Verizon California Inc. v. Peevey

holding that the AT & T in Title VII drives Costa’s Communications of California Inc.; choose between two alternative MCI WorldCom Communica court must tions, Inc.; MCIMetro jury depending instructions the evi Access Trans Services, LLC, mission plaintiff presented.16 There is Defendants- dence Intervenors-Appellees. language in the ADA. The ADA no similar provide does not “same decision” No. 04-15155. provide any Neither does it defense. United States Appeals, Court of damages for the mechanism reduction Ninth Circuit. depending discriminatory on whether ani employer’s mus motivated the action Argued and Submitted Jan. 2005. part. Finally, today or in we hold whole July Filed 2005. plaintiffs only need ever show motivating factor in an discrimination is Accordingly,

ADA case. the rationale for

selecting jury between instructions in a

Title VII case is absent the ADA cont

ext.17 reasons, join I

For these cannot Note majority’s opin- and Part III.B.2 of the decision, only

ion. our a “motivat- Under jury factor”

ing appropriate instruction

in an ADA case. INC., CALIFORNIA

VERIZON

Plaintiff-Appellant, PEEVEY;

Michael R. Loretta M.

Lynch; Wood; Geoffrey F. Carl W.

Brown; Kennedy, P. in their Susan capacities

official as Commissioners

of the Public Utilities Commission of California,

the State not as

individuals, Defendants-Appellees, tion, regardless actually pre- Id. of the evidence 16. sented, it is a waste of scarce re- Furthermore, light 17. of the that a fact require courts to make this sources to district plaintiff discriminatory need show that unnecessary ADA determination in an case. partially challenged ac- animus motivated the 1070 NOONAN, BEA,

Before: Circuit JONES, Judge.* Judges, and District NOONAN, Judge: Circuit must decide an incumbent We whether exchange challenge local to nomi- carrier’s nally “interim” rates for access to its net- by competitive exchange local carri- work ers, rates are set which state utilities Weissmann, Gross, Burton A. Henry pursuant commission to the Telecommuni- Ring, P. Hunt and Rosemarie T. John Act ripe cations is for LLP, Ange- Munger, Tolies & Olson Los review, subject though even such rates are les, CA, plaintiff-appellant for Verizon Cal- adjustment by to later the state utilities ifornia Inc. (“a true-up”). commission the in- When Wu, Mary F. Randolph L. McKenzie exchange cogni- cumbent local carrier has Francisco, CA, Kimberly Lippi, J. San zable claims which cannot and will not be defendants-appellees R. Pee- Michael compensated by true-up, we hold such Wood, Lynch, vey, Loretta M. Carl W. challenge review. Kennedy P. Geoffrey F. Brown and Susan BACKGROUND capacities

