85 Vt. 20 | Vt. | 1911
The bill is for specific performance of a contract for the sale to the orator of a certain piece of quarry land and an undivided one-tenth of another piece of quarry land adjoining, both located in the town of West Rutland, this State. Before and at the time of making the contract in question the
Our Statute of Frauds provides that no action at law or in equity shall be brought upon a contract for the sale of real estate or an interest therein, unless the contract or agreement upon which such action is brought, or some memorandum or note thereof, is in writing and signed by the party to be charged therewith, or by some person thereunto by him lawfully authorized in writing. P. S. 1576.
The master finds that Carlos, John, and Charity were all desirous of selling their common interests in both these pieces of land, and to that end, John and Charity entered into negotiations with the orator; that after some preliminaries and on June 1, 1905, the contract in question was concluded to sell to the orator the entire interests of the three co-tenants in said premises, for the sum of sixty-three hundred dollars, two hundred dollars of which was then paid in cash, and the balance of sixty-one hundred dollars was to be paid after the orator had examined the title and when the deed was passed; that previous to June 1, considerable correspondence passed between John and his sister on the one part and Carlos on the other, with reference to the sale of these lands, but that all the authority which John had for signing this contract for his brother, was given in letters fropi the latter of- May 25, and of May 29, 1905.
It appears that sometime before the 25th of May, 1905, John and Charity were offered six thousand dollars for the property by the orator, and that Charity wrote Carlos a letter concerning it, in reply to which Carlos sent them the letter of May 25, saying:
“I should say accept at once. We might do better if we worked the Columbian and Vermont Marble Co. against each other, asking each to give best bid at once. But we might lose. Father used to say it is a good time to sell when we get a good price. I know there is over $6000.00 worth of marble in that one-tenth, but we cannot get it out. So it is my judgment to sell it. ” On receipt of this letter John wrote Carlos as follows: “Your reply to Chick’s (Charity’s) letter just received. But you do not make it plain in your letter what we want to know. The Vermont Marble Company has offered us $6000.00 for the onc-tenth interest in theFant Marble property and the Manley quarry inclusive, and l am working hard to get the bid raised by Eastman who is opening the quarry you were interested in. We have not had a chance to realize anything on it before, and now have a spot cash offer, ánd I feel that now is the time to sell because the marble business is on a boom and as it’s higher and it’s time to sell when we have a chance. * * * * And I think Chick would like to sell as well as myself, and I want your permission to sell to the highest bidder for spot cash, by return mail, a,nd I will get all I can.”
As a part, of the same letter Charity wrote: “We thought by your letter that you did not understand that the ‘blue quarrry’ or ‘Manley quarry’ was included with the one-tenth in the $6000.00 offer from the Vermont Marble Co. Now George Eastman has offered $100.00 more than the Vermont Marble 'Co. Johnny thinks perhaps he can' bring it up to $10,000 as there is a little competition. Shall we let it go to the highest bidder? I think George Eastman is anxious to get it because he isjafraid-the Vt. Co. will work it’ with their other property .each side of it and hurt him.”
*26 In reply Carlos wrote the letter of May 29, to John, which reads: “1905-5-29.
“Brother John: — Just got home and found that your letter got to the house an hour too late to catch me. I understood perfectly that the one-tenth interest in the Fant and the ten rods north of it, were included in the .deal. You have my idea, exactly in working two or .more firms in bidding against each other, so as to get the highest price possible.
“Also you have my sanction to sell as soon as you are satisfied you have the top notch in price, for $6000.00 or as much higher as you can work them up.
“Would it not be a good plan to see if you can get the Columbian Marble Co. started in to bid as well as the other two? I think if you can get it up to $10,000.00 you will do well. Keep cool and tell them to put in their best bid first as that is the one that will get it. If you do not sell it for spot cash, sell it for at least $6000.00 down and mortgage notes secured on the marble property for the balance. Keep cool and you may run it higher than the $10,000.00. But as soon as you are satisfied you have the top, close the deal.
“Your brother,
C. E. MEAD,
87 Artesian Ave., Chicago, Ill.”
It is very apparent that these brothers and the sister were working in harmony for the benefit of their united interests. They were all anxious to sell and, as appears from these letters, thought the conditions of the marble business were sufficiently favc rabie to make the time most opportune for realizing a good price for the property. ' It appears in like manner that tl ey all thought it best to accept the offer of $6000, unless a better one should be made. In his letter of May 25, where only that sum was particularly'spoken of, Carlos wrote : “I should say accept at once.”
Again in his letter of May 29, he says, “you have my sanction to sell as soon as you are satisfied you have the top notch price, for $6000,00 or as much higher as you can work them up. * * But as soon as you are satisfied you have the top close the deal.” In neither of these letters does Carlos convey the idea that any offer made must be submitted to him before acceptance. To
The defendant relies upon the rule, seemingly pretty generally laid, down, that the mere employment of an ordinary real estate- broker to effect a sale of land, even though the price and terms be prescribed, does not amount to giving present authority to such broker to conclude a binding contract for the same; and that the words “for sale” or “to sell” and the like, usually mean no more than to negotiate a sale by finding a purchaser upon satisfactory terms. Yet the facts of record show the agent not to have been a mere broker. Consequently even though the above rule be sound (a question not considered), it is not applicable here, where the principal and the agent, brothers, together with their sister, were equally interested as co-tenants in the property to be sold, the principal residing in a distant
It is said that John was a spesial agent having special and limited authority, and that the orator must be taken as having had full knowledge of the extent of his power when the contract in question was made; that this being so the orator knew the agent was authorized to sell the property only to the highest bidder, which he did not do; and consequently the orator in procuring the contract of sale was aware of such misconduct by the agent in the matter of his agency as precludes it from obtaining a contract that should be binding upon the principal.
