24 Mo. 31 | Mo. | 1856
delivered the opinion of the court.
1. The case of LeBois v. Bramell, (4 How. U. S. 449,) establishes the doctrine that the approved survey of the commons of a village, confirmed by the act of June 13, 1812, is equivalent to a patent. If this is so, then the city of St. Louis had as perfect a title from the general government to her commons
We are not aware of any case in which the precise point involved in this controversy has arisen. The doctrine that the certificates and proofs taken before the recorder, under the act of 1824, were ¡¡rima facie, evidence, was not established without a struggle. Taken as it has been received, that the certificates were ¡¡rima facie evidence against the government, there is not much to be said against it. Being evidence against the government, those claiming subsequently to the act of 1812 can not occupy a more advantageous position than the government itself maintained. But we can see no reason, nor perceive any principle, on which a certificate of the recorder should have a prevailing effect, unless disproved, against one claiming under the act of 1812, or any act prior thereto. Indeed, it would be against principle, as it would be assuming that Congress may pass a title, and then, by a subsequent act, require less evidence to defeat that title than was required when it was first conveyed. The certificate would prevail against one claiming under the act of 1812 ? who had none, and who could not prove inhabitation, cultivation or possession before the 20th December, 1803 ; because, in that case, there would on one side be no evidence of any fact which was requisite to confer title by the act of 1812.
2. It is maintained by the plaintiffs that Quinette, having been a tenant in common with them, and having been in possession of the premises in controversy, the defendant Ewing, succeeding to Quinette’s possession by a deed from him, held likewise as a co-tenant, and was estopped from denying the right of his co-tenants, the plaintiffs, to the possession of the disputed lot. The facts preserved in the record do not sustain this point. It appears that Ewing sued Quinette to recover possession of the lot; that he obtained a judgment, and that a writ for the delivery of the possession was in the hands of the officer when Quinette conveyed to Ewing. This we consider
It is next insisted that tbe purchase by the defendant Ewing of Quinette’s interest in this land, and tbe recitals in the deeds under which Ewing and Quinette held possession, amounted to such a recognition of the Yasquez title as estops Ewing from denying that there was such a title to this land. Inasmuch as Ewing claims by a distinct title, wholly disconnected with that of Yasquez, we hold that the doctrine of estoppel does not apply. There is nothing in the nature of an estoppel which precludes a party from setting up a title like that interposed by Ewing against the recovery of the plaintiffs. (Landes v. Perkins, 12 Mo. 259; Blight’s Lessee v. Rochester, 7 Wheat. 635.)
3. The. plaintiffs, moreover, contend that the deed of the city to Lane enured to the joint use of himself and his co-tenants, inasmuch as he compromised the Yasquez title with the city, and by means of it obtained the commons’ title from her. Whatever equity there may be in the defendants, growing out of the compromise with the city, about which we express no opinion, it is evident that the petition filed in this cause is not so framed as to obtain any such relief. This action was .brought to try the legal title of the parties; it is in the nature of an ejectment, and the allegations in the bill are only suited to that purpose. If the defendants have any equity, it must be sought in a proceeding so ordered as to show that they are entitled. Surely,- the defendants could not expect that the court would hold that they were legally entitled to the right acquired from the city, when they had neither paid nor offered to pay any portion of the sum by means of which Lane obtained her title.
the judgment will be affirmed.