that the claims are not directed to See, Benson; e.g., son’s mind. Cyber improving computer performance and do Source, 654 F.3d at (noting, not recite such benefit. The claims case, context of the claims in that that “a price are to directed determination and performed by method that can be human merely computer improve use a to thought merely alone is an abstract idea performance of that determination —not 101.”). patent-eligible and is not performance computer. of a arguments similarly Versata’s other are argues Versata that its claims are tied to PTAB unavailing. The did not shift SAP’s a machine and that patent eligi- this favors proof burden of onto Versata. The bility. noted, previously As we the ma- §§ inquiries did not conflate the 102 and chine-or-transformation can test be a use- with inquiry and the ful in determining eligibility clue by failing PTAB did not err to consider However, method claims. the claims at any alleged commercial success of Versa- general purpose issue do not transform a improperly ta’s invention. Versata con- computer into a specific machine. The improvements technologies flates with steps (e.g., arranging, in Versata’s claims commercial success. Commercial success storing, retrieving, sorting, eliminating, de- necessarily is not for an proxy improve- conventional, routine, termining) are technology ment in a nor it does necessari- normal, They well-known. involve the ba- ly pat- indicate that claims were drawn sic computer. functions of a “In order for eligible subject ent matter. impose the addition of a machine to Finally, both Versata and SAP cite Ul meaningful claim, limit on scope of a it play significant support respective po must tramercial their part permitting performed, the claimed argues method to be rath- sitions. its claims unpatentable “entrepreneurial to an 26-29 of the '350 were are not directed “technological” § 101. are instead as abstract ideas under 35 U.S.C. objective” and use fewer tables they because arguments raised Additional were thereby, software prior-art searches than preclu- and claim parties regarding waiver *28 “ words, ‘offering] dramatic in Versata’s sion, long in potential arising issues the [computer] perform- in improvements have exam- litigation. course of their We ” Appellant’s Supplemen- Citation of ance.’ issues, nothing in them ined these and find omitted). (citation Authority at 2 The tal that should reach differ- persuade us we from language Versata cites is Versata expressed conclusions than those here- ent 1259; however, Software, 717 F.3d at in. knows, “computer” is the word original quotation, and we did not in the Summary opinion. in that address section 101 not case, in the regard With to the issues we noted, already the claims at As we have conclude: in improvement issue do not recite (cid:127) in a case to this court On computer technology. aof final written decision the weighing arguments After the and evi PTAB, general principle as a we parties, dence submitted and follow the during review issues the decided ing hearing, an oral the PTAB issued its PTAB process, regardless review In patentability. final written decision on in they process, when first arose if decision, correctly applied its the PTAB they part predicate are of or a in Supreme Court’s test Alice and . ultimate merits. Mayo. no persuasive Versata identifies ba (cid:127) in pat- The invention claimed the '350 disturbing sis for the PTAB’s determina pat- ent is a covered business method tion, amply supported by which was understood, that term and it ent as is analysis record before it. The section 101 meaning not fall within the of a does applied by legally was not erro “technological invention.” Mayo neous under and Alice. And its (cid:127) The PTAB’s claim constructions are underlying