Verdu v. ImVerdu v. Im
- Reporters:
- Before:
- Zahid N. Quraishi
QURAISHI, District Judge
This matter comes before the Court upon the Motion for Summary Judgment (the “Motion,” ECF No. 60) filed by Defendant Yeohee Im (“Defendant“). In support of the Motion, Defendant filed a brief (“Moving Br.,” ECF No. 60-1) and a Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (“SUMF,” ECF No. 60-2). Plaintiff Sergio Verdu (“Plaintiff“) filed an opposition (“Opp‘n Br.,” ECF No. 66), a Response to Defendant‘s SUMF (“RSMF,” ECF No. 66-1), and a supplemental Statement of Disputed Material Facts pursuant to Local Civil Rule 56.1 (“SSDF,” ECF No. 66-2).1 Defendant filed a reply brief (“Reply Br.,” ECF No. 70) and a response to Plaintiff‘s SSDF (“RSDF,” ECF No. 70-1). After careful consideration of the parties’ submissions, the Court decides the Motion without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78 and Local Civil Rule 78.1.2 For the reasons outlined below, the Court will GRANT Defendant‘s Motion for Summary Judgment.
A. Procedural Background
Plaintiff filed a complaint in the New Jersey Superior Court stemming from a “private, educational disciplinary matter” between himself and Defendant, a former graduate student of his at Princeton University. (Compl., ECF No. 1-2 ¶ 1.) The Complaint asserts a claim of defamation (Count One), and two claims of false light / invasion of privacy (Counts Two and Three). On August 6, 2019, Defendant removed the case to this Court on diversity jurisdiction grounds. (ECF No. 1.) Defendant filed an Answer to the Complaint (ECF No. 4), followed by an Amended Answer on December 12, 2019 (ECF No. 17). On January 14, 2021, Defendant filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court then referred this case to mediation pursuant to Local Civil Rule 301.1 (ECF No. 75). The case was administratively terminated pending the mediation, (see Clerk‘s docket entry dated March 22, 2023), which was ultimately unsuccessful.
B. Factual Background
The Court recites only the facts that it finds are undisputed and relevant to the instant Motion.3
Starting in Fall 2015, Defendant was a graduate student at Princeton University (“Princeton“) pursuing her Ph.D. in electrical engineering. (SUMF ¶ 9; RSMF ¶ 9.) She selected Plaintiff as her graduate advisor after her first semester because of his prominent reputation in the field of Information Theory. (SUMF ¶ 9; RSMF ¶ 9.) By that time, Plaintiff had taught at Princeton for over 30 years, written several books, won several awards, and had “risen to the top
From mid-February 2017 to early March 2017, Plaintiff invited Defendant to his home on three separate occasions, during which they were alone and often drinking alcohol provided by Plaintiff. (SUMF ¶ 15; RSMF ¶ 15.) After leaving Plaintiff‘s home on one such occasion on March 10, 2017, Defendant texted a fellow graduate student, stating: “Don‘t sleep . . . My advisor asked me to watch some popular Korean movie at his place so we did and it was just two of us and he was touching my thigh. I should‘ve said no but I couldn‘t think any [sic] at the time.” (SUMF ¶ 29; RSMF ¶ 29.) That same evening, the classmate met Defendant at her apartment. (SUMF ¶ 30; RSMF ¶ 30.) Defendant then sent an email to Plaintiff early the next morning, which read: “Hello professor, After I came home, I realized I wasn‘t comfortable with you touching my leg, I consider our relationship solely as advisor and student and would appreciate if you do so. I think it would be nice to set some boundaries.” (SUMF ¶ 31; RSMF ¶ 31.) A few hours later, Plaintiff responded: “OMG Yeohee, needless to say I totally agree about the boundaries. Are you available on Monday at 10 to clear it up?” (SUMF ¶ 32; RSMF ¶ 32.) The parties met on Monday, March 13, 2017 to discuss what had happened, during which time Defendant testified that she was “scared to be with him” and “had no idea what would happen.” (SUMF ¶ 33, 35; RSMF ¶¶ 33, 35.) Sometime between March 10 and March 13 Defendant called Princeton‘s Sexual Harassment/Assault Advising, Resources and Education (“SHARE“) program for counseling. (SUMF ¶¶ 33–34; RSMF ¶¶ 33–34.)