in their official as Commission- ers of the Public Utilities Commission of The Telecommunications Aсt of 1996 the State of California. (“the 104-104, Act”), Pub.L. No. 110 Stat. (codified 56 as amended in scattered sec Randolph M. Barrad and Catherine W. U.S.C.) part tions of 47 aims in to intro Deutsch, Austin, Sidley, Brown & Wood competition among exchange duce local LLP, Francisco, CA, and David San J. Communs., FCC, carriers. Inc. v. Miller, AT & T Communications Califor- 467, 476-77, 122 S.Ct. 152 nia, Inc., Francisco, CA, for San interve- (2002). exchange” A “local L.Ed.2d nor/defendant-appellee AT & T Communi- connecting “a network terminals like tele California, cations of Inc. faxes, phones, and modems to other termi Verrilli, Jr., B. Donald Michael B. De- geographical city.” nals within a area like a Mach, Daniel Sanctis and Jenner & Block at The Act U.S. S.Ct. 1646. LLP, D.C., Washington, Jeffrey A. recognizes types exchange two of local car Rackow, MCI, Inc., D.C., Washington, exchange riers. An “incumbent local car intervenors/defendants-appellees MCI (“ILEC”) is a carrier that owns a rier” Communications, WorldCom Inc. 490, 122 Id. at exchange. local S.Ct. 1646 MCIMetro Access Transmission Services 251(h)). § (citing “competi 47 U.S.C. A LLC. (“CLEC”) exchange tive local carrier” is a mаrket, a local carrier new without See exchange of its own. at 491- regulation, 122 S.Ct. 1646. Absent “[a] in compete newcomer could not with the to provide cumbent carrier local service * Jones, gon, sitting by designation. The Honorable Robert E. Senior United Judge States District for the District of Ore- replicating provides the in Act that the Federal coming without close Communica (“FCC”) local existing [or entire network tions cumbent’s Commission shall act in the 490, 122 exchange]... Id. S.Ct. 1646. place and stead of the state utilities com 252(e)(5). mission. See 4H U.S.C. How Act competition, requires To foster ever, where, here, the state utilities to “ac that ILECs make available CLECs arbitration, commission conducts the such to the “network elements” cess” ILECs’ commission is bound the Act’s provi 47 “on an unbundled basis.” U.S.C. governing sions how the rates must be set 251(c)(3). § A “network element” is “a regulations, and the FCC’s related 47 facility equipment ‍​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​​​‍provision in the or used - 252(c)(1)-(2), § including regula U.S.C. telecommunications service” or those of a that require tions state utilities commis “features, functions, capabilities that sions to use the total element run long facility of such provided means (“TELRIC”) incremental cost methodolo numbers, equipment, including subscriber 51.505; see AT T also & gy. § 47 C.F.R. databases, systems, and informa signaling Bd., v. Iowa 366, 385, Corp. Utils. 525 billing and collection or tion sufficient (1999) 721, 119 142 L.Ed.2d (up S.Ct. 835 transmission, routing, used in the or other holding jurisdiction design the FCC’s to provision of a telecommunications service.” 153(29). pricing methodology to bind state utilities provide § To 47 U.S.C. “access” Communs., Inc., commissions); Verizon to a network element “on an unbundled 497-528, 535 U.S. at 122 or, (up S.Ct. 1646 differently, provide said to ac basis”— holding regulations in partic TELRIC cess to unbundled network elements ular). (“UNEs”)' element, that, It important to to note in lease how —'“is described, setting requirements, to a carrier at a forth these neither requesting ever the Act price specific regulations stated to that element” with nor FCC distin .the requiring out that other elements also be guishes between “interim” rates and “fi Ill., (“bundled”). See Verizon Com nal” rates. AT & T Communs. leased Cf. muns., Inc., Co., Inc. v. Ill. Tel. 122 Bell S.Ct. 411 F.3d (7th Cir.2003) (“[T]he 1646. possibility repair promulgat in the future is no warrant for Act, requesting Pursuant to the CLECs ing today a rate that deviates from the attempt to access to UNEs are first Federal requires TELRIC law standard. negotiate rates for such access with the that rate for unbundled network ele ILEC owns the network. U.S.C. ments, commission, by a adopted state 252(a)(1). 251(c)(1), parties §§ If the suc- comply adopted.”) with TELRIC when rates, cessfully negotiate the relevant state required accept utilities commission is they those unless discriminate In the California Public Utilities party a carrier not a to the con- against (“CPUC”) nomi Commission established tract, or the rates are otherwise shown to nally access interim rates for CLECs contrary public be interest. characterize these Verizon’s UNEs. We (e)(2)(A). 252(e)(1), §§ If par- U.S.C. because, in rates as interim name rates, agree any party cannot ties reasons relevant CPUC did negotiations may request arbitration to setting perma not undertake the task of by be conducted relevant state utilities then, nent rates until 2002. Even it did 252(b)(1). commission. 47 U.S.C. rates, rather permanent not set held expedited proceedings to establish revised Act that a assumes stаte utilities rates, interim which were to remain commission or otherwise fail to refuse arbitration, until rates could es permanent conduct the case the effect which tablished., (2) that interim rate order was not in receiving several interim After from and interested proposals compliance regu- rate with the Act nor with CLECs, the interim rate the CPUC issued meth- implementing lations TELRIC appeal. in this order is at issue (3) the interim rate order odology; PUC LEXIS 168 2003 Cal. WL (4) confiscatory; that the interim rate was 2003). (Cal.Pub.Util. brief, Mar. process; in violation of due order was based on rates interim rates were revised the interim rate order was utilities commission approved by the rights. of Verizon’s civil violation also is the Jersey, where Verizon New sought to have the interim rate order de- ILEC; adjusted in an ef the rates were vacated, to have its clared unlawful higher costs fort to reflect Verizon’s enjoined, enforcement and to have the Jersey. Id. relative to New California returned to the for further matter CPUC 1560216,2003 Cal. PUC LEXIS 2003 WL sought its costs proceedings. Verizon also 168, alleges both that at *109-10. Verizon attorneys’ litigating and fees incurred in methodology used to set the New Jer the suit. sey comply does not with TELRIC rates California, T AT & Communications of both, by the interpreted FCC previously Inc., Communications, ¶¶ 36, MCI WorldCom that CPUC, Compl. and and Inc., “costs, requirements, geography, and MCIMetro Access Transmission network levels, unique suit, and other features demand after Services LLC intervened setting differ [relevant rates] partial a motion for which Verizon filed ” by Compl. significantly state.... Verizon first, summary judgment as to its second ¶¶ However, attempt 42-43. an However, concluding and fourth claims. remedy problems, these admitted and claims that Verizon’s first second were subject to a made the interim rates CPUC review, judicial ripe for the district permanent rates final “true-up” when partial court Verizon’s motion for denied 1560216, 2003 ly adopted. were 2003 WL summary judgment as to those two claims “true-up” at *110. A Cal. PUC LEXIS merits, reaching without their and sua a determination the CPUC which ad sponte dismissed the same two claims. rates, down, justs up the interim either Then, an giving opportunity after Verizon date of the inter as of the earlier effective upon to offer some material basis which to order, adjusted im rate so that the interim claims, distinguish remaining its three equal permanent rates as set district court dismissed those claims also permanent proceeding. later in rate ripeness. appealed lack of for Verizon rate impact The of the interim order juris- complaint. dismissal of its We have immediately entered March 2003 was 252(e)(6) § pursuant diction to 47 U.S.C. the rates that Verizon could reduce and 28 U.S.C. and vacate and re- charge for access to its UNEs CLECs mand with the district instructions charge it had been able to relative to what court consider on the merits whether Veri- under the rate order. After the earlier declaratory in- zon is entitled to the application for re- CPUC denied Verizon’s junctive relief. an action in fed- hearing, brought R. against eral district court Michael Pee- STANDARD OF REVIEW vey and other commissioners the-CPUC review de novo whether claims We capacities, their official which Verizon ripe review. Laub v. Unit alleged five claims: the interim Interior, Dep’t 342 F.3d ed States arbitrary capricious rate order was (9th Cir.2003). evidence; 1080, 1084 supported by and not substantial distinction of US v. West Communications ANALYSIS Intelenet, (9th MFS 193 F.3d 1112 Cir. Act Telecommunications The 1999), I compelling. to be nevertheless methodology for the provides single find US West to be distinguishable on a setting of rates: TELRIC. “Federal law basis, opportunity different and take this rate for unbundled net requires elements, respond to articulate that basis and also to adopted by a state commis work sion, comply many arguments with TELRIC when to the advanced Communs., adopted.” AT & T F.3d at in support intervenors of their is made this law for provision 411. No view Verizon’s claims are not in a any rate to be established different of US independent review even way. CPUC had West. comply. ready The issue was