findings credibility fact de affirmed. supported by terminations are substantial (cid:127) requirements 101 of the Pat- evidence in the record. See Microsoft apply ent Act in a review. - conn, Inc., Corp. 14-1542, v. Proxy Nos. (cid:127) The '350 claims at issue were 1292, 1297, 2015 WL held invalid under properly (Fed.Cir. 2015) *2 June (noting matter, general as a we review Conclusion findings PTAB’s of fact for substantial herein, record). For the reasons set forth supporting evidence of the PTAB in its final decision written recognize any given We anal decision is affirmed. ysis in a 101 “abstract idea” case is AFFIRMED hardly a guidepost clear for future cases arising 101—each case stands on HUGHES, Judge, concurring-in- Circuit own, requires analysis by separate dissenting-in-part. part, the judges who must make the decision. account, Taking agree majority I with the that the Pat- that into and for rea Appeal properly sons we affirm ent Trial and Board held explained, have we decision of the PTAB that claims 17 and that the '350 claims at issue were that, § 101. I agree can, did, invalid under also about whether Congress pre- case, we need reach whether the clude review of whether the right- Board apply Board is authorized to' its “broadest fully undertook that the first rule in a interpretation” post- reasonable place. authority Our type review that Thus, I grant agree review. that we decision, whether framed terms should affirm the Board’s decision on the Board’s authority institution or its ulti- merits. mately invalidate, authority to separate conclusion, however, reaching and distinct from our to review majority impermissibly expands this the invalidation itself. jurisdiction scope court’s and our of review “To determine particular whether a stat second-guess the Board’s initial deter- precludes judicial review, ute we look to its mination that at issue is a “cov- *29 express language, the structure of the stat ered patent.” business method Our re- scheme, utory legislative history its and question view of that by plain is barred purpose, and the nature of the administra structure, language, purpose of the tive action Pregis involved.” Corp. Kap v. post-grant provisions; by review our (Fed.Cir.2012) pos, 1348, 700 F.3d 1357-58 precedent interpreting recent an identical (citing Inst., Cmty. Block v. Nutrition 467 statutory bar on partes review the inter 340, 345, 2450, U.S. 104 S.Ct. 81 L.Ed.2d provisions. review I agree cannot with the (1984)). 270 majority’s statutory evasion of the bar its reframing mere of the issue for review presumption judicial of review not a question of the Board’s “ultimate au- ed by majority is not insurmountable. thority invalidate,” rather than the can, course, “Congress of make exceptions n Board’s authority to institute. That ap- practice historic whereby courts re proach defeats Congress’s clearly ex- agency view action.” Bowen v. Mich. pressed majority intent. And the offers 667, Acad. Family Physicians, 476 U.S. compelling why no reason approach is 672-73, 2133, 106 S.Ct. 90 L.Ed.2d 623 desirable, appetite other than its for arro- (1986); (“This see also 5 U.S.C. 701 gating to statutory the court the Board’s chapter applies ... except to the extent finally decide which ... preclude judicial statutes re are “covered business method patent[s]” view-”). To presumption overcome the suitable for review. Because the statute we must find “clear and convinc- precludes review of the Board’s institution ing evidence” of legislative pre- intent to decision that Versata’s is a “covered Gardner, clude review. Abbott Labs. v. patent,” business method I respectfully 136, 141, 1507, 387 U.S. 87 S.Ct. 18 dissent-in-part. (1967). L.Ed.2d example, 681 For the pre- sumption may be by “specific overcome

