JOSE L. VELLON v.
No. 39 MAP 2022
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA MIDDLE DISTRICT
DECIDED: April 19, 2023
TODD, C.J., DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, BROBSON, JJ. [J-76-2022] SUBMITTED: Oсtober 14, 2022
OPINION
JUSTICE DONOHUE
In this appeal, we are tasked with interpreting Section 3806 of Pennsylvania’s Vehicle Code,
I. Facts and Procedural History
The facts underlying this appeal are undisputed. On March 25, 2016, Appellant Jose L. Vellon (“Vellon“) was arrested for DUI of alcohol pursuant to Subsection 3802(a)(1) of the Vehicle Code,
Vellon pleaded guilty to the First and Second DUIs. On October 19, 2017, he was sentenced on both DUI violations. As to
Subsequently, Appellee Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing (“PennDOT“) informed Vellon that it would be susрending his driving privileges as a collateral consequence of his DUI convictions pursuant to Section 3804 of the Vehicle Code,
(i) Except as provided for in subparagraph (iii), 12 months for an ungraded misdemeanor or misdemeanor of the second degree under this chapter.
(ii) 18 months for a misdemeanor of the first degree or felony of the second or third degree under this chapter.
(iii) There shall be no suspension for an ungraded misdemeanor under section 3802(a) where the person is subject to the penalties provided in subsection (a) and the person has no prior offense.
For the First DUI, PennDOT advised Vellon that, pursuant to Subsection 3804(e)(2)(i) of the Vehicle Code, his license would be suspended for one year, effective April 19, 2019. Concerning the Second DUI, PennDOT reported that, pursuant to Subsection 3804(e)(2)(ii) of the Vehicle Code, Vellon’s driving privileges would be suspended for eighteen months, effective October 19, 2017.5 Vellon filed a summary appeal in the court of common pleas challenging his license suspension solely for the First DUI.
The trial court held a hearing on March 1, 2018. At that hearing, Vellon argued that PennDOT erroneously suspended his license for the First DUI. Because the First DUI resulted in a conviction for an ungraded misdemeanor under Subsection 3802(a) and Vellon had no prior DUI violations, he contended that, pursuant to Subsection 3804(e)(2)(iii) of the Vehicle Code, PennDOT should not have suspended his driver’s license for the First DUI. See
Vellon then asked the trial court to reconsider its order. The court granted this request and later entertained further argument on the validity of PennDOT’s suspension of Vellon’s license for the First DUI. Thereafter, the court again concluded that PennDOT properly suspended Vellon’s driving privileges. The court oрined that Subsection 3806(b)(3) of the Vehicle Code “clearly allows two or more offenses sentenced on the same day to be considered prior offenses of each other.” Trial Court Opinion, 12/30/2019, at 7. The court bolstered this conclusion by suggesting that, “if the legislature had not intended this interpretation, it would have stated that ‘the offense for which defendant is sentenced first shall be a prior offense within the meaning of this subsection’ or words to similar effect.” Id. Vellon appealed to the Commonwealth Court, which affirmed the trial court’s order in a published opinion. Vellon v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 263 A.3d 679 (Pa. Commw. 2021).
In the Commonwealth Court, Vellon argued, in relevant part, as follows:
[T]he trial court erred in concluding that the definition of “prior offense” set forth in Section 3806(a) of the Vehicle Code includes a conviction for which judgment of sentence has not been imposed before the sentencing on the present offense—i.e., that Section 3806(b)(3) of the Vehicle Code somehow permits [Vellon’s] Second DUI to be a prior offense of his First DUI such that [PennDOT] could suspend [Vellon’s] operating privilege for one year under Section 3804(e) of the Vehicle Code[.]
Id. at 681-82.
In reviewing the relevant portions of the Vehicle Code, the Commonwealth Court observed that, “to qualify for the exception to the operating privilege suspension set forth in Section 3804(e)(2)(iii), an individual must: (1) be convicted for an ungraded misdemeanor under Section 3802(a); (2) be subject to the penalties in Section 3804(a) (relating to first-time DUI offenses); and (3) have no prior offense.” Id. at 682. The intermediate court then noted the parties’ agreement that Vellon’s First DUI met conditions (1) and (2). Thus, the court opined, “Whether [Vellon] meets the requirements of the exception set forth in Section 3804(e)(2)(iii) ... hinges on whether he has a prior offense as that term is defined in Section 3806 of the Vehicle Code.” Id. at 682-83. The court then attempted to construe the Vehicle Code utilizing the well-settled tenets of statutory сonstruction. Id. at 684-85.
