Lead Opinion
The parties dispute the market value of Appellant’s antique jeep, which was damaged beyond repair in a collision. Despite conflicting affidavits of ostensible experts, the trial court granted summary judgment for Appellee. The trial court also granted summary judgment on Appellant’s claim for damages for loss of use. We reverse in part and affirm in part.
Appellant contends that the deposition testimony of his two expert witnesses, Franklin E. Artes and Thomas Wray, was sufficient to establish a material fact dispute on market value. The trial court disregarded the testimony of both witnesses, albeit for different reasons. It disregarded the testimony of Mr. Artes because he admitted in his deposition that he was not licensed or trained as a professional appraiser. It disregarded the testimony of Mr. Wray because he relied on hearsay in arriving at his opinion. Regarding Mr. Wray’s analysis, the trial court commented:
You know, the expert doesn’t sound like an expert to me based on what I know about experts. And basically what he’s doing is he’s saying I keep records of what people sell their cars for. And so based upon that, I have an opinion. Well, that’s not an expert. That makes a computer an expert. You could call a computer as a witness.
We conclude that the trial court erred in disregarding the testimony of both witnesses.
Mr. Artes qualifies as an expert notwithstanding his lack of licensure or professional training. An expert is a person who is qualified in a subject matter “by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.” § 90.702, Fla. Stat. (2008) (emphasis added). This definition “applies not only to persons with scientific or technical knowledge but also to anyone with any specialized knowledge.” C. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence, § 702.1 (2010 ed.). The lack of licensure in Florida does not disqualify a person from testifying as an expert. Davis v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist.,
Mr. Artes has been the owner of Jeep-ers Den and Truck Accessories since 1997. Part of his business includes appraising and consigning Jeeps like the one Appellant owns. He learned appraisal methodology through his experience as a licensed residential appraiser for several years. He provides valuation opinions • on Jeeps for the public, including numerous insurance companies. He personally maintains records on Jeep sales and keeps himself aware of prices by use of internet websites. Although Mr. Artes testified that he does not describe himself as an “expert” because of his lack of professional training in vehicle appraisals, he considers himself “pretty knowledgeable in the Jeep industry.” Especially given the procedural posture of the case, we conclude that it was error to disregard Mr. Artes’ opinions.
Mr. Wray is a professional appraiser and expert witness who has appraised cars for over thirty years. His expertise is not in dispute. Mr. Wray’s investigation included a physical inspection of Appel
It is axiomatic that an expert may rely upon hearsay in arriving at an opinion, provided that the hearsay is of the type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field. Section 90.704, Florida Statutes (2009), makes this clear by providing that facts or data upon which an expert bases an opinion need not be admissible in evidence if they are of the type reasonably relied upon by experts in the subject. E.g. Schoenwetter v. State,
For these reasons, the trial court should not have disregarded the testimony of Appellant’s expert witness. We agree, however, with the trial court that loss of use damages were unavailable here. See Meakin v. Dreier,
REVERSED in part; AFFIRMED in part, and REMANDED.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
I fully agree with the trial court’s rejection of Appellant’s experts’ opinions of his “antique”
The record reflects that Mr. Artes based his opinion of the Jeep’s value, between $18,000 and $24,000, on his records of other Jeeps’ listing prices, not sale prices. He provided no documentation or testimo
Appellant testified that he had spent $30,000 on the Jeep since 1991. His opinion that its fair market value was between $20,000 and $30,000 relied on his records of expenditures over the years and Mr. Artes’ opinion that it was worth $18,000 to $24,000, based upon his knowledge of listing prices.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting State Farm’s motion to exclude Mr. Wray as an expert or to exclude his testimony after concluding that he did not qualify as an expert and that his determination of market value was not based on any market analysis. Mr. Wray did not use Kelley or NADA to value Appellant’s Jeep, but, instead, telephoned individuals at other vehicle customizing shops for their opinions based upon his telephoned description of Appellant’s Jeep.
Acceptance or rejection of expert testimony is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court, and its decision will not be overturned on appeal absent a showing of abuse of discretion. Doctors Co. v. State, Dept. of Ins.,
I would affirm.
Notes
. Vega never identified his 1983 CJ7 4x4 Jeep as an "antique" to State Farm. He purchased the vehicle in 1991 for $4400, and, at the time of the collision, it had about 230,000 miles on the odometer.
Concurrence Opinion
concurring.
I fully concur with the majority opinion. I write to point out that, though not argued here or below, a fact issue was clearly presented through the deposition of Appellant, who gave his own opinion of value as the owner of the property.