I language or specific legislative history that outset, At the it is important to note that is a congressional reliable indicator of in- this is Congress case about whether tent, or specific congressional intent to precluded “judicial has govern- review of preclude judicial fairly review that is dis- ment actions that legal rights alter the legislative cernible the detail of the person.” Maj. Op. affected at 1319. To Bowen, 673, scheme.” 476 at U.S. 106 contrary, the statute clearly provides (internal quotation S.Ct. 2133 omit- marks for invalidity review of the Board’s deci- see, ted); e.g., sion, Lindahl v. Pers. government which is the action that Office of 13, legal right Mgmt., alters the 470 n. holder. U.S. 779-80 105 Rather, (1985) See 35 U.S.C. this ease is S.Ct. (recog- 84 L.Ed.2d 674 8128(b) nizing precludes that 5 U.S.C. all determination the Director whether to Secretary review of the of Labor’s com post-grant institute a review under this pensation decision under the Federal Em section shall be final nonappealable.” Act); ployee Compensation Collins v. 324(e). 35 U.S.C. Nothing this lan States, (Fed. United 67 F.3d 287-88 guage suggests the bar limited to inter Cir.1995) (finding plain language locutory appeals. no temporal There is Act, Military Claims which states limitation. Nor exception is there an that “the settlement of a claim under [the appeals from a final written decision. conclusive,” provides is final and Act] clear contexts, other Congress when desired to convincing legislative evidence of in prohibit only interlocutory appeals, in it review). Further, preclude judicial tent to express language cluded to that effect. reviewability is not an all or nothing ques See, 1160(e) (“There e.g., 8 U.S.C. shall tion: Congress allow review of some judicial be no ... of a determina underlying decision, issues prohibit but tion respecting an application of special See, Lindahl, review of e.g., others. 779-80, status under this except U.S. 105 S.Ct. section ... (holding 8347(c) U.S.C. bars agency’s judicial review of review of an order of exclusion of determinations, factual questions but not ”); 1818(i)(1) deportation.... 12 U.S.C. procedure); Shinseki, of law and Harris v. (barring review of the Federal Reserve’s (Fed.Cir.2013) *30 (noting to proceed decision with an administrative § that precludes 38 U.S.C. review of enforcement action “except as otherwise the Veterans Court’s factual determina provided section,” in this including on re applications fact, tions or of law to but order). view a final of cease-and-desist questions law). allows of review The plain language provisions of related Whether the presumption of review is §§ supports 329 and 328 interpreta- overcome in this depends case on two is- tion. provisions sues. The first is Those whether a party the bar on authorize judicial review the Board’s institution to appeal the Board’s final written decision 324(e) § decisions in 35 U.S.C. is limited to court, to this only but refer to issues ad- interlocutory appeals, as argues, dressed exclusively during the merits or whether applies it also to from appeals phase of a post-grant review. Section 329 the Board’s final written decision on the states, “A party dissatisfied with the final merits. answer to question The written decision of the [Board] under sec- inquiry. should end the But majority the 328(a) may tion appeal the decision [to the has decided that some statutory require- (em- § Federal Circuit].” U.S.C. ments for instituting review can be re- added). phasis Section 328 defines the framed, which raises a second issue: “final written decision” “a final as written whether an institution decision that falls decision respect with to patentability the 324(e) § within the scope of is nonetheless ” any claim challenged.... Id. renewable a “predicate question” re- 328(a) added). § (emphasis This language garding the Board’s ultimate authority to Congress’s reinforces desire for this court validity. determine to review the substantive patenta- issues of A bility addressed the Board a final decision, written various the issues plain 324(e) language §of unambig- during uously decided judicial decision to bars institute— any review—at time— 324(e) decision which Board’s deems post- institute “final and nonap- grant 324(e) review. states, Section “The pealable.” decision, post-grant thereby vacating of the review tution its final The structure validity, further clarifies the duration of the written decision on all of this process time 324(e). Post-grant expense parties §in reviews are will be wasted. The bar First, phases. into two distinct will have to return to district court divided litigate validity Board determines whether to institute same issues review, on the information the Board decided—even if agrees based this court any response by validity for review and with the Board’s ultimate petition determi- Second, Congress See id. nation. owner. could not have intended review, the Board con- this result. To grants creating if the Board avoid a more cost- chal- petitioner’s ly process, siders the merits of the and less efficient must inter- we 324(e) lenge pret according and issues a final written decision on to its lan- plain validity challenged guage of the claims. Un- to bar review of the decision to structure, require- this divided institute even after a final der written decision instituting ments for review are not revis- on the merits. during phase ited the merits of review. sum, structure, In plain language, 324(e) Section confirms that the decision to purpose post-grant pro- 324(e). institute is “final.” Id. provide visions clear convincing evi- 324(e) breath, § same states the deci- Congress dence that did not intend to limit “nonappealable.” sion is Id. To be consis- 324(e) interlocutory appeals. Con-