In so doing, the Commonwealth Court first addressed Vellon’s contention that “the definition of ‘prior offense’ in Section 3806(a) of the Vehicle Code applies to Section 3806(b)(3) such that it does not permit a finding that [Vellon’s] Second DUI is a prior offense of his First DUI.” Id. at 685. Vellon further argued that “the exclusionary language in Section 3806(a)—i.e., ‘except as set forth in subsection (b)’—does not exempt Section 3806(b)(3) from the definition of ‘prior offense’ in Section 3806(a).” Id. The court noted that Vellon supported his position by relying on this Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Mock, 219 A.3d 1155 (Pa. 2019), and the Commonwealth Court’s opinion in Diveglia v. Department of Transportation, 220 A.3d 1167 (Pa. Commw. 2019).
The Commonwealth Court explained that, in Mock, this Court “considered whether the timeline for the ten-year lookback provision under Section 3806(b)(1)(i) of the Vehicle Code begins
The Commonwealth Court agreed with Vellon that Mock and its own precedent “unequivocally establish that the definition of ‘prior offense’ as set forth in Section 3806(a) of the Vehicle Code applies to Section 3806(b) of the Vehicle Code, and that Section 3806(a)’s exclusionary language does not permit Section 3806(b)(3) to operate independently of the general definition of ‘prior offense.’” Id. The court, however, posited that it was required to further analyze the Vehicle Code because this precedent was not dispositive as to the correct operation of Section 3806(b)(3) of the Vehicle Code.” Id. The Commonwealth Court rejected Vellon’s argument that Subsection 3806(b)(3) requires that the lookback and “on or after date” rules of Subsection 3806(b)(1)(i) and (ii) apply in a circumstance where an individual is sentenced to two or more offenses on the same day, and that the language “within the meaning of this subsection” in Subsection 3806(b)(3) limits its operation only to Subsection 3806(b)(1)(i)-(ii). Id. In so doing, the Commonwealth Court primarily relied upon the principle of statutory interpretation that requires a court to construe a statute, if possible, to give effect to all its provisions. Id. at 687 (citing, inter alia,
Instead, the Commonwealth Court interpreted “Section 3806(b)(3) of the Vehicle Code as contemplating the possibility that
Vellon filed a petition for allowance of appeal, which we granted to consider the following issue, as phrased by Vellon:
Whether the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania erred in affirming the Court of Common Pleas denial of the statutory appeal of suspension of operating privileges based on a finding that
75 Pa.C.S. [§] 3806(b)(3) requires that each pending multiple driving under the influence offense for which sentencing occurs on the same day be considered a “prior offense” for all other offenses, without regard to whether sentence has yet been imposed, as provided for in the general definition of “prior offense” under75 Pa.C.S [§] 3806(a) ?
Vellon v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 274 A.3d 1226 (Pa. 2022) (per curiam).
II. Arguments of the Parties
In his brief to this Court, Vellon explains that, pursuant to Subsection 3804(e)(2)(iii) of the Vehicle Code, PennDOT should not suspend the driving privileges of a person convicted of DUI if the following thrеe criteria are present: (1) the licensee must be convicted of violating
Vellon notes that the first and second criteria are not in dispute in this matter. Agreeing with the Commonwealth Court, he posits that the sole issue in this appeal is “whether a prior offense within the meaning of
Next, Vellon takes issue with the Commonwealth Court’s contemplation that his interpretation of “prior offense” could result in a licensee having no prior offenses
Vellon posits that absurd results flow from the Commonwealth Court’s interpretation of Subsection 3806(b)(3). “The second offense DUI, for which the defendant has not been sentenced, to be counted as a first offense DUI for sentencing on the first offense DUI, was not the intent of the [L]egislature.” Id. Vellоn states that Subsection 3806(b)(3) could, but does not, state: “If the defendant is sentenced for two or more offenses in the same day, both offenses are considered prior offenses for one another.” Id.