On June 9, 2017, Princeton sent Defendant and Plaintiff the panel‘s findings5 and explained to Plaintiff that he would as a result be placed on probation for one year, have to complete the university‘s Community Integrity Program, and would have it added to his permanent record. (SUMF ¶¶ 49–50; RSMF ¶¶ 49–50.) Upon learning of Princeton‘s disciplinary actions and explanation therefor, Defendant responded: “I think that‘s a very unacceptable answer and I think the [U]niversity has to come up with a better excuse.” (SUMF ¶¶ 55, 57; RSMF ¶¶ 55, 57.) In the Fall of 2017, Defendant publicly raised her concerns to a Huffington Post reporter, who published an article discussing not only Plaintiff‘s actions but also “the broader problem of sexual harassment on university campuses.” (SUMF ¶¶ 58–60; RSMF ¶¶ 58–60.) Subsequently, numerous other
II. JURISDICTION
The Court has diversity jurisdiction pursuant to
III. LEGAL STANDARD
Once the moving party has met that threshold burden, the nonmoving party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The opposing party must present actual evidence that creates a genuine dispute as to a material fact for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; see also
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court‘s role is not to evaluate the evidence and decide the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine dispute for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248–49. Credibility determinations are the province of the fact finder. Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992). The summary judgment standard, however, does not operate in a vacuum. “[I]n ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the judge must view the evidence presented through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254.
Defendant seeks summary judgment on all counts in the Complaint. The Court will consider each count in turn.
A. Defamation Claim
Count One asserts a claim for defamation. Under New Jersey law, defamation consists of: “(1) a false and defamatory statement; (2) communication of the statement to a third party; and (3) fault amounting to negligence or actual malice on the part of the [speaker].” Lee v. TMZ Prods. Inc., 710 F. App‘x 551, 560 (3d Cir. 2017) (citing DeAngelis v. Hill, 847 A.2d 1261, 1267–68 (N.J. 2004)). A heightened “actual malice” standard applies “when a matter of public concern is involved,” even in “defamation lawsuits brought by private-figure plaintiffs” against both media and non-media defendants. Lipsky v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., Civ. No. 13-105, 2013 WL 5354511, at *2 (D.N.J. Sept. 24, 2013); Lee, 710 F. App‘x at 560 (citing Durando v. Nutley Sun, 37 A.3d 449, 457–58 (N.J. 2012)). The actual malice standard “imposes a heavy burden” by requiring that the defendant “made the statement ‘knowing that it was false or with a reckless disregard for the truth.‘” Lee, 710 F. App‘x at 560; Lipsky, 2013 WL 5354511, at *2 (quoting DeAngelis, 847 A.2d at 1270). “The defendant‘s motivation for making the statement is irrelevant” to the actual malice inquiry, “and thus hostility and ill will on the part of the defendant are not considered.” Lipsky, 2013 WL 5354511, at *2 (citing DeAngelis, 847 A.2d at 1270).
1. Whether a Showing of Actual Malice is Required in this Case
As a first matter, the parties dispute whether the actual malice standard applies in this case. Defendant argues that it does apply because the relevant statements involve a matter of public interest and concern—the problem of sexual harassment and sexual assault not just generally, but in schools and universities in particular and the need for those institutions to “properly deter such conduct.” (Moving Br. at 8–12, 16–19 (highlighting recent attention by both the press and the
The Court finds that actual malice is the appropriate standard in this case because Defendant‘s statements do involve a “matter of public interest and concern.” The record reflects that the statements do not solely pertain to Defendant‘s private and personal experience with Plaintiff, as Plaintiff contends, but rather more broadly concern the issue of sexual harassment and sexual assault on school and university campuses, which, as Defendant points out, has been given much attention by the press, the government, and the general public in recent years. Indeed, the content of the statements bears on the “public‘s vital interests” as opposed to “predominantly relat[ing] to the economic interests of [Defendant].” Prof‘l Recovery Servs., Inc. v. Gen. Elec., 642 F. Supp. 2d 391, 406 (D.N.J. 2009) (quoting Senna v. Florimont, 958 A.2d 427, 444 (N.J. 2008)). The form of the statements, which were presented via social media and the press, further supports that they involve a matter of public interest and concern, as well as the context—
2. Whether Plaintiff Raises a Genuine Issue of Material Fact Regarding Defendant‘s Actual Malice
Defendant‘s motion argues that Plaintiff has failed to produce the required clear and convincing evidence of her actual malice, especially given that: Defendant took action in “immediate response” to the March 10, 2017 incident; Defendant had nothing to gain and everything to lose, academically and professionally, by reporting Plaintiff‘s conduct; Princeton‘s Title IX Panel concluded that Plaintiff touched her in a way that was “unwelcome” and “sexual in nature” and that constituted sexual harassment; and Plaintiff‘s conduct in fact constitutes a crime under New Jersey law. (Id. at 21–27, 30–36.) Emphasizing that actual malice requires a subjective inquiry into the speaker‘s perception of the truth or falsity of her statements, Defendant maintains that she not only “honestly believed” she was telling the truth when she made the statements at issue, but she in fact was telling the truth. (Id. at 21–22, 28–29.) Defendant adds that summary judgment is generally favored in “meritless defamation actions” like this one. (Moving Br. at 1, 4–5.)