tent with the clear division between the 324(e) gress intended to bar review of phases- Congress imprinted two into the the Board’s institution decisions statute, “nonappealable” interpret- is best time, even on from final appeal written appellate ed to maintain this division at the One such decision is whether the decision. level the various institution insulating challenged a “covered business decisions from even from method Act patent.” America Invents separate phase. and distinct merits (AIA), 112-29, 18(a)(1)(E), Pub.L. No. *31 interpretation supported by (2011) (“The This is also 125 Stat. Director purpose post-grant the reviews. Con- may a proceeding institute transitional gress post-grant pro- intended reviews to only patent for a that is a covered business “quick vide a and cost effective alterna- patent.”). method The Board makes this 112-98, litigation.” H.R.Rep. to No. ] tive[ determination. as of its decision to part (2011), pt. at 47-48 2011 U.S.C.C.A.N. institute, and not revisit does issue 324(e) interpret § If 324(e) 77-78. we to Thus, during § the merits phase. second-guess allow this court to precludes review of the Board’s covered- Board’s institution decisions on ap- business-method determination this decision, however, from a final written we peal. “unnecessary create the kind of

will B counterproductive litigation costs” that 324(e) Congress proceedings majority agrees intended these to The bars (2011). By avoid. Id. at 40 the time the review of the Board’s decision to institute final Maj. Board’s final written decision reaches even after a written decision. (“[T]he court, in- parties Op. expressly and the Board will have at 1315 statute may not the deci- [review devoted considerable resources to resolv- structs that we institute].”). ing validity question. majority issues in And to But the re- sion stayed Congress’s will inquiry district courts often have relat- fuses to end the with proceedings, anticipation simpli- keep ed of a intent. To the final plainly expressed say meaning fication of the issues for trial. If this court over the of “covered business authority majority has patent,” reverse Board’s insti- method reframes as a “limit on invalida- [the Board’s]

issue Board’s authority to invalidate because it 18,” under which authority tion falls out- “defines the authority PTAB’s to invalidate 324(e). Maj. scope Op. side the Maj. Op. 18.” at 1320. But no- agree approach. I cannot with this where does the statute describe the CBM requirement a limit as on the au- Board’s The statute describes “covered busi- thority to invalidate. Timken U.S. (CBM patent” requirement Cf. ness method States, Corp. v. United limit requirement) as a on the Board’s (Fed.Cir.2005) (“Not every agency viola- authority institute review. Section 18 tion of a statutory command results in the Director states that institute “[t]he sanction of invalidating agency action only proceeding patent transitional for a statute.”). pursuant taken to the To the business patent.” that is a covered method accurate, extent that statement is it only- 18(a)(1)(E). §AIA The statute then ex- because the provides statute pressly bars our review of the institution “may Board institute a pro- transitional decision: “The determination the Di- ceeding only for a that is a covered post-grant rector whether to institute a business patent.” method AIA review under this section shall be final and 18(a)(1)(E). 324(e). And limit on the nonappealable.” 35 U.S.C. Board’s Thus, authority to plain language under the institute review is in- stat- ute, directly a limit on authority authority the Board has unreviewable to invali- date a patent: decide whether is a “covered If the Board cannot insti- patent.” business method tute review in place, the first it cannot issue final written decision. majority proposes that if we call the requirement CBM something else—not however, This indirect relationship, can- only a authority limit on the Board’s to not be enough to find Congress in- review, institute says, statute but tended this court to review an institution also a limit on the Board’s ultimate author- requirement aas limit on the Board’s ulti- ity to invalidate the can we authority mate to invalidate. Taken to its —then review the issue. But our task is to apply logical conclusion, this approach would statute, the language of the not to rewrite 324(e) eviscerate in the context of an it. language And the of the statute ex- appeal from a final written decision. All pressly requirement ties CBM aspects of the Board’s decision to institute institute, Board’s unreviewable decision to game would be fair because all the Board’s ultimate to inval- statutory limits on the institution decision By using language idate. different *32 than are also indirect limits on the Board’s final that Congress employed, majori- which authority result, to invalidate. As a ty expands scope of our review to 324(e) § only would bar review of the include the same substantive issue— Board’s decision to in institute an interloc- whether a is a “covered business utory appeal, before the final decision has patent” method Congress barred —that 324(e) majority § issued. The agrees that 324(e). § from review in Thus, is not so limited. the majority can- majority justify The fails to not identify statutory treating requirement a the CBM basis for proposed reframing as a limit on the authority of the Board’s ultimate declares, issue. summarily It any solely without to invalidate require- because that citation, supporting that the CBM ment require- authority limits the Board’s to insti- ment should be treated as a limit on the tute.1 Indeed, Congress likely intended the patent” term "covered business method not as a

1341 post-grant of a “covered business review under this section shall requirement The final non-appealable.” be patent” is a limit on the Board’s U.S.C. method 324(e). plain decision. That is how the institution frames the

language of the statute CBM Cuozzo, in holding To avoid the the ma- a limit the Board’s requirement, not as jority rely reframing continues to on its of ma- authority ultimate to invalidate. The requirement the CBM a limit on the issue, jority’s reframing per- of the while authority Board’s to But invalidate. even exercise, interesting academic is haps if refraining that were appropriate, congressional with in- plainly inconsistent in holding Cuozzo still could not be distin- convincing evi-

tent. There is clear guished. in provision The relevant Cuozzo 324(e) Congress dence that intended may only states that the Board institute bar review of the Board’s institution deci- partes an inter review if “the information no evi- sions at all times. And there is presented in ... petition re- Congress dence that intended to exclude sponse ... that a shows there is reason- the institution decision provision from this likelihood that petition pre- able would of whether the is “covered busi- Cuozzo, vail.” (quoting F.3d I patent.” Accordingly, ness method con- 314(a)). 35 U.S.C. The appellant argued 324(e) precludes our review of clude that that the Board violated this provision by a “covered whether Versata’s instituting prior review on the art basis patent.” method business “presented If petition.” Id. correct,

