Venegas v. SkaggsVenegas v. Skaggs
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Attorney Michael Mitchell (“Mitchell”) appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to intervene in his former client’s Section 1983 action. Mitchell moved to intervene in order to confirm a $406,000 lien for attorney’s fees on the judgment. Juan Francisco Venegas (“Venegas”), the former client, cross-appeals the district court’s ruling that Mitchell’s entitlement to attorney’s fees is not limited to the
I.
Mitchell successfully represented Vene-gas in his Section 1983 action against Long Beach police officers for false arrest and two and one-half years’ imprisonment for a murder conviction obtained using perjured evidence. Venegas retained Mitchell in
The contingent fee agreement Venegas and Mitchell entered into provided Mitchell with a $10,000 retainer and a contingent fee of 40% of the “gross amount recovered,” less the retainer. The agreement also required Mitchell to apply for attorney’s fees under
Client agrees that Attorney may, at Attorney’s election, and at any time, intervene as a party in the action for the sole purpose of protecting Attorney’s interest in and to any attorney fee award which may be made by the trial or any appellate court.
The agreement explicitly covered only Mitchell’s handling of the trial:
This agreement covers one trial only. In the event there is a mistrial or an appeal, the parties may mutually agree upon terms and conditions of Attorney’s employment, but are not obligated to do so. On January 8, 1986, Venegas consented
in writing to the association of another law firm, with the attorneys to share the contingent fee 50-50.
At a jury trial Mitchell obtained a $2.12 million verdict for Venegas. After post trial motions this award entitled Mitchell to $406,000 under the contingent fee agreement. Mitchell moved for attorney’s fees under
Venegas refused Mitchell’s offer to represent him on appeal for another 10 percent of the judgment, and substituted counsel on September 14, 1986. He maintains that he “fired” Mitchell, notwithstanding the agreement’s coverage of “one trial only.”
On October 20, 1986 Mitchell filed his motion to intervene for the purpose of confirming a lien on the judgment for attorney’s fees under the contingent fee agreement. Mitchell sought intervention as of right under
The district court denied Mitchell’s motion to intervene but declined to invalidate the contingent fee agreement, leaving any dispute over the contract terms to a state court action. The court did, however, decide that the difference between the contingent fee and court-award fees is not a “windfall” to which Mitchell is not entitled.
II.
Since we conclude that the district court erred in denying Mitchell permissive intervention, we need not decide whether Mitchell is entitled to intervention as of right. We review the denial of permissive intervention for an abuse of discretion. Willard v. City of Los Angeles, 803 F.2d 526, 527 (9th Cir.1986).
A court may grant permissive intervention under
If the court had limited its rulings in Venegas’s action to the merits of his Section 1983 claims, then its finding of no “common question of law or fact” might have been justified. In fact, the court chose to decide a question that was common with, and indeed central to, Mitchell’s motion. In the course of hearing Vene-gas’s action, the court decided that Mitchell’s entitlement to attorney’s fees is not limited under federal law to the
The existence of a common question of law or fact does not automatically entitle an applicant to intervene. Rather,
In exercising its discretion to grant or deny permissive intervention, a court must consider whether the intervention will “unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties.”
In addition to the interests of the original parties, a court in deciding whether to permit intervention should evaluate whether the movant’s “interests are adequately represented by existing parties.” State of California v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 792 F.2d 775, 779 (9th Cir.1986). In the case of a former attorney seeking intervention in order to secure rights under a contingent fee agreement, “[njeither of the existing parties is concerned with protecting the [attorney’s] interest.” Gaines v. Dixie Carriers, Inc., 434 F.2d 52, 54 (5th Cir.1970) (holding that under such circumstances, former attorney may intervene as of right). Venegas, in fact, strenuously opposes Mitchell’s claim to attorney’s fees. In Venegas’s view, Mitchell is entitled to at most about a sixth of the fees he demands. Since the district court chose to rule on issues central to Mitchell’s claim, it should have allowed Mitchell to intervene so that he could defend his position.
