Venard v. CrossVenard v. Cross
- Reporters:
- Before:
- Brewer
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Brewer, J.:This was an action brought by the plaintiff in the district court to abate a mill dam, and perpetually enjoin defendant from maintaining it. Upon the final hearing judgment was rendered for defendant, and the plaintiff brings the case here on error.
*260
“ Sect. 1. “When any person may be desirous of erecting and maintaining a mill dam upon Ms own land, across any water course, and shall deem it necessary to raise the water by means of such dam, or occupy grounds for mill-yard, so as to damage, by overflowing or otherwise, real estate not owned by him, nor damaged by consent, he may obtain the right to erect and maintain said dam by proceeding as in this act provided.”*
The remaining sections prescribe the steps to be taken. They provide for the appointment of commissioners, the assessment and payment of damages, and for appeals from the award of the commissioners. This act practically takes from one individual the use of his property and gives it to another. It is defended on the ground that thereby a power of great value is utilized, which otherwise would be wholly lost, and because the use by the latter is of far greater public benefit than that of the former. The flowing of water furnishes one of the strongest, most manageable, and most serviceable of natural forces, and has been resorted to in all ages of the world as one of the greatest helps to human industry. But flowing through the ordinary channel of a stream, it is comparatively an idle, valueless, wasted power. OMy when its flow is checked, regulated, controlled, does this power become a helpful servant of man. This is accomplished ordinarily by the erection of a dam. But the building cf the dam frequently results in the (overflowing of land situated above the dam. The use of the land thus overflowed is sacrificed to the acquisition of the iwater-power. And when the land overflowed belongs to a party other than the builder of the dam, the former loses the use of his land that the latter may obtain the use of the water*261power. Of the benefits resulting from thus utilizing this power it is needless to speak. In some communities it has been and still is an incalculable blessing. Judge McCurdy, in Olmstead v. Camp, 33 Conn., 551, says: “It would be difficult to conceive a greater public benefit than garnering up the waste waters of innumerable streams and rivers and ponds and lakes, and compelling them with a gigantic energy to turn machinery, and drive mills, and thereby build up cities and villages, and extend the business, the wealth, the population, and the prosperity of the State.” Here with us in Kansas, owing to the physical conformation of the State and the general use of steam as a motive power the comparative value of water power, secured by mill-dams, will probably always be slight. Yet in each particular instance the same reasoning which sustains the Mill-Dam Acts of Massachusetts and Connecticut will sustain that of Kansas. The benefits resulting to the community at large from thus utilizing an otherwise wasted power are so great that it is deemed fair to consider the securing of it a public purpose. Angelí in his Treatise on Watercourses, § 487 says: “ It seems however to be abundantly well settled that it is sufficiently for the public good; for the statutory law, of which we have given an account, has been too long engrafted in the jurisprudence of the states in which it has been enacted, revised and amended through a long course of legislation, and too steadily sustained by judicial sanction, to be now declared not to be within the eminent domain of the government. More especially should this long and uninterrupted public acquiescence be deemed conclusive, when it is considered that the line of demarcation between a use that is public and one that is strictly and entirely private, is a line not easy to be drawn.” Pursuing the line of argument adopted by this court in the case of the Board of County Com‘rs of Leavenworth Co. v. Miller, (the railway bond case, 7 Kas., 479,) we arrive at the same result. Eor at the time of the adoption of the constitution acts similar to this had been sanctioned by the legislatures, executives, and courts of many of the states, and almost universally upheld. And if the people *262had not intended that the legislature of this State should exercise a like power they would have imposed a clear limitation. Without pursuing the discussion any further, we hold the Mill-Dam Act one within the scope of the legislative power granted by the constitution to the legislature, and not in conflict with the terms of that instrument. It is perhaps no more than right to say that, regarding this question simply in the light of principle, one member of the court at least, dissents entirely from the reasoning which would uphold the validity of this act.
In regard to the regularity of the last proceedings had by defendant under said act, it is sufficient to say that we consider them regular and conforming to the statute.
For the reasons heretofore given, the judgment of the court below will be reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings.
All the Justices concurring.
Notes
[* This section was amended by ch. 47, Laws of 1869, p.132; hut the amendment does not affect the question here decided. — Reporter.]