failed to judicial decision. I. US Communications v. West MFS

This obvious result has been clouded Intelenet, Inc. US West Communs. our decision US West majority distinguishes Intelenet, Inc., (9th MFS legitimacy the basis that “neither the Cir.1999), understandably prec- treated as possible adjustment by interim rates nor US West by edеnt the district court. (a pricing proceedings later so-called true accepted by contention was made and the Verizon,” up) accepted by slip is at op. that rates parties both the were “interim that, contrast, by suggesting U.S. adjusted by pricing be later not Id. at 1118. But neither legitimacy West did contest “the proceedings.” that, possible nor interim I legitimacy the of interim rates rates.” take this mean (a adjustment by pricing proceedings later according majority’s reading, true-up) accepted so-called is Verizon. legitimacy West did not contest true-up As neither interim rates nor a that, interim, being rates virtue of need in- compensating for such costs as credit compliance long not be in with the Act so TELRIC, are covered we surance see as U.S. West was later made whole. import no reason to into this case the I agree. With this do not As we ex- assumptions and admissions were de- there, plained challenge[d] “US West sev- cisive US West. in pricing provisions eral of the as inconsis- presented straightforward has a pricing tent with the standards fixed challenge to the basis on which the CPUC the Act.” Id. at 1117-18. We nevertheless rates; namely set the current the rates set ripe concluded that the claims were not Jersey, inadequate in New with judicial primarily review because U.S. adjustment for costs in Verizon’s Califor- true-up West conceded would cut complied nia. Whether this short with and, thus, might it moot the make whole ripe law and the constitution is federal Id. This does not appeal. 1118-19. adjudication. mean U.S. West did contest the Accordingly, judgment of the district Indeed, legitimacy of such interim rates. court is and the case RE- VACATED is expressly said otherwise: we MANDED. rates, challenges US West the interim BEA, Judge, concurring: Circuit says would be resolved its concerns if and MFS were ordered to com- TCG join majority’s I Although holding pensate U.S. West for differences and its conclusion that claims are Verizon’s review, per- I not find the interim rates and the ripe for do its between possibili there was a an “admin- denied review where referred to as prices, manent ty that would suffer losses true-up.” U.S. West istrative if, ultimately, compensated would not be unnecessary Accordingly, .... we avoid decided not the state utilities commission declining to adjudication by review true-up. But to the extent to order true-up If a is or- prices interim now. moot, taken as dered, allegations must be might become Verizon’s appeal this suffered, true, suffering it has as U.S. has indicated would West uncompensa- such an order. losses with will continue suffer satisfied possibil it not a mere by true-up; ble Id. at 1118-19 . in which we ity procedural phase At the Thus, I find US West distinguishable given allega find ourselves and from the case here not because U.S. West tions, certainty. it must be deemed legitimacy did not contest the did or above, comply interim rates that do not with Finally, possibil- alluded to as methodology, but be- Act TELRIC ity appeal that the would be mooted was true-up cause it conceded that a ground not the sole on which we relied contrast, whereas, by it whole Veri- make holding that the claims raised US West made no similar concession. To zon has Rather, were not review. contrary, fully I more address stated: as we below, affirmаtive- Part II.B.l Verizon has appeal Even if the does not become ly alleged true-up will not make moot, is de- either because respects: whole two different appeal[] [the CLECs] nied because during loss of retail customers suffered true-up, the award of a this court will until period permanent estab- benefit from the Commission’s and the lished, loss is claimed to be due to which legal analysis district court’s of whether rates; unlawfully low interim true-up a is authorized the Act and of nonpayment credit risk of CLECs it from their assessment whether the difference the rates as set between imposed particular in these should be ultimately and as the interim rate order cases. adjusted by true-up, a risk Verizon has Id. at 1119. This rationale is inapplicable Fur- presently been and is forced bear. parties here because none of the are con- agrees ther, these two CPUC nor testing true-up whether a is authorized elements of loss claimed Verizon will imposed here. It is whether should be Thus, true-up. not be considered in the by all: The made the admitted the extent that the district court here was subject true-up, interim rates to a 2003 obliged accept allegations Verizon’s 1560216, 168, 2003 Cal. PUC LEXIS WL true, an uncompensable losses as issue (Cal.Pub.Util. 13, 2003); Mar. at *110 below, which I address in Part II.B.3 con- a true-up. there will be West, trary to what was conceded US any true-up cannot this future here moot short, pos- absent even the remotest appeal. sibility that claimed losses will Verizon’s (assum- compensated through true-up be argument Nor is there merit in the true) ing allegations to be there- of the CPUC and the intervenors that our moot, by rendering appeal this and in the US West applies rationale in here with any suggestion parties absence of greater even force than it did there be challenge propriety of con- intend true-up cause the here is more certain to generally or as ducting either occur than it was in US West. Presumably West, US West does us. even US argument applied we bind is

1075 Massanari, 1155, A. The 266 F.3d Fitness of the Hart v. Issues Judi- See (9th Cir.2001) (“In determining cial Decision 1170 decision, by an earlier whether it is bound 1. The Issues Raised Here Are Pri- ... spirit a сourt considers the ‘reason and marily Legal Require and Do Not particular cases’ also ‘the letter of [and] Development Further Factual precedents.’ This includes not requirements The that the issues ‍​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​​​‍raised announced, giving rule but also the facts primarily legal require and not further ....”) (citation dispute to the omit- rise are, fact, factual development the same. ted). controversy ‘essentially legal “[A] na ture’ ... when no factual amplifi ‘further Ripeness ” II. necessary.’ City cation is Auburn v. (9th Qwest Corp., 260 F.3d Cir. West, I Having distinguished so US 2001) (quoting Western Oil & Gas Associa ripeness would consider whether the doc County, tion v. Sonoma 905 F.2d action. trine nevertheless bars Verizon’s (9th Cir.1990)). Verizon’s claims re ripeness doctrine at issue here was quire analysis only of the administrative first set forth in Abbott Laboratories v. record so that the court can determine Gardner, 136, 153, 87 S.Ct. already the rates imposed-— whether (1967), prudential, and is a 18 L.Ed.2d 681 comply whether interim or with the jurisdictional, rather than doctrine. Na final — Act regulations, including and relevant Davis, Society, tional Audubon Inc. v. methodology. TELRIC See Fоx Televi (9th Cir.2002), F.3d as amended Stations, sion Inc. v. Federal Communica (9th Cir.2002). It by, 312 F.3d 416 re Commission, tions quires considering whether a “[i]n (D.C.Cir.2002) (holding that “whether the [challenging case administrative action] review, a court must evaluate ^[1] Commission’s determination [regarding ‘ownership arbitrary rules’] certain was the fitness of the issues for deci sion and ^[2] hardship parties capricious contrary to law” was Thus, “purely legal” question). the claims withholding court consideration.” US require development no further factual West, (quoting 193 F.3d at 1118 Winter primarily legal. Review, Inc., Medical 900 F.2d California Cir.1990) (9th 1322, (quoting Abbott Challenged 2. The Action Is Final Laboratories, 149, at 1507)) (internal omitted). challenged a action is suffi- quotation marks Whether ciently judicial depends “A claim fit for if the “final” for review decision issues of action which primarily legal, require raised are do not on whether it is sort jurisdiction development, further factual chal federal have to review. courts Act, any case in lenged (quoting action is final.” Id. Stan Under the which “[i]n Schaible, Alaska Production Co. v. State commission makes a determination dard (9th Cir.1989)) (internal 624, 252], any party ag- § 874 F.2d under U.S.C. [47 оmitted). grieved by may bring “To such determination quotation marks meet litigant appropriate an action in an Federal dis- hardship requirement, must show in trict court to determine whether withholding review would result statement meets the re- hardship agreement direct and immediate and would § possible quirements [47 251] [47 entail more than financial loss.” U.S.C. 252(e)(6) (em- 1325) Winter, § § 47 U.S.C. (quoting 252].” Id. 900 F.2d U.S.C. (internal omitted). added). have had quotation phases previously marks We