Plaintiff urges that, because the parties provide conflicting testimony about what transpired between them and there were no other witnesses during those events, this case concerns at its heart a credibility determination that “categorically preclude[] summary judgment.” (Opp‘n Br. at 1, 3, 9–10, 16–17.) According to Plaintiff, given that Defendant “is not a mere publisher relying on
Here, the analysis centers on Defendant‘s state of mind when she made the allegedly defamatory statements. First, the Court rejects Plaintiff‘s argument that credibility determinations preclude summary judgment in cases like this one. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256–57 (1986) (rejecting argument that credibility questions preclude summary judgment). In fact, the New Jersey Appellate Division has made clear that negative credibility assessments “do[] not constitute clear and convincing evidence of actual malice,” and “discredited testimony does not rebut an inference of actual malice that the record supports.” Berkery v. Est. of Stuart, 988 A.2d 1201, 1212 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010) (“[E]ven if a jury were to believe plaintiff‘s allegations and find that [defendant] is not credible, such a conclusion would not support a finding of actual malice.“) (internal quotation marks omitted). Still, it is Defendant‘s burden on this motion to show that no material facts are in dispute11 and that Plaintiff fails to establish that a reasonable
jury could find, by clear and convincing evidence, that she made the statements with actual malice—in other words, with knowledge of, or reckless disregard as to, their falsity.12 Marino, 2017 WL 216691, at *7, *9.
As set forth above, it is undisputed that on three occasions from February to March 2017, Plaintiff invited Defendant to his home, where the two were alone. It is also undisputed that on March 10, 2017, Plaintiff touched Defendant‘s leg, served Plaintiff alcohol while they were alone in his house, and attempted to help clean a stain off of Defendant‘s sweatshirt.13 It is further undisputed that Defendant texted her classmate that same night about the incident, who visited Defendant‘s apartment, after which Defendant sent an email to Plaintiff about it early the next morning, expressing that she “wasn‘t comfortable with [him] touching [her] leg.” (SUMF ¶ 31; RSMF ¶ 31.) Moreover, it is undisputed that: within three days following the events of March 10, Defendant sought counseling through Princeton‘s SHARE program; the Title IX panel conducted an investigation after which it concluded that Plaintiff had sexually harassed Plaintiff, in violation of the school‘s sexual harassment policy; the panel concluded, inter alia, that Plaintiff‘s sexual harassment of Defendant was “severe,” “unwelcome,” and “sexual in nature,” and that “a reasonable person in [Defendant‘s] position would have viewed [Plaintiff‘s] behavior as sexual advances,” (SUMF ¶¶ 20, 25, 27–28; RSMF ¶¶ 20, 25, 27–28); Defendant was made aware of these findings and found Princeton‘s disciplinary measures imposed on Plaintiff to be “very unacceptable,” (SUMF ¶¶ 55, 57; RSMF ¶¶ 55, 57); and that there was a second investigation
The Court finds that the Title IX Memo also weighs in Defendant‘s favor. The Memo is admissible because Defendant is relying on it as evidence of her state of mind while making the alleged defamatory statements, rather than for the truth of the Memo‘s contents. It does not constitute hearsay when used for this purpose.
