Vermilyea v. . PalmerVermilyea v. . Palmer
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- Before:
- Church
This is an equitable action brought to recover one-third of the personal estate left by Oliver Rhead, husband of the plaintiff‘s intestate, Mary Rhead, which had been received by the defendant‘s testator, Benjamin Rhead, as administrator of Oliver Rhead, and to set aside a release executed by the said Mary Rhead to the defendant as executor.
Two questions were ordered to be tried by a jury: first, whether any undue influence was practiced upon Mary Rhead to obtain the release, and second, whether the said Mary Rhead, at the time of signing the release, had sufficient mental capacity to know or understand the character or effect of the release. The jury answered “no” to both questions, thereby negativing undue influence, and affirming a want of
There are no exceptions raising questions of law in the case. There was evidence tending to show a want of capacity, and the decision of the jury was not so destitute of facts to sustain it as to justify the court in deciding as a matter of law that it is against or without evidence. It is insisted, however, that this court has the power and it is its duty to examine the question of fact and decide it according to the weight of evidence. It is urged, in substance, that the order for trial by a jury of a specific question of fact in an equitable action, being a substitute for a feigned issue under the old chancery practice, and there being no restriction or limitation upon the power of this court in the Constitution, or in any statute, we must adopt the practice existing before the Code in equity cases and review the facts as well as the law. (
A uniform system was intended to be adopted, and the system actually adopted assimilates in its principal characteristics to the practice in the law courts, instead of that in equity courts. The introduction of a proceeding peculiar to the old
The order for trial by jury of a specific question of fact, authorized by section 72, was borrowed from the chancery practice, and in terms is introduced as a substitute for the proceeding by feigned issue. The language of this section confines it by implication to actions of an equitable nature, but section 254 authorizes the same proceeding in all actions not required to be tried by a jury, irrespective of their character. There are but three modes of trial prescribed by the Code, and they embrace every possible civil action, viz., by jury, by the court and by referees. (
The mode of reviewing questions of fact and law was intended to be uniform. It is true that there is no restriction in the Constitution upon the power of this court to review the facts, except as may be implied from its limitation to an appellate jurisdiction, and that implication would not probably extend to equity suits. It was left to the legislature to define the jurisdiction of the court, and the theory and policy
This court has uniformly disclaimed the power to review the facts in a trial by jury in any case. (Wright v. Hunter, 46 N Y, 409.) In a trial by the court or referees, which is substantially the same (id., 267, 272), the General Term is authorized to review the facts upon an appeal from the judgment, and the Code expressly confines such review to that tribunal, except in the instance above specified. (Id., 268, 272.) The intention of the Code to prohibit the review of facts by this court is clearly manifested by these provisions, and is confirmed by the general consideration that the legal and not the equitable practice is substantially adopted. Writs of error are abolished, and appeals substituted. The former brought up questions of law only, the latter perform the same office, except when otherwise provided. This view also produces uniformity, while the other would recognize two systems of practice, not in different classes of cases, but in certain cases dependent upon the adoption of a particular proceeding. This could not fail to produce incongruity and confusion. If it is legitimate to reason upon the question, it is difficult to see why this court should be precluded from reviewing facts where the court tried the action without the aid of a jury, and be required to do so when such aid was rendered. It would imply more safety in the opinion of the judge than in judge and jury. Again, what reason can be urged for making a trial, where this proceeding is resorted to,
The question of the power of this court to review questions of fact in such cases must not be confounded with the question, whether the rules applicable to exceptions upon ordinary trials by jury must be applied in reviewing such trials upon an appeal from the judgment. The effect of the section, 72, is, I think, to determine the force of the finding of the jury in an equitable action. It is difficult to discover any other reason for its introduction, because the same proceeding is authorized by section 254. It is quite clear that the court by which the trial is had is not bound to regard exceptions which ought not to affect the merits, and if so it is equally clear that this court, reviewing the questions of law upon the trial, must adopt the same rule. So if the court should mislead the jury by an erroneous charge upon the law, the error might, if vital or important, be available in this court without an exception. This seems to result from the adoption of this chancery proceeding, and to this extent the reasoning in the case of Forrest v. Forrest (25 N.Y., 501) applies. Such, also, I understand to have been the opinion of a majority of this court in Shumway v. Shumway; but that point is not involved in this case, and it is unnecessary to pass upon it. It is only referred to for the purpose of affirming that it has no bearing upon the question of the power of this court to review the facts.
The judgment must be affirmed.
All concur except ALLEN and RAPALLO, JJ., dissenting.
Judgment affirmed.