occasion to define “a operation today determination” for from the of the rates are 252(e)(6) § purposes of 47 U.S.C. uncompensable by to be means of holding utility context not need true-up. exhaust state available remedies before intervenors, howev judicial seeking review in federal court of a er, attempt distinguish AT T& Commu final rate order set AT T CPUC. & Systems grounds nications on the Bell, Systems Communications v. Pacific question there was whether exhaustion of (9th Cir.2000). so state required remedies was and that the doing, expressly distinguished judi- we challenged there were final rather cial provision review in the Act from that than interim. Admittedly, we faced a dif in the Administrаtive Procedure Act ferent question in AT & T Communica (“APA”), noting that whereas the APA But, Systems tions than we face here. as agency “authorizes review of ‘final began I my analysis, whether a challenged action,’ § 5 U.S.C. section 252 does action sufficiently “final” for re provide there must be a ‘final’ view depends on whether it is the sort of determination after exhaustion all avail- action which jurisdic federal courts have Rather, able remedies.” Id. explained, we tion to review. The Act authorizes requires only that “[i]t there be ‘a determi- review for “determination[s]” state ” nation,’ and, thus, we held that state “[a] commissions, 252(e)(6), 47 U.S.C. and I commission’s decision can be ‘a determina- why see no reason we should define the tion’ subject even it is request to a if statutory differently term for purposes of rehearing long so as opera- the decision is ripeness doctrine than we pur did for tional or binding parties on the in the poses of the exhaustion doctrine.1 a request absence rehearing.” Id. Further, the CPUC and the intervenors’ emphasis on the fact that the rates hеre At least to allega the extent Verizon’s nominally interim rather than final is uncompensable tions of accepted harm are misplaced for at least three reasons. true, the interim rate order here is both First, argument today is not with operative and binding on Verizon. The the final rates. Even if the final rates order was entered on and effective as of fully comply with the TELRIC methodolo- March 2003. 2003 WL gy and' even with ensuing true-up, Cal. PUC LEXIS at *117. If Verizon Verizon would still mount the same chal- comply,

refuses to pen it faces substantial lenge to the interim rates that it makes alties. §§ Cal. Pub. Util.Code 2107-08 Thus, today. claims, neither its nor the (providing penalty for a of as much as defenses, CPUC’s nor the intervenors’ $20,000 for “each offense” and providing if they differ were to litigate after that “in continuing case of a violation each the final promulgated. rates are day’s continuance thereof shall sepa be a offense”). Second, rate and distinct the although assumption And that interim may subject the interim rates substantially to a true- rates are fleeting be more than up, the losses that and, thus, to result final rates that there is or Indeed, 1. recently explained we ripe- ciples of federalism lend this doctrine addi- pertains ness it involving doctrine as to "cases reviewing force tional when federal court is agencies recognize[s] administrative ... agency a state stage decision at an interim in judicial action should restrained when oth- West, evolving process." an US 193 F.3d at act,” political er branches have acted or will 1118. Both of these rationale are not unlike Robinson, Principal Insurance Co. v. Life underlying those the exhaustion doctrine. (9th Cir.2004), F.3d "[p]rin- and that tively quickly, without the fundamentally differ considerable de something should be lay expense procuring interim rates way the in which review ent about reviewed, ing holding hearings. belied cost studies and full are or are not already CPUC, have Hence, rates here argues facts. The interim such rates bet years, and for more than two Act, been in effect purpose ter of the which is effect although permanent we are informed promote сompetition among to local ex year, they could be may be set this rates assumption, carriers. The change CPUC’s By comparison, year. late as next set as however, setting rate absent its there that “are set state commis final rates in competition, will be no- error. To “usually” pursuant done so sions” are begin, even before the interim rate order [only] 3- or agreements “arbitrated with already making at issue was terms,” Communications 4-year competitors its network available under Commis Inc. v. Federal Communications Further, rates set even CPUC. sion, circumstance, an ILEC and absent-such added), and L.Ed.2d always negotiate CLECs are free to rates.2 likely change thereafter. rates, they agree If cannot on and the Third, and the intervenors’ CPUC is without the resources to set rates the OPUC fashion, down to the indefen- position largely timely boils it can defer to the FCC., that a state commission proposition sible power determinant of the See 47 ju- 252(e)(5) (“If from can insulate its U.S.C. a State commission “determination^” labeling them “interim.” dicial review fails,, сarry responsibility to act to out its' judicial review This would eviscerate the any proceeding or under this section be, particu- cannot provided by statute and section, this then the other matter under that, history larly light of the fact as the preempting an order shall issue [FCC] demonstrates, interim of this so-called case jurisdiction pro of that State commission’s years, com- can for effect remain ceeding days or matter within 90 after compliance pain mand immediate (or notice) taking of such being notified sanctions, allegedly and can cause losses failure, responsibility and shall assume be, are, uncompensable. and will which this of the State commission under section abuse, or respect proceeding matter Recognizing potential this with commission.”). arbitrary particularly concedes that Fi CPUC and act for the State subject review provisions rates should be if no nally, even there were such See, Br. at 19- e.g., even if interim. CPUC parties negotiate for the rates or 20; Arg. Jan. 2005 Oral 00:37:37- to set rates such that the FCC absencе degree Although 00:38:09. of arbi the absence of interim rates would mean of an interim rate render it trariness carriers, competition among exchange local review, in need of more or less Congress remains that did fact rate does not render an interim more in the Act for rates —interim or provide and, thus, “a less determination” binding that nev fit otherwise—that are judicial review. comply do not federal law ertheless with regulations such as the TELRIC position by also defends its CPUC AT T methodology. See & Communica arguing that interim and unreviewable Illinois, Bell Tele Inc. v. Illinois tions regulatory ‍​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​​​‍rates are useful tools (7th Cir.2003) Co., 402, 411 they phone to set rates rela permit Indeed, goal expeditiously alleges meet the Commission’s of I note that Verizon that it 2. rates,” reducing proposal that this was “proposed voluntary certain of reduction of ¶ rejected. Compl. to 29. its UNE rates on an interim basis in order (“[T]he repair of possibility promise true-up. the future is of a later Even as- promulgating today suming true-up actually no warrant for a rate that a were to dаte, from standard. occur at deviates the TELRIC some the [interim] future requires Federal law rate for Rate below-cost Order’s UNE rates elements, by network adopted irreparable unbundled cause Verizon California commission, comply they give state with TELRIC harm because an CLECs arbi- junior adopted.”). trary competitive advantage when are not a We that allows varsity legislature; away neither is the them to take CPUC. customers Veri- from States, Mistretta v. United zon harm This cannot be Cf. California. 361, 427, prospect 102 L.Ed.2d 714 cured true-up future (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting). We both the Commission’s erroneous rates. Moreover, Congress provided any true-up years must abide what has could be away, exacerbating and live without that which it has withheld. thus the harm. is, moreover, guarantee There no Thus, I would conclude that the interim CLECs who have received the benefit of sufficiently rate order here is final for below-cost rates will still exist and have judicial review. pay the resources to back their wind- alone do willingly so without Hardship B. The to the Parties of fall —let protractеd litigation some Withholding Judicial Consider- —at future point when the Commission corrects its ation erroneous rates. Alleged Uncompensable 1. Verizon’s Harm .... As a result the interim UNE complaint seeking declaratory its Commission, rates set Verizon injunctive relief, that the aggrieved has California been within the CPUC’s interim rate order caused immedi- 252(e)(6) meaning of Section of the 1996 harm by requiring ate to Verizon 252(e)(6). Act, 47 U.S.C. California’s (1) both: to subsidize CLECs the form “interim” UNE rates will enable Verizon rates, unlawfully low which resulted in competitors procure California’s to customers; Verizon’s loss retail UNEs from Verizon California to bear the credit risk that the CLECs well below Verizon California’s costs of benefitting from the interim rates will not Further, providing they UNEs. will en- true-up exist at the time the takes effect competitors able Verizon California’s or will lack pay the wherewithal win over Verizon custom- California’s difference between the interim rates and ers, competitors not because the permanent period rates for the of time innovative, more but because efficient thе interim rates were in effect. Verizon they have regulatory won a substantial further alleged promised true-up in the below-cost UNE windfall form of compensate Verizon for either of rates. these harms: ¶¶ added).3 Compl. irreparably