appellant was then the Board ex- II statutory authority ceeded its to conduct partes an inter review and issue a final 324(e) majority’s interpretation The decision, written because it violated stat- permit pat review of whether Versata’s utory limit on instituting review patent” ent is a “covered business method Thus, place. just first Cuozzo addressed directly precedential our de conflicts with predicate question authority as much a Speed Technologies, cision in In re Cuozzo presented to invalidate as we are with LLC, 14-1301, No. 793 F.3d 1299- here. (Fed.Cir. July WL 2015). case, In that we addressed the majority makes too much of a note scope statutory judicial bar on re that the alleged Cuozzo defect 314(d), provides view in which proper case could have been cured with determination the Director Maj. “[t]he pleading. Op. See at 1322. For the partes whether to institute an inter review purpose determining whether Cuozzo final nonap- under this section shall be a limit on the involved Board’s 314(d). invalidate, pealable.” 35 U.S.C. We held it is irrelevant whether the provision alleged review of all defect could have “bar[s] been cured. decisions, pleading institution even after the Board The fact remains that was Cuozzo, actually issues final decision.” defective and therefore the Board at 1273. That holding statutory authority controls our inter exceeded its to insti- *33 Thus, of pretation analogous majority’s bar on review tute review. under the 324(e), states, preferred framing, which “The determination the Board violated an the Director whether limit institute indirect on its ultimate patents,’’ limitation on the Board’s invalidation authori- which were of central concern in (2011) ty, focusing passing Cong. but aas means of the Board’s the AIA. 157 Rec. 9952 (remarks Grimm). “low-quality Rep. business[-]method resources on of invalidate, least to the same extent quirement, at that even if we label that require- allegedly did so here. the Board ment a limit on the Board’s ultimate au- thority to invalidate. potential importantly, More for a not limit proper pleading holding did III 314(d) plain language Cuozzo that the bars review of the Board’s institution judicial deci- The bar on review of institution 324(e) only sions. It noted this fact to establish decisions does not mean that ground an declining alternative to re- owners are without recourse in the institute, view the Board’s decision to spe- extreme case. Even when a statute clear cifically by aligning ly case with In re Congress demonstrates intended to bar Co., (Fed.Cir.1998). judicial Hiniker 150 F.3d 1362 of agency generally, review action Hiniker, appellant alleged In that the courts recognized “implicit have statutory PTO violated a limit on its au- exception narrow” for agency action that thority parte to institute ex plainly reexamination. violates an unambiguous statutory Id. at 1367. This court found that Reich, the mandate. Hanauer v. 82 F.3d (4th alleged 1304, 1307 PTO corrected the error during Cir.1996); see, e.g., Leedom review, phase the merits Kyne, 184, therefore v. 180, 358 U.S. 79 S.Ct. “[a]ny in [the error (1958); institution] decision Key L.Ed.2d 210 Med. Supply, was clean during Burwell, (8th washed 955, reexamina- Inc. v. 962-65 F.3d proceeding.” tion at Cir.2014); Id. 1367. According- Soc’y Am. Cataract Re & ly, though statutory provision no expressly Surgery Thompson, v. 279 F.3d fractive (7th barred the Court Cir.2002); declined to re- Airlines, Am. Inc. Herman, view (5th the PTO’s institution decision. Id. v. 176 F.3d 293-94 Cir. majority The Cuozzo suggested 1999); Labor, Sec’y Staacke v. U.S. same there, (9th was true on the facts where “a Cir.1988); F.2d 281-82 Dart v. proper petition States, could have been drafted.” United 221-27 Cuozzo, (D.C.Cir.1988). 793 F.3d at 1274. But compar- this case, however, ison with Hiniker merely “confirm[ed] the Board’s finding Versata’s con correctness” that the Court could not re- stitutes “covered business pat method view the Board’s institution decision in ent” does not unambiguous violate an man that case. Id. 1273. It did not limit its date. The reasonably Board interpreted 314(d) prior interpretation of to bar re- an unclear statutory term properly view of all institution Thus, decisions. al- applied its interpretation to pat Versata’s though the Board’s Hanauer, error assessing (“Be ent. See 82 F.3d at 1311 CBM requirement may not.be “washed cause [agency’s] interpretation of the clean” in the merits decision—and there- statute plausible, it does not violate a fore have been mandate.”). renewable absent statutory clear Accordingly, express 324(e) bar on review in statutory the clear exception mandate does —that does not distinguish this case from the not apply. do not jurisdiction We have unqualified holding in Cuozzo that the ex- review the Board’s determination under 35 314(d) press 324(e). bar in “bar[s] review of all U.S.C. decisions,

