165 Va. 145 | Va. | 1935
delivered the opinion of the court.
. W. N. Vaughan was convicted in the Hustings Court of
“(c) Any person, firm, or corporation engaged in the laundry business whose principal office or place of business is located outside of the city of Richmond, and who solicits laundry business in the city of Richmond, $150.00, and in addition thereto there shall be paid a license tax of $75.00 for each vehicle so used. The whole license tax assessed in this sub-section shall be paid in one sum at the time the license is issued and the same shall not be pro-rated or transferred.”
The facts certified show that prior to and at the time of his conviction Vaughan was operator and owner of a steam laundry in the town of Ashland, Virginia; that he had no plant or place of business in the city of Richmond, or in any other place except in the town of Ashland; that under an agreement with the drivers, Vaughan used and employed several trucks in soliciting laundry business for him in the city of Richmond, and in bringing it to Vaughan’s plant in Ashland where it is laundered under the agreement with the drivers. The drivers then get it and return it to the customers, collect the regular price named in the Ashland laundry ticket, retain thirty per cent thereof as their full compensation in soliciting and bringing the laundry business to Vaughan, and turn over seventy per cent thereof to Vaughan under their agreement with him.
Vaughan paid the city license tax of $150.00 as required by the above ordinance, but refused to pay the additional license tax of $75.00 each thereby prescribed for the vehicles used in soliciting laundry business for him. He contends that the said ordinance is void because it pre
The sole question is, therefore, whether that provision of the ordinance which requires laundries located outside of the city of Richmond and soliciting business in the city, to pay a license tax of $75.00 for each vehicle used in soliciting such business, is valid as held by the Hustings Court, or invalid as contended by petitioner.
We think the question is controlled by the case of Richmond Linen Supply Company v. City of Lynchburg, 160 Va. 644, 169 S. E. 554. In that case the Linen Supply Company operated a laundry in the city of Richmond. Its business consisted of renting towels and other linens to hotels, coats to barbers, dresses to waitresses, and like supplies to all customers it could secure. These supplies were delivered to its customers in Lynchburg from Richmond and, after being used until soiled, were then collected and carried back to Richmond where they were laundered by the company’s laundry and then redelivered. The defendant in that case was charged with and convicted of violating an ordinance of the city of Lynch-burg which, after prescribing the license tax to be imposed upon laundries located within that city provided as follows:
“On every person, firm or corporation (other than a laundry or dry cleaning establishment located in the city of Lynchburg, paying regular laundry or dry cleaning license tax in the city of Lynchburg) engaged in soliciting general laundry or dry cleaning work, including towel or laundry service, or the renting or furnishing of towels and linens for compensation, where said person, firm, or corporation doés the laundry or dry cleaning work thereon outside of the city, or has it done outside of the city, $300.00 per annum hot pro-rated.”
“ ‘The power of taxation is fundamental to the very existence of the government of the States. The restriction that it shall not be so exercised as to deny to any the equal protection of the laws does not compel the adoption of an iron rule of equal taxation, nor prevent variety or differences in taxation, or discretion in the selection of subjects, or the classification for taxation of properties, businesses, trades, callings, or occupations.’
“And further: ‘It is not the function of this court, in cases like 'the present, to consider the propriety or justness of the tax, to seek for the motive, or to criticize the public policy which prompted the adoption of the legislation. Our duty is to sustain the classification adopted by the legislature, if there are substantial differences between the occupations separately classified. Such differences need not be great. The past decisions of the court make this abundantly clear.’ ”
After quoting numerous other authorities bearing on the specific question, Justice Holt says:
“We have seen that courts are extremely reluctant to declare laws unconstitutional; that classifications are to be sustained whenever there is any fair basis for them; that equality in taxation, particularly where licenses are concerned, is a dream unrealized, and that differences in
“In these circumstances, it cannot be said that this classification is arbitrary or unsupported by reason.”
It is shown in the case at bar that there are eleven laundries located in the city of Richmond which not only pay a specific license tax of from $150.00 to $250.00 each, according to the number of persons employed, and pay to the city of Richmond a real estate tax of $2.35 on each $100 of assessed value thereof, and a personal property tax of $2.20 on each $100 of assessed value thereof, but also paid for the months of May, June, July, August, September and October, 1933, the year in which this case arose, the aggregate sum of $5,849.08 to the city of Richmond for water used in the operation of said laundries.
In the Linen Supply Company Case the ordinance imposed a tax of $300 for soliciting laundry or dry cleaning work, including towel or laundry service, or the renting or furnishing of towels for compensation in the city of Lynchburg, where the laundry or dry cleaning work thereon was done outside of that city.
In the case at bar the ordinance under attack imposes a tax of $75 upon each vehicle used in soliciting laundry business in the city of Richmond, where the work is done outside of said city. In both cases, therefore, the tax claimed to be unconstitutional is imposed upon the solicitation of laundry business, or incidental services, where the laundry work is done or to be done outside the city in which the business is solicited; the only distinction being that in the former case the company operating the laundry owned
Affirmed.