ILECs would be if harmed state impose commissions could artifi- Nor does the CPUC contest cially subject low UNE rates future will afford Verizon no real is, view, my argu- 3. There no merit in the intrastate telecommunications markets. Competition ment the CPUC typically and the intervenors that does not demand that which, resulting competitors, harm from Verizon’s loss of custom- firms their ac- subsidize Verizon, cognizable very purpose cording ers is not precisely hap- because the what has promote competition pened of the Act suggest is to in the here. Nor does the Act other- - In- eludes that the remedy alleged.- for the losses state commissions deed, arguments, the CPUC con- should set arbitrated rates for intercon- at oral as contem- nection and access to ceded not unbundled ele- losses, pursuant ments a рlated forward-looking will not account for these [to] permit pricing methodology. law not the economic cost federal would compen- to set future rates so as to The Commission concludes that CPUC resulting prices harms from that new past pay sate Verizon entrants inter- 12, 2005 connection artificially low rates. Jan. Oral and unbundled elements Arg. telephone at 00:33:59-00:34:58. should be based on the local companies Total Long Service Run In- at ar- position The stated oral CPUC’s particular cremental Cost a network any par- guments quite correct. Where element, which the Commission calls ty requests compulsory arbitration Long-Run “Total Element Incremental commission, the commission state utilities (TELRIC), plus Cost” reasonable ... ... any “shall establish rates for net- forward-looking joint share and (d) according work elements subsection common costs. 252(c)(2). § of this section.” 47 U.S.C. ¶ 29 15,499, 11 F.C.C.R. at (d) (emphas in,relevant requires part Subsection added), es as amended 11 F.C.C.R. by a commis- State “[d]eterminations 22,301 (1996); § see also C.F.R. 51.505.4 just sion of ... and reasonable rate for is, short, provision There no either in ... network elements ... shall be based regulations the Act or the FCC’s ... the cost ... of net- providing on rates to so to compensate be based may ... ... include a work element past damages ILECs for of the sort al 252(d) profit.” 47 U.S.C. reasonable leged here. FCC, turn, pro- The mulgated regulations interpreting this sub- argue, and the intervenors section: however, any such harm is temporary speculative

