In this аction for declaratory judgment, plaintiff appeals as of right the grant of summary disposition to defendant and a declaration that defendant had no obligation to defend or indеmnify plaintiff under an automobile insurance policy. We affirm.
The facts are undisputed. Plaintiff’s automobile was insured with defendant pursuant to the no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq.; MSA 24.13101 et seq. The policy included an "Authorizаtion for Excluded Driver (Named Excluded Person)” endorsement, pursuant to MCL 500.3009(2); MSA 24.13009(2), that named plaintiff’s wife, Brenda Verbison, as an "excluded person.” The endorsement included the following statutorily required language:
warning—When a named excluded person operates a vehicle all liability coverage is void—no one is insured. Owners of the vehicle and others legally responsiblе for the acts of the named excluded person remain fully personally liable.
The same language was repeated in the body of the policy, together with an additional pаragraph that read:
If a vehicle is being operated by an individual named on the Declaration Certificate as an Excluded Driver, insurance under this policy is null and void for Bodily Injury Liability Insuranсe Coverage, Property Damage Liability Insurance *637 Coverage, Comprehensive Coverage, Collision Coverage, Car Rental Coverage and Sound Equipment Coverage.
Plаintiff did not permit his wife to operate the vehicle. On October 12, 1990, she found a hidden set of keys, took the car, and was involved in an automobile accident. The injured motorist. sued plaintiff аnd his wife. Plaintiff’s alleged liability was presumably based on the owner’s liability statute, MCL 257.401; MSA 9.2101. Plaintiff tendered the defense of the suit to defendant, which denied coverage, citing the "excluded driver” endorsement. Plaintiff then sought a declaration that defendant was required to defend and indemnify him in the third-party suit.
Because both parties agree that there are no material factual issues аnd the question involved is one of law, we treat the motion as one granted pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10). A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116 (0(10) tests the factual support for a claim. The court must consider thе pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions, and other documentary evidence available to it and grant summary disposition if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the mоving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
AFL-CIO v Civil Service Comm,
Plaintiff principally argues that MCL 500.3009(2); MSA 24.13009(2) unconstitutionally authorizes the deprivation of a property right without due process of law. We disagree.
MCL 500.3009(2); MSA 24.13009(2) provides:
If authorized by the insured, automobile liability *638 or motor vehicle liability coverage may be excluded when a vehicle is operated by a named person. Such exclusion shall not be valid unless the following notice is on the face of the policy or the declaration page or certificate of the policy and on the certificate of insurance: Warning—when a named excluded person operates a vehicle all liability coverage is void—no one is insured. Owners of the vehicle and others legally responsible for the acts of the named excluded person remain fully personally liable.
Statutes are presumed constitutional.
Katt v Ins Bureau,
The applicability of procedural due process guarantees depends initiаlly on the presence of a "property” or "liberty” interest within the meaning of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment.
Williams v Hofley Mfg Co,
Although the issue presented has not been squarely addressed, a number of our decisions have concluded that the provisions of MCL 500.3009(2); MSA 24.13009(2) are a valid exercise of legislative power, i.e., that the "rational basis” test of
Shavers
and
O’Donnell, supra,
has been met. As the Court said in
Muxlow v Auto Club Ins Ass’n,
Plaintiff has not overcome the presumption that MCL 500.3009(2); MSA 24.13009(2) is constitutional. First, a nontangible property interest in
*640
volves "reasonable] reli[ance] upon an existing practice.”
Bundo v Walled Lake,
Plaintiff’s argument is really no more than a public policy argument in constitutional garb. This Court will not interpose a policy-driven interpretation on the plain language of a statute in which the Legislature has chosen among competing policy concerns. The situations that plaintiff presents as arising because of the appliсation of § 3009(2) are simply inapposite. For example, plaintiff did not permit his car to be driven without insurance coverage. Thus, he cannot be subject to criminal sanctions under MCL 500.3102(2); MSA 24.13102(2).
Finаlly, even if the suggested right to procedural due process were recognized, the outcome of this *641 case would remain the same. According to Bundo, supra, rudimentary due process requires
(i) timely written notice detailing the reasons for proposed administrative action; (ii) an effective opportunity to defend by confronting any adverse witnesses and by being allowed to present in person witnesses, evidence, and arguments; (iii) a hearing examiner оther than the individual who made the decision or determination under review; and (iv) a written, although relatively informal, statement of findings. [395 Mich 696 ; citations omitted.]
Plaintiff had timely written notice of the action because thе effect of the exclusion was explicitly described in plaintiff’s policy and on the endorsement. Because plaintiff does not dispute that his wife drove the car or that the exсlusion was part of the policy, an opportunity to confront adverse witnesses or to present witnesses, evidence, and arguments would have made no difference. No othеr hearing examiner could have reached a different conclusion. And a "written . . . statement of findings” would not change the undisputed facts.
Plaintiff also argues that he did not knowingly waive his right to due process because he was not fully informed of the consequences of executing the "named driver” exclusion.
This issue was not raised below. As a general rule, this Court declines to consider an issue that was not decided by the trial court.
American Nat'l Fire Ins Co v Frankenmuth Mut Ins Co,
Plaintiffs waiver argument is without merit. The "warning” on the policy plainly stated that "[w]hen a named excluded person operates a vehicle all liability coveragе is void—no one is insured. Owners of the vehicle and others legally responsible for the acts of the named excluded person remain fully personally liable” (emphasis added). The policy went on to identify exactly which forms of coverage ("Bodily Injury Liability Insurance Coverage, Property Damage Liability Insurance Coverage,” etc.) would be unavailable. The protection afforded under these forms of coverage were set out in the body of the policy. Plaintiff knew, or should have known, exactly what he would lose if his wife drove the vehicle. An insurer need not spell out the details of what is meant by full personal liability. The implications are clear enough.
Affirmed. Defendant may tax costs.