Plaintiff‘s opposition fails to cite evidence leading to a disputed material fact as to Defendant‘s purported actual malice. Instead, it raises the following arguments:
- Plaintiff cites the parties’ conflicting testimony regarding the events that transpired at Plaintiff‘s house—but even when there are assertions that “the jury might, and legally could, disbelieve the defendant‘s denial . . . of actual malice,” the plaintiff “is not thereby relieved of his own burden of producing in turn evidence that would support a jury verdict,” which Plaintiff has not done here. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256–57 (1986). Moreover, as noted above, credibility issues do not constitute clear and convincing evidence of actual malice. Berkery, 988 A.2d at 1212.
Plaintiff cites some discrepancies between Defendant‘s testimony and descriptions by the press of certain details of Plaintiff‘s sexual touching (see SSDF ¶ 3)—but Plaintiff does not explain how these minor inconsistencies speak to Defendant‘s purported actual malice at the time she made the defamatory statements. - Plaintiff theorizes that Professor Cuff helped orchestrate Defendant‘s accusations against Plaintiff—but even if the facts suggested that Defendant was motivated to make the statements by a malicious intent, alongside Professor Cuff, to get Plaintiff fired from Princeton, which the Court does not suggest that they do, that would not help prove actual malice here because intent is irrelevant to the question of whether Defendant made the statements with knowledge of or “reckless disregard” as to their falsity. Furthermore, Professor Cuff‘s state of mind, as a non-party, is wholly irrelevant to that inquiry.
Based on the material, undisputed facts, the Court finds that a reasonable jury cannot conclude, by clear and convincing evidence, that Defendant acted with actual malice in making the statements. To the contrary, the evidence shows that Defendant made the statements, if not with the honest belief that she was telling the truth—i.e., that Plaintiff‘s conduct in fact did constitute “sexual crimes“—at least without the requisite reckless disregard as to their falsity. As such, the Court finds that Defendant has more than met her burden on this motion. The Court therefore will grant summary judgment as to Count One of the Complaint.
B. False Light / Invasion of Privacy Claims
Counts Two and Three assert claims for false light / invasion of privacy. A false light claim has two elements: 1) that the plaintiff was placed in a false light that “would be highly offensive to a reasonable person,” and 2) the defendant “had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of” the statement. Marino v. Westfield Bd. of Educ., Civ. No. 16-361, 2017 WL 216691, at *9 (D.N.J. Jan. 18, 2017) (quoting Durando, 37 A.3d at 458) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Under New Jersey law, the knowledge requirement parallels the actual-malice standard of defamation.” Id.; see also Soobzokov v. Lichtblau, 664 F. App‘x 163, 169 (3d Cir. 2016) (“New Jersey extends the same constitutional protection to false light . . . claims as it does to defamation claims.“) (citing Durando, 37 A.3d at 458, and Decker v. Princeton Packet, Inc., 561 A.2d 1122, 1129 (N.J. 1989)).
Defendant argues that, for all of the same reasons she has articulated with respect to Plaintiff‘s defamation claim, Plaintiff cannot show actual malice by the clear and convincing evidence required for his false light claims, and therefore Counts Two and Three fail. (Moving Br. at 42–44.)
Plaintiff argues, on the other hand, that Defendant failed to “meaningfully address” her false light claims and therefore waived any argument against them.15 (Opp‘n Br. at 21–22.) Defendant‘s argument is inchoate, according to Plaintiff, because it fails to address the specific facts and claims behind the false light causes of action; for example, Count Two alleges that Defendant provided selective and misleading information to journalists and members of Princeton‘s student body and faculty, which Defendant fails to address. (Id.)
Here, the Court finds that it must also grant summary judgment as to Counts Two and Three because of Plaintiff‘s failure to show that a reasonable jury could find actual malice on the part of Defendant by clear and convincing evidence. See Marino, 2017 WL 216691, at *9 (false light claims require actual malice); Soobzokov, 664 F. App‘x at 169 (finding lack of actual malice precluded both claims “[b]ecause we have already found that the cited passages do not constitute
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons outlined above, Defendant‘s Motion for Summary Judgment will be GRANTED. An appropriate Order will follow.
Date: January 31, 2024
ZAHID N. QURAISHI
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE