73 Ga. 534 | Ga. | 1884
' The declaration in this case set forth the wrongs complained of in three counts, one for malicious prosecution, one
It does not appear from the record that any objection was made to this testimony when offered, and we must in fairness presume that none was in fact made; this of itself would be sufficient to dispose of this ground of the motion for a new trial. Independently of this, however, we can perceive no possible objection to this evidence. To have rejected it for the reasons assigned in this motion would have been to deprive the defendant of the only means of making good the facts set forth in his special plea and of making that plea available or of any value to him.
The prosecution and arrest and the charge leading
The jury should not have been charged, as they were not, that it was incumbent upon the defendant to disprove the truth of the charge as set forth in plaintiff’s declaration. He tendered no such issue by his plea; he undertook to establish that he acted with probable cause and without malice in making the accusation and causing the arrest.
In the clear and able exposition of the law made by the judge’s charge, which is in the record, this issue was fairly and fully presented, and the consequences of a failure to establish the facts set forth in the plea, by proof sufficient to satisfy the minds of the jury to a reasonable certainty, were distinctly specified. There was no material error, if any at all, in this charge, and we have shown that there was none in the several rulings of the court complained of. The evidence to sustain the verdict was sufficient. The judge who tried the case was satisfied with it, and we cannot say that there was error in refusing to set it aside and to grant a new trial.
Judgment affirmed.