184 Iowa 891 | Iowa | 1918
The respective rights of the parties are de
“First. After the payment of all my just debts I give and devise all my real and personal property of every kind and description, to my wife, Hannah E. Vaughn, to have, hold and control the same so long as she remains my widow:
“Second. And I further will that all my life insurance that I may die seized of shall go to said wife.
“Third. In case my wife, Hannah E. Vaughn, shall marry again then in that case I will and devise that my said wife shall receive one third of all my real and personal property, and the residue thereof shall be equally divided between my children.”
This will was duly executed in 1887. In 1897, he executed the following codicil thereto:
“I, John Vaughn, of Knoxville, Marion County, Iowa, a farmer, do make this my codicil, hereby confirming my last will, made on the 12th day of June, 1887, and do hereby give and grant unto my said wife, Hannah E. Vaughn, the power to sell and convey my real estate and execute a deed for the same, the same as I could do if living.”
The question presented is whether the widow took a fee title or only a life estate. For the appellees, it is contended that the case is ruled by Busby v. Busby, 137 Iowa 57, In re Will of Weien, 139 Iowa 657, and kindred cases; whereas the appellants contend that the case is ruled by Brunk v. Brunk, 157 Iowa 51, and Price v. Ewell, 169 Iowa 206.
The line of distinction between the two lines of cases is narrow. It is, nevertheless, fairly marked. The guiding