341 So. 2d 823 | Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | 1977
Plaintiff, Paul Vaughan, appeals an amended final judgment awarding defendant, Art Construction Company, $106,652.28 plus costs and attorney’s fees and foreclosing a mechanic’s lien on Vaughan’s property.
In August 1972 Paul Vaughan entered into a standard A.I.A. contract with Art Construction Company to build a single family residence in eight months for a total price of $775,500. The contract provided that no claim for extras or deletions would be honored unless evidenced by a written change order signed by the parties. The contract also provided that the architect could sign a change order pursuant to written authority from Vaughan. In September 1972 construction commenced and subsequently changes were made by the contractor at the direction and approval of Carson Bennett Wright, the supervising architect. These changes resulted in construction delays and additional costs. During the construction period, the contractor made 21 draw requests
Appellant Vaughan primarily argues that a mechanic’s lien should not have been impressed against his property because there was no proof that an affidavit had been served upon him pursuant to Section 713.-06(3)(d)(l), Florida Statutes (1975).
In addition to previously furnishing appellant with 21 progress payment affidavits pursuant to Section 713.06(3)(d)(l), Florida Statutes (1975), on August 30, 1974 appellee Art Construction executed an affidavit with a list of all debts outstanding to secure final payment from appellant. Therefore, the record is sufficient to support the conclusion that appellee complied with Section 713.06(3)(d)(l), Florida Statutes (1975). See R. F. Driggers Construction Co. v. Bagli, 313 So.2d 450 (Fla.2d DCA 1975). We also note that appellee after introduction of the August 30, 1974 affidavit at the trial, moved to amend the complaint to show that the required affidavit was furnished; however, the trial judge did not feel the amendment was necessary since appellee had proved it filed the affidavit. Thus, this point of appellant must fail.
Appellant also contests the award of the $35,000 attorney’s fee on the grounds that appellee is not entitled to such an award, and the amount of the fee is excessive. We cannot agree.
Appellee having prevailed on its action to impress a mechanic’s lien is entitled to an award of a reasonable attorney’s fee pursuant to Section 713.29, Florida Statutes
We have also considered appellant’s remaining points on appeal, and conclude that no reversible error has been made to appear.
Affirmed.
. Accompanied by progress payment affidavits.