54 S.E.2d 511 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1949
The evidence did not sufficiently connect the defendant with the perpetration of the offense of uttering, passing, or tendering in payment a forged check to warrant the conviction for that offense under the facts of this case.
It would appear to be the position of the State that on April 15 the forged check was cashed by the prosecutor, Leo R. Amiel, at the request of the defendant, for a person unknown to Amiel, *732
and that, by virtue of the defendant's request that Amiel "cash my buddy's check," the defendant was a principal in the first degree and accomplice of the person who passed the forged check on Amiel. W think not. It appears from the evidence that the check had already been endorsed before it was presented to Amiel, as Amiel says that it was not endorsed in his presence. It does not appear that the defendant saw the check or the endorsement thereon when it was presented, or that he knew that there was a forged endorsement on the "buddy's check" which Amiel says was presented at that time. The jury by its verdict on count 1 found that the defendant did not endorse the check himself. The defendant contends that a transaction similar to the one which Amiel described in his testimony did occur, but that this occurred on March 31, not April 15, and the documentary evidence together with the oral testimony prove uncontrovertibly that the transaction described by Amiel did occur on March 31, and the transaction as first described did not occur on April 15. Amiel testified that on April 15 he cashed a check for the defendant and at his request cashed the Ellis check for the defendant's "buddy," and that he endorsed the checks and cashed them withinthe hour at the bank. The Ellis check shows that it was endorsed by Amiel and cashed at the bank on April 15. According to Amiel's testimony on cross-examination, the Vaughn check was not endorsed by him and cashed at the bank, but the Vaughn check was stampedfor deposit on April 16. The Dryden check and the Vaughn check, both dated March 15, were both endorsed by Amiel and bore the bank stamp of March 31. We think that this testimony did not sufficiently connect the defendant with the forged check being cashed so as to warrant his conviction of guilty of uttering or passing a forged check. Even if the jury indulged in possibilities instead of probabilities and found that as a matter of fact the defendant did, on April 15, request Amiel to cash his buddy's check, which was the Ellis check, there is not the slightest intimation that the defendant knew that his buddy presented the Ellis check to be cashed, or that, if he knew the Ellis check was being presented, the defendant knew that the buddy had not come by the check legally. Neither the case ofFincher v. State,
Judgment reversed. Gardner and Townsend, JJ., concur.