The 1996 Act the states to set or is otherwise requires prices cognizable ripeness for interconnection and unbun- not under the doctrine cost-based, do dled elements that are non- either because the interim rates discriminatory, require include a Verizon to alter its “conduct” or states the harm is mere financial loss. I profit. help reasonable To because this, in turn. accomplish arguments the Commission con- address each of these add, however, upon express I centered an incumbent carrier's exist- wise. I hasten to $100, opinion proven no as to whether Verizon has ing (say percent at wire сenters or, remand, prove allega- will be able to its annum); per $9 arid that would reason- rates here are tions that the interim unlawful- (an depreciation loop able for on that 11- ly low. life); year useful then the annual TELRIC loop $20. for the element would be explained Supreme 4. The has Court TEL- charged The actual TELRIC rate to an en- methodology RIC as follows: leasing trant the element would be frac- TELRIC of an element has three com- “The figure, TELRIC based on a "rea- tion of the ponents, operating expenses, depre- projection” sonable of the entrant’s use of cost, appropriate and the risk-ad- ciation (whether per-usage the element on flat or justed capital.” example cost of A concrete basis) by aggregate use of as divided total may help. $1 a Assume that it would cost entrant, incumbent, element loop year operate a most efficient ele- competitor that leases it. other ment; $10 that it would take for interest Inc., Communications payments capital а on the carrier (citations omitted). loop & to invest build the lowest cost n. have First, the CPUC and the uncompensable contingent intervenors harm is upon argue only tempo and, that Verizon’s harm is thus, future events alleged, is ei rary any speculative or because retail cus temporary speculative. ther or in Cases may tomers lose while the which this court and others have found in interim rates are effect return once claims to unripe be review on set, permanent rates are and because being tempo basis harm true-up compensate will Verizon for rary speculative inappo- are therefore in charges difference the rates it site. CLECs under the interim rate order and Second, the CPUC and the intervenors charge what it will be able to CLECs argue that Verizon’s alleged harm is not permanent under the rate order. As for cognizable hardship prong under the of customers, the loss of retail assuming even ripeness analysis because the interim rate every allegedly customer who left require order does not Verizon to alter its Verizon under the interim rates returns Here, only “conduct” but its rates. rates,5 permanent under the Verizon will CPUC and the rely intervenors on lan not compensated for the loss of revenue in guage stating cases claims are from the loss of such retail customers for review when challenged agen while the interim rates were effect. cy requires action change “conduct.” true-up adjustment will be based on Laboratories, E.g., Abbott UNEs, the cost of the and not on the basis 87 S.Ct. 1507 (holding regu that “where a of what the competitors’ retail customers lation requires an signifi immediate and might paid they have Verizon had not change cant plaintiffs’ conduct of changed providers. service their affairs penalties with serious at adjusted As for the rates that Verizon noncompliance, tached to access to the may charge pursuant to the courts ... permitted”); must be Associa period, interim the credit risk that tion Colleges American Medical Verizon has been forced to bear in exists States, (9th United Cir. dependently of whether the intervenors 2000) (“Courts typically rеad the Abbott and other ultimately pay CLECs the true- apply Laboratories rule to regula where If up. an investor accept junk is forced to require changes tions in present conduct bonds, equal amount maturity, sanctions.”). on threat of future I can bonds, place of Treasury may buy he cred why setting discern no reason rates should insurance; it premium the insurance “conduct,” not be considered nor do the will Similarly reduce his return. support position. Indeed, cases such a buy were Verizon to credit insurance on even the cases on which the CPUC and the payments pursuant intervenors’ rely true-up, the cost of intervenors make clear that such credit insurance the refer Thus, not an element ences to changes of TELRIC.6 “conduct” are meant to nothing about Verizon’s alleged present distinguish situations where the agency ac course, 5. Nor is there reason to so junk-bond assume. In the 6. Of Verizon—like the economists, parlance given the transaction holder —could choose to run the risk of non- they costs that customers bеar when switch payment, predictable with the effect on its providers given price service differ- financial statements and own creditworthi- among providers entials service under the ness, option might but that is an some interim rates per- relative to those under the prudent days vigilance think in these over rates, may manent not be efficient for cus- corporations. tomers to return to Verizon even if was effi- cient for place. them to leave in the first turn cited above on the fact that the impact and immediate” eases has “direct tion Indeed, im merely the I have from situations in which loss was financial. plaintiffs Ab indirect two cases in we held that speculative. found which pact 152-53, Laboratories, 87 unripe judicial 387 at for at claims were review bott 1507; Med Association American in part least because the harm was mere S.Ct. of (distin loss, Colleges, 217 F.3d at 783-84 readily ical financial both of which are from its com Abbott Laboratories guishing from either distinguishable the case Association, case, Inc. Toilet Goods panion no that the suggеstion because there was Gardner, 158, 163-65, S.Ct. 87 v. uncompensable financial loss was or be (1967), 1520, 697 the 18 L.Ed.2d wherein challenged otherwise cause the action was challenged found ac Court the Supreme judicial ripe for State Cali review. of review, judicial on the for ripe tion not v. Ben fornia, Department Education impact regulation that “the of the grounds Cir.1987) nett, 827, (9th F.2d 833 833-34 by those immediately not ‘felt was [there] judicial for (holding unripe review Cali day-to-day subject conducting it in their to claim Department fornia of Education’s ”). Here, that question no there is affairs’ authority to that Bennett was without rate order had a direct the interim charge prejudgment misapplied interest on upon effect immediate Verizon. I funds because “the harm that is Title expense,” is limited to financial presaged Third, the CPUC and the intervenors there, in the event that California stated correctly note that we have often ultimately pre Department Education cognizable a mere financial loss is not that vailed, suffer it would no harm because analysis purposеs hardship harm for required pay prejudg would not be to Princi ripeness E.g., doctrine. under interest); Hawaiian Electric Co. v. 670; ment Co., at Insurance 394 F.3d pal Life Protection United States Environmental West, 1118; Village 193 F.3d at US (9th Cir.1984) 1440, F.2d (9th Agency, 723 1445 Babbitt, 403, 408 v. 999 F.2d Gambell (“HECO’s ... alleged hardship financial Cir.1993); Anchorage v. Municipality of outweigh inappropriate (9th insufficient States, 1325-26 F.2d United resolution.”). for judicial ness of the issues Cir.1992); Dietary Coali Supplemental Moreover, agency we have action Sullivan, held tion, Inc. v. 978 F.2d delayed “recovery] indefinitely (9th Cir.1992); & Gas Western Oil compen ... tort” and “reimbursement for Association, Winter, 1291; 905 F.2d payments” practical “creat[ed] sation However, has al F.2d at 1325. ripe a claim hardship” sufficient render customers, loss of which is not leged the Director, judicial review. Chavez loss. Inter financial See Midcoast mere Pro Compensation Workers Transmission, Ener Inc. v. Federal state Office (9th 961 F.2d 1415-16 Cir. 960, grams, Commission, Regulatory gy 1992). (D.C.Cir.2000) (holding pe 969-70 agency for review of orders were

