Vaughn v. StateVaughn v. State
On Mаrch 30, 2011, Mark Anthony Vaughn entered a nonnegotiated guilty plea to one count of theft by deception (
Vaughn appeals from that order, arguing that the restitution as ordered included amounts taken outside of the dates charged in the accusation and beyond the civil statutе of limitation and that the trial court did not follow the mandate of
On appeal frоm a restitution order, this Court reviews the record “to determine whether each party has met his or her specified burden and whether a restitution award was supported by the preponderance of the evidence.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) In the Interest of E. W.,
The record shows that the accusation, filed September 15, 2010, charged Vaughn and co-defendant William Hackworth with theft by deception in that they, “between the dates of the 12th day of January, 2008 and the 10th day of January, 2010,... did then and there obtain property, to wit: MONETARY FUNDS, . . . belonging to ROME ELECTRIC MOTOR WORKS” by facilitating and accepting fraudulent payments for which no goods or services were obtained. (Emphasis supplied.) The amount reportedly taken during that period was approximately $57,000. The restitution order, however, required Vaughn to repay $260,637.02 based on his and Hackworth’s theft of funds over a nearly 12-year period from May 1998 through February 2010.
Robert Bowling from Rome Electric testified at the sentencing hearing that Vaughn was in charge of ordering supplies and was allowed to initial his own invoices, which the company then paid. Hackworth
William Bowling, brother of Robert and another officer of the company, testified at the restitution hearing and presented a tabulation of all the fraudulent invoices, beginning May 14, 1998 and ending February 12, 2010, totaling $260,637.02. William Bowling also testified that, when the theft was initially reported to police in 2011, the dates of false invoices reported were from January 12, 2008 through February 21, 2010, amounting to $57,000. Bowling also said that he told the detective that this was just the beginning.
During the restitution hearing, Vaughn argued that restitution should be limited to the period within the dates set out in the accusation and stated that he had relied on the dates and amounts in the accusation and the State’s file. Uрon the court’s inquiring of counsel if he were limited to the dates in the accusation, the State responded
[t]he only thing that I can suggest to the Court, the way the indictment read[s] is between two specific dates. Some indictments say on or about a certain date. This one ... alleged a beginning and an ending date. That was what was presented to the police at the time the arrest was made.
Vaughn argues that the restitution as ordered included amounts taken outside of the dates charged in the accusation and beyond thе civil statute of limitation and that the trial court did not follow the mandate of
Restitution forces criminal defendants to take responsibility for damage they have caused, hеlps deter crime, and “is punishment when ordered as part of a criminal sentence.” Harris v. State,
At a restitution hearing, the State has the burden of demonstrating the amount of loss sustained by the viсtim by the preponderance of the evidence,
As charged, the accusation fеll within the four-year statute of limitation for prosecution of theft by deception and was the basis upon which Vaughn was sentenced.
Although acknowledging the two-year time span included in the accusation, the trial court nonetheless ordered restitution for the entire twelve-year рeriod. The trial court, relying on Stack-Thorpe v. State,
Because Vaughn pled guilty, we take this opportunity to overrule Beall v. State,
The only case cited in Beall for that proposition, State v. Barrett,
A defendant may waive rights which еxist for his own benefit, but he may not waive those which belong to the public generally. ... As the protection afforded by [statutes oflimitation] is statutory in origin, does not affect the cоurt’s jurisdiction, and is personal to an individual defendant, it is comparable to the speedy trial provisions ofOCGA § 17-7-171 , which can be waived.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Barrett, supra,
In Beall v. State, supra, the accused probate judge pled guilty to an accusation alleging violation of her oath of office without any plea agreement with the Stаte. Following a restitution hearing, Beall was ordered to pay $54,000, which included monies taken during a four-month period outside the statute of limitation. This Court, citing only Barrett, supra, rejected her argument that she could not be required to pay restitution for those four months, stating only that “entry of a guilty plea waives statute of limitation defenses.” As set out above, that is not the holding of Barrett, and we reverse Beall.
Vaughn’s plea agreement contained no language indicating that he was waiving his statute of limitation defense. Instead, he explicitly argued at the restitution hearing that the trial court could not assess him damages outside of the statute of limitation.
Therefore, because the trial court ordered restitution beyond the period enсompassed by the accusation and the civil statute of limitation, we reverse and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Judgment reversed and case remanded.
Notes
Hackworth died prior to Vaughn’s sentencing hearing.
The amount of the victim’s damages is only one factor for a court to consider in determining the amount of restitutiоn. The sentencing court must also consider the offender’s present financial condition and future earning capacity, as well as the goal of rehabilitation of the offender.
The exceptions are where the accused is not usually and publicly a resident of this state; where the accused and the crime are unknown; where the accused is a government officer or employee and the crime charged is theft by conversion of public property while such an officer or employee; and where the accused is a guardian or trustee and the crime charged is theft by conversion of property of the ward or beneficiary.