institution even after the Board issues a final decision.” Id. at 1273. IV Cuozzo,

In light of we are bound to day, At the end of majority does 324(e) interpret § to preclude review of a lot waving of hand presump- about the the Board’s assessment judicial CBM re- tion of an agency’s *34 Co., Morgan action. But nowhere tures II LLC v. JP authority to take Chase & that it majority actually suggest (Fed.Cir.2015) does the Congress to inappropriate would be (Hughes, dissenting). J. If this court the CBM decision from our review. remove invalidity vacate the Board’s decision on it, have approved Nor could since courts decision, the basis a threshold the time judicial limitations on our far more drastic spent by and resources the parties and the I. supra review. See Part Board in the proceedings administrative reasonably if make But even we could squandered, will parties have been and the majority pro- the technical distinction likely needlessly will be forced to expend preserve a narrow poses and therefore re-litigating even more resources the valid bar, reading statutory I cannot fath- ity issue in district court. And that is true why Surely to do so. om we would want even if invalidity the Board’s ultimate deci prevent concern is not to the Board sion was correct. instituting from review of a so far meaning outside the of “covered business 324(e) Congress apply intended it patent” any method that exceeds reason- all times to avoid consequences. these of that term. As dis- interpretation able why issue, That is when addressing the III, supra, long cussed in Part courts have Congress plainly said that the Board’s de- statutory an recognized exception bars termination was “final” “nonap- agency plainly on review when an violates pealable.” nothing And in the sug- statute unambiguous statutory mandate. And 324(e) gests applies with less force to event, remotely not even requirement the CBM than in- any other here, all three judges agree case where stitution requirements for 18 reviews. properly the Board exercised its dis- not, therefore, employ We should an un- cretion to institute review of this CBM warranted technical distinction to find au- patent. thority to review the Board’s initial assess- Rather, point majority’s I fear the ment that a is a “covered business final, position is to wrest from the PTO the patent.” method authority patents to decide which are “cov- patent[s]” method appropri- ered business jurisdiction Because we do not have ate for 18 review. But that is not how review the Board’s determination that Ver- AIA Congress designed the to work. Con- sata’s is a “covered business meth- gress gave authority this court the to re- 18(d), patent,” respectfully od AIA I dis- validity view the merits of the Board’s sent-in-part. determinations and to ensure those deci- prevailing sions are correct under law. gave it

And PTO to decide

which merit review in the first from

place, and insulated decision our

review. majority’s desire to revisit the CBM

requirement statutory detracts from this

scheme and the intended benefits of Congress recognized,

reviews. As 18 was “provide

intended to ad cheaper, faster reviewing

ministrative alternative for busi patents.”

ness method Intellectual Ven notes agency to substantial USPTO entitles monetary mat “relating “financial” as deference in how it defines its mission. dictionary comports ters” with defini recognized del Congress broad tion, citing Dictionary The Random House egation rulemaking authority the es (2d ed.1987) English Language of this implementation tablishment and USPTO, (defining, according to the “finan post-grant proceeding. transitional “pertaining relating money cial” as or 18(a)(1). helpful It matters”). said; might See have been interpretation, it is This agency if the had used that readily which embraces '350 understanding of the defi elaborate on its expressly a “method for determin claims provided nition in the statute. Neverthe ing price product” of a in claim 17. '350 less, explained, for the reasons we have we According col. l. patent, in- USPTO, and the in the of the statute conclude that the '350 nothing text

Case Details

Case Name: Versata Development Group, Inc. v. SAP America, Inc.
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
Date Published: Jul 9, 2015
Citation: 793 F.3d 1306
Docket Number: 2014-1194
Court Abbreviation: Fed. Cir.
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