titioners Finally, harm here is alleged resulting sufficiently aggrieved from the uncompensable means of claims were of customers that their loss finan significant. regarding refrain review). judicial cases repeated of these cial loss each Supreme uttered Court was first Further, to the extent Verizon’s There, Supreme Laboratories. Abbott as mere finan harm’ can be characterized an advanced loss, agreed argument with we Court although repeated cial have often “ financial ‘mere government insuf that mere financial loss is the refrain justification pre-en- of the is not hardship, expense’ to establish none ficient review,” holding that 2. Procedural Context forcement “possible financial loss is not itself then, appeal, The resolution of the must sufficient interest to sustain a chal turn on whether allegations were lenge governmental action.” Abbott sufficient support its claim of hardship Laboratories, 387 U.S. at or, rather, whether the district court was That mere finan correct to dismiss Verizon’s claims in the cial loss would not typically justify pre- absence of hardship. evidence of Verizon’s judicial review is not at all еnforcement however, Before considering question, this surprising typically because “adequate preliminary three points must be made compensatory or other corrective relief regarding procedural context in which date, will be available at a later in the the district court’s orders were rendered. ordinary litigation.” course of See Los First, point at no did the nor CPUC Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission intervenors ‍​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​​​‍file a cross-motion for sum- v. National League, Football 634 F.2d mary judgment nor a motion to dismiss. (9th 1197, Cir.1980) 1202 (quoting Samp Second, in their in 61, 90, opposition brief Murray, son v. 415 U.S. 94 S.Ct. 937, (1974)); partial 39 Verizon’s motion for summary L.Ed.2d 166 Toilet cf. Association, judgment, 164-65, Goods neither the ap- 387 U.S. at 87 intervenors nor parently (holding presented S.Ct. 1520 challenge evi- contradicting administrative action was dence judi Verizon’s claims of ir- part Further, cial in reparable review because “no harm. irremedia reply its motion, ble adverse consequences[would] support flow brief from of its spe- Verizon requiring a later challenge cifically to this regula oppоrtunity reserved the to make tion”). There is no reason to conclude that a showing that Verizon had suffered and is the case here.7 would irreparable continue to suffer harm concluding, 7. In so I do not sovereign immunity by assume that the waive voluntarily their statutory provisions providing participating for federal re by the scheme established Act), view of "determination[s]” state utilities AT & T Communications v. BellSouth preclude damages. Inc., 636, relief in the form of See Telecommunications 238 F.3d 643- Maryland (5th Cir.2001) (same), v. Inc. Public Service Verizon Com 47 MCI Telecommuni 635, 643-44, Maryland, Co., mission Corp. cations Telephone v. Illinois Bell 647-48, 1753, 323, (7th Cir.2000) 122 S.Ct. (same), 152 L.Ed.2d 871 222 F.3d 338-44 (2002) (holding provision that the for federal Corp. MCI Telecommunications v. Public Ser Utah, review 929, of "determination[s]” state utilities vice Commission 216 F.3d 935- 252(e)(6) (10th § Cir.2000) (same), in 47 U.S.C. neither limits the 39 US West Communi general grant cations, jurisdiction Seattle, 1365, in 28 U.S.C. F.Supp. Inc. v. TCG “places [any] 1331 nor (W.D.Wash.1997) (same), restriction on the 1368-70 with Bell award”); relief a court can WorldCom, Maryland, BellSouth Tele Atlantic Inc. v. MCI communications, Inc., 279, Georgia Inc. v. (4th Cir.2001) Public Ser 240 F.3d 290-94 Commission, (11th vice (holding 400 F.3d that states do not waivе their sover Cir.2005) (affirming judg eign immunity the district by participating court's in the scheme against ment Act), state utilities commission for established vacated on other damages that BellSouth grounds Maryland Telecommunications sub nom. Inc. v. Verizon suffered as a result prior of the commission's Public Maryland, Service Commission rates). Rather, unlawfully established I note 152 L.Ed.2d 871 only question (2002), North, sovereign Strand, that the of whether GTE Inc. v. 209 F.3d immunity preclude (6th Cir.2000) ("[I]t suing Verizon from 922 n. virtually damages very the CPUC for utility much unset certain that a state commission's deci Compare tled. MCI Corp. Telecommunication accept regulatory authority sion to under the Atlantic-Pennsylvania, Bell legitimately [Act] cannot be construed as a (3d Cir.2001) (holding 509-13 sovereign states valid immunity.”). waiver of 3. The District Court’s Order showing such a court deemed if the district necessary. denying partial Verizon’s motion for summary judgment dismissing Veri- Third, court denied once the district (and, later, claims the re- zon’s first two summary judg- motion -for part Verizon’s complaint), mainder of Verizon’s the dis- first two ment and dismissed Verizon’s trict court first held as a matter of law claims, meaningful oppor- hаd no allegations irreparable that Verizon’s present evidence substantiate tunity to . harm were irrelevant. As the district hardship. The district court’s its claim of court stated: “The discernible differ- first two claims dismissing order ence between this case and West v. US evi- way invited Verizon to submit no appears MFS to be that U.S. West admit- remaining ripe. claims were dence that its ted that its concerns would be resolved Rather, court held that “[i]t the district true-up, whereas dis- pending ruling ripeness appears Court’s putes is uncon- this issue. Court Plaintiffs remain- also forecloses grounds difference is material.” vinced this action,” permitted three causes of ing in the alterna- The district court then held response demon- to file “a written Verizon if tive that even West did not control US remaining three claims strating why its case, the the court would still hold that following the not be dismissed should not Verizon’s claims were ripeness ruling.” Verizon Court’s financial loss is “possible review because Califor- THE, nia, Peevey, C03-2838 Inc. v. No. and hardship” not sufficient to establish 2004) (N.D.Cal. loss of cus- arguments regarding at 6-7 Jan. slip oр. and words, pure speculation, tomers “rests on (emphasis other harm not constitute speculative such does inviting Verizon to dem- district court was injury.” Id. at 4-6. irreparable reasoning court’s why onstrate the district two claims was not also as to the first holding was er The district court’s first claims. remaining to the three applicable Indeed, ror, in Part I explained as above. Further, op- did take the even if Verizon a material differ I can think of no more of evidence, that would portunity present to analysis than that U.S. ripeness ence to rul- impacted the district court’s it recover its claimed stipulated not have could West while Verizon damages through claims. The court ing as to the first two cannot, agrees claims it and it would reconsider suggested never court’s alterna The district with Verizon. two claims. its dismissal the first As de likewise was error. holding tive Thus, court de- at the time the district above, has II.B.1 Verizon tailed Part summary for partial nied Verizon’s motion compensable harm is not alleged that its first two judgment and dismissed Verizon’s harm, plead as through true-up. This ir- claims, repeatedly alleged had ed, rather than direct and immediate harm, and neither the CPUC reparable po thus future events and contingent on dispositive nor the intervenors had filed Fur speculative. tentially temporary or to the con- motion nor introduced evidence ther, as hard pleaded, cognizable it is as Further, the district court trary. once from the resulting extent ship even to the sum- partial motion for denied Verizon’s other con opposed as to setting of rates dismissed Verizon’s mary judgment duct, extent limited and even to the claims, meaning- is sufficient to had no financial loss. This first two mere review, given proce warrant present ful evidence. opportunity case, posture ing, dural detailed “the cost of the new facilities are question ripe Part II.B.2 “The pipeline’s above. added total rate base and ness, challenges like other to a court’s charged reflected to all customers jurisdiction, subject matter as a treated system-wide,” pric- whereas in incremental 12(b)(1),” motion to under dismiss Rule ing, charge imposed] “an additional [is and, thus, is the burden of the com “[i]t solely[on who customers are direct- those] allege plainant demonstrating facts ly by the expansion served facilities.” Id. appropriateness invoking judicial resolu at 964. Midcoast claimed that FERC’s tion of dispute.” Moore’s Federal approval ignored of rolled-in rates 101.73[1] Practice adde id., own agency’s policy precedent, d).8 that “but contended determina-