It cannot be doubted that the law requires the utmost good faith from agents (Noyes v. Langdon, 59 Vt. 569, 10 Atl. 342, 343); nor that an agent invested with special and limited powers •cannot bind his principal in any act not warranted by the express •authority delegated to him and what was necessarily incident thereto, that he may perform the act to which his agency applied (Riley v. Wheeler, 44 Vt. 189); nor that a party dealing with such agent is chargeable with knowledge of the limitations of his authority. Ferguson v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 84 Vt., 350, 78 Atl. 997. The question then is, Was the agent guilty of misconduct in the performance of the duties of his agency?
The record shows that through the spring of 1905 defendant .Eastman also had negotiations with John and his sister Charity for the purchase of the common property owned by them and Carlos, and knew John and his sister were in correspondence with Carlos about the same, and had received written eommuni«eation from him that he was willing to sell the lands for the best
The very early case of Cevil v. Rich, 1 Ch. Cas. 309, is much
In Peay v. Siegler, 48 S. C. 496, 59 Am. St. Rep. 731, the letters conferring authority on the agent to sell certain land, upon certain terms therein specified, as a restriction used these words: “Of course I want a reliable purchaser, one whom you think would make his payment promptly.” The agent made a contract for the sale of the land accordingly, but the principal rejected the contract because he did not think the purchaser reliable. The court said the principal in making this requirement defined what he meant by a reliable purchaser, as one whom the agent thought would make hispaymentspromptly; that the agent so regarded the purchaser, and the contract was binding. In Adams v. Capron & Co., 21 Md. 186, 83 Am. Dec. 566, defendant Adams, a beef packer, consigned a lot of beef to Huth & Co. in London. The plaintiffs, Capron & Co., were correspondents of the London firm, and the nature of their relations was such that shipments by the consignor to the consignee were made under the guaranty of Capron & Co. The latter made an advancement to the consignor on account of this consignment of beef to London and took his receipt upon which the action was brought, acknowledging receipt of the •money on beef so shipped for sale for his account, and promising ■to refund any deficiency that might arise therefrom. Before the beef arrived in London the consignor wrote to the consignees stating he had sent the beef, etc., continuing, “I trust to your good management in its disposition; do with it just as if it were your own.” It appeared'that the market was very dull and sales difficult; that the consignees used every endeavor
It is argued that the contract in question was obtained by the exercise of what amounted to duress upon the agent by the orator, in that when he signed the contract, he was acting under a fear that he would lose the deal if the contract be not concluded at once, by reason whereof he was not in the exercise of his free judgment, and that therefore specific performance should not be ordered. In making its offer the orator had a right to limit the time (Carr v. Duval, 14 Pet. 77, 10 L. ed. 361), and the place (Eliason v. Henshaw, 4 Wheat. 225, 4 L. ed. 556) of acceptance, and to make a binding contract the offer had to be accepted according to the terms specified. Ellis’s Admr. v. Durkee, 79 Vt. 341, 65 Aid. 94. The question of acceptance was one entirely with the vendors, acting personally,, or through a representative; and the record shows no ground for saying that they were devested of independent action or the free exercise of judgment; nor that the contract was not fair, equal, and just in its terms.
It is further argued that the orator has in effect accepted a return of the earnest money paid at the time of signing the contract, in applying the same to the price of the undivided interests conveyed by John and Mrs. Burr, and that this may at least be said to amount to a waiver of its advantages under
The trust impressed upon the legal estate held by the vendor followed it in the hands of his grantee Eastman, unless he was. a bona fide purchaser for value, without notice of the orator’s equitable title. It is found that about the time the contract, with the orator had been signed, and before the orator’s agent had left the room where the signing was done, Eastman came into the house and into that room and learned in a general way from those present what had occurred and that in terms the whole property was contracted to the orator; that Eastman did not before nor then learn just what authority John had to sign his brother’s name, but he knew that John claimed the right to sign a contract for his brother in the sale of the premises. Yet neither then nor at any time thereafter were inquiries made by Eastman respecting the nature or extent of-the authority John had or claimed to have to act as agent in the transac
The decree below, however, being in accordance with the amended prayer, goes further than this. It also declares the deed of conveyance under which Eastman took the legal title to be of no force and effect as against the orator. This renders the decree inconsistent with itself, for if Eastman took nothing by the deed, how can any conveyance by him give the orator the legal estate, or effect complete performance of the contract? In law a contract for the sale of land is wholly, and in every respect, executory; the vendor remains to all intents the owner of the property, and can convey it free from any legal claim or incumbrance; and the vendee acquires no interest whatever in the land. The. relations between the parties are personal, merely. And if the grantee of the legal estate is a bona fide purchaser for value, without notice of the equitable title under the prior contract, the legal ownership is sufficient in equity to cut off the equitable estate. Pomeroy’s Con. Sec. 314. Furthermore, if the second purchaser takes his conveyance with notice of the trust, the cestui que trust may either follow the trust property in the bands of the purchaser, or he may call upon the trustee to account for the purchase money, thereby affirming the sale. 2 Spence Eq. Jur. 310; Murray v. Ballou, cited above. But the cestui que trust has not an absolute equitable right
It follows that the decree, altered in the respect named, should be affirmed.
Decree affirmed and cause remanded with mandate.