Veach v. VeachVeach v. Veach
The husband‘s basic position is thаt the original final judgment which only awarded rehabilitative alimony for a set period, contained no provision for the court‘s continuing jurisdiction. Consequently, he argues that under
Relying solely on the required presence оf this change of circumstance, the husband points out that the petition for modification contains no allegation of change in circumstance1 and instead dwells solely on why the wife has been “utterly incapable” of rehabilitating herself. Accordingly, he argues thаt the court had no jurisdiction to amend and extend the alimony payments. We disagree.
The original award was obviously based on the hoped for premise that the wife could and would recover from her psychiatric problems at the end of the rehabilitative period. This is not only inherent in the very definition of the word “rehabilitation,” but also in this case because the court concomitantly required the husband to pay much of her medical аnd psychiatric fees during the same period. It is equally obvious from our study of the testimony at the modification hearing that the wife suffers from continuing severe emotional and psychоlogical problems which have made her incapable of finding sustained employment. This is conceded by the husband who admits that “that much is evident in the rambling disoriented nature of her tеstimony.” However, the husband argues that this does not constitute a change in circumstances at all and points out that it is merely a continuation of the same mental illness2 which she suffered from at the time of final dissolution when only rehabilitative alimony was awarded.
There is merit to this argument, but it ignores the purpose of rehabilitative alimony. As the Second District put it in Lee v. Lee, 309 So.2d 26, 28 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975):
“Thе entire concept is another viable working tool for the courts in those casеs wherein the present dependent party in a dissolution proceeding apparently has the potential ultimately to `go it alone.‘”
We agree that the purpose of rehabilitative alimony is to sustain the dependent spouse until he or she can “go it alone.” As a consequence, if it transpires that the dependent cannot go it alоne, it would defeat the entire equitable concept of what alimony is all about tо be unable to extend
We, therefore, align ourselves with the Second District decision in Lee v. Lee, supra, and with the Fifth District holding in Myrick v. Myrick, 402 So.2d 452 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), and hold that “so lоng as the petition for modification is filed before the time for making payments has expired, the trial court continues to have subject matter jurisdiction to hear and decide the issues raised by the petition even after the rehabilitation period has run.” Id. at 453.
As to the crоss-appeal, we agree that the permanent award is very low but are compelled to affirm it under the rationale expressed in Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So.2d 1197 (Fla. 1980).
AFFIRMED.
MOORE, J., and OWEN, WILLIAM C., Jr., (Retired) Associate Judge, concur.