Thus, tion, with v. Toilet Associ- be faced the loss of Gardner Goods ation, 167, 168-70, upon completion the Cities’ business of the (1967), a companion L.Ed.2d 704 ease to Pipeline.” North Alabama Id. at 969. Laboratories, Abbott Toilet Goods Associa- Midcoast reasoned that had FERC re- regulations tion challenged promulgated quired incremental pricing, Southern’s Secretary Health, Education and rates for users of the North Alabama Pipe- injunctive Welfare and sued for and de- high line would have been so relative to claratory Secretary relief. The moved to the rates that proposed charge Midcoаst ripeness grounds, dismiss on district competing project that FERC would motion, court denied and the Second not have authorized the construction of Circuit affirmed. Id. at 170-71 n.& 87 Pipeline. North Southern’s Alabama Id. Supreme S.Ct. 1526. The Court likewise which, note, The D.C. I has Circuit — affirmed, id. at holding S.Ct. particular expertise in administrative in relevant “We part: say cannot on this law—held: record that burden of [compliance the with If claim analysis, [Midcoast’s] survives regulations the is other than sub- issue] can question there be no that Midcoast stantial, accepting, as we a must on mo- certain, suffered a injury has concrete tion to on the the pleadings, dismiss alle- statutory that satisfies both the con- and gations complaint supporting of judicial requirements stitutional re- as true.” Id. at affidavits view. added). 1526 (emphasis aggrieved Whether Mideoast is is a Likewise, in Midcoast Trans- Interstate fact; question of they and where are in mission, Inc., petitioned Midcoast for re- a dispute, court assume must the cor- view of Energy Regulatory the Federal challenging party’s rectness ver- of (“FERC”) Commission’s granting orders sion ... of facts. (“South- Southern Company’s Natural Gas .... presented Midcoast has facts ern”) application to gas construct a natural which, correct, if fully support a finding pipeline and, as is relevant FERC’s it has aggrieved been the pricing order that Southern could the cost recover determination.... of the pipeline through new construction “rolled-in” pric- Accepting, purposes rather than as we “incremental” must for of Transmission, ing. analysis, accuracy Midcoast Interstate our Midcoast’s of Inc., 198 at 963-64. In pric- F.3d rolled-in calculation the incremental rate of emphasize 8. I reaching that in peal having these conclu- without first submitted it to the sions, rely I do not on of the evidence district court. ap- Verizon in submitted with its connection prudence of of charge, FERC’s decision on the be required Southern has in its that Midcoast been the transaction terms of effect on are satisfied we consequence of a direct aggrieved. As ratepayers. irrespective action and agency’s added). Id. proceeding, rate the outcome of future indisputably “allege[d] facts busi- have lost the Cities’ Midcoast will demonstrating the in- appropriateness of the North Ala- from the moment ness voking dispute,” resolution of Pipeline begins natu- deliveries bama Federal Practice 101.73[1] Moore’s time that the Cities are gas until the ral (2005), in Part II.B.l above. as detailed obligations their under released from above, Nor, II.B.2 did as detailed Part the Southern contracts.... nor the intervenors cross- the CPUC file find, we also It is for this reason that summary judgment motion for nor even Because Mid- ripe issue for review.... proffer responding evidence Verizon’s irrespec- loss coast an imminent faces summary judgment that partial motion for rate outcome tive future obliged might have substantiate question no there can be proceeding, allegations. procedural its this context pricing determi- that the Commission’s particularly given specific Verizon’s under clas- nation is review of the opportunity present reservation Laborato- test Abbott sic established desire, court evidence should the district Gardner, 136, 149, ries v. sponte .court’s the district sua dismissal (1967): 1507, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 S.Ct. join I with the Accordingly, was error. rolled-in determi- legality pricing of the district court’s majority vacating the deci-

nation fit for immediate partial motion denying orders sion, by Midcoast hardship and the faced dismissing summary judgment and Veri- indisputable. remanding in- complaint, zon’s with (emphases Id. at 969-70 court consider structions district Similarly, City New Orleans v. merits whether Verizon is entitled Commission, Regulatory Energy Federal declaratory injunctive relief the City of 948 (D.C.Cir.1995), fees) (and attorneys’ the costs challenged an Entergy New Orleans seeks. Entergy spin allowing order FERC plants electricity generating two be off “prudence”

cause order addressed spin-off only as to its current effect

of the utility until such time as up

on rates purchase capac new

system would need argued petitioners ity. FERC America, STATES of UNITED “aggrieved” parties, not id. yet were Plaintiff-Appellee, disagreed: Circuit the D.C. challenging parties assert HERMOSO-GARCIA, Octavio aggrieve eventually them transfer will rates, Defendant-Appellant. ‍​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​​​‍and so the form of unreasonable they into. prudently entered was If No. 04-30196. correct, we them to as must assume Appeals, States Court United determining ag- their purposes befor Ninth Circuit. they right had a to review grievement,

Case Details

Case Name: Verizon California Inc. v. Peevey

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Date Published: Jul 6, 2005

Citation: 413 F.3d 1069

Docket Number: 04-15155

Court Abbreviation: 9th Cir.