If this court refused to . . . exercise jurisdiction [over a discharged attorney’s motion for fees, the discharged attorney] would be forced to file a suit in state court. The parties to this action would then face a considerable delay and expense in having [the discharged attorney’s] claim determined. They would be required to make a record that would consist of facts and arguments that are already before this court. Finally, the parties would be forced to litigate before a judge who lacks the long experience with this case, and with these parties, that this court has had. Equity, along with judicial economy, dictate that this court employ its ancillary jurisdiction to hear this motion.
We hasten to add that we are not holding that an attorney seeking to defend a contingency fee contract may intervene as of right in the underlying action. Compare Stockton v. United States, 493 F.2d 1021, 1023-24 (9th Cir.1974) (rejecting attorney’s right to intervene to assert a claim for attorney’s fees in tax refund suit)4 with Gaines v. Dixie Carriers, Inc., 434 F.2d 52, 53-54 (5th Cir.1970) (recognizing dismissed law firm’s right to intervene in underlying maritime action in order to protect its contingency fee). The trial court abused its discretion when it denied Mitchell permissive intervention because it chose to address the merits of his contingency fee agreement.
III.
Venegas contends that the district court erred in holding that
As we recognized in Hamner v. Rios, 769 F.2d 1404, 1409 (9th Cir.1985), a statutory award under
Since the legislative history of
We conclude that a rule limiting an attorney’s fees under a contingent agreement to the statutory award would be inconsistent with Congress’s goal of promoting respect for civil rights by enhancing “the arsenal” available to plaintiffs in civil rights cases. Congress has recognized that civil rights legislation can be effective only if the victims of civil rights abuses are able to attract attorneys to litigate their claims. See City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 576-78, 106 S.Ct. 2686, 2695-96, 91 L.Ed.2d 466 (1986) (discussing legislative history of
To hold that the statutory award is the maximum amount of fees available to counsel, notwithstanding a contingent fee arrangement providing for a higher fee, overlooks the basic nature and purpose of contingent fee agreements. Contingent fee agreements enable plaintiffs with meritorious claims but limited finances to obtain counsel, and they are set to account for the risk of nonrecovery. If attorneys begin to view statutory fees in civil rights cases as inadequate, use of the statutory award as a ceiling on fees could lead to a reluctance to represent civil rights plaintiffs, thus frustrating the intent of Congress.
Hamner, 769 F.2d at 1409 (emphasis added).
The need for private arrangements which “account for the risk of nonrecovery” is greater now than it was when we decided Hamner. When Hamner was decided, the rule in this Circuit was that courts could factor in “the risk of nonrecovery” in awarding attorney’s fees under
The plurality in Delaware Valley assumed that mechanisms existed outside of statutory awards which encourage attorneys to accept risky civil rights cases. Specifically, the Court contended that its decision to eliminate “risk-enhancement” from
The Supreme Court’s holding on waivers of attorney’s fees awards under
Venegas argues that contingent fees in excess of the statutory awards are “windfalls” for civil rights attorneys. It is clear Congress intended that attorneys fees in civil rights cases would be “adequate to attract competent counsel, but [would not be] windfalls to attorneys.” S.Rep. No. 94-1011, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. at 6, U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.News 1976, pp. 5908, 5913. The Second Circuit has limited attorneys’ entitlements under contingent agreements to the statutory awards in order to prevent “windfall recoveries for successful attorneys.” Wheatley v. Ford, 679 F.2d 1037, 1041 (2d Cir.1982). See also Sargeant v. Sharp, 579 F.2d 645, 648 (1st Cir.1978) (suggesting that “courts are . . . rightly concerned that windfall fees be avoided and that an otherwise reasonable fee not be made excessive by virtue of a fee agreement”). The fear of windfall recoveries, however, is unfounded for two reasons. First, there is no reason to believe that civil rights plaintiffs will routinely compromise their own interests by agreeing to one-sided contingent fee agreements. See, e.g., Pharr, 704 F.2d at 1218 (courts should give deference to a contingent fee contract because it “represents [the attorney’s and client’s] notion of what constitutes a reasonable fee”); Hagge v. Bauer, 827 F.2d 101, 111 (7th Cir.1987) (“Our latest decisions have advanced the notion that the contingent fee arrangement should carry considerable evidentiary significance in ascertaining a reasonable fee award”). Second, by reviewing contingent
IV.
