107 N.E. 48 | NY | 1914
The action is to set aside a certain tax lease issued by the comptroller of the city of New York to the defendant under a sale in October, 1906, of the plaintiff's premises for the unpaid taxes of 1900 and 1901 and for unpaid Croton water rents for the years 1898 and 1900. The validity of this lease is challenged on several grounds which need not be discussed at this time because *149 there is a question of practice upon which we must dispose of the case.
After issue had been joined, the case was brought to trial at a Special Term of the Supreme Court. Both parties offered evidence pertinent to the issue. At the opening of the case counsel for the defendant moved for a dismissal of the complaint on the ground, inter alia, that it does not state a cause of action. The court reserved decision. At the close of the plaintiff's case the defendant's counsel renewed his motion, without stating any ground, and again the court reserved its decision. The defendant then introduced some testimony and rested, whereupon the case was declared closed. Then the defendant's counsel renewed his motion "on the grounds already stated," and again the court reserved its decision. There were no findings of fact or conclusions of law, and the presiding justice neither made nor signed any decision except the so-called judgment which appears in the record. That judgment, it will be noted, makes no decision on any question of fact or law in the case, and does nothing more than to adjudge "that the plaintiff's complaint be dismissed with costs, amounting to $107.75."
The defendant appealed from the so-called judgment, and the Appellate Division considered the case on the merits, reversed the judgment on the law and the facts and directed a new trial.
The defendant now appeals to this court, and the first question with which we are confronted is whether the record in its present form warrants any review either in the Appellate Division or in this court. The answer to that question must be given in the light of what was actually done. The record contains no findings of fact or conclusions of law, and it is conceded that none were made. Neither does it appear that the trial justice made or signed any decision upon any question of law or fact with directions to enter judgment in accordance therewith. In that behalf the appeal book discloses nothing *150 beyond the declaration of the so-called judgment, "that the plaintiff's complaint be dismissed with costs, amounting to $107.75." Since every valid judgment must rest upon a decision of one or more questions of law or fact, or both, it is obvious that the judgment herein was prematurely entered. It is founded upon no stated decision either of law or fact, and there was, therefore, no authority for its entry. This characterization of the record depends, not upon the legal effect or form of the judgment, but upon the circumstance that there has been no decision of any nature upon which to base a judgment. In this condition of the case it is manifestly unnecessary to discuss the question whether the so-called judgment rests merely on a nonsuit or on a decision finally disposing of the merits. Whether it is one or the other will of course clearly appear when the record has been amended by adding to it the decision of the trial justice and a judgment consistent therewith.
In the present condition of this record there is nothing to authorize an appeal either to the Appellate Division or to this court. The Appellate Division should have dismissed the appeal and have sent the case back to the Special Term for an amplification of the record. (People ex rel. Havron v.Dalton,
The order should be reversed and the action remitted to the Special Term for decision, without costs to either party.
WILLARD BARTLETT, Ch. J., HISCOCK, COLLIN, CUDDEBACK, HOGAN and CARDOZO, JJ., concur.
Order reversed, etc.