Instead, Vellon contends that Subsection 3806(a) provides a clear definition of “prior offense” that allows a DUI violation to qualify as a “prior offense” only for convictions “for which judgment of sentence has been imposed before the sentencing on the present violation.” Id. at 19-20. Here, when the trial court sentenced Vellon in open court for the First DUI, he had not been sentenced for the Second DUI. Accordingly, in Vellоn’s view, the Second DUI does not fit within Subsection 3806(a)’s general definition of “prior offense[,]” which must be read into subsection (b) pursuant to Mock, and therefore, the Second DUI cannot operate as a “prior offense” under Subsection 3806(b)(3).
Vellon concedes that PennDOT appropriately suspended his license for the Second DUI, as it correctly utilized his First DUI in categorizing him as a repeat offender for purposes of the Second DUI. Thus, he believes that he “did not elude any prior conviction based on his being sentenced for both DUI offenses on the same day[,]” fulfilling the legislative intent of Subsection 3806(b)(3). Id. at 21. For these reasons, Vellon asks this Cоurt to reverse the order of the Commonwealth Court.
In response, PennDOT insists that the Commonwealth Court correctly interpreted the Vehicle Code in this matter. It highlights that the Legislature amended Section 3806 in 2016 to add Subsection 3806(b)(3). However, contrary to Vellon’s position (and in contravention of Mock), PennDOT posits that, “[i]n accordance with the exception to
While PennDOT agrees with Vellon that the Legislature does not promulgate laws with the intention of creating absurd results,
In closing, PennDOT “acknowledges that there may be instances where a criminal trial court will find that [a d]efendant did not have a ‘prior offense’ in accordance with
III. Analysis
The answer to the sole issue in this appeal requires the Court to interpret Section 3806 of the Vehicle Code. “Issues of statutory interpretation present this Court with questions of law; accordingly, our standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary.” Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n v. Andrew Seder/The Times Leader, 139 A.3d 165, 172 (Pa. 2016). The task of interpreting a statute is guided by the Statutory Construction Act,
Pursuant to that Act, “[t]he object of all statutory interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly.”
The Statutory Construction Act also instructs that, in ascertaining the intention of the General Assembly in enacting a statute, several presumptions may be used. Id. § 1922. Among those presumptions is that “the General Assembly intends the entire statute to be effective and certain.” Id. § 1922(2). We also may presume that the General Assembly does not intend absurd or unreasonable results. Id. § 1922(1). As this Court wisely stated over sixty years ago, to avoid such results, we “must read [statutes] in the light of reason and common sense.” Ayers v. Morgan, 154 A.2d 788, 789 (Pa. 1959). Lastly, we may presume that the General Assembly does not intend to violate the Constitution of the United States or this Commonwealth.
This case is not our first interpretation of the current version of Section 3806 of the Vehicle Code. In Mock, we determined that it was the intent of the General Assembly that the definition of “prior offense” contained in Subsection 3806(a) is incorporated into the use of that term in Subsection 3806(b), especially where such interpretation gives effect to both subsections. Mock, 219 A.3d at 1164. Here, we deal again with the interplay between the two subsections; this time with the specific interpretative guidance adopted in Mock.
With Mock and the rules of statutory construction as the backdrop, we reject the Commonwealth Court’s interpretation of
We look first to the unreasonableness of the Commonwealth Court’s holding. If the trial court had sentenced Vellon for the First DUI on a day prior to when it adjudicated the Second DUI, then, pursuant to Subsection 3806(a)’s general definition of “prior offense,” Vellon would not have had a prior offense for purposes of the First DUI. He, however, would have had a prior offense for purposes of the Second DUI when he was sentenced for that violation on a later day. See
If the trial court would have sentenced Vellon for the Second DUI on a day prior to when it sentenced him for the First DUI, then Vellon still would have received only one recidivist license suspension. This is so because he would have been convicted and sentenced on the Second DUI before he was convicted and sentenced on “the present violation,” i.e., the First DUI. See
The interpretation of Subsection 3806(b)(3) adopted by the Commonwealth Court leads to the unreasonable and absurd result that, when a defendant has no previous DUI violations and is sentenced for two DUI violations on different days, he is subject to one recidivist license suspension. Yet, when a defendant has no previous DUI violations and is sentenced for two DUI violations on the same day, he is subject to two recidivist license suspensions. Thus, under the Commonwealth Court’s holding, the mere happenstance of the timing of sentencing based upon a court’s schedule, availability of counsel, inclement weather or a host of other idiosyncratic occurrences that result in the entry of multiple sentences on the same day also results in the imposition of increased collateral consequences that would not have occurred but for such fortuities.8
Moreover, Subsection 3806(b)(3) is amenable to an interpretation that is not
This interpretation of Subsection 3806(b)(3) is supported by a chronological reading of the timing provisions in subsection (b). Subsections 3806(b)(2) and (3) instruct:
(2) The court shall calculate the number of prior offenses, if any, at the time of sentencing.
(3) If the defendant is sentenced for two or more offenses in the same day, the offenses shall be considered prior offenses within the meaning of this subsection.
Read together, these subsections require the sentencing court to calculate the number of prior offenses at the time of sentencing (on the present violation) and that, in making this calculation, sentences entered on the same day for two or more offenses to which Section 3806 applies shall be considered prior offenses for the purpose of the applicable penalties on the present violation. This interpretation evidences the Legislature’s intention to preclude a volume discount on multiple same day sentences by making clear that the two or more offenses shall be prior offenses when making the calculation under Subsection 3806(b)(2). Thus, Subsection 3806(b)(3) makes clear that when two or more judgments of sentence are entered on the same day, that timing does not impact the calculation of each of the sentences as a prior offense at the time of sentencing on the present violation.
The object of our interpretation of Subsection 3806(b)(3) is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly. Our conclusion that Subsection 3806(b)(3) applies to the calculation of prior offenses after the same day imposition of multiple sentences gives effect to all of the relevant provisions of Section 3806, avoids absurd and unreasonable results and comports with the presumption that the General Assembly does not intend to violate the state or federal Constitutiоns. Moreover, it employs the interpretation of Section 3806 recently articulated in Mock.
Our interpretation of Subsection 3806(b)(3) makes clear that it has no application to the circumstances present in this
Chief Justice Todd and Justice Wecht join the opinion.
Justice Mundy files a concurring opinion in which Justice Dougherty joins.
Justice Brobson did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.
[J-76-2022] - 18
Notes
(a) General rule.--Except as set forth in subsection (b), the term “prior offense” as used in this chapter shall mean any conviction for which judgment of sentence has been imposed, adjudicаtion of delinquency, juvenile consent decree, acceptance of Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition or other form of preliminary disposition before the sentencing on the present violation for any of the following:
- an offense under section 3802 (relating to driving under influence of alcohol or controlled substance);
- an offense under former section 3731;
- an offense substantially similar to an offense under paragraph (1) or (2) in another jurisdiction; or
- any combination of the offenses set forth in paragraph (1), (2) or (3).
(b) Timing.--
- For purposes of sections 1553(d.2) (relating to occupational limited license), 1556 (relating to ignition interlock limited license), 3803 (relating to grading), 3804 (relating to penalties) and 3805 (relating to ignition interlock), the prior offense must have occurred:
- within 10 years prior to the date of the offense for which the defendant is being sentenced; or
- on or after the date of the offense for which the defendant is being sentenced.
- The court shall calculate the number of prior offenses, if any, at the time of sentencing.
- If the defendant is sentenced for two or more offenses in the same day, the offenses shall be considered prior offenses within the meaning of this subsection.
(a) General impairment.--
- An individual may not drive, operate or be in actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle after imbibing a sufficient amount of alcohol such that the individual is rendered incapable of safely driving, operating or being in actual physical control of the movement of the vehicle.
ARD is a pretrial disposition of certain cases, governed primarily by Chapter 3 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure, which suspends formal criminal proceedings before conviction and provides the accused with certain rehabilitative conditions, the completion of which results in the dismissal of the pending criminal charges and a clean record for the defendant.
J.F. v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 245 A.3d 658, 661-62 (Pa. 2021).
(c) Highest rate of alcohol.--An individual may not drive, operate or be in actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle after imbibing a sufficient amount of alcohol such that the alcohol concentration in the individual‘s blood or breath is 0.16% or higher within two hours after the individual has driven, operated or been in actual physical control of the movement of the vehicle.
The Commonwealth Court in Diveglia held that the second-in-time DUI qualified as a prior offense to the first-in-time DUI. In so doing, the intermediate court “emphasized that the plain language of Section 3806 considers any conviction for which judgment of sentence has been imposed to be a prior offense, regardless of the date of occurrencе of the violation itself.” Id. Consequently, the court ruled that Diveglia’s second-in-time DUI conviction constituted a prior offense for purposes of her first-in-time DUI conviction.