In this case, we find that the district court did not err in ruling that the contingency fee agreement is reasonable. We review a district court’s award of reasonable attorney fees under
The district court found that Mitchell’s contingent fee is reasonable because it reflected the risk of nonrecovery he assumed in accepting this case.8 We find no basis in the record to support a ruling that the district court abused its discretion in making this finding. Venegas has presented no evidence suggesting that a 40% contingent fee is not standard in California for civil rights cases, or that his particular case posed an unusually low risk for a civil rights case. Moreover, we previously recognized that this case turned on the resolution of a “difficult question of credibility.” Venegas v. Wagner, 831 F.2d 1514, 1519 (9th Cir.1987). Compare Hagge v. Bauer, 827 F.2d at 112 (upholding statutory award equivalent to a 40% contingency fee in a civil rights case even though the case involved “settled precedent, and no defense of immunity”).
CONCLUSION
We conclude that the district court abused its discretion in denying Mitchell’s motion to intervene. We remand to the district court to determine the merits of Mitchell’s motion to confirm a lien. We affirm the district court’s ruling that Mitchell’s entitlement to attorney’s fees is not limited to the
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.
Notes
. The district court reviewed the 40% contingency fee for reasonableness, even though Mitchell is at most entitled to half of the fee because he agreed to share the fee with other attorneys who participated in the case.
. The district court also indicated that it refused Mitchell‘s motion to intervene because “California courts have uniformly held that a discharged attorney may not intervene in his client’s lawsuit to establish or enforce his lien.” Since “[i]t is wholly clear that the right to intervene in a civil action pending in a United States District Court is governed by
. Venegas challenges the contingent fee agreement on a number of state law grounds, including fraudulent representation.
. In Stockton, the court noted that it was not deciding “whether as a general proposition an attorney’s interest in a fee is a sufficient interest to call for intervention of right under
.In Blanchard v. Bergeron, 831 F.2d 563, 564 (5th Cir.1987), the Fifth Circuit held that a
. It is settled that, since “courts retain supervisory power over the attorney-client relationship [and since] fees are central to that relationship, . . . contingent fee arrangements are . . . subject to the courts’ supervision.” Cooper v. Singer, 719 F.2d 1496, 1505 (10th Cir.1983). See Starr v. Bowen, 831 F.2d 872, 874 (9th Cir.1987); Hamner, 769 F.2d at 1409. See also Hoffert v. General Motors Corp., 656 F.2d 161, 165 (5th Cir.1981); Allen v. United States, 606 F.2d 432, 435-36 (4th Cir.1979); Dunn v. H.K. Porter Co. Inc., 602 F.2d 1105, 1108 (3rd Cir.1979); ABA Canons of Professional Ethics, Canon 13 (1908) (“A contract for a contingent fee . . . should always be subject to the supervision of a court, as to its reasonableness“).
. Where the district court concludes that a contingent fee that exceeds the statutory award is reasonable, the plaintiff may be required to pay the difference between the 1988 award paid by the defendant and the contingent fee. Hamner, 769 F.2d at 1409. The plaintiffs attorneys are not entitled to both the statutory award and the full amount of the contingent fee.
. In Hamner, we recognized that a court has the discretion to consider a number of other factors in determining the reasonableness of a contingent fee, including the gap between the statutory award and the contingent fee and the quality of the attorneys performance. Hamner, 769 F.2d at 1409-10. See also Sears v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 779 F.2d 1450, 1456 (10th Cir.1985) (considering attorney’s length of participation, level of performance, success, and level of finances as well as “risk of nonrecovery” in deciding reasonableness of a contingent fee in a civil rights case).