Plaintiff Reza Veiseh transferred the real property in question to a custodian for the benefit of his minor daughter pursuant to the California Uniform Transfers to Minors Act ( Prob. Code, §§ 3900 - 3925 ). The act requires the property to be held for the use and benefit of thе minor. Veiseh did not comply with this requirement. Instead, he maintained possession and control of the real property for his own use and benefit, rather than the use and
California case law establishes that "lawful possession" simply means actual, peaceful possession and a person with actual possеssion can sue for trespass even if he or she does not have any legal rights in the land. We conclude Veiseh's failure to comply with the California Uniform Transfers to Minors Act did not render his possession of the real property unlawful for purposes of California trespass law. The general definition of lawful possession applies in this case bеcause, among other things, nothing in the text of the statute or the record supports the inference that the legislation was enacted to protect trespassers or otherwise define who could pursue a cause of action for trespass. The trial court's explicit findings about Veiseh's possession and control are sufficient to establish the lawful possession element of his trespass claim.
We therefore reverse the judgment and remand for further proceedings.
FACTS
Plaintiff Reza Veiseh is a resident of Los Angeles County. In 2004, Veiseh acquired ownership of 20 acres of land assigned Kern County Assessor's Parcel Number
On Oсtober 6, 2008, Veiseh recorded a grant deed transferring the Parcel from himself to "Zohreh Afshar, as custodian for Hedyeh Veiseh, under the California Uniform Transfers to minors act." Zohreh Afshar is Veiseh's former wife and Hedyeh Veiseh is his daughter, who was a minor when the deed was recorded. At trial, Veiseh testified he and his former wife maintained good relations and were living in the same house where he had a separate room. He also testified he transferred the Parcel to the custodian and his minor daughter for estate planning reasons because, at the time, he was not feeling well and a couple of his friends had passed away.
Sometime in 2015, when his daughter was 19 or 20 years old, there was an attempt using a quitclaim deed to transfer the proрerty from her back to Veiseh. Veiseh testified he prepared the quitclaim deed and caused it to be recorded.
PROCEEDINGS
Veiseh's lawsuit against the defendants was commenced in October 2011. The operative pleading in this case is the second amended complaint. Defendant Donald Stapp and defendants William and Irma Becherer are the respondents in this appeal. Veiseh alleged that Stapp grazed cattle on land adjacent to the Parcel, which land was owned or leased by the Becherers. The three causes of action in the second amended complaint were labeled (1) injury to farmland, (2) trespass, and (3) negligence.
The trial court bifurcated the issuе of Veiseh's standing to assert the causes of action. In September 2016, the court held a three-day bench trial on that issue. Four witnesses testified at the trial-the sheriff's deputy who responded to Veiseh's call about the alleged trespass, Veiseh's former wife, William Becherer, and Veiseh. At the close of the evidence on the bifurcated issue of stаnding, the trial court orally stated its decision from the bench. The court found Veiseh "was maintaining possession and control of the premises solely for his benefit and interest. Absolutely no interest in the custodian, absolutely no interest [or] benefit for the minor. Solely in his possession and control, his benefit."
In December 2016, the court issued a statement of decision. The decision relied heavily on the California Uniform Transfers to Minors Act and concluded Veiseh "did not have lawful possession and control where the property was to be held, maintained, and used solely for the benefit оf
I. LEGAL PRINCIPLES
A. Standard of Review
"In reviewing a judgment based upon a statement of decision following a bench trial, wе review questions of law de novo. [Citation.] We apply a substantial evidence standard of review to the trial court's findings of fact. [Citation.]" ( Thompson v. Asimos (2016)
B. Standing and Trespass
1. Role of Title to the Real Estate
The question of who may sue for trespass to realty was addressed by our Supreme Court over a century ago. "It is a well-settled proposition that the proper party plaintiff in an action for trespass to real property is the person in actual possession. No averment of title in plaintiff is necessary. [Citations.]" ( Lightner Mining Co. v. Lane (1911)
"A defendant who is a mere stranger to the title will not be allowed to question the title of a plaintiff in possession of the land. It is only where the trespasser claims title himself, or claims under the real owner, that he is allowed to attack the title of the plaintiff whose peаceable possession he has disturbed." ( Id. at p. 695,.) 120 P. 771
These statements from Lightner Mining remain an accurate description of California's approach to the tort of trespass to realty. The Third District quoted portions of Lightner Mining to support its conclusion that "prior peaceful possession is sufficient to maintain the action of ejectment against one who enters as a trеspasser." ( Smpardos v. Piombo Const. Co. (1952)
2. Actual, Lawful Possession
Under Lightner Mining , the proper person to bring "an action for trespass to real property is the person in actual possession." ( Lightner Mining , supra ,
Some decisions and secondary authorities use the term "lawful possession" when describing the elements of a trespass cause of action. "The simple elements of a cause of аction for trespass or injury are (1) the plaintiff's lawful possession or right to possession, as the owner or otherwise, of described property ...." ( 5 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Pleading, § 631, p. 65, italics added.) Defendants contend Veiseh cannot establish his trespass claim because there was no evidence his possession of the Parcel was lawful.
The meaning of the term "lawful possession" was addressed by the Third District in the context of "a statutory provision conferring a right of recovery for trespass upon 'the owner of or person who is in lawful possession of land' trespassed upon by defendant's animal."
"The court held that the words 'lawful possession' as contained in the statute meant only ' "peaceable or quiеtpossession, contra-distinguished from possession which is not merely constructively tortious, but actually so." [Citation.]' [Citation.] The court declared that plaintiff's burden under the statute was satisfied by a showing of actual possession." ( Williams , supra , 41 Cal.App.3d at p. 508 ,.) 116 Cal.Rptr. 200
More recent decisions have addressed the nature of the possession needed to pursue a trespass action by stating:
" 'The cause of action for trespass affords protection for a possessory, not necessarily an ownership interest.' [Citation.] For that reason, the plaintiff need not have legal rights in the land. [Citation.] Even 'one in peaceable though wrongful possession of real property may sue in tort for forcible interference with that pоssession even in the absence of injury to his person or goods ....' " ( Spinks v. Equity Residential Briarwood Apartments (2009), 1042 [ 171 Cal.App.4th 1004 ] ( Spinks ), quoting Allen v. McMillion (1978) 90 Cal.Rptr.3d 453 , 214, 218 [ 82 Cal.App.3d 211 ] ; see 59 Cal.Jur.3d (2012) Trespass to Realty, § 8 [necessity of possession].) 147 Cal.Rptr. 77
We conclude the principles set forth in Williams and Spinks accurately describe the type of possession necessary to maintain an action for trespass to realty. Accordingly, the term "lawful possession" includes peaceable possession, which can bе established by proving actual possession-that is, subjecting the land to one's will and control. ( Williams , supra ,
3. Uniform Transfers to Minors Act
During the trial, defendants argued that Veiseh's possession of the Parcel was not lawful because he was in violation of the California Uniform Transfers to Minors Act. Under the act, property transferred to a сustodian for the benefit of a minor is held and managed by the custodian for the use and benefit of the minor. ( Prob. Code, §§ 3904, 3912, 3914.) The trial court addressed defendants' argument by finding that, following the transfer of the Parcel pursuant to the grant deed, Veiseh "continued to maintain possession and control of the [Parcel] solely for his own benefit and interest, with absolutely no intent to benefit the minor, through her custodian." The court determined Veiseh's handling of the Parcel and the benefits derived from it was not consistent with the terms of the conveyance or the California Uniform Transfers to Minors Act. Based on the failure to comply with the legislation, the court concluded Veiseh had no right of lawful possession in the Parcel during the times rеlevant to the alleged trespass.
Defendants' argument and the trial court's reliance on the California Uniform Transfers to Minors Act to conclude Veiseh did not have lawful
First, defendants' reliance on Veiseh's failure to comply with the California Uniform Transfers to Minors Act is contrary to the general principle that a person with peaceable, actual possession of real property has standing to pursue a trespass action. ( Lightner Mining , supra ,
Based on the foregoing, we conclude a failure to comply with one or more provisions of the California Uniform
The parties' main points of contention are resolved by our legal conclusions about the appropriate definition of lawful possession. All that remains is the relatively simple process of applying that definition of lawful possession to the trial court's findings of fаct.
In its statement of decision, the trial court found "that following the transfer pursuant to the grant deed, [Veiseh] continued to maintain possession and control of the subject property solely for his own benefit and interest, with absolutely no intent to benefit the minor, through her custodian." Under the principles that define lawful possession, "[e]ven 'one in peаceable though wrongful possession of real property may sue in tort for forcible interference with that possession ....' " ( Spinks , supra ,
Having established the element of lawful possession, Veiseh has shown "it is reasonably probable that the trial court would have reached a result mоre favorable to the appellant absent the error." ( Jones v. Farmers Ins. Exchange (2013)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed, and the matter remanded to the trial court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Appellant shall recover his costs on appeal.
WE CONCUR:
LEVY, Acting P.J.
SNAUFFER, J.
Notes
On appeal, these findings of fаct about possession and control of the Parcel are not disputed by the parties. Therefore, a detailed description of the supporting testimony is not provided.
California Civil Jury Instruction (CACI) No. 2000, "Trespass-Essential Factual Elements," states the plaintiff must prove "1. That [name of plaintiff ] [owned/leased/occupied/controlled] the property."
The statutory provision in question apparently is no longer in effect. It is not citеd by defendants. Despite its repeal, the statutory term "lawful possession" is still used in case law and secondary authorities.
We note that Penal Code section 602 describes the crime of trespass and makes references to "the person in lawful possession." (Pen. Code, § 602, subds. (j), (k), (l).) Penal Code section 602.8, which describes a public offense involving entry onto land under cultivation or enclosed by fence, uses the phrase "the person in lawful possession of the land." (Pen. Code, § 602.8, subds. (a), (b)(2), (b)(3).)