137 Ga. 213 | Ga. | 1911
The main point in this case is whether there existed any valid constitutional law by virtue of which the ordinary could demand payment of his'fees, from county funds, for preparing the applications of those entitled to pensions at the time the services were rendered, for which compensation is demanded. Under the constitution of this State as originally adopted, the power of taxation over the whole State was given to supply soldiers, who lost a limb or limbs in the military service of the Confederate States, with substantial artificial limbs during life. The constitution'was subsequently amended at various times, authorizing taxes to be levied to pay pensions for such Confederate soldiers as may have been otherwise disabled or permanently injured in such service, or who may, by reason of age and poverty, or infirmity and poverty, or blindness and-poverty, be unable to provide a living for themselves; and for the widows of such Confederate soldiers as may have died in the service of the Confederate States, or since, from wounds received therein or disease contracted in the service, or by reason of age and poverty, or infirmity and poverty, or blindness and poverty, are unable to provide a living for themselves. In the various enactments to carry into effect these constitutional provisions, it was provided that blanks should be prepared an.d sent to the ordinar}’, to be filled out by applicants for pensions, and, upon proper proof being made before the ordinary of the county that the, applicant was entitled to a pension, the completed application was to be forwarded to the proper authority. The ordinary was allowed a fee of one dollar for each case prepared by Mm, which was to be paid by the applicant. It was declared to be un
; The first of these acts not only wrought, a change in the law as to the time and manner of the payment'of pensions, but also imposed for the first-time upon the counties a charge for the payment of the ordinary’s fees for the services rendered’ in the collection of the pensions. The later act made no reference to the former act, and only purported to change the time and manner of the payment .of pensions. Although no reference was made to the act of 1907, it is clear that the act of 1908 is to be construed in connection therewith, and to be given effect only on those matters dealt with in the later act. It did not purport to repeal the provision for the payment of ordinary’s fees by the county; and as that was an important feature in the first act, we can not say that the legislature intended to repeal that important provision in the law on the subject of the payment of the ordinary’s fees. That which was left in the act of 1907 applied solely to the payment of the ordinary’s fees. It could have been made the subject-matter of a complete and independent act. We think, therefore, that the provision with reference to the payment of the fees of the ordinary for services rendered to pensioners was not impliedly repealed by the act of 1908.
May the legislature constitutionally enact a law imposing upon á county the duty of paying the fees for services rendered by the ordinary to pensioners? The constitutional scheme of taxation contemplates a separation of the taxing power of the State from that of the county. It is declared in article 7, section 1, paragraph 1, of the constitution, that “the powers of taxation over the whole State shall be exercised by-the General Assembly for the following purposes only:” for the support of the State government and the public institutions; for educational purposes; to pay the principal and interest on the public debt; to suppress insurrection, to repel
But it is contended, that, inasmuch as some of the pensioners are entitled to their bounty by reason of age and poverty, or infirmity and poverty, or blindness and poverty, rendering them unable to provide a living for themselves, it is proper for the General Assembly to classify them as paupers, and provide for the payment of the fees of the ordinary from the pauper funds of the county. The legislative scheme was to treat all pensioners alike, and to make no exception in favor of any class of pensioners; and even if it be conceded that the legislature would have the right to make such classification, it has not done so. To recognize such an exception to the legislative enactment would be not only to give a partial effect to the legislative scheme, but to impute to that body an intention to create an invidious distinction by classifying indigent pensioners as paupers, when no such classification was intended.
Applying these principles, to the case in-hand, which was an application for mandamus by the ordinary to require the county commissioners to audit his claim for fees in services rendered to indigent pensioners under the act of 1907, the mandamus should have been